dismissed L-1A Case: Motion Picture

identifying drJa &la to 
prevent ckcarty unwmanted 
hhSi~ af pod privacy 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rrn. 3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
File: WAC 07 245 501 18 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: 0 3 2008 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1 101 (a)(] 5)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
4 Robert P. Wiemann, Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
m. 
WAC 07 245 501 18 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition for a nonirnrnigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed tbs nonirnrnigrant petition seeking to employ the beneficiary in a new office in the United 
States as an L-1A nonirnmigrant intracompany transferee pursuant to section lOl(a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 5 1101 (a)(15)(L). The petitioner, a limited liability 
company organized under the laws of the State of Nevada, is allegedly in the motion picture business. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary was 
employed abroad in a primarily managerial or executive position. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal, which was forwarded to the AAO for review.' 
 On appeal, 
counsel asserts that the petitioner established that the beneficiary was employed abroad in an executive 
capacity. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimrnigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101 (a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his 
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (I)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
I 
Although it appears that the director considered the appeal as a motion to reopen or reconsider, the director 
dismissed the motion on November 13, 2007 because the petitioner did not state new facts for the director's 
consideration. Consequently, as the director decided not to take favorable action on the appeal, she properly 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO in accordance with 8 C.F.R. tj 103.3(a)(2)(iv). The matter is now properly 
before the AAO for consideration. 
WAC 07 245 501 18 
Page 3 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
In addition, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(~) states that if the petition indicates that the beneficiary is 
coming to the United States as a manager or executive to open or to be employed in a new office, the 
petitioner shall submit evidence that: 
(A) 
 Sufficient physical premises to house the new office have been 
secured; 
(B) 
 The beneficiary has been employed for one continuous year in the 
three year period preceding the filing of the petition in an executive 
or managerial capacity and that the proposed employment involved 
executive or managerial authority over the new operation; and 
(C) 
 The intended United States operation, within one year of the 
approval of the petition, will support an executive or managerial 
position as defined in paragraphs (l)(l)(ii)(B) or (C) of this section, 
supported by information regarding: 
(I) 
 The proposed nature of the office describing the scope of the 
entity, its organizational structure, and its financial goals; 
(2) 
 The size of the United States investment and the financial 
ability of the foreign entity to remunerate the beneficiary and 
to commence doing business in the United States; and 
(3) 
 The organizational structure of the foreign entity. 
The primary issue in the present matter is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary was 
employed abroad in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
the organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential hnction within the organization, or a department 
or subdivision of the organization; 
WAC 07 245 50 1 18 
Page 4 
(iii) 
 if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to 
hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as 
promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised, 
functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the 
function managed; and 
(iv) 
 exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function for 
which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be 
acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory 
duties unless the employees supervised are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" as an 
assignment with an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) 
 establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(iv) 
 receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board 
of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
The petitioner does not clarify in the initial petition whether the beneficiary primarily performed managerial 
duties under section 10 1 (a)(44)(A) of the Act, or primarily executive duties under section 10 1 (a)(44)(B) of 
the Act. While the petitioner describes the beneficiary as a manager of an essential function in its response to 
the director's Request for Evidence, counsel asserts on appeal that the beneficiary was employed abroad in an 
executive capacity. Given the lack of clarity, the AAO will assume that the petitioner is asserting that the 
beneficiary was employed in either a managerial or an executive capacity and will consider both 
classifications. 
The foreign employer described the beneficiary's employment abroad in a letter dated August 10, 2007 as 
follows: 
[The beneficiary] is [the foreign employer's] Executive Manager, and he has worked for [the 
foreign employer] is this capacity since April 2006. His duties have included executive-level 
management and coordination of the business operations of the company, and he is the 
steward of Audience Alliance's intellectual property. He is also the essential link between the 
companies and its customers. 
On August 25,2007, the director requested additional evidence. The director requested, inter alia, the foreign 
employer's payroll records pertaining to the beneficiary's foreign employment; an organizational chart for the 
WAC 07 245 501 18 
Page 5 
foreign employer identifying all employees under the beneficiary's supervision by name and job title; a 
description of the job duties, educational levels, and annual salaries of all employees under the beneficiary's 
supervision; and a more detailed description of the beneficiary's duties abroad, including a breakdown of the 
amount of time the beneficiary devoted to each of his ascribed duties. 
In response, counsel submitted a letter dated September 10, 2007 in which he further describes the 
beneficiary's foreign employment as follows: 
The beneficiary was hired by the foreign company on 13 April 2006 as its Media Response 
Manager. He has held only this position since his date of hire. 
Neither counsel nor the petitioner addressed why the beneficiary's foreign position was described as 
"executive manager," and not as "media response manager," in the initial petition. 
In response to the director's request for an organizational chart and job descriptions for all subordinate 
employees, counsel explained the following in the September 10,2007 letter: 
The foreign company does not maintain an organisational chart, but the following 
summarises the executive staffing of the company: 
Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer 
Director of Marketing and Communications 
[The beneficiarvl - Media Res~onse Manager 
The beneficiary's job duties are directly related to public and media response to the 
company's clients' advertising campaigns [citation omitted], a core element of the company's 
business. Thus, the beneficiary is an essential function manager under 8 CFR 
214.2(1)(1)(ii)(B)(2) which does not require the supervision of employees. However, the 
follow-ing [sic] personnel have been under the beneficiary's supervision at the company: 
employee 
m - employee 
- employee 
- contractor 
contractor 
- contractor 
- contractor 
contractor 
contractor 
However, the petitioner did not submit descriptions of the job duties or supervisory structure of these claimed 
WAC 07 245 501 18 
Page 6 
subordinate employees and contractors. 
Finally, the petitioner described the beneficiary's duties abroad as follows: 
Executive management of certain business and commercial operations of the 
company; 
Management of third-party relationships for call handling and communications 
technology components of client advertising campaigns; 
Recruiting, training and managing the staff employed by and contracted to the 
company in relation to media response to clients' advertising campaigns; 
Hiring and firing such staff or recommending these and other personnel actions; 
Exercising day-to-day authority over the activities of the foreign company's Media 
Response division; and 
Reporting on campaign Key Performance Indicators and operations to company 
management and client stakeholders. 
However, the petitioner did not submit a breakdown describing how much time the beneficiary devoted to 
each of these ascribed duties. 
On September 28, 2007, the director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that 
the beneficiary was employed abroad in a primarily executive or managerial capacity. 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner established that the beneficiary was employed abroad in an 
executive capacity. Specifically, counsel argues that the beneficiary performed "high level supervision and 
management duties" because he was directing the performance of the tasks of the media response division by 
subordinate employees and contractors. Counsel further describes the beneficiary's claimed duties abroad as 
"media response manager" as follows: 
The day-to-day activities of the Media Response Division include the physical handling of 
calls through a telephony solution, the capture of respondent data, the subsequent population 
of respondent data into databases, the tabulation of that data into meaningful reporting of 
caller activities, and the provision of caller fulfillment details to other divisions of [the 
foreign employer] for the purpose of marketing fulfillment. The day-to-day management of 
the division includes the appropriate scheduling of people to provide coverage of call 
volumes, monitoring and reviewing agent and third party performance, interrogation of data 
resulting from reporting tools used, liaising directly with client's senior management, and 
liaising with other divisions in areas of shared stakeholding. In performing these duties, the 
beneficiary reported directly to the Managing Director on a monthly basis. 
Counsel also asserts that all of the subordinate workers who allegedly performed the media response tasks 
"reported to and were directed by the beneficiary." In support, counsel submitted an organizational chart for 
the foreign employer showing the beneficiary administering the media response division. 
WAC 07 245 501 18 
Page 7 
Upon review, counsel's assertions are not persuasive. 
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3). The petitioner's description of the job 
duties must clearly describe the duties performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties were 
either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. 
In this matter, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's job duties fails to establish that the beneficiary 
acted in a "managerial" or "executive" capacity abroad. The petitioner submitted a vague and inconsistent job 
description which fails to sufficiently describe what the beneficiary did on a day-to-day basis. The petitioner 
states in the initial petition that the beneficiary was employed as the foreign employer's "executive manager" 
since April 2006 and that his duties "included executive-level management and coordination of the business 
operations of the company, and he is the steward of Audience Alliance's intellectual property." However, in 
its response to the director's Request for Evidence, the petitioner claims that the beneficiary was employed as 
the foreign employer's "media response manager" since April 2006. The petitioner offers no explanation for 
why it changed its description of the beneficiary's foreign employment in its response to the Request for 
Evidence. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent 
objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the 
petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 
582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a 
reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. 
Id. at 591. 
Regardless, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's job duties as "media response manager" is so 
vague that it is impossible for Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) to deduce with any degree of 
certainty what, exactly, the beneficiary did on a day-to-day basis for the foreign employer. For example, the 
petitioner claims that the beneficiary managed "third-party relationship for call handling and communications 
technology components of client advertising campaigns," recruited, trained, supervised, and fired his 
subordinate staff members, and reported to company management on his activities. However, broad 
executive-sounding duties are not probative of the beneficiary actually performing qualifying duties. The fact 
that the petitioner has given the beneficiary a managerial or executive title and has prepared a vague job 
description which includes inflated job duties does not establish that the beneficiary actually performed 
managerial or executive duties. Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties 
were primarily executive or managerial in nature; otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a matter 
of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), afd, 905 
F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for 
purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 
I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comrn. 1972). 
Consequently, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary primarily performed primarily 
managerial or executive duties abroad. This failure is exacerbated by the petitioner's failure to respond to 
several of the director's evidentiary requests. For example, the petitioner failed to describe the supervisory 
structure of the beneficiary's subordinate workers, to specifically describe the day-to-day duties of the 
WAC 07 245 50118 
Page 8 
subordinate workers, or to submit a breakdown of the beneficiary's duties, which describes how much time 
the beneficiary devoted to each of his ascribed duties. Failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a 
material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(14). Absent a clear and 
credible description of both the beneficiary's duties and the duties of his subordinates, it is impossible for CIS 
to conclude that the beneficiary was employed in a "primarily" managerial or executive capacity. As 
currently constituted, the record indicates that the beneficiary was more likely than not, at most, a first-line 
supervisor of non-professional employees and contractors engaged in collecting data for the media response 
division. First-line supervisory tasks are not considered qualifying managerial or executive duties. An 
employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not 
considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 101 (a)(44)(A) and 
(B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties); see 
also Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593,604 (Cornm. 1988). 
As alluded to above, the petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary will supervise and control 
the work of other supervisory, managerial, or professional employees, or will manage an essential function of 
the organization. As asserted on appeal, the beneficiary "directly" supervised a variety of employees and 
contractors engaged in performing tasks associated with the media response division of the foreign employer. 
However, as the record is devoid of evidence addressing the duties or supervisory structure of these workers, 
it has not been established that any of these workers is a supervisory or managerial employee. Once again, 
failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the 
petition. 8 C.F.R. 3 103.2(b)(14). In view of the above, the beneficiary would appear to be primarily a frst- 
line supervisor of non-professional workers, the provider of actual services, or a combination of both. A 
managerial or executive employee must have authority over day-to-day operations beyond the level normally 
vested in a first-line supervisor. See 101(a)(44) of the Act; see also Matter of Church Scientology 
International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. Moreover, as the petitioner failed to establish the skills required to 
perform the duties of the subordinate positions, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary managed 
professional employees.2 Therefore, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary was employed 
primarily in a managerial capacity.3 
2 
In evaluating whether the beneficiary will manage professional employees, the AAO must evaluate whether 
the subordinate positions require a baccalaureate degree as a minimum for entry into the field of endeavor. 
Section 101(a)(32) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(32), states that "[tlhe term profession shall include but not 
be limited to architects, engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and teachers in elementary or secondary 
schools, colleges, academies, or seminaries." The term "profession" contemplates knowledge or learning, not 
merely skill, of an advanced type in a given field gained by a prolonged course of specialized instruction and 
study of at least baccalaureate level, which is a realistic prerequisite to entry into the particular field of 
endeavor. Matter of Sea, 19 I&N Dec. 817 (Cornm. 1988); Matter of Ling, 13 I&N Dec. 35 (R.C. 1968); 
Matter of Shin, 1 1 I&N Dec. 686 (D.D. 1966). 
3 
While the petitioner on appeal has apparently abandoned its claim that the beneficiary managed an essential 
function of the organization, the record would nevertheless not support this position even if maintained. The 
term "hnction manager" applies generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a 
subordinate staff but instead is primarily responsible for managing an "essential function" within the 
WAC 07 245 50 1 18 
Page 9 
Similarly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will act in an "executive" capacity. The 
statutory definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated position within a complex 
organizational hierarchy, including major components or hnctions of the organization, and that person's 
authority to direct the organization. Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act. Under the statute, a beneficiary must 
have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish the goals and policies" of that organization. 
Inherent to the definition, the organization must have a subordinate level of employees for the beneficiary to 
direct, and the beneficiary must primarily focus on the broad goals and policies of the organization rather than 
the day-to-day operations of the enterprise. An individual will not be deemed an executive under the statute 
simply because they have an executive title or because they "direct" the enterprise as the owner or sole 
managerial employee. The beneficiary must also exercise "wide latitude in discretionary decision making" 
and receive only "general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of directors, or 
stockholders of the organization." Id. For the same reasons indicated above, the petitioner has failed to 
establish that the beneficiary acted primarily in an executive capacity. The job description provided for the 
beneficiary is so vague that the AAO cannot deduce what the beneficiary did on a day-to-day basis. 
Moreover, as explained above, it appears that the beneficiary was primarily employed as a first-line 
supervisor and performed the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide a service. Therefore, the 
petitioner has not established that the beneficiary was employed primarily in an executive capacity. 
Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary primarily performed managerial or 
executive duties, and the petition may not be approved. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary "has at least one 
continuous year of full-time employment abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years 
preceding the filing of the petition." 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(iii). 
organization. See section 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. The term "essential function" is not defined by statute 
or regulation. If a petitioner claims that the beneficiary is managing an essential function, the petitioner must 
furnish a written job offer that clearly describes the duties to be performed in managing the essential function, 
i.e., identify the function with specificity, articulate the essential nature of the function, and establish the 
proportion of the beneficiary's daily duties attributed to managing the essential function. See 8 C.F.R. 5 
214.2(1)(3)(ii). In addition, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's daily duties must demonstrate that 
the beneficiary manages the function rather than performs the tasks related to the function. In this matter, the 
petitioner has not provided evidence that the beneficiary managed an essential function. The petitioner's 
vague job description fails to document that the beneficiary's duties were primarily managerial. Also, as 
explained above, the record indicates that the beneficiary was primarily a first-line supervisor of non- 
professional employees and/or performed non-qualifying operational or administrative tasks. Absent a clear 
and credible breakdown of the time spent by the beneficiary performing his duties, the AAO cannot determine 
what proportion of his duties were managerial, nor can it deduce whether the beneficiary was primarily 
performing the duties of a function manager. See IKEA US, Inc. v. US. Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22, 
24 (D.D.C. 1999). 
WAC 07 245 501 18 
Page 10 
The petitioner claims that the beneficiary has been employed abroad by the foreign entity since April 2006. 
However, other than the foreign employer's letter dated August 10, 2007, the record is devoid of evidence 
establishing that the beneficiary was employed abroad. 
On August 25, 2007, the director requested additional evidence, including the foreign employer's payroll 
records pertaining to the beneficiary's foreign employment. In response, the petitioner submitted a two-page 
document titled "card transactions" which lists various credit and debit transactions and which repeatedly 
refers to the beneficiary. However, the significance of this document is unclear, and it does not establish that 
the beneficiary was an employee of the foreign employer. The petitioner did not submit copies of pay stubs 
or payroll documents. Once again, going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not 
sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of 
California, 14 I&N Dec. 190. The failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of 
inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 103.2(b)(14). The non-existence or other 
unavailability of required evidence creates a presumption of ineligibility. 8 C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(2)(i). 
Accordingly, as the petitioner has failed to submit evidence establishing that the beneficiary was indeed 
employed abroad for one continuous year by the foreign employer, the petition will not be approved for this 
additional reason. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has failed to establish that it has a qualifying relationship 
with the foreign employer, Keystone Media Pty. Ltd., an Australian proprietary limited company. 
Title 8 C.F.R. 4 214.2(i)(l)(ii)(G) defines a "qualifying organization" as a firm, corporation, or other legal 
entity which "meets exactly one of the qualifying relationships specified in the definitions of a parent, branch, 
affiliate or subsidiary specified in paragraph (I)(l)(ii) of this section." An "affiliate" is defined, in part, as "[olne 
of two legal entities owned and controlled by the same group of individuals." 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(1)(ii)(L)(2). 
The regulation and case law confirm that ownership and control are the factors that must be examined in 
determining whether a qualifying relationship exists between United States and foreign entities for purposes 
of this visa classification. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593; see also Matter of 
Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986); Matter of Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 (Comm. 
1982). In the context of this visa petition, ownership refers to the direct or indirect legal right of possession of 
the assets of an entity with full power and authority to control; control means the direct or indirect legal right 
and authority to direct the establishment, management, and operations of an entity. Matter of Church 
Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 595. 
The regulations specifically allow the director to request additional evidence in appropriate cases. See 8 
C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(3)(viii). As ownership is a critical element of this visa classification, the director may 
reasonably inquire beyond the issuance of membership interests into the means by which these membership 
interests were acquired. As requested by the director, evidence of this nature should include documentation 
of monies, property, or other consideration furnished to the entity in exchange for the membership interests. 
The director also requested the names of all account holders, other than the foreign employer and its 
WAC 07 245 501 18 
Page 1 1 
stockholders, depositing funds with the petitioner and a description of their affiliation with the foreign or 
United States entity. 
In this matter, the petitioner claims to be an affiliate of the foreign employer. The petitioner claims that both 
it and the foreign employer are owned and controlled by the same two individuals, and - 
. However, as evidence that the 
 purchased their interests in the petitioner, counsel submits 
documents which indicate that both members paid $100.00 for their respective interests. However, the record 
also indicates that the petitioner's primary hding source was not the foreign employer or its stockholders. 
Instead, most of the petitioner's finding originated with third parties such as a Hong Kong company called 
Audience Alliance Motion Picture Studios Limited and two Wyoming limited liability companies. The 
record is devoid of evidence establishing that either the Hong Kong company or the Wyoming limited 
liability companies are qualifying organizations. In fact, the record is devoid of evidence addressing the exact 
affiliation of these primary funding sources to the petitioner even though this was specifically requested by 
the director. Once again, failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall 
be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(14). 
While the funding. of the petitioner and its enterprise by third parties is not alone disqualifying, it calls into 
question whether the petitioner is truly controlled by the two members of the limited liability company or, 
whether, control has been ceded to the various entities providing funds. It must be emphasized that the 
burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the 
Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1361. Absent full disclosure of the conditions related to the funding of the petitioner by third 
parties, it is impossible for CIS to discern the exact control of the petitioner, and the petition will not be 
approved for his additional reason. 
Additionally, the 
 etitioner submitted an operating agreement for the U.S. company. 
 The operating 
agreement lists 
 as the only member of the limited liability company and as the member who 
owns 100 percent interest in the company. In response to the director's request for proof of the stock 
e petitioner submitted a one-page document entitled, "Admission of New Member," signed by 
and 
 on July 15, 2007, stating that ( contributed $100.00 and is 
admitted as a fill member of the company. The petitioner did not submit cancelled checks, wire transfers or 
other proof that the two individuals purchased the stock. Also, in reviewing the operating agreement for the 
U.S. company, under section VII General Provisions, the agreement states that, "a list of the names and 
addresses of the current membership of the LLC also shall be maintained at this address, with notations on 
any transfers of members' interests to nonmember or persons being admitted into membership in the LLC." 
However, the petitioner did not provide this documentation with the petition. Going on record without 
supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these 
proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Crafi of 
California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Cornm. 1972)). 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afd, 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews 
WAC 07 245 501 1 8 
Page 12 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can 
succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's 
enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the appeal will be 
dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.