dismissed L-1A Case: Metal Export And Transport

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. A3000
Washington, DC 20529
PUBLICCOpy
identifyingdatadeletedto
preventclearlyunvv'arr~nted .
invasionofpersonalprivacy
U.S.Citizenship
and Immigration
Services
File: EAC 04 139 52066 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER Date: NOV 0 12007
IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:
Petition: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(l5)(L) of the Immigration
. I
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(L)
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER:
INSTRUCTIONS:
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.
~
Administrative Appeals Office
www.uscis.gov
EAC 0413952066
Page 2
DISCUSSION: The Director , Vermont Service Center , denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The
matter is now before the Admin istrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal.
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant visa petition seeking to employ the benefi ciary as its manager /CEO as
an L-IA nonimmigrant intracompany transferee pursuant to section 101(a)(l5)(L) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (the Act) , 8 V.S.c. § 110l(a)(l5)(L) . The petitioner is a corporation organized under the laws
of the State of New York and is allegedly engaged in the purchase and export of non-ferrous metal and scrap
and in transport and .travel activities.
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish (I) that the beneficiary will be
employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity; or (2) that the beneficiary was
employed abroad in a primarily managerial or executive capacity.
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined .to treat the appeal as a motion and
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel to the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary
. will be employed in the United States in an executi ve capacity and was employed abroad in a managerial and
executive capacity. In support, counsel submits a br ief.
To establish elig ibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria
outlined in section 101 (a)(l5)(L) of the Act. Specifically , a qualifying organization must have employed the
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity , or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary 's application for admission into the United
States. In addition , the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial , executive, or
specialized knowledge capacity.
The regulation at 8 C.F .R. § 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be
accompanied by:
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (1)(l)(i i)(G) of this section.
,
(ii) E vidence that the alien will be emplo yed in an executive , managerial, or specialized
knowledge capacity, including a detailed de scription of the services to be performed.
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of
the petition.
(iv) Evidence that the alien 's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was
managerial , executive or invol ved specialized knowledge and th at the alien 's prior
education, training, and employment qualifies him/her to perform the intended
services in the United States; however , the work in the United States need not be the
same work which the alien performed abroad.
EAC 04 139 52066
Page 3
The first issue in the present matter is whether the beneficiary will be employed by the United States entity in
a primarily managerial or executive capacity.
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U .S.c. § I 10 I (a)(44)(A) , defines the term "managerial capacity" as an
assignment within an organization . in which the employee primarily:
(i) manages the organization , or a department , subdivision, function , or component of
the organization;
(ii) supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial
employees, or manages an essential .function within the organization, or a department
or subdivision of the organization;
(iii) . if another employee or other employees are directly supervised , has the authority to
hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as
promot ion and leave authorization) , or if no other employee is directly supervised ,
functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the
function managed; and
(iv) exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function for
which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be
acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory
duties unless the employees superv ised are professional.
Sect ion 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" as an
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily:
(i)
(ii)
(Iii)
(iv)
directs the
management of the organization or a major component or function of the
organization;
establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component , or function;
exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making ; and
receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives , the board
of directors , or stockholders of the' organization. -
The petitioner does not. clarify in the initial petition whether the beneficiary will be performing primarily
.managerial duties under section IOI(a)(44)(A) of the Act or primarily executive duties under section
101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, although counsel on appeal appears to limit the beneficiary to an executi ve
classification . Given the lack of clarity, the AAO will assume that the petit ioner is asserting that the
beneficiary will be employed in either a managerial or an executive capacity and will consider both
classifications.
EAC 04 13952066
Page 4
In support of its petition, the petitioner submitted an organizational chart for the United States operation. This
chart shows the beneficiary reporting to the president and directly supervising five workers - a marketing
analyst, a human resources employee , a secretary , a sales and marketing manager, and a purchase manager.
The marketing manager , the secretary, and the sales and marketing manager are each, in turn, shown to
supervise one subordinate employee. The beneficiary would be the petitioner's ninth employee.
On May 5, 2004 , the director requested additional evidence . The director requested, inter alia, evidence that
the beneficiary will he employed in an executive or managerial capacity in the United States and complete
position descriptions for the other workers employed by the petitioner.
In response, the petitioner submitted a letter dated July 29, 2004 which describes the beneficiary's proposed
job duties as follows:
[The beneficiary] will be directing the enterprise , establishing goals and policies,
implementing marketing strategies, supervising the work of the other employees , reviewing
performance data to maintain standards and achieve objectives. He will have the authority to
hire and fire and will exercise discretion over day[-[to]-]day operations .
The petitioner also submitted job descriptions for the beneficiary's subordinate employees. The petitioner
described the three employees , who appear in the organizational chart to each have supervisory authority over
one subordinate employee , as follows:
Marketing Analyst[:] Research market conditions , collect and analyze data on customers
[sic] needs, preferences and buying habits to identify potential markets , gather information on
competitors, prices , sales, marketing methods and distribution[.]
Sales and Marketing Manager[:] Compile lists describing product offerings and
specifications, develop pricing strategies , formulate marketing activities and develop
marketing strategy[.]
* * *
Secretary[:] Answer telephones and give information to callers , take messages , arrange
meetings "for office personnel, type correspondence , greet visitors and callers, maintain
scheduling[. ]
On October 14 , 2004, .the director denied the petition . The director concluded that the petitioner did not
establish that the beneficiary will be employed in the United States in a primaril y managerial or executive
capacity. .
On appeal, the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary's duties are primarily those of an executive.
Upon review, the petitioner's assertions are not persuasive .
. EAC 0413952066
Page 5
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the
petitioner's description of the job duties:, See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(ii); The petitioner's description of the job
duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are
either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. A petitioner cannot claim that some of the duties of the
position entail executive responsibilities, while other duties are managerial. A beneficiary may not claim to
be employed as a hybrid "executive /manager" and rely on partial sections of the two statutory definitions.
The petitioner 's description of the beneficiary'sjob duties has failed to establish that the beneficiary will act
in a "managerial" capacity. In support of its petition, the petitioner has provided a vague and nonspecific
description of the beneficiary's duties that fails to demonstrate what the beneficiary will do on a day-to-day
basis. For example , the petitioner states that the beneficiary will direct the enterprise , establish goals and
policies, implement marketing strategies, supervise the work of the other employees, and review performance
data to maintain standards and achieve objectives . However, the petitioner fails to define the goals, policies ,
standards, or 'marketing strategies will be established and implemented or to explain what, exactly , the
beneficiary will do in directing the enterprise. The .fact that the petitioner has given the beneficiary a
managerial title and has prepared a vague job description which includes inflated duties does not establish that
the beneficiary will actually perform managerial duties. Specifics are clearly an .important indication of
whether a beneficiary's duties are primarily executive or managerial in nature; otherwise meeting the
definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F.
Supp. 1103 (E .D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905 F .2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). Going on record without supporting
documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings .
. Matter of Treasure Craft ofCalifornia, 14 I&N Dec . 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972).
The petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary will supervise and control the work of other
supervisory, managerial , or professional employees, or will manage an essential function of the organization.
As explained in the organizational chart, wage reports, and job descriptions for the subordinate staff members,
it appears that the beneficiary will directly supervise five employees and, indirectly, three subordinate
employees. However, the petitioner has not established that the three employees who each appear in the
organizational chart to have supervisory authority over one subordinate employee are truly engaged in
performing supervisory duties . An employee will not be considered to be a supervisor simply because of a
job title or because he or she supervises daily work activities and assignments. Rather, the employee must be
shown to possess some significant degree of control or authority over the employment of subordinates. See
generally Browne v. Signal Mountain Nursery, L.P., 286 F.Supp.2d 904, 907 (E.D. Tenn. 2003) (cited in
Hayes v. Laroy Thomas, Inc., 2007 WL 128287 at *16 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 11 ,2007)) . To the contrary, it appears
from the job descriptions in this matter that the three claimed first-line supervisors are actually primarily
performing the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide a service, e.g., market research, sales,
marketing, and clerical tasks. Artificial tiers of subordinate employees and inflated job titles are not probative
and will not establish that an organization is sufficiently complex to support an executive or managerial
position. The petitioner has not established that the reasonable needs of the United States operation compel
the employment of a managerial or executive employee to oversee one or more subordinate supervisors . To .
the contrary, it is more likely than not that both the beneficiary and his staff are primarily performing non­
qualifying tasks . See generally Family, Inc. v . u.s. Citizenship and Immigration Services , 469 F.3d 1313 (9th
Cir.2006) .
EAC 04 139 52066
Page {>
In view of the above, the beneficiary would appear to be primarily a first-line supervisor of non-professional
employees, the provider of actual services, or a combination of both. An employee who "primarily" performs
the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily" employed
in a managerial or executive capacity . .See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one
"primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties) ; see also Matter of Church Scientology .
International, 19 I&N Dec. 593 , 604 (Comm. 1988). A managerial employee must have authority over day­
to-day operations beyond the level normally vested in a first-line supervisor , unless the supervised employees
are professionals. 101(a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act ; see also Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N
Dec. at 604. Moreover, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will manage professional"
employees. 1 Therefore, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in a
managerial capacity.'
lIn evaluating whether the beneficiary manages professional employees, the AAO must evaluate whether the
subordinate positions require a baccalaureate degree as a minimum for entry into the field of endeavor.
Section 101(a)(32) of the Act, 8 U .S.c. § 1101(a)(32), states that "[t]he term profession shall include but not
be limited to architects, engineers , lawyers, physicians , surgeons, and teachers in elementary or secondary
schools, colleges , academies, or seminaries." The term "profession" contemplates knowledge or learning, not
merely skill, of ~n advanced type in a given field gained by a prolonged course of specialized instruction and
study of at least baccalaureate level, which is a realistic prerequisite to entry into the particular field of
endeavor. Matter of Sea, 19 I&N Dec. 817 (Comm. 1988); Matter of Ling, 13 I&N Dec. 35 (R.c. 1968);
Matt er of Shill, 11 I&NDec . 686 (D.O. 1966) . Therefore , the AAO must focus on the level of education
required by the position, rather than the degree held by the subordinate employee. The possession of a
bachelor's degree by a subordinate employee does not automatically lead to the conclusion that an employee
is employed in a professional capacity as that term is defined above. In this matter , the' petitioner has not
established that a bachelor's degree is necessary to perform the duties of any of the positions subordinate to
the beneficiary.
It is further noted that counsel on appeal claims that several of the beneficiary's subordinates possess
university degrees. However, counsel did not submit any evidence to support these claims. The unsupported
statements of counsel on appeal or in a motion are not evidence and thus are not entitled to any evidentiary
weight. See INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183 , 188-89 n.6 (1984) ; Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17" I&N Dec .
503 (BIA 1980).
2While the petitioner has not argued that the beneficiary will manage an essential function of the organization, .
the record nevertheless would not support this position even if taken. The term "function manager" applies
generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a subordinate staff but instead is
primarily responsible for managing an "essential function" within the organization. See section
101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. The term "essential function" is not defined by statute or regulation . If a
petitioner claims that the beneficiary is managing an essential function , the petitioner must furnish a written
job offer that clearly describes the duties to be performed in managing the essential function, i.e ., identify the
function with specificity, articulate the essential nature of the function , and establish the proportion of the
beneficiary's daily duties attributed to managing the essential function. See 8 C.F .R. § 214.2(l)(3)(ii). In
addition, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's daily duties must demonstrate that the beneficiary
manages the function 'rather than performs the duties related to the function. In this matter, the petitioner has
EAC 04 139 52066
Page 7
Similarly, the petitioner has failed to establi sh that the beneficiary wil1 act in an "executive" capacity. The
statutory definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated position within a complex
organizational hierarchy , including major components or functions of the organization , and that person 's
authority to direct the organization . Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act. Under the statute , a beneficiary must
have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish the goals and policies" of that organization.
Inherent to the definition , the organization must have a subordinate level of employees for the beneficiary to
direct, and the benefic iary must primarily focus on the broad goals and policies of the organization rather than
the day-to-day operations of the enterprise. An individual wilI not be deemed an executive under the statute
simply because they have an executive title or because they "direct" the enterprise as the owner or sole
managerial employee. The beneficiary must also exercise "wide latitude in discretionary decision making"
and receive only "general supervision or direction from higher level executives , the board of directors, or
stockholders of the organization." Id. For the same reasons indicated above, the petitioner has failed to
establish that the beneficiary will act primarily in an executive capacity. The job description provided for the
beneficiary is so vague that the AAO cannot deduce what the beneficiary will do on a day-to-day basis .
Moreover, as explained above , it appears that the beneficiary will be primarily employed as a first-line
supervisor and will perform tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide a service. Therefore , the
petitioner has not established that 'the beneficiary wilI be employed primarily in an executive capacity.
Accordingly, in this matter , the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will be primarily
performing managerial or executive duties , and the petition may not be approved for that reason.
The second is sue in the present matter is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary was
employed abroad in a primarily managerial or execut ive capacity.
The foreign entity described the beneficiary's job duties abroad in an undated letter submitted in response to
the director's Request for Evidence as folIows :
[The beneficiary] made marketing plans on [a] quarterly and yearly basis and monitored their
execution as welI as looking for new markets, trends and opportunities to capitalize on
company resources to obtain the maximum market share. ,He oversees merchandising and
quality related matters and issues for existing buyers and meets with them to get feedback ,
problems and compla ints to improve systems to deliver services to customer satisfaction.
[The beneficiary] was put in charge of all personal [sic] decisions wh ich included hiring,
not provided evidence that the beneficiary will manage an essential function. The petitioner 's vague job
description fails to document what proportion of the beneficiary's duties 'will be managerial , if any, and what
proportion will be non-managerial. Also , as explained above , the record establishes that the beneficiary will
primarily be a first-line supervisor of non-professional employees and/orwill be engaged in performing non­
qualifying operational or admini strative tasks. Absent a clear and credible breakdown of the time spent by the
beneficiary performing his duties, the AAO cannot determine what proportion of her duties will be
managerial! nor can it deduce whether the beneficiary will be primarily perform ing the duties ofa function
manager. See IKEA US , Inc. v. u.s. Dept. ofJustice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22, 24 (D.D.C. 1999).
EAC 04 13952066
Page 8
firing and job assignments and introduced methods of specific accountability, receiving
monthly reports from middle managers to monitor productivity and performance. He also
assembled specific sales teams with the goal of improving customer relations. His were final
recommendations concerning increments, promotions and other benefits for the employees
setting company policy in this regard , taking any action on disciplinary issues.
The petitioner also submitted an organizational chart for the foreign entity. The chart shows the beneficiary
reporting to the chairman but not having any supervisory authority over subordinate employees . .
On October 14, 2004, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that the petitioner did not
establish that the beneficiary was employed abroad in a primarily maY,lagerialor executive capacity.
On appeal , counsel asserts that the director erred and that the beneficiary was employed abroad In an
executive and managerial capacity.
Upon review, the petitioner's assertions are not persuasive.
Once again, when examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first
to the petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C .F.R. §§ 2l4.2(l)(3)(ii) and (iv). The petitioner's
description of the job duties must clearly describe the duties performed by the beneficiary and indicate
whether such duties were either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id.
The petitioner's description of the beneficiary's job duties has failed to establish that the beneficiary acted in
a "managerial" capacity. Many of the duties listed by the petitioner appear to be non-qualifying
administrative or operational tasks which do not rise to the level of being managerial or executive in nature.
For example , the petitioner states that the beneficiary made marketing plans, looked for new markets , trends
and opportunities, and met with buyers to get feedback. However, marketing and sales duties constitute
administrative or operational tasks when the tasks inherent to these duties are performed by the beneficiary.
As the petitioner has not established how much time the beneficiary devoted to such non-qualifying tasks, it
cannot be confirmed that he was "primarily" employed as a manager. An employee who "primarily"
perforins the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily"
employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act ; see also
Matter ofChurch Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604.
. .
The petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary supervised and controlled the work of other
supervisory, managerial, or professional employees, or managed an essential function of the organization. As
shown on the organizational chart, it does not appear that the beneficiary directly supervised any subordinate
employees. While the petitioner implies in the beneficiary's job description that he "assembled specific sales
teams" and oversaw some sales functions , it is unclear who he supervised and how often . Once again, going
on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of
proof in these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190. Regardless , the
supervision of a sales team is generally a task for a first-line supervisor and is not an executive or managerial
duty. A managerial employee must have authority over day-to-day operations beyond the level normally
vested in a first-line supervisor, unless the supervised employees are professionals. 10l(a)(44)(A)(iv) of the .
EAC 04 13952066
Page 9
Act ; see also Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. Therefore, the petitioner has
not established that the beneficiary was employed primarily in a managerialcapacity;'
Similarly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary acted in an "executive" capacity. As
explained above, it appears that the beneficiary was a first-line supervisor and/or primarily performed non­
qualifying sales and marketing tasks. Finally , given that the beneficiary reported to a chairman within the
organization , and given no evidence to the contrary, it appears that the beneficiary did not truly have the
authority to direct the organization. Therefore , the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary was
employed primarily in an executive capacity.
Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary primarily performed managerial or
executive duties abroad , and the petition may not be approved for that reason .
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has failed to establish that it has a qualifying relationship
with the foreign employer. . .
Title 8 C.F.R. § 214 .2(i)(l )(ii)(G) defines a "qualifying organization" as a firm, corporation , or other legal
entity which "meets exactly one of the qualifying relationships specified in the definitions of a parent , branch,
affiliate or subsidiary specified in paragraph (l)(l )(ii) of this section" and "is or will be doing business." A
"subsidiary'vis defined in pertinent part as a corporation "of which a parent owns, directly or indirectly, more than
half ofthe entity and controls the entity." "Doing business" is defined in pertinent part as "the regular , systematic,
and continuous provision of goods and/or services."
In this matter, the petitioner , a corporation, asserts that it is 80 % owned by the foreign employer. In support of
this assertion, the petitioner submitted organizational documents and a stock certificate purporting to issue 160
out of200 shares to the foreign employer. However, the petitioner's 2003 Form 1120, ·U.S. Corporation Income
Tax Return, indicates that the petitioner is 100% owned by an individual, Abid Syed, and that the petitioner is not
a subsidiary. The petitioner offers no explanation for this fundamental inconsistency in the record regarding its
ownership and control. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by
independent objective evidence . Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice
unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter ofHo, 19
I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). As the record contains serious u~resolved inconsistencies regarding the
petitioner's ownership and control , it cannot be confirmed that the petitioner is truly a qualifying organization,
and the petition may not be approved for this additional reason .
3While the petitioner has not argued that the beneficiary managed an essential function of the organization,
the rec~rd neverthe1~ss ' would not support this position even if taken. The petitioner 's'vague job description
fails to document what proportion of the beneficiary's duties was managerial , if any, and what proportion was
non-managerial. Also, as explained above, the record establishes that the beneficiary was primarily a first­
line supervisor of non-professional employees and/or was engaged in performing non-qualifying sales and
" marketing tasks.
(
,
EAC 04 139 52066
Page 10
Furthermore , the petition er has failed to establi sh thatthe foreign entity was "doing business" , when the instant
petition was filed. While the petitioner submitted foreign busine ss document s, most of these documents date
, from 2003. The in stant petition was filed on April 8, 2004. Although the petitioner also submitted
documents from 2004 , e.g., current financial statements , reference letters , and bank statements , in response to
the director's Request for Evidence , the petitioner submitted only one in voice from 2004 even though the
director specificall y requested evidence of recent transactions . Failure to submit requested evidence that
precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(14) . The
non-existence or other unavailability of required evidence creates a presumption of ineligibility. 8 C.F.R . ,
§ 103.2(b )(2)(i). Given the petitioner's failure to establish that the foreign entity was engaged in the regular ,
systematic, and continuous provision of goods and/or services at the time the petition was filed, the petitioner
has failed to establish that the foreign entity is a qualifying organization.
Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to establish that it and the foreign entity are qualifying organizations ,
and the petition may not be approved for this additional reason.
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be den ied by
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identif y all ofthe grounds for denial in the initial deci sion. See
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F . Supp . 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D . Cal. 2001) , afJ'd, 345 F .3d 683
(9th Cir. 2003) ; see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997 , 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews
appeals on a de novo basis).
The petition will be den ied for the above stated reasons , with each considered as an independent and
alternati ve basis for denial. When the MO denies a petition on multiple alternati ve ground s, a plaintiff can
succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's
enumerated grounds. SeeSpencer Enterpris es, Inc., 229 F . Supp. 2d at 1043.
In visa petition proceedings , the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the appeal will be
dismissed.
ORDER: , The appeal is di smissed.