dismissed L-1A Case: Mobile Telephone

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icleiirifying dzt;ls deleted to 
prevent clemriy mavmmmted 
invaaion dpenenal privacy 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N. W., Rm. 3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
File: EAC 06 225 52985 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER Date: 
 APR 3 0 2808 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonirnrnigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(l5)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1 101 (a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any fbrther inquiry must be made to that office. 
Robert P. Wiemann, Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
EAC 06 225 52985 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
petitioner filed an appeal with the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on December 20,2006. The director 
declined to treat this appeal as a motion and forwarded the appeal and the entire record of proceeding to the 
AAO for review. On or about April 30,2008, the AAO dismissed the appeal. 
Upon review of the record, it is noted that on December 2 1, 2006, the petitioner also filed a motion to reopen 
and reconsider the Vermont Service Center's decision of November 22, 2006, which was not reviewed or 
ruled upon at the time of filing since the record of proceeding was being reviewed on appeal by the AAO at 
that time. Therefore, while the November 22, 2006 decision was rendered by the service center and not the 
AAO, the AAO was the office which rendered the last decision in this matter on April 30, 2008. Therefore, 
the authority to review the petitioner's motion of December 21, 2006 rests with the AAO. See 8 C.F.R. 5 
103.5(a)(l)(ii). The motion will be dismissed. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant visa petition seeking to employ the beneficiary as its operations 
manager as an L- 1 A nonirnmigrant intracompany transferee pursuant to section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 4 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is a corporation 
organized under the laws of the State of Texas and is allegedly in the mobile telephone business. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish that the beneficiary will be 
employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
The petitioner subsequently filed a motion. The director declined to consider the motion and forwarded the 
matter to the AAO. On motion, counsel to the petitioner asserts that the director erred and that the 
beneficiary's duties will be primarily those of a manager. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonirnmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101 (a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifjrlng managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his 
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. fj 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (I)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
EAC 06 225 52985 
Page 3 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The primary issue in the present matter is whether the beneficiary will be employed by the United States 
entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(44)(A), defmes the term "managerial capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
the organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department 
or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to 
hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as 
promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised, 
functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the 
function managed; and 
(iv) 
 exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function for 
which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be 
acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory 
duties unless the employees supervised are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) 
 establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(iv) 
 receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board 
of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
EAC 06 225 52985 
Page 4 
The petitioner does not clarify in the initial petition whether the beneficiary will primarily perform managerial 
duties under section 101 (a)(44)(A) of the Act, or primarily executive duties under section 101 (a)(44)(B) of 
the Act, and counsel asserts on motion that the beneficiary will be employed in a managerial capacity. Given 
the lack of clarity, the AAO will assume that the petitioner is claiming that the beneficiary will be employed 
in either a managerial or an executive capacity and will consider both classifications. 
The petitioner describes the beneficiary's proposed duties in a letter dated July 24,2006 as follows: 
Management - 70% 
Responsible for overseeing the management of the company; Recruiting and terminating 
managerial and subordinate employees where the need arises; Liaising with the Manager to 
oversee daily activities of the company and establishment of procedures and policies; 
Reviews activity and operations of store management division progress towards stated goals 
and objective. 
Contract Negotiation - 20% 
In charge of final approval of contracts with service providers and large customer orders; He 
has the authority to use her [sic] discretion in binding the company in contractual obligations. 
The petitioner did not address to what duties the beneficiary will devote the remaining 10% of his time. 
The petitioner claims in the Form 1-129 to employ seven workers. While the petitioner submitted quarterly 
tax returns from 2005 indicating that the petitioner employed at times as many as eight workers, the petitioner 
did not submit any quarterly wage reports from 2006. 
The petitioner also submitted an organizational chart and job descriptions for its subordinate employees. The 
chart indicates that the beneficiary will report to the president and will directly supervise a "store manager" 
and an "accounts manager." Each of these claimed subordinate managers is, in turn, portrayed as supervising 
one or more subordinate workers. The duties of the "store manager" are described as follows: 
Reports directly to President. Supervises assistant manager and store employees; Plans and 
prepares work schedules and assigns employees to specific duties; Formulates pricing 
policies on merchandise according to requirements for store profitability; Supervises 
employees engaged in sales work, talung of inventories, reconciling cash with sales receipts, 
keeping operating records; In charge of promotion activities; In charge of marketing and 
advertising. 
The duties of the "account manager" are described as follows: 
He is in charge of reviewing financials and budgets; reviewing profit/loss statements; 
balances books monthly; handles payroll; meets with accountant to file tax returns. 
Participates in formulating and administering company policies and developing long range 
goals and objectives; Reviews activity and operations of store management division progress 
toward stated goals and objectives; Reports directly to President. 
EAC 06 225 52985 
Page 5 
On November 22, 2006, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that the petitioner failed to 
establish that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in a managerial or executive capacity. 
On motion, counsel asserts that the beneficiary's duties are primarily those of a manager. In support, counsel 
submits a brief and a letter from the petitioner dated December 10,2006 in which the petitioner further claims 
that the beneficiary will be responsible for "expanding [the petitioner's] operation to become a nationwide 
wholesaler of cellular communications products" which will involve hiring additional employees and setting 
up warehousing and distribution facilities. 
Upon review, counsel's assertions are not persuasive. 
As a threshold matter, it is noted that a visa petition may not be approved based on speculation of future 
eligibility or after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of facts. See Matter of 
Michelin Tire Corp., 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. Comrn. 1978); Matter of Katigbak, 14 I&N Dec. 45,49 (Comm. 
1971). Therefore, the petitioner's plan to expand its business and to hire additional workers is irrelevant. Any 
assertion that the beneficiary will be primarily employed in a managerial or executive capacity after the 
speculative expansion of the business or the hiring of additional staff will not establish that the petitioner is 
eligible for the benefit sought. 
Accordingly, when examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look 
first to the petitioner's description of the job duties. 
 See 8 C.F.R. 4 214.2(1)(3)(ii). 
 The petitioner's 
description of the job duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate 
whether such duties are either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. A petitioner cannot claim that 
some of the duties of the position entail executive responsibilities, while other duties are managerial. A 
petitioner may not claim that a beneficiary will be employed as a hybrid "executive/manager" and rely on 
partial sections of the two statutory definitions. 
Ln this matter, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's job duties fails to establish that the beneficiary 
will act in a "managerial" or "executive" capacity. In support of the petition, the petitioner has submitted a 
vague and non-specific job description which fails to sufficiently describe what the beneficiary will do on a 
day-to-day basis. For example, the petitioner states that the beneficiary will devote most of his time to 
"overseeing the management of the company," to reviewing "activity and operations of store management 
division progress towards stated goals and objective," and to establishing "procedures and policies." 
However, the petitioner fails to explain what, exactly, the beneficiary will do in "overseeing" the management 
of the business or to define the goals, objectives, procedures, and policies of the operation. Furthermore, the 
petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary's ascribed duties pertaining to the petitioner's "expansion" 
efforts will be managerial or executive in nature or that the beneficiary will be relieved fi-om performing the 
non-qualifying tasks related to setting up warehousing and distribution facilities by subordinate workers. 
Finally, general managerial-sounding duties such as "oversee daily activities" are not probative of the 
beneficiary performing qualifying duties. The fact that the petitioner has given the beneficiary a managerial 
or executive title and has prepared a vague job description which includes inflated job duties does not 
establish that the beneficiary will actually perform managerial or executive duties. Specifics are clearly an 
important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties are primarily executive or managerial in nature; 
otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., 
EAC 06 225 52985 
Page 6 
Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff d, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). Going on record without 
supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these 
proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972). Accordingly, it 
has not been established that the beneficiary will "primarily" perform managerial or executive duties. An 
employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not 
considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and 
(B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties); see 
also Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593,604 (Comm. 1988). 
The petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary will supervise and control the work of other 
supervisory, managerial, or professional employees, or will manage an essential function of the organization. 
As asserted in the record, the beneficiary will directly supervise a "store manager" and an "accounts manager" 
who are both portrayed as supervising one or more subordinate workers. However, it has not been established 
that the beneficiary will truly supervise and control these claimed supervisory or managerial employees. As 
noted in the job descriptions for the "store manager" and the "accounts manager," these workers report 
"directly" to the president of the business. Therefore, it does not appear that the beneficiary will supervise or 
control these employees. An employee will not be considered to be a supervisor simply because of a job title, 
because he or she is arbitrarily placed on an organizational chart in a position superior to another employee, 
or even because he or she supervises daily work activities and assignments. Rather, the employee must be 
shown to possess some significant degree of control or authority over the employment of subordinates. See 
generally Browne v. Signal Mountain Nursery, L.P., 286 F.Supp.2d 904, 907 (E.D. Tenn. 2003) (cited in 
Hayes v. Laroy Thomas, Inc., 2007 WL 128287 at "16 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 1 I, 2007)). 
Regardless, even if the petitioner established that the beneficiary will supervise and control the "store 
manager" and an "accounts manager," it has not been established that either of these workers is truly a 
supervisory or managerial employee. The petitioner describes its business as a seven-employee retail and 
wholesale operation concentrating on "cell phone products" and claims to be located in a shopping center near 
a grocery store. The petitioner also claims to have a five-tiered management hierarchy consisting of the 
president, the beneficiary, the store and accounts managers, an assistant manager, and sales representatives. 
However, it is not credible that the reasonable needs of the petitioner's seven-employee wireless telephone 
sales business would require five of its workers to perform supervisory or managerial duties, and it has not 
been established that either the "store manager" or the "accounts manager" is a supervisory or managerial 
employee. To the contrary, based on the job descriptions and the size and nature of the petitioner's business, 
it appears that the beneficiary, store manager, the accounts manager, and the other employees will more likely 
than not primarily perform the tasks necessary to the operation of the business. See generally Family, Inc. v. 
US. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 469 F.3d 13 13 (9~ Cir. 2006). 
Accordingly, it appears that the beneficiary will primarily be a first-line supervisor of non-professional 
workers, the provider of actual services, or a combination of both. A managerial employee must have 
authority over day-to-day operations beyond the level normally vested in a ftrst-line supervisor, unless the 
supervised employees are professionals. 101(a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act; see also Matter of Church Scientology 
International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. Moreover, as the petitioner failed to establish the skills and education 
required to perform the duties of the subordinate positions, the petitioner has not established that the 
EAC 06 225 52985 
Page 7 
beneficiary will manage professional employees.' Therefore, the petitioner has not established that the 
beneficiary will be employed primarily in a managerial capacity.2 
Similarly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will act in an "executive" capacity. The 
statutory definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated position within a complex 
organizational hierarchy, including major components or functions of the organization, and that person's 
authority to direct the organization. Section IOl(a)(44)(B) of the Act. Under the statute, a beneficiary must 
have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish the goals and policies" of that organization. 
Inherent to the definition, the organization must have a subordinate level of employees for the beneficiary to 
direct, and the beneficiary must primarily focus on the broad goals and policies of the organization rather than 
the day-to-day operations of the enterprise. An individual will not be deemed an executive under the statute 
simply because they have an executive title or because they "direct" the enterprise as the owner or sole 
managerial employee. The beneficiary must also exercise "wide latitude in discretionary decision making" 
and receive only "general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of directors, or 
1 
In evaluating whether the beneficiary will manage professional employees, the AAO must evaluate whether 
the subordinate positions require a baccalaureate degree as a minimum for entry into the field of endeavor. 
Section 101(a)(32) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 4 1101(a)(32), states that "[tlhe termprofession shall include but not 
be limited to architects, engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and teachers in elementary or secondary 
schools, colleges, academies, or seminaries." The term "profession" contemplates knowledge or learning, not 
merely skill, of an advanced type in a given field gained by a prolonged course of specialized instruction and 
study of at least baccalaureate level, which is a realistic prerequisite to entry into the particular field of 
endeavor. Matter of Sea, 19 I&N Dec. 8 17 (Cornm. 1988); Matter of ling, 13 I&N Dec. 35 (R.C. 1968); 
Matter of Shin, 11 I&N Dec. 686 (D.D. 1966). 
2 
While the petitioner has not argued that the beneficiary will manage an essential function of the organization, 
the record nevertheless would not support this position even if taken. The term "function manager" applies 
generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a subordinate staff but instead is 
primarily responsible for managing an "essential function" within the organization. See section 
101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. The term "essential function" is not defined by statute or regulation. If a 
petitioner claims that the beneficiary is managing an essential function, the petitioner must furnish a written 
job offer that clearly describes the duties to be performed in managing the essential function, i.e., identify the 
function with specificity, articulate the essential nature of the function, and establish the proportion of the 
beneficiary's daily duties attributed to managing the essential function. See 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(3)(ii). In 
addition, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's daily duties must demonstrate that the beneficiary 
manages the function rather than performs the duties related to the function. In this matter, the petitioner has 
not provided evidence that the beneficiary will manage an essential function. The petitioner's vague job 
description fails to document that the beneficiary's duties will be primarily managerial. Also, as explained 
above, the record indicates that the beneficiary will primarily be a first-line supervisor of non-professional 
employees andlor will perform non-qualifying operational or administrative tasks. Absent a clear and 
credible breakdown of the time spent by the beneficiary performing his duties, the AAO cannot determine 
what proportion of his duties will be managerial, nor can it deduce whether the beneficiary will primarily 
perform the duties of a function manager. See IKEA US, Inc. v. US. Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22, 24 
(D.D.C. 1999). 
EAC 06 225 52985 
Page 8 
stockholders of the organization." Id. For the same reasons indicated above, the petitioner has failed to 
establish that the beneficiary will act primarily in an executive capacity. The job description provided for the 
beneficiary is so vague that the AAO cannot deduce with any certainty what the beneficiary will do on a day- 
to-day basis. However, as explained above, it appears that the beneficiary will be primarily employed as a 
first-line supervisor and/or will perform the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide a service. 
Therefore, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in an executive 
capacity. 
In reviewing the relevance of the number of employees a petitioner has, federal courts have generally agreed 
that Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) "may properly consider an organization's small size as one 
factor in assessing whether its operations are substantial enough to support a manager." Family, Inc. v. US. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, 469 F.3d at 13 16 (citing with approval Republic of Transkei v. INS, 
923 F.2d 175, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Fedin Bros. Co. v. Sava, 905 F.2d 41,42 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam); Q 
Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 293 F. Supp. 2d 25,29 (D.D.C. 2003)). Furthermore, it is appropriate for CIS to 
consider the size of the petitioning company in conjunction with other relevant factors, such as a company's 
small personnel size, the absence of employees who would perform the non-managerial or non-executive 
operations of the company, or a "shell company" that does not conduct business in a regular and continuous 
manner. See, e.g. Systronics Corp. v. INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2001). 
Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will primarily perform managerial or 
executive duties, and the petition may not be approved for that reason. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary was employed abroad 
full-time for at least one continuous year with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the 
filing of the petition. 8 C.F.R. $3 214.2(1)(3)(iii). 
The petitioner claims that the beneficiary was employed abroad by the foreign employer "from July 2001 to 
July 2004." The instant petition was filed on August 1, 2006, exactly two years after the beneficiary 
purportedly left the employ of the foreign employer. 
On August 15, 2006, the director requested additional evidence establishing that the beneficiary had been 
employed for one continuous year within the three years prior to August 1, 2006. The director requested, 
inter alia, the beneficiary's last annual tax return and payroll documents. 
In response, the petitioner submitted several 2004 "payment vouchers" purportedly evidencing that the 
beneficiary was paid on a monthly basis by the foreign employer in Pakistan for one continuous year. The 
petitioner, however, did not submit a copy of the beneficiary's individual tax return as requested by the 
director. 
Upon review, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary was employed a full-time abroad 
for at least one continuous year with a qualieing organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. First, the most recent "payment voucher" is dated July 3 1, 2004 and does not even cover a one 
year period between August 1,2003 and August 1, 2006. Second, despite being specifically requested by the 
director, the petitioner failed to submit evidence pertaining to his filing of tax returns in Pakistan reporting his 
EAC 06 225 52985 
Page 9 
2004 income. Failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds 
for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(14). As the petitioner's failure to submit this requested 
evidence, or to credibly address the unavailability or non-existence of this evidence, precludes a material line 
of inquiry into whether the beneficiary was employed abroad during the requisite timeframe, the petition may 
not be approved for this additional reason. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary was employed 
abroad in a position that was primarily managerial or executive in nature. 8 C.F.R. $8 214.2(1)(3)(iv). 
The foreign employer described the beneficiary's duties abroad in a letter dated October 5,2006 as follows: 
[The beneficiary] held the position of Production Director. He spent 100% of his time 
performing executive managerial duties. His duties consisted of overseeing his department 
and production staff. He had complete discretionary authority in managing his department 
such as hiring, training, and firing employees. He directly supervised three department 
managers - Production Manager - ImportIExport Manager - and Warehouse Manager. As a 
part of his responsibilities he supervised department managers to ensure that the volume of 
business is handled by the subordinate managers and employees to fill orders and receive and 
process incoming and outgoing shipments. In addition, [the beneficiary] was responsible for 
developing organizational policies and coordinating operations between managers and 
departments and establishes responsibilities of each manager and department. He was 
responsible for reviewing activity reports which reflect the volume of import/export goods 
and review reports to determine progress in attaining quotas. 
Also, [the beneficiary] was responsible for planning production schedules, approving all 
department expenditures, and preparing budget reports. In order for [the beneficiw] to 
perform his duties it required that department managers implement operational procedures to 
increase production, distribution of products are performed timely and company property is 
safeguarded against damage and theft. 
The petitioner also submitted an organizational chart for the foreign employer. 
 The chart shows the 
beneficiary directly supervising an importJexport manager and a production manager who are both, in turn, 
portrayed as supervising subordinate workers. The warehouse manager is portrayed as reporting to the 
importlexport manager. 
Finally, the petitioner described the duties of the beneficiary's purported subordinates abroad. 
 The 
importlexport manager, the production manager, and the warehouse manager are vaguely described as 
supervising subordinate workers in their performance of tasks related to the manufacturing and export of yarn 
and garments. 
Upon review, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary was employed abroad in a 
managerial or executive capacity. The petitioner submitted a vague and non-specific job description which 
fails to establish what, exactly, the beneficiary did on a day-to-day basis to "oversee" his staff. Specifics are 
clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties were primarily executive or managerial in 
EAC 06 225 52985 
Page 10 
nature; otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. 
Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1103, afd, 905 F.2d 41. Furthermore, the foreign employer's vague 
descriptions of the duties of the beneficiary's claimed subordinates fail to establish that any of these workers 
was truly a managerial, supervisory, or professional worker. A managerial title combined with the petitioner's 
uncorroborated claim that a subordinate worker "supervised" other workers and an arbitrary requirement that 
the position requires a university degree will not establish that an employee was truly a managerial, 
supervisory, or professional worker. Once again, going on record without supporting documentary evidence 
is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of 
California, 14 I&N Dec. 190. Absent detailed descriptions of the duties of both the beneficiary and his 
purported subordinates, it is impossible for CIS to discern whether the beneficiary was "primarily" engaged in 
performing managerial or executive duties abroad. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act; see also 
Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. 
Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary was employed in a primarily managerial or 
executive capacity abroad, and the petition may not be approved for this additional reason. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afd, 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews 
matters on a de novo basis). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can 
succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's 
enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
appeal will be dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.