dismissed L-1A Case: Management Consulting

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
In Re: 21 564316 
Appeal of Texas Service Center Decision 
Form 1-129, Petition for L-l A Manager or Executive 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
The Petitioner, a management consulting firm, seeks to temporarily employ the Beneficiary in the 
United States as an associate (management consultant) under the L-1 A nonimmi grant classification for 
intracompany transferees. Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 101 (a)(l 5)(L), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 110 1 (a)(15XL). The L-1 A classification allows a corporation or otherlegal entity(inc ludingits affiliate
or subsidiary) to transfer a qualifying foreign employee to the United States to work temporarily in a
managerial or executive capacity.
The Director of the Texas Service Center denied the petition, concluding that the record did not 
establish, as required, that: (1) the Beneficiary has been employed abroad in a qualifying capacity, 
and (2) the Petitioner will employ the Beneficiary in the United States in a managerial or executive 
capacity. The matter is now before us on appeal. 
In these proceedings, it is the Petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the requested benefit. See
Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Upon de nova review, we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. LAW
To establish eligibility for the L-1 A nonimmi grant visa classification, a qualifying organization must 
have employed the beneficiary "in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized 
knowledge," for one continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for 
admission into the United States. Section 101 (a)( l 5)(L) of the Act. In addition, the beneficiary must 
seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same 
employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial or executive capacity. Id. The petitioner 
must also establish that the beneficiary 's prior education, training, and employment qualify him or her 
to perfonn the intended services in the United States. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3). 
II. ANALYSIS
The Director determined that the Petitioner did not establish that it seeks to employ the Beneficiary in 
the United States in a managerial or executive capacity. The Petitioner refers to the position as 
managerial, and therefore we need not address the separate requirements for an executive capacity. 
"Managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily 
manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of the organization; 
supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial employees, or 
manages an essential function within the organization, or a department or subdivision of the 
organization; has authority over personnel actions or functions at a senior level within the 
organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and exercises discretion over the 
day-to-day operations of the activity or function for which the employee has authority. Section 
10l(a)(44)(A) of the Act. 
To show that a beneficiary is eligible for L-lA nonimmigrant visa classification as a manager, a 
petitioner must show that the beneficiary will perform all four of the high-level responsibilities set 
forth in the statutory definition at section I 01 (a)( 44)(A) of the Act. If a petitioner establishes that the 
offered position meets all four elements set forth in the statutory definition, the petitioner must then 
prove that the beneficiary will be primarily engaged in managerial duties, as opposed to ordinary 
operational activities alongside the petitioner's other employees. See Family Inc. v. USCIS, 469 F.3d 
1313, 1316 (9th Cir. 2006). In determining whether the beneficiary's duties will be primarily 
managerial, we consider the description of the job duties, the company's organizational structure, the 
duties of the beneficiary's subordinate employees, the presence of other employees to relieve the 
beneficiary from performing operational duties, the nature of the business, and any other factors that 
will contribute to understanding the beneficiary's actual duties and role in the business. 
The Beneficiary entered the United States in July 2019 as a J-1 nonimmigrant exchange visitor to 
study atl !University, where he earned a master's degree in business administration in May 
2021. 1 
The Petitioner described the Beneficiary's intended position in the United States: 
[T]he beneficiary will manage workstreams for client engagements, drawing on his 
experience with [ the Petitioner's affiliate] abroad, to ensure that the team's deliverables 
align with the client's objectives. The beneficiary's responsibilities will include project 
planning, project management, and resource deployment management. In addition, he 
will have supervisory authority over a team of ... professionals supporting each study, 
including Business Analysts (Management Consultants), Research Analysts, and other 
members of the consulting team .... 
. . . [T]he beneficiary's position in the U.S. will entail the management of an essential 
function within our business operations. Specifically, the beneficiary will manage 
specialized and critical workstreams by leading and guiding various projects teams and 
supervising analysts ... [and] will manage these workstreams by leading his teams to 
validate data, create potential solutions based on that data, build portfolio models, and 
highlight subsequent implications of such models. The beneficiary will be brought in 
to lead these specific client engagements .... 
1 We note that, following the denial of the present petition, the Petitioner filed another Form I-129 petition, seeking to 
classify theBeneficiaiyas anH-lBnonimmigrantin a specialty occupation. That petition was approved in February 2022, 
granting the Beneficiary H- lB status until August 2024. 
2 
The Petitioner asserted that, in the course of carrying out the above duties, the Beneficiary will: 
(a) manage an essential function of our business- specifically, critical workstreams for 
important client engagements which help our clients transform their businesses; (b) 
function at a senior level with respect to the function managed; ( c) supervise and 
control the work of professional employees; and ( d) exercise discretion over the day­
to-day operations of [the] essential function under his purview. 
The statutory definition of "managerial capacity" allows for both "personnel managers" and "function 
managers." See sections 10l(a)(44)(A)(i) and (ii) of the Act. The Petitioner asserted that the 
Beneficiary's "job responsibilities will entail both functional managerial responsibilities ... [and] 
people management." The Petitioner, however, has not established that the Beneficiary would be 
primarily either a personnel manager or a function manager. 
Personnel managers are required to primarily supervise and control the work of other supervismy, 
professional, or managerial employees. The beneficiary must have the authority to hire and fire those 
employees, or recommend those actions, and take other personnel actions. Sections 101 ( a)( 44)(A)(ii)­
(iii) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.2(l)(l)(ii)(B)(2)-(3). 
The Petitioner asserted that the Beneficiary would "have supervisory authority over"teams comprising 
"1-2 Analytics Analysts, 1-3 Business Analysts, 1-3 Research Analysts, and Visualization 
Specialists/Experts." The Petitioner submitted an organizational chart, showing the Beneficiary alone 
on the upper level and the various analysts and experts on the lower level. The chart did not show the 
organizational structure above the Beneficiary's intended position, or otherwise place the team into 
the context of the larger organization. 
The Petitioner did not indicate that the teams are fixed structures within the organization. Rather, the 
company's "organizational structure is ... fluid by its very nature - lower-level management 
consultants can report to several managerial-level management consultants concmrently on different 
client engagements, while managerial-level management consultants can have a number of different 
management consultants reporting to them on different engagements at the same time as well." This 
informal structure suggests that a "managerial-level management consultant" has authority over 
"lower-level management consultants" only within a given project; the higher-level consultant does 
not have exclusive authority over any permanently designated subordinates. 
Under section 101 (a)(44)(A)(iii) of the Act, direct supervision of other employees must entail "the 
authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as promotion 
and leave authorization)." The Petitioner stated: "No single employee at [the petitioning company] 
has direct hiring or firing authority for management consulting roles. Instead, individuals in 
managerial positions provide strategic input on decisions that directly influence these outcomes, and 
they further contribute directly to subordinate employees' performance reviews." The Petitioner stated 
that the Petitioner would participate in these performance reviews, but did not indicate that the 
Beneficiary's authority would include recommending hiring, firing, and other personnel actions. 
Evaluations that do not involve recommendations for specific personnel actions do not satisfy the 
statutory and regulatory criteria for a managerial capacity. 
3 
The Director denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioner had not established that it would 
employ the Beneficiary as a personnel manager. On appeal, the Petitioner repeats the assertion that 
the Beneficiary would have supervisory authority over professional employees. 
The record portrays the Beneficiary's position as that of a team leader, who actively participates in the 
operational tasks of individual client engagements rather than primarily overseeing and coordinating 
operational tasks delegated to subordinates. The Petitioner has not established that the Beneficiary's 
intended position meets all the statutory and regulatory criteria of a managerial capacity. 
The term "function manager" applies generally when a beneficiary's managerial capacity derives not 
from supervising or controlling a subordinate staff, but instead from primarily managing an "essential 
function" within the organization. See section 101 (a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. If a petitioner claims that 
a beneficiary will manage an essential function, it must clearly describe the duties to be performed in 
managing the essential function. In addition, the petitioner must demonstrate that: 
(1) the function is a clearly defined activity; (2) the function is "essential," i.e., core to 
the organization; (3) the beneficiary will primarily manage, as opposed to perform, the 
function; ( 4) the beneficiary will act at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy 
or with respectto the function managed; and ( 5) the beneficiary will exercise discretion 
over the function's day-to-day operations. 
Matter ofG- Inc., Adopted Decision 2017-05 (AAO Nov. 8, 2017). In this matter, the Petitioner has 
not described or provided evidence that the Beneficiary manages an essential function. 
The job description for the Beneficiary's intended position includes these elements, among others: 
• Manage key, discrete parts of consulting projects ... ; 
• Develop and implement analytical approach and project plans for work streams; 
• Manage collection of required client and industry data and performance ofrequired 
analyses and syntheses of findings and the development of client-ready 
recommendations; [and] 
• Organize and lead client interviews on behalf of the engagement team and lead 
selected client interviews. 
The Petitioner asserts that "workstreams and client engagements are a crucial part of [its] business 
operations, and the Beneficiary's management over them therefore constitutes management of an 
essential function of [the] business." The Petitioner, however, has not shown that the Beneficiary 
would be responsible for the overall management of these workstreams throughout the company. 
Rather, the Beneficiary's stated responsibilities would involve granular details of individual projects 
by one team, rather than oversight over the process performed in parallel by many other teams 
throughout a company that claims over 9000 employees in the United States and 30,000 worldwide. 
The Petitioner has not established that each project is an essential function of the company in its own 
right, rather than one iteration of an ongoing activity that, collectively, constitutes an essential function. 
4 
Likewise, the Petitioner asserted that the Beneficiary would "function at a senior level with respect to 
the function managed," but the Petitioner did not show that the Beneficiary would have senior-level 
authority over the company structure that encompasses all its consulting projects. Rather, he "will 
serve in a senior capacity with respect to his engagement projects" ( emphasis added). 
As noted above, the organizational chart submitted with the petition illustrated the structure below the 
Beneficiary, but not above him, and therefore the Petitioner provided no broader frame of reference 
for the "senior level" claimed. After the Director requested more details about the Beneficiary's place 
in the organizational hierarchy, the Petitioner submitted charts for some specific projects. Each of 
these charts shows three levels of employees: 
• Engagement Manager 
• The Beneficiary 
• Junior Management Consultants and various experts and analysts 
The Petitioner did not provide more information about the "Engagement Manager" to whom the 
Beneficiary would report. The scope of an engagement manager's responsibility is directly relevant 
and material to the issue at hand. If an engagement manager's primary responsibility is overseeing a 
number of management consultants, then we cannot conclude that the Beneficiary would function at 
a senior level with respect to the overall function of client engagements. 
The Director denied the petition, stating that the Petitioner had not shown that the intended position in 
the United States qualifies as a managerial capacity. The Director observed that the submitted 
organizational charts did not show the Beneficiary's place in the company's hierarchy, and that the 
Petitioner had not corroborated the assertion that the Beneficiary will exercise discretion over the day­
to-day operations of an essential function of the company. 
On appeal, the Petitioner asserts: "In any given engagement, [the Beneficiary] will be a senior team 
leader. . . . The organizational charts that were provided illustrate his senior, hierarchical role." The 
Petitioner does not address the Director's remarks concerning those organizational charts, and the 
Petitioner does not establish that "any given engagement" is an essential function of the organization 
rather than a single manifestation of the overall function of undertaking such engagements. 
The Petitioner also states: "leading and developing the strategies for major clients ... is one of the 
most important functions" within the company. But, as explained above, the Petitioner does not show 
that the Beneficiary would have senior authority over this function. Rather, he would lead teams on 
individual projects within that function. 
The information provided by the Petitioner indicates that the Beneficiary would have some authority 
over small teams working on individual projects, but does not demonstrate that he would function at 
a senior level with respect to an essential function of the organization. 
For the above reasons, the Petitioner has not met its burden to establish that it will employ the 
Beneficiary in a managerial capacity in the United States. 
5 
Because the above discussion is sufficientto determine the outcome of the appeal, we need not discuss 
the issue of the Beneficiary's previous employment abroad, and we therefore reserve that issue.2 
While we have not undertaken an in-depth analysis of the Beneficiary's prior position abroad as a 
management consultant, we note that the Petitioner's description of that position is essentially identical 
to the description provided for his intended position in the United States, which, as discussed above, 
has not been shown to be a qualifying managerial capacity, either as a function manager or a personnel 
manager. We further note a potentially significant discrepancy. The Petitioner asserts that the 
Beneficiary worked in Pakistan "as a Fellow (Management Consultant)" from April 2015 to October 
2016, and as a "Management Consultant from October 2016 to July 2019." But an August 2019 letter 
from a company official in Pakistan indicates that the Beneficiary's title was "Business Analyst." 
According to job descriptions provided by the Petitioner, business analysts have different 
responsibilities than management consultants, and are subordinate to them. The Petitioner neither 
acknowledged nor explained this discrepancy, which has clear implications for the actual nature of the 
Beneficiary's duties and responsibilities abroad. 
The appeal will be dismissed for the above stated reasons. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
2 See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25-26 (1976) (stating that, like courts, federal agencies are not generally required 
to make findings and decisions unnecessary to the results they reach); see also MatterofL-A-C-, 26 I&NDec. 516,526 
n.7(BIA2015) (declining to reach alternative issues on appeal where anapplicantis otherwise ineligible). 
6