dismissed L-1A Case: Maritime Services

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. A3042 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
File: SRC-04-035-5 1762 Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: 
Petition: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101 (a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITJONEK: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
'2* Robert P. Wiemann, Director 
Administrative Appeals Office 
19 
SRC-04-035-5 1762 
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DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimrnigrant visa. The matter 
is now before the Administrative Appeals Ofice (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to extend the employment of its Chairman-Managing 
Director as an L-1A nonimrnigrant intracompany transferee pursuant to section 101(a)(lS)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 8 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is a corporation 
organized in the State of Florida that provides investigation, surveying, and consulting services for the 
maritime industry. The petitioner claims that it is the affiliate of 
located in Kingston, Jamaica. The beneficiary was initially granted a one-year period of stay to open 
a new office in the United States and the petitioner now seeks to extend the beneficiary's stay. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish that the beneficiary will be 
employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the evidence of 
record shows that the beneficiary will be employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity, and that 
the director abused her discretion in denying the petition. In support of these assertions, counsel submits a 
brief, additional evidence, and previously submitted documentation. 
To establish eligibility for the L-l nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section lOl(a)(lS)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his 
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (I)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
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education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(14)(ii) also provides that a visa petition, which involved the opening of a 
new office, may be extended by filing a new Form 1-129, accompanied by the following: 
(A) Evidence that the United States and foreign entities are stiH qualifying organizations 
as defined in paragraph (I)(l)(ii)(G) of this section; 
(B) Evidence that the United States entity has been doing business as defined in 
paragraph (1)(1 )(ii)(H) of this section for the previous year; 
(C) A statement of the duties performed by the beneficiary for the previous year and the 
duties the beneficiary will perform under the extended petition; 
(D) A statement describing the staffing of the new operation, including the number of 
employees and types of positions held accompanied by evidence of wages paid to 
employees when the beneticiary will be employed in a management or executive 
capacity; and 
(E) Evidence of the financial status of the United States operation. 
The issue in the present matter is whether the beneficiary will be employed by the United States entity in a 
primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 3 1101(a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
the organization; 
(ii) supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department 
or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to 
hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as 
promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised, 
functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the 
function managed; and 
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(iv) exercises discretion over the day to day operations of the activity or function for 
which the employee has authority. A first line supervisor is not considered to be 
acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory 
duties unless the employees supervised are professional. 
Section 10 1 (a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1 101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision making; and 
(iv) receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board 
of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
In a letter submitted with the initial petition on November 18, 2003, the petitioner described the beneficiary's 
job duties as follows: 
[The beneficiary] is currently working for [the petitioner] and he will continue to serve in his 
managerial capacity as Chairman-Managing director in charge of planning. developing and 
establishing the policies and objectives of the company. 
The primary duty of this position involves complete executive decision making authority for 
the development of the business in the United States. His duties include establishing poIicies 
and procedures for financial management, market definition, pricing structure and outside 
professional relationships, setting sales and revenues targets, and directing the management 
of daily operations. 
[The beneficiary] has autonomous control over, and exercises discretionary decision-making 
in, establishing the most advantageous course of action for the successful management and 
direction of development activities. 
On November 28, 2003, the director requested additional evidence. In part, the director requested: (1) a 
description of the duties of the petitioner's employees, if applicable; (2) an explanation of how the beneficiary 
will not engage in the day-to-day operations of the business, and how he will be primarily engaged in 
managerial or executive duties; (3) copies of the petitioner's Employer's State Quarterly Tax Returns with all 
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attachments for the previous two quarters; (4) a copy of the petitioner's IRS Form 940EZ, Employer's Annual 
Federal Unemployment Tax Return; and (5) a copy of the petitioner's 2002 IRS Form 1120, U.S. Corporation 
Income Tax Return. 
In a response filed on December 2, 2003, in part the petitioner submitted a letter from counsel, and copies of 
its state and federal quarterly tax returns for the second and third quarters of 2003. In counsel's letter, he 
stated the following: 
There is one direct employee of the petitioner, who reports to . . . the beneficiary. The 
employee . . . runs the daily office matters of the company . . . . In addition to clerical and 
accounting duties, [the beneficiary's subordinate] acts as liaison between [the beneficiary] and 
the 15 marine surveyors/investigators who are retained as required when a ship is damaged or 
cargo damaged throughout the Caribbean, South America, the Gulf of Mexico and the Florida 
coast. 
[The beneficiary's subordinate] has a Bachelors degree in Spanish, and is currently working 
on a Masters degree. Her ability to communicate in both English and Spanish is essential, as 
many of the ports and countries where the company operates are Spanish speaking. 
The beneficiary . . . is not engaged in the day to day operations of the office, and is primarily 
engaged in an executive role. His work is mainly in overseeing the network of personnel 
developed in the geographic areas served by the company, communicating with the ship 
owners, charterers, shippers and overseas insurers who retain [the petitioner] when a ship 
runs aground, damages property, or cargo being shipped is damaged. 
[Tlhe petitioner company has individuals throughout the region served hy the company that 
have been trained in handling marine accidents and investigations in a manner required by the 
petitioner, the companies it serves, and the overseas insurers. The company has 
surveyor/investigators in Florida also for local incidents. 
Counsel noted that, as the petitioner did not commence operations until 2003, the petitioner did not file a 2002 
IRS Form 1 120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return. 
On December 11, 2003, the director denied the petition. The director determined that the petitioner did not 
establish that the beneficiary will be employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive 
capacity. Specifically, the director stated that the petitioner did not show that the beneficiary will be 
managing other professionals or managers, and it appears that the beneficiary will have to engage in the day- 
to-day business activities of the company. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the evidence of record shows that the beneficiary will be 
employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. Counsel alleges that the director's denial 
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erroneously contradicts Citizenship and Immigration Services' (CIS) prior decision to accord the beneficiary 
L-IA status "on the basis of the same set of fact [sic] and circumstances." Counsel cites Kaliski v. District 
Director of Immigration and Naturalization Service, 620 F.2d 2 14 (9Ih Cir. 1 980), and Mars Jewelers, Inc. v. 
INS, 702 F.Supp. 1570, 1573 (N.D. Ga. 1988), to stand for the proposition that the director abused her 
discretion by failing to provide "clear and convincing evidence to support [her] denial of [the] previously 
granted visa." Counsel further asserts that the director limited her analysis of the beneficiary's duties to the 
requirements of managerial capacity, and failed to consider whether the beneficiary satisfies the requirements 
for executive capacity. Counsel states that the director's decision was "based on an improper understanding of 
law," and it was "arbitrary and capricious." Counsel discusses the beneficiary's duties as follows: 
[The beneficiary] is clearly canying out duties of an executive nature . . . . [The beneficiary] 
who is the Chairman and the Managing director of both the parent and the subsidiary 
organization in the US clearly does not take any direction from anyone in the US or within 
the parent organization but only general control exercise [sic] by the shareholder of the 
organization. Thus, the beneficiary fulfills an important aspect of the Regulation concerning 
discretionary powers. 
There can be no argument to the proposition that as the Chairman and managing director of 
the organization the beneficiary does indeed direct the management of the subsidiary 
company. This fulfills a second criterion set-forth in the Regulations. 
In his capacity as the Chairman and the Managing Director the beneficiary also establishes 
the goals and policies of the organization. This fulfills the third criterion mentioned in the 
Regulations. 
Finally the Chairman Managing Director of any organization would have wide latitude in 
discretionary decision-making. The beneficiary in this case has also wide latitude in 
discretionary decision-making. 
Establishing strategic relationships is a key job duty of the managing director. Since the 
world P&I clubs is a limited and closed universe it is important for a new entrant in a market 
(such as [the petitioner]) to establish strategic relationships with other players in this realm. 
[The beneficiary] provides the leadership and guidance for this task, which is entirely 
executive in nature. 
Providing a strategic vision for the growth of the company is yet another task, purely of an 
executive and managerial nature expected of [the beneficiary]. 
Counsel references recent negotiations carried out by the beneficiary for services to be provided by the 
petitioner. Counsel states: 
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[I]n order to negotiate major contracts . . . [the] beneficiary had to carry out extensive 
background work, negotiations and deciding critical elements of the proposed business 
partnership. [The] [bleneficiary had to determine the nature and extent of the proposed 
partnership, manage various aspects and issues that arise during negotiations, determine 
appropriate level of support for each other, defining the roles of the two companies, defining 
areas of cooperation, discussing any limitations such as geographical limitations, discussing 
financial issues, discussing liability issues and discussing nature of support personnel to be 
hired to cany out the functions of proposed joint venture and many other complex issues. 
These jobs are most certainly within the purview of Executive and Managerial nature. 
Counsel cites a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) Interim Decision, Matter of Continental Grain 
Company, 14 I&N Dec. 140, Interim Decision (BIA 1972), in which the BIA found that the beneficiary was 
employed in a primarily executive capacity, and asserts that the facts of the present matter are suff~ciently 
similar to warrant the same finding. Counsel cites numerous matters and decisions to stand for the 
proposition that a court may overturn a CIS decision where there has been an abuse of discretion, and that CIS 
must adhere to Congress's intent in adjudicating a visa petition. 
Upon review, counsel's assertions are not persuasive. As a preliminary matter, the AAO will address 
counsel's assertion that the director erred in denying the petitioner's petition for an extension of the 
beneficiary's status when CIS previously approved a petition based on similar facts. Established precedent 
reflects that prior approvals do not preclude CIS from denying an extension of the original visa based on 
reassessment of the petitioner's qualifications, Texas A&hf Univ. v. Upchurch, 99 Fed. Appx. 556,2004 WL 
1240482 (5th Cir. 2004). Further, the petitioner's prior petition to which counsel refers was a petition to al!ow 
the beneficiary to enter the United States to open a new office. Thus, that petition was governed by the 
regulations pertaining to new offices. See 8 C.F.R. fj 214.2(1)(3)(v). The present petition is a request for an 
extension of the beneficiary's status after completing a one-year period to open a new office. Thus, the 
present petition is governed by a different set of regulations pertaining specifically to new office extensions. 
See 8 C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(14)(ii). As different law and evidentiary requirements apply to the present petition, 
the director has a duty to carefully review the petitioner's representations and documentation to determine if 
eligibility has been established. Contrary to counsel's suggestion, the fact that a prior petition was approved 
on behalf of the beneficiary does not serve as prima facie evidence that eligibility has been established in the 
present proceedings. 
Further, counsel asserts that the director must support her negative findings by clear and convincing evidence. 
The AAO notes that in visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought 
remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The director does not have an 
affirmative burden to present evidence to bolster negative findings. In support of counsel's contention, he 
cites Kaliski v. District Director of Immigration and Naturalization Service, 620 F.2d 2 14 (gth Cir. 1980), and 
Mars Jewelers, Inc. V. INS, 702 F.Supp. 1570, !573 (N.D. Ga. 1988). It is noted that both of these cases 
relate to immigrant visa petitions, and not the extension of a "new office" nonimmigrant visa. As the new 
office extension regulations call for a review of the petitioner's business activities and staffing afier one year, 
the cases cited by counsel are distinguishable based on the applicable regulations. See 8 C.F.R. 
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4 214.2(1)(14)(ii). As counsel has not discussed the facts of the cited matters, they will not be considered 
further in this proceeding. 
Additionally, regarding Mars Jewelers, Inc. v. INS, in contrast to the broad precedential authority of the case 
law of a United States circuit court, the AAO is not bound to follow the published decision of a United States 
district court in matters arising within the same district. See Matter of K-S-, 20 I&N Dec. 715 (BIA 1993). 
Although the reasoning underlying a district judge's decision will be given due consideration when it is 
properly before the AAO, the analysis does not have to be followed as a matter of law. Id. at 719. 
As noted above, counsel asserts that the director limited her analysis of the beneficiary's duties to the 
requirements for managerial capacity, and failed to consider whether the beneficiary satisfies the requirements 
for executive capacity. Counsel states that the director's decision was "based on an improper understanding of 
law," and it was "arbitrary and capricious." When denying a petition, a director has an affirmative duty to 
explain the specific reasons for the denial; this duty includes informing a petitioner why the evidence failed to 
satisfy its burden of proof pursuant to section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 1361. See 8 C.F.R. 6 103.3(aXI)(i). 
Upon review of the director's decision, the AAO agrees that the reasons given for the denial are conclusory 
with few specific references to the evidence entered into the record. As the AAO's review is conducted on a 
de novo basis, the AAO will herein address the petitioner's evidence and eligibility. See Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 
997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a de novo basis). 
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. fj 2 14.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner's description of the job 
duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are 
either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. The petitioner must specifically state whether the 
beneficiary is primarily employed in a managerial or executive capacity. In the instant matter, the petitioner 
and counsel have represented that the beneficiary is employed in both a managerial and an executive capacity. 
For example, in the initial petition the petitioner stated that the beneficiary "will continue to serve in his 
managerial capacity." Yet, on appeal counsel repeatedly asserts that the beneficiary's duties are "executive in 
nature:" and refers to the "managerial nature" of some of the beneficiary's tasks. If the petitioner intends for 
the beneficiary to be employed in both a primarily managerial and executive capacity, the petitioner must 
establish that the beneficiary meets each of the four criteria set forth in the statutory definition for executive 
duties under section I0 l(a)(44)(B) of the Act, and the statutory definition for managerial duties under section 
1 0 1 (a)(44)(A) of the Act. 
The initial job description submitted by the petitioner was brief and vague, providing little insight into the true 
nature of the tasks the beneficiary will perform in the United States. For example, the broad statement that 
the beneficiary is "in charge of planning, developing and establishing the policies and objectives of the 
company" does not indicate what tasks the beneficiary will perform on a daily basis. The statement that "(the 
beneficiary] has autonomous control over, and exercises discretionary decision-making in, establishing the 
most advantageous course of action for the successful management and direction of development activities" 
does not explain the beneficiary's actual daily duties. On appeal. counsel discusses the beneficiary's duties 
primarily by making conclusory statements regarding the tasks customarily associated with his managerial 
title, and by paraphrasing the statutory definition for executive capacity. Specifics are clearly an important 
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indication of whether a beneficiary's duties are primarily executive or managerial in nature, otherwise meeting 
the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations, Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. 
Supp. 1 103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), afS'd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). The actual duties themselves reveal the true 
nature of the employment. Id, The provided job descriptions do not allow the AAO to determine the actual 
tasks that the beneficiary will primarily perform, such that they can be classified as managerial or executive in 
nature. 
Counsel indicates that the beneficiary's "work is mainly in overseeing the network of personnel developed in 
the geographic areas served by the company, communicating with the ship owners, charterers, shippers and 
overseas insurers who retain [the petitioner] when a ship runs aground, damages property, or cargo being 
shipped is damaged." Counsel states that there are "1 5 marine surveyors/investigators" who the petitioner 
hires on a contract basis, and suggests that their work is coordinated by the beneficiary. However, the 
petitioner has not provided evidence of hiring these workers, such as documentation of payments made to 
them, or contracts for their services. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not 
sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of 
California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972). 
Counsel references the beneficiary's efforts in participating in contract negotiations that are important to the 
petitioner's operations. While contract negotiations could be considered an executive task, the petitioner has 
not shown that such negotiations constitute the majority of the beneficiary's time. See 8 C.F.R. 
$ 2 14.2(1)(3)(ii). 
Counsel claims that the beneficiary supervises one subordinate employee, who "runs the daily office matters 
of the company," performs "clerical and accounting duties," and "acts as liaison between [the beneficiary] 
at~d the 15 marine surveyors/investigators." Although the beneficiary is not required to supervise personnel, 
if it is claimed that his duties involve supervising employees, the petitioner must establish that the subordinate 
employees are supervisory, professional, or managerial. See 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. 
In evaluating whether the beneficiary manages professional employees, the AAO must evaluate whether the 
subordinate positions require a baccalaureate degree as a minimum for entry into the field of endeavor. 
Section lOl(aX32) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(32), states that "[tlhe term profession shall include but not 
be limited to architects, engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and teachers in elementary or secondary 
schools, colleges, academies, or seminaries." The term "profession" contemplates knowledge or learning, not 
merely skill, of an advanced type in a given field gained by a prolonged course of specialized instruction and 
study of at least baccalaureate level, which is a realistic prerequisite to entry into the particular field of 
endeavor. Matter of Sea, 19 I&N Dec. 817 (Comm. 1988); Matter of Ling, 13 I&N Dec. 35 (R.C. 1968); 
Matter of Shin, 1 1 I&N Dec. 686 (D.D. 1966). 
Therefore, the AAO must focus on the level of education required by the position, rather than the degree held 
by a subordinate employee. The possession of a bachelor's degree by a subordinate employee does not 
automatically lead to the conclusion that an employee is employed in a professional capacity as that term is 
defined above. In the instant case, counsel indicates that the beneficiary's subordinate completed a bachelor's 
degree in Spanish. However, the petitioner has not established that a bachelor's degree is actually necessary 
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to perform the clerical work of the beneficiary's subordinate. Nor has the petitioner shown that the 
beneficiary's subordinate supervises other staff members or manages a clearly defined department or function 
of the petitioner, such that she could be classified as a manager or supervisor. Thus, the petitioner has not 
shown that the beneficiary's subordinate employee is supervisory, professional, or managerial, as required by 
section 101 (aX44)(A)(ii) of the Act. 
The AAO fbrther notes that the petitioner's IRS Forms 941, Employer's Quarterly Tax Return, and Florida 
State Employer's QuarterIy Reports for the second and third quarters of 2003 state that the petitioner had one 
employee during those periods, namely the beneficiary. Therefore, the petitioner has failed to submit 
documentation that the beneficiary's claimed direct subordinate is in fact employed by the petitioner. Again, 
going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the 
burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 
1972). 
Counsel cites BIA Interim Decision, Matter of Continental Grain Company, 14 I&N Dec. 140, Interim 
Decision (BIA 1972), in which the BIA found that the beneficiary was employed in a primarily executive 
capacity, and asserts that the facts of the present matter are sufficiently similar to warrant the same finding. 
Counsel has hrnished no evidence to establish that the facts of the instant petition are analogous to those in 
the cited matter. Once again, going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for 
purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. See Matter of Treasure Crafr of California, 14 
I&N Dec. at 190. Counsel's analysis is limited to conclusory assertions and paraphrased language of the 
statutory definition of executive capacity. 
The record is not persuasive in demonstrating that the beneficiary has been or will be employed in a primarily 
managerial or executive capacity. 'The petitioner indicates that it plans to hire additional employees in the 
future. However, the petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing the nonimmigrant visa petition. 
A visa petition may not be approved at a future date after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under 
a new set of facts. Matter of Michelin Tire Corp., 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. Comm. 1978): Furthermore, 
8 C.F.R. !j 214.2(l)(3)(v)(C) allows the intended United States operation one year within the date of approval 
of the petition to support an executive or managerial position. There is no provision in CIS regulations that 
allows for an extension of this one-year period. If the business is not sufficiently operational after one year, 
the petitioner is ineligible by regulation for an extension. In the instant matter, the petitioner has not 
established that it has reached the point that it can employ the beneficiary in a predominantly managerial or 
executive position. 
Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will be employed in a primarily managerial 
or executive capacity, as required by 8 C.F.R. $214.2(1)(3). 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has not established that it has a qualifyit~g corporate 
relationship with the beneficiary's foreign employer as required by 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(I)(ii)(G). The 
regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(14)(ii)(A) requires the petitioner to submit "[elvidence that the United States 
and foreign entities are still qualifying organizations." On the initial petition, the petitioner indicated that it is 
the affiliate of the beneficiary's foreign employer. Yet, the petitioner has failed to submit documentation to 
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show the ownership of the foreign entity or the petitioner. Again, going on record without supporting 
documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. 
Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 i&N Dec. at 190. For this additional reason, the appeal will be 
dismissed. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afd. 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989Xnoting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
In visa proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
director's decision will be affirmed and the petition will be denied. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.