dismissed L-1A Case: Nutraceuticals

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigratio~ 
Services 
MATTER OF R- INC. 
Non· Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
DATE: JUNE 28,2018 
APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER DECISION 
PETITION: FORM 1-129, PETITION FOR A NONIMMIGRANT WORKER 
The Petitioner, a nutraceutical developer and distributor, seeks to temporarily employ the 
Beneficiary as its general manager under the L-lA nonimmigrant classification for intracompany 
transferees. Immigration and Nationality ,Act (the Act) section 101(a)(15)(L), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(15)(L). The L-lA classification allows a corporation or other legal entity (including its 
affiliate or subsidiary) to transfer a qualifying foreign employee to the United States to work 
temporarily in a managerial or executive capacity. 
The Director of the California Service Center revoked the approval of the instant petition concluding 
that the Petitioner did not establish that he was employed in a managerial or executive capacity. 
On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the Beneficiary supervises four subordinates and that he acts as 
a function manager overseeing the company's regulatory affairs, finance, and logistics functions. 
Upon de novo review, we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. LEGAL fRAMEWORK 
To establish eligibility for the L-lA nonimmigrant visa classification, a qualifying organization must· 
have employed the beneficiary "in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized 
knowledge," for one continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for 
admission into the United States. Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. In addition, the beneficiary 
must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same 
employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial or executive capacity. Jd. The 
petitioner must also establish that the beneficiary's prior education, training, and employment 
qualify him or her to perform the intended services in the United States. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3). 
Under U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services regulations, the approval of an L-lA petition may 
be revoked on notice under six specific circumstances. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(9)(iii)(A). To properly 
revoke the approval of a petition, a director mu:st issue a notice of intent to revoke that contains a 
Matter of R- Inc. 
detailed statement of the grounds for the revocation and the time period allowed for 
rebuttal. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(9)(iii)(B). 1 
II. U.S. EMPLOYMENT IN A MANAGERIAL CAPACITY 
The sole issue to be addressed is whether the Petitioner has established that the Beneficiary was 
employed in a managerial capacity as of the date of the Director's Notice of Intent to Revoke 
(NOIR). The Petitioner does not claim that the Beneficiary was employed in an executive 
capacity. Therefore, we will restrict our analysis to whether the Beneficiary was employed in a 
managerial capacity. · 
"Managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily 
manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of the organization; 
supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial employees, or 
manages an essential function within the organization, or a department or subdivision of the 
organization; has authority over personnel actions or functions at a senior level within the 
organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and exercises discretion over the 
day-to-day operations of the activity or function for which the employee has authority. Section 
101(a)(44)(A) of the Act. 
When examining the managerial capacity of a given beneficiary, we will review the petJtJOner's 
description of the job duties. The petitioner's description of the job duties must clearly describe the 
duties performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are in a managerial capacity. 
See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(ii). Beyond the required description of the job duties, we examine the 
company's organizational structure, the duties of a beneficiary's subordinate employees, the 
presence of other employees to relieve a beneficiary from performing operational duties, the nature 
of the business, and any other factors that will contribute to understanding a beneficiary's actual 
duties and role in a business. 
Accordingly, we will discuss evidence regarding the Beneficiary's job duties along with evidence of 
the nature of the Petitioner's business, its starting levels, and its organizational structure. 
A. Duties 
Based on the definition of managerial capacity, the Petitioner must first show that the Beneficiary 
performed certain high-level responsibilities. Champion World, Inc. v. INS, 940 F.2d 1533 (9th Cir. 
1991) (unpublished table decision). Second, the Petitioner must prove that the Beneficiary was 
primarily engaged in managerial duties, as opposed to ordinary operational activities alongside the 
1 An L-1 A nonimmigrant intracompany transferee petition filed on behalf of the Beneficiary was approved on December 
15, 2015, for the period June 7, 2015, to June 6, 2017. The Director later revoked this approved petition on December 
21, 2017, following the issuance of a notice of intent to re.voke (NOIR) on April 20, 2017. The Director concluded that 
the Beneficiary was no longer eligible for the nonimmigrant classification. See 8 C.F.R§ 214.2(1)(9)(iii)(2). 
2 
Matter of R-Inc. 
Petitioner's other employees. See Family Inc. v. USC!S, 469 F.3d 1313, 1316 (9th Cir. 2006); 
Champion World, 940 F.2d 1533. 
The Petitioner stated that it was established in 2010 to develop and distribute supplements and 
vitamins. The Petitioner indicated that it "plans to develop products that will be manufactured in the 
United States and distributed in the Philippines and other Asian market[s]." It explained that it was 
currently "developing" three products, a multivitamin supplement for adults, a multivitamin 
supplement for toddlers, and time release vitamin C supplements. 
In response to a request for evidence (RFE) issued by the Director, the Petitioner stated that the 
Beneficiary had "discretion in developing and directing [the Petitioner's) USA policies and 
services." The Petitioner further explained that the Beneficiary devoted his time to the following 
duties: 
• 17% of his time "develop[ing), direct[ing), and implement[ing] and enforce[ing] [the 
Petitioner's] operating budget"; 
• 16% of his time to "high-level client contact and contract negotiations"; 2 
• 8% of his time on overseeing and developing "new innovative products in partnership with 
manufacturers"; 
• 8% of his time on developing "print, direct-mail, web and other advertising"; 
• 8% of his time on managing and directing the "development of the company brand"; 
• 9% of his time coordinating with a foreign marketing manager to develop a marketing plan; 
• 5% of his time spent on training, firing, and supervising staff; 
• 3% of his time on "implementing operation and project budgets"; 
• 7% of his time to overseeing "bidding" and "contract negotiation with high-level 
management of manufacturers and distributors"; 
• I% of his time on recruiting a new "V.P. of.U.S. operations to manage the [foreign] office"; 
and 
• 18% of his time on supervising the "coordination of regulatory teams from the Philippines, 
USA, Korea and India." 
The Director issued a NOIR in April 2017 reqyesting additional evidence relevant to whether the 
Petitioner was doing business and whether the Beneficiary was acting in a managerial or executive 
capacity. Following a site visit, the Director indicated that it could not confirm the Beneficiary's 
asserted duties or whether he had subordinates, emphasizing that it did not appear the Petitioner "had 
any brands manufactured or exported." In response, the Petitioner submitted largely the same duties 
provided previously in response to the RFE and submitted additional evidence relevant to its 
operations, business plans, and subordinates. The Director later revoked the approved petition, 
2 In its initial documents submiLLcd with the petition, the Petitioner aLLributed 9% of the Beneficiary's time to "high-level 
contact and contract negotiations." 
3 
Matter of R- Inc: 
concluding that the Petitioner did not establish that the Beneficiary was acting in a managerial or 
. . 3 
executive capaCity: 
On appeal, the Petitioner submits additional assertions regarding the Beneficiary's role, stating that 
he possesses "managerial authority over our highly qualified and professional statT members" and 
"Contract/Toll Manufacturers in the U.S." It also indicates that he "assigns projects, directives and 
instructions to subordinates in the U.S. as well as. for our Philippine company." 
The Petitioner submits evidence indicating that the Beneficiary was primarily engaged in the 
performance of non-qualifying operational level tasks as of the date of the NOIR. For instance, in 
response to the NOIR, the Petitioner provided evidence reflecting the Beneficiary paying the 
company's rent. The Petitioner also submitted invoices listing the Beneficiary as the "requisitioner," 
including some dated as late as April 2017, o~ the month the NOIR was issued. Likewise, the 
Petitioner provided numerous emails reflecting the Beneficiary's involvement in day-to-day non­
managerial duties, such as issuing purchase orders to suppliers, working on supplement bottle 
specifications, receiving quotes from suppliers, ~ending pill samples, arranging for the shipment of 
pills, sending information to clients on where to send payment, sending checks to suppliers, and 
making labels. Further, several of the aforementioned emails are dated in 2017 including some 
dating as late as April 2017, or the time of the NOIR. The Petitioner also submitted several invoices 
from freight forwarders dated in March and April2017 that bear the Beneficiary's name as the only 
company contact. 
In sum, the Petitioner has provided substantial documentation indicating that the Beneficiary was 
primarily engaged in non-qualifying operational duties and that he was delegating few of these tasks 
to subordinates working for it or the foreign employer. The Petitioner also submits no documentary 
evidence reflecting the Beneficiary's delegation of these non-qualifying tasks to his claimed 
subordinates. 
Further, the Beneticiary's duties also suggest his performance of non-qualifying operational duties. 
For example, the Petitioner stated that the Beneficiary was focused on developing "print, direct-mail, 
web and other advertising" and overseeing "bidding" with manufacturers and distributors. This, 
along with the submitted emails and documentation, reinforces a conclusion that the Beneficiary was 
primarily focused on non-qualifying matters. · Further, it is questionable that several of the 
operational duties reflected in the provided documentation are not mentioned in the Beneticiary's 
duty description, such as handling orders, billing, payment, shipment, and other day-to-day 
operational duties. An employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product 
or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial capacity." See, 
e.g., sections IOI(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the 
enumerated managerial duties); Matter of Church Scientology lnt'l, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm'r 
1988). 
3 We note that the Director did not offer a conclusion in; the revocation notice as to whether the Petitioner was doing 
business. · 
"4 
Matter of R- Inc. 
The Petitioner also did not document what proportion of the Beneficiary's duties were managerial 
functions and what proportion was non-qualifying. As noted, the Petitioner submits evidence 
indicating the Beneficiary's involvement in administrative or operational tasks, but does not fully 
quantify the time he devoted to these duties. This lack of documentation is important because 
several of the Beneficiary's documented tasks do not fall directly under managerial duties as defined 
in the statute. For this reason, we cannot determine whether the Beneficiary was primarily 
performing the duties of a manager. See IKEA US, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22, 
24 (D.D.C. 1999). 
In contrast to the substantial evidence indicating the Beneficiary's performance of non-qualifying 
tasks, the Petitioner has not submitted sufficient examples or documentation to substantiate his day­
to-day managerial-level duties. Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a 
beneficiary's duties are primarily managerial in nature, otherwise meeting the definitions would 
simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 110\ 
1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). The Beneficiary's duty description 
includes several generic duties that could apply to any manager acting in any business or industry 
and they do not provide insight into the actual nature of his role. The Petitioner provided insufficient 
examples and little supporting documentation to demonstrate the Beneficiary's performance of 
qualifying duties, such as operating budgets he implemented, marketing plans he established, staff he 
trained, or the regulatory team he coordinated. This lack of detail as to the Beneficiary's day-to-day 
qualifying managerial tasks is particularly noteworthy since the Petitioner asserts that he has been 
acting in his capacity as general manager in the United States since 2010. 
We acknowledge that the Petitioner has provided evidence indicating that it executed contracts for 
the supply of herbal medicines both in the United States and abroad; however, this alone does not 
demonstrate that the Beneficiary spends a majority of his time negotiating these contracts. In fact, as 
we have discussed, the documentation, such as emails and transactional documents, reflects that the 
Beneficiary is primarily involved in several non-qualifying operational level tasks and the Petitioner 
has provided few examples of his qualifying managerial duties, beyond occasional negotiation and 
execution of agreements. 
Even though the Beneficiary holds a senior position within the organization, the fact that he manages 
or directs a business does not necessarily establish eligibility for classification as an intracompany 
transferee in an managerial capacity within the meaning of section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act. By 
statute, eligibility for this classification requires that the duties of a position be "primarily" 
managerial in nature. Sections 101(A)(44)(A) of the Act. The Beneficiary may exercise discretion 
over the Petitioner's day-to-day operations and possess the requisite level of authority with respect to 
discretionary decision-making; however, the job description alone is insufficient to establish that his 
actual duties were primarily managerial in nature. 
·s 
.
Matter of R- In c. 
B. Staffing 
If staffing levels are used as a factor in determining whether an individual is acti ng in a managerial 
capacity, we take into account the reasona ble needs of the organization, in light of the overall 
purpose and stage of development of the organiz~ttion . See section "101(a)(4 4)(C) of the Act. 
In support of the petition in June 2015, the Petiti~ner indicated in the Form 1-129 that it only had one 
employee. The Petitioner stated that the Benefici ary posses sed "managerial authority over our 
highly qualified and professional staff members in both the U.S. and the Philippin es" and 
"Contract/Toll Manufacturers in the U.S." In respo nse to the NOIR in May 2017, the Petitioner 
submitted an organizational chart indic ating that the Beneficiary supervised an exec utiv e secretary, 
an eco mmerc e and busine ss development manager, an accountant, and a raw material development 
·consultant. The chart further indicated that the ecom merce and business development manager 
oversaw an sales employee and a graphic artist. The chart also reflect ed that the 
Beneficiary oversaw the "Philippine operation," consisti ng of a regulatory affairs departm ent with a 
registered pharmacist and product development pharm acist, a finance department with a department 
head and a cashier, a logistic s departm ent made up of a custom s and logis tic office r, and a quality 
control laboratory with two employees . In addition, the chart showed that the Beneficiary 
supervised three "contract/toll manufacturers" and listed several employe es working with these 
contractors in its organizational chart. 
The statutor y defi nition of "managerial capacity" allows for both "personnel managers" and 
"function manage rs." See section 10l( a)(44)(A)(i) and (ii) of the Act. Personnel manage rs are 
required to ·primarily supervise and control the work of other supervi sory, profess iona l, or 
managerial employees. Contrary to the common understanding of the word "manag er," the statute 
plainly states that a "first line supervisor is not considered to be act ing in a managerial capacity 
merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisor y duties unless the employees supervised are 
professional." Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act. If a beneficiary directly supervi ses other 
emp loyees, the beneficiary must also have the authority to hire and fire those empl oyees , or 
recommend those act ions, and take other personnel actions. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(1)(ii)(B)(J). 
First, the Petitioner has not submitt ed sufficient evide nce to establish that it had employees in the 
United States subordinate to the Beneficiary. As discu ssed, the Peti tioner asserted in respons e to the 
NOIR that it employed a business development ~an ager, an accountant, a raw material development 
consultant, and an assistant to the general mana ger/executive secre tary. In the RFE , the Director 
requested that the Petitioner submit tax documentation to substantiate these e mplo yees such as IRS 
Forms W-2 and 1099 and state quarterly wage reports. Further, in the NOIR , the Directo r pointed to 
submitted IRS Forms 1120S U.S. Income Tax Returns for an S Corporation dating from 2014 
through 2016 which reflected that the company had no paid any wages or salaries during these years. 
Howeve r, the Pet itioner did not submit sufficient supporting documentation to corroborate its 
employees in the United States. The Petitioner provided internally generated payroll docum entation 
from February 2017 indic ating that it had only one emp loyee , the asserted business development 
6 
Malter of R- Inc. 
manager. Further, internally generated payroll documentation from March 2017 reflected that the 
Petitioner employed the Beneficiary, the claimed business development manager, the raw material 
development consultant, and another unidentified employee. The Petitioner did not provide tax 
documentation, as requested, to substantiate its employees. In addition, the Petitioner provided IRS 
Forms 1120S from 2014 through 2016 reflecting that it paid no salaries and wages, leaving further 
need for credible and probative tax documentation to corroborate its employees. 
We do not find that internally generated payroll documentation from March and April 2017 
adequately supports a conclusion that the Petitioner had sufficient employees to sustain the 
Beneficiary in a managerial capacity, nor does it overcome the lack of tax documentation provided 
on the record. Even if we accept the Petitioner's asserted U.S. organizational chart as of the date of 
the NOIR, this evidence indicates that the company did not hire any subordinates to the Beneficiary 
until March 2017, approximately seven years following its creation. It is also questionable that these 
employees were shown as being hired in the sanie month as the NOIR. The Petitioner must resolve 
discrepancies in the record with independent, objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. 
Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). 
The organizational chart also does not indicate that the Beneficiary's U.S. subordinates oversaw 
subordinates of their own. The Petitioner also s'ubmits no evidence to demonstrate that his claimed 
U.S. subordinates had bachelor's degrees or that their duties involved professional level duties 
requiring specific bachelor's degrees. 4 
The Petitioner has also not provided adequate evidence to demonstrate that the Beneficiary 
supervised foreign employees and contractors in his U.S. capacity. For instance, the Petitioner 
asserts that the Beneficiary oversaw four foreign departments while assigned to the United Stales 
affiliate, including subordinate employees and professionals making up these departments. 
However, it provides little supporting documentation to substantiate this claim, such as foreign 
payroll documentation or evidence reflecting the Beneficiary delegating tasks to these foreign 
departments and employees. Likewise, the . Petitioner submits little supporting evidence to 
demonstrate that manufacturers and suppliers with which it deals can be considered part of the 
company's organizational chart. In fact, the Petitioner provides emails and transactional documents 
indicating that the Beneficiary dealt with these suppliers in an arms-length fashion indicating that he 
does not have managerial authority over these manufacturers and suppliers. 
Furthermore, the provided evidence leaves significaill question as to whether the Petitioner had 
developed sufficiently to support the Beneficiary in a managerial capacity. For instance, the 
4 In evaluating whether a beneficiary manages profcssibnal employees, we must evaluate whether the subordinate 
positions require a baccalaureate degree as a minimum for entry into the field of endeavor. Cf 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2) 
(defining "profession" to mean "any occupation for which a U.S. baccalaureate degree or its foreign equivalent is the 
minimum requirement for entry into the occupation"). Section I 0 I (a)(32) of the Act, states that "[t]he term profession 
shall include but not be limited to architects, engineers, 'lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and teachers in elementary or 
secondary schools, colleges, academies, or seminaries." 
"7 
.
Matter of R-lnc. 
Beneficiary was first approved for a L-lA nonimmigrant intracomp any tran sfe ree visa in July 2010. 
However, in response to the NOIR in April 2017, the Petitioner indicated tha t it was still in ''Phase 
1 ~ ' of its business plan involving "product development and formulation in accordance with expor t 
country requirements." It ulso stated that Phase 1 include d research· and development , proces s 
validation, the preparation and submittal of a product dossier to the Federal Drug Administration 
(FDA), and lastly, "first commercial production." The Petitione r also mentioned a ''very time­
consuming FDA process" related to getting its proposed supplements approved for manufacture and 
sale. 
The Petitioner's business plan was to manufacture supplements and vitamins in the United States 
and sell them on the Philippine and other Asian markets . However , the re is little indication that after 
more than seven years from the approval ofthe Beneficiary's first petition in July 2010 to the date of 
this appeal in January 2018 that the Petition er has successfully executed its plaf_ls to manuf acture and 
sell vitamins and supplements in the United States. For instanc e, in resp onse to the NOIR, the 
Petitioner referencea sales at and through and lists contacts from these companies 
as part of its organizational chart. However, there is no supporting evidence to indic ate that the 
Petitioner is selling 
its supplements through these vendors. Indeed, the Peti tioner's most recent IRS 
1120S from 2016 indicat es that it only earned $150,473 in revenu e and paid no salaries or wages 
during that year. Otherwise, the Petitioner provides no other supporting evidence to establish that it 
was sufficiently developed such that it could support the Benefi ciary in a manag erial capa city. 
' 
Therefore , based on the foregoing, the Petitioner has not established tha t the Beneficiary acted as a 
personnel manager. · 
On appeal, the Petitioner also asserts that the Benefici ary qualifies as a function manager overse eing 
regulatory affairs, logistics , and finance functiOI)S. The term "function mana ger" applie s generally 
when a benefici ary does not supervise or control the work of a subordinute staff but instead is 
primarily responsi ble for managing an "ess ential function" within the organization. See section 
101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act If a p etitioner claims that a beneficiary will manage an esse ntial 
function, it must clearly describe the duti es to be performed in managing the essential function. In 
addition , the petitioner must demo nstrate that "( 1) the function is a clearly defined activity; (2) the 
function is 'esse ntial,' i.e., core to the organization; (3) the beneficiary will prima rily manage, as 
opposed to perform, the function; (4) the beneficiary will act at a senior level within the 
organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and (5) the beneficiary will 
exerc ise discr etion over the function's day-to-day operations." Matter of G- Inc., Adopted Decision 
2017-05 (AAO Nov. 8, 2017). 
The Petitioner has not demonstrated that the Beneficiary acted as a function manager. As discussed, 
the Petitioner has provided subs tantial ev idenc~ reflecting the Beneficiary ~ s involvem ent in non­
qualifying operational tasks such as issuing pu~chase orders to su ppliers , work ing on supp lement 
bottle specifications, receiving quotes from suppliers, sending supplement samples, arranging for the 
shipment of pills, sending information to clients on where to send payment, sending · checks to 
Malter of R- Inc. 
suppliers, and making labels. This documentary evidence dates up to, and after, the date of the 
NOIR. 
Therefore, the evidence indicates that the Beneficiary was more likely performing his asserted 
functions rather than managing them. The Petitioner has not provided adequate evidence to 
demonstrate that the Beneficiary had subordinates in the United States, or that it engaged foreign 
employees and contractors, as of the date of the NOIR, to primarily relieve him from performing his 
functions. In fact, as we have discussed, the supporting documentation indicates that the Beneficiary 
was substantially involved in logistics and bookkeeping duties, rather than managing his asserted 
functions. In addition, there is little evidence to demonstrate that the Beneficiary was also relieved 
of regulatory matters; as submitted evidence indicates that he submitted documentation for the 
potential approval of supplements by the FDA and there is little evidence that he primarily delegated 
this function to claimed subordinates. Therefore, the Petitioner has not established that the 
Beneficiary acted as a function manager. 
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the Director properly revoked the previously 
approved petition, as the Petitioner did not establish that the Beneficiary acted in a managerial 
capacity. For this reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
III. QUALIFYING RELATIONSHIP 
Although not addressed by the Director in the revocation notice, we note that it does not appear the 
Petitioner has a qualifying relationship with the Beneficiary's former foreign employer. See section 
101(a)(15)(L); see also 8 C.F.R. 214.2(1)(1)(ii)(G) (providing definitions of the terms "parent," 
"branch," "subsidiary," and "affiliate") and 8 C.F.R. 214.2(1)(14)(ii)(A) (requiring evidence that 
petitioners and foreign entities are "still qualifying organizations"). 
The Petitioner stated in the petition that it and the foreign employer are affiliates. The regulation at 
8 C.F.R. 214.2(I)(1)(ii)(L) defines affiliates as: (1) one of two subsidiaries both of which arc owned 
and controlled by the same parent or individual, br (2) one of two legal entities owned and controlled 
by the same group of individuals, each individ~al owning and controlling approximately the same 
share or proportion of each entity. · 
The Petitioner submitted evidence indicating that it is owned by three shareholders, while the foreign 
employer is owned by five shareholders. The evidence does not indicate that either of these entities 
is primarily controlled by any company or individual; for instance, the evidence retlects that the 
Beneficiary owns 35% of the Petitioner along with two other shareholders holding 35% and 30% 
interests respective! y. As such, the entities cannot qualify as affiliates based on the ownership and 
control by a specific individual or company. Further, they cannot otherwise qualify as affiliates 
since the foreign employer is owned by five shareholders, while the Petitioner is owned by three. 
Therefore, the companies are not one of two legal entities owned and controlled by the same group 
of individuals with each individual owning and controlling approximately the same share or 
9 
Matter of R-Inc. 
proportion of each entity. In fact, to the extent that the Petitioner and foreign employer have 
common owners, these owners own differing percentages of the companies. 
The record does not establish the required qualifying relationship between these entities; therefore, 
even if the Petitioner had overcome the ground of revocation discussed above on appeal, we would 
have been required to remand this matter to the Director for the issuance of a new NOIR to address 
this additional ground of eligibility. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Petitioner has not established that the Beneficiary was employed in a managerial capacity; 
therefore, the revocation of the approved petition. will not be disturbed. 
ORDER: . The appeal is dismissed. 
Cite as Matter of R- Inc., ID# 1383912 (AAO June 28, 2018) 
10