dismissed L-1A Case: Product Distribution

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rm. A3042 
Washington, DC 20529 
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-< lL2 4-L % 1 L/LJ-~ 2 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
VE~~T SERVICE CEN? EK Date: 
IN RE: Petitioner: 
Beneficiary: 
PETITION: Petition for a Noninlrnigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(lS)(L) of the'lrnmigration 
and Nationality Act, S U.S.C. S 1101 (a)(15)(L) 
ON REHtIl7 OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have bsen returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
pRobert P. Wiernann, Director 
/ Adrninirtia~ive Appeals Office 
EAC 02 197 50308 
Page 2 
I 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petition for a nonirnrnigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to extend the employment of its office manager as an 
L-1A intracompany transferee pursuant to 5 lOl(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 
U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is a corporation organized in the State of New York that is engaged 
in the distribution and sale of the foreign entity's products in the United States. The petitioner claims that it is 
the subsidiary of the beneficiary's foreign employer, located in Haryana, India. The petitioner now seeks to 
extend the beneficiary's stay for three years. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish that the beneficiary has been 
employed in the United States or would be employed under the extended petition in a primarily managerial or 
executive capacity. 
On appeal, counsel claims that Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) "failed to evaluate all of the 
available evidence," and erroneously determined that the beneficiary would not be performing managerial 
functions in the United States entity. Counsel contends in a brief submitted in support of the appeal that the 
director incorrectly based his denial on thz belief thdt the beneficiary would perform the services of the 
Susiness because of the smal1 size of the petitioning organization. 
'Yo establish L-1 eligibility, thz petitioner must meet the criteria outliried in sectioi~ lOl(a)(lS)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 5 1 10 1 (a)(lS)(L). Specifically, within three years 
preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, a qualifying organization rnust 
have employed the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized 
knowledge capacity, for one continuous year. h dddition. the beneficiary must seek to eiiter the United States 
temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof 
in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3) states that an individuai petition iiled on Porm 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization whir,h employed or will employ the alien are 
qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment abroad with a 
qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of the petition. 
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior education, 
training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended services in the United States; 
however. the work in the United States need not be the same work which the alien performed abroad. 
EAC 02 197 50308 
Page 3 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(14)(ii) also provides that a visa petition, which involved the opening of a 
new office, may be extended by filing a new Form 1-129, accompanied by the following: 
(A) Evidence that the United States and foreign entities are still qualifying organizations as 
defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section; 
(B) Evidence that the United States entity has been doing business as defined in paragraph 
(l)(l)(ii)(H) of this section for the previous year; 
(C) A statement of the duties performed by the beneficiary for the previous year and the duties 
the beneficiary will perform under the extended petition; 
(D) A statement describing the staffirig of the new operation, including the number of employees 
and types of positions held accompanied by evidence of wages paid to employees when the 
beneficiary will be employed in a management or executive capacity; and 
(E) Evidence of the financial status of the United States operation. 
The issue in the present proceeding is whether the beneficiary would be employed by the United States entity 
in a priniarily managerial or executive capacity.' 
Section I Ol(a)(u)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. '$ I lOl(a)(M)(A), provides: 
The tenn "managerial capacity" means an assignmei~t within an organizatioii in which the zmployee 
primarily- 
(i) Manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function. or component of 
the organization; 
(ii) Supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential ,Function within the organization, or a department or 
subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) Has the authority to hire and fire or recornmend those as well as other personnel actions 
(such as promotion and leave authorization) if another employee or other employees are directly 
supervised; if no other employee is directly supervised, functions at a senior level within the 
organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and 
(iv) Exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function for whjch 
?he employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be acting in a managerial 
capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised 
are professioi~al. 
I As the present matter relates to the extension of a petition involving a new office the beneficiary is not 
required under the regulations to have been employed in the petitioning organization in a primarily 
managerial or executive capacity prior to the filing of this petition. 
EAC 02 197 50308 
Page 4 
Section IOl(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 llOl(a)(LW)(B), provides: 
The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee 
primarily- 
(i) Directs the management of the organization or a raajor component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) Establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component. or function; 
(iii) Exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(iv) Receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of 
directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
The pctitioner filed the instant petition on May 21.2002, noting that the beneficiary would be employed in the 
United States entity as the company's office manager. The petitioner indicated on the petition that the 
Seneficiary7s proposed job duties would hclude managing all details of the business, makiilg discretioilary 
decisicis, and hiring and filing enlployees. In an accompanying letter dated May 16, 3002, the petitioner 
stated that the beneficiay would 5e em~loycd in the TJnited States in a managerial role, and would be given 
full discretionary zuthority to enter into sales negotiations, to determine shippillg schedules, lo establish 
prices, to conduct all aspects of the petitioner's marketing, and to control the local office. 'rhe petitioner 
noted on the petition that it presently employed six workers, including the beneficiary, and stated in its May 
2,002 letter that the beneficiary would supervise the following employees: sale supervisor; sales staff; arld a 
marketing manager. The petitioner explained that the beneficiary "[would] be responsible for managing and 
directing all of these individuals together with supervisory personnel that we anticipate hiring in order to 
market our products in the United States." 
The director subsequently issued a request for evidence on June 30, 2002. Noting that additional evidence 
was needed in order to determine the beneficiary's employment capacity, the direcror asked that the petitioner 
submit the following: (1) an organizational chart of the United States entity inciicating the beneficiary's 
position in the hierarchy; (2) a comprehensive description of the beneficiary's job duties indicating how the 
beneficiary's proposed eniployment meets the regulatory requirements for managerial or executive capacity; 
and (3) descriptions of the positions and educational credentials of the beneficiary's subordinate employees, 
including a breakdown of the number of hours each employee would devote to their individual job 
responsibilities. 
Counsel responded in a letter dated September 23, 2002. In his response, counsel outlined the regulatory 
requirements for managerial and executive capacity, and stated that the beneficiary's proposed responsibilities 
relate most to the criteria of an executive.' Counsel stated that although the petitioner maintains five 
Throughout counsel's response to the director's request for evidence counsel erroneously refers to the 
regulatory requirements relating to petitions for employment-based immigrants. The AAO notes that the 
appropriate statute and regulation are section lOl(a)(lS)(L) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L) and the 
regulation at 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1). 
EAC 02 197 50308 
Page 5 
employees on its payroll records, "it is important to note that the concept of an executive, as defined by 8 
C.F.R. [$I 204[.]5(j)(2)[,] incorporates a functional manager or an individual with broad discretion to 
establish the goals and policies of the organization," and therefore, the fact that the beneficiary is managing 
employees "is not dispositive in determining if the beneficiary satisfies the definition of an intracompany 
executive." Counsel explained that while in the "executive position" of "founder and president," the 
beneficiary has been responsible for the petitioner's marketing, its maintenance of client contacts, formulating 
the petitioner's policies, and reviewing market analyses to determine client needs, volumc potential and price 
schedules. Counsel further stated that as the petitioner's "sole executive," the beneficiary has been 
responsible for the development, marketing and management of the company, for controlling the company's 
budget, expenses, and revenue by negotiating prices, quantities and payment terms, and for the management 
of file petitioner's accounting, marketing and sales functions. Counsel claimed that "[alccording to the 
definition of a multi-national executive, it is quite clear that [the beneficiary] is operating in an executive 
capacity," as his responsibilities "include establishing the goals qnd policies of the organization. exzrcising 
wide latitude in discretionary decision-making, and directing the management of a major component of the 
organization." 
Counsel also referred to an unpublished A40 decision, stating that it "stands for the propositior~ that a 
funciional manager with broad decision making discretion qualifies under the category of Certain 
?dultinationa! Executives arid Managers." Counsel claimed that the instant matter is analogous as the 
benzfiziary "not only iu~lctions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy -,vith respect to the 
ii~nctions 111anaged. but also has absolute authority over the firnctions, specifically sales and accountin5 which 
x-e essential to the organization." 
?n respvlisc to lhe director's Yequesc for a comprehensive description of the beneficiary's job duties; counsel 
submitted the following: 
Managing the business, administration, purchases, sales, payments, taxation, marketing, . 
customer relationship, and wholesale trade. supervise the other employees and functioii at a 
senior level within the organization[al] hierarchy with respect to the function managed. He 
has all powers and can hire and fire any employee. The beneficiary has to report to the 
director only regarding the smooth functioning of the company. This is a mna~lagerial post 
with some duties of an executive as the company just started its business in the U.S. 
Couwel lloted that in addition to the beneficiary, thz petitioner employs five workers. Counsel, however, lists 
only the following four employees: a sales associate, a packing incharge [sic], a production coordinator, and a 
bookkeeper. Counsel stated that the petitioner also hies outside companies for consulting, legal and 
accounting services, and plans to hire additional employees, such as sales representatives and executives, a 
purchase manager and marketing assistants as the company grows. Counsel provided a brief description of 
the job duties performed by each of the four employees and the employees' resumes. 
In a decision dated April 2, 2003, the director determined that the petitioner did not demonstrate that the 
beneficiary would be employed under the extended petition in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
The director stated that the petitioner's vague job description did not identify the daily activities of the 
beneficiary, and merely paraphrased the regulatory definitions of manager and executive. The director also 
noted that the record did not show that the beneficiary would be managing supervisory, professional, or 
managerial employees who would relieve the beneficiary from performing the services of the corporation, or 
EAC 02 197 50308 
Page 6 
that the petitioning organization "would realistically utilize the beneficiary as a veritable manager." The 
director concluded that the beneficiary would be involved in the non-managerial, day-to-day functions of the 
organization. Accordingly, the director denied the petition. 
In an appeal filed on May 5, 2003, counsel states that CIS erroneously concluded that the beneficiary would 
not be performing managerial functions during his employment in the United States entity. Counsel claims 
that CIS' denial of the petition "has displayed its standard bias against small corporations," as the director 
assumed that a corporation with less than an undefined number of individuals would not support a successful 
L-1 petition. Counsel challenges the director's finding that the beneficiary would perform the services of the 
corporation, and states that the nature and size of a corporation are irrelevant to detennining the capacity in 
which the beneficiary is employed. Counsel also contends that the beneficiary is responsible for managing 
the corporation, determining personnel decisions, and making discretionary decisions regarding the success of 
the basiness, and accordingly, "is at the apex of the employment hierarchy in the corporation." Counsel 
acknowledges that the beneficiary's subordinate employees are not professional or managerial, but states that 
nevertheless, the beneficiary exercises management and control over the workers' activities. 
On appeal. the petitioner has not established that  he beneficiary would be employed by the petitioning 
orgai~izatior~ in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. When examining the executive or managerial 
capacity ol the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to Lhe petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 
I?. . 1 2)(3)(. As required in the regulations, the petitioner must submit a detailed description of the I 3;uecutivt: irr maagerial services to be performed by  he beneficiary. Id. 
In the present matter, the petitioner fails to clarify whether it is claiming that the beneficiary would ,be prinn~ily 
engaged in managerial duties under section 10l(a)(44)(.4) of the Act, or primarily executive duties under 
section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act. While the petitioner stxed in its May 16, 2002, letter that the beneficiary 
would "fulfill a managerial role with our company in the United States," counsel notes in his September 2002 
letter that the beneficiary's employment more closely resembles that of an executive. In fact, counsel claimed 
that according to the regulations, the beji~eficiary would be employed as a multi-national executive, and provided 
what counsel claimed are executive job duties, such as formulating policy, reviewing rnarket analyses, 
determining the company's budget, and directing the management of accounting, marketing, and sales. 
Alternatively, counsel also stated that the beneficiary's "ManageriaVExecutive7' position includes hiring 
employees and managing the organization, which are deemed to be managerial responsibilities. See 8 C.F.R. 
5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(B). Counsel subsequently states on appeal that "the beneficiary will be performing a ~nanagerial 
function," and outlines managerial tasks to be perfonned by the beneficiary. A petitioner may not claim to 
employ a bzneficiary as a hybiid "executive/manager" and rely on partial sections of the two statutory 
definitions. A petitioner must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate 
whether such duties are either in an executive or managerial capacity. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(ii). Counsel 
fails to clarify the inconsistencies in the record, and does not establish that a beneficiary meets each of the 
four criteria set forth in the statutory definition for executive or the statutory definition for manager. 
Additionally, the petitioner provides a vague job description that also prevents the AAO from ascertaining in 
I what capacity the beneficiary would be employed. While counsel provided in his September 2002 letter a 
1 brief outline of the beneficiary's proposed job duties, he also stated that: 
The position of Managermxecutive offered to [the beneficiary] is an executive position in 
which he establishes the goals and policies of the organization, exercises wide latitude in 
EAC 02 197 50308 
Page 7 
discretionary decision-making and directs the management of a major component of the 
organization. 
Counsel also states on appeal that with regard to the beneficiary's managerial capacity, he would "manage the 
organization," "supervise and control the work of other employees," "exercise day-to-day control over the 
enterprise," and would have the authority to hire and fire employees. Conclusory assertions regarding the 
beneficiary's employment capacity are not sufficient. Merely repeating the language of the statute or 
regulations does not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 
1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 905 F. 2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990); Avyr Associates, Inc. v. Meissner, 1997 WL 
188942 at *5 (S.D.N.Y.). 
Moreover, as noted by the director, the record does not show that under the extended petition the beneficiary 
would b=. relieved from performing non-qualifying functions of the petitioning organization. It is evident 
from both the petitioner's May 2002 letter and counsel's September 2002 letter, which describe the 
beneficiary's responsibilities as negotiating sales, determining shipping schedules, establishing prices, 
devising the company's budget, and reviewing market analyses, that the beneficiary would be perfomming 
non-managerial and non-executive operations of the business. Based on the current record, the AAO is 
unable to determinz whether the claimed managerial duties constitute the nlajority of the beneficiary's duties, 
cr wkethcl- tic: beneficiary primarily performs non-managerial administrative or operational duties. The 
3etitinner'; description of the beneficiary's job duties does not establish what proportion of tile bencficlaryts 
duties is rndnagerial in nature, and what proportion is actually non-managerial. See Kep:dblic of 7'rLivtsk~i V. 
INS, 923 F.3d 175, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Also, an employee who primarily perfonns the  asks necessary to 
prod1.1ce a product or to provide services is not considered to be employed in a managerial or exesu5ve 
capacity. ~Clcrtter of Church Scientology bzternational, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comrn. 1988). 
Counsel correctly notes on appeal that a company's size is irrelevant of the beneficiary's employment in a 
qualifying capacity. As required by section 101(a)(44j(C) of the Act, if staffing levels are used as a factor in 
determining whether an individual is acting in a managerial or executive capacity, CIS must take into account 
the reasonable needs df the organization, in light of the overall purpose and stage of development of the 
organization. However, it is appropriate for CIS to consider the size of the petitioning company in 
conju~ictior~ with other relevant factors, such as a compariy's small personnel size, the absence of employees 
who would perform the non-managerial or non-executive operations of the company, or a "shell company" 
that does not conduct business in a regular and continuous manner. See, e.g. Systronics COT. v. INS, 153 F. 
Supp. 3d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2001). The size of a company nlay be especially relevant when Z1S notes 
discrepancies in the record and fails to believe that the facts asserted are true. Id. 
To establish that the reasonable needs of the organization justify ths beneficiary's job duties, the petitioner 
must specifically articulate why those needs are reasonable in light of its overall purpose and stage of 
development. In the present matter, the petitioner has not explained how the reasonable -needs of the 
petitioning enterprise justify the beneficiary's performance of non-managerial or non-executive duties. Going 
on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of 
proof in these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Cornm. 1972): 
I 
The A40 will also address the conflicting assertions made by counsel in his response to the director's request 
for evidence. It appears that counsel is claiming in his September 2002 response that the beneficiary would 
be employed in the United States as a functional manager, even though he asserts that the beneficiary would 
EAC 02 197 50308 
Page 8 
be employed as an executive. Additionally, counsel seems to attempt to circumvent the requirement that a 
manager supervise supervisory, managerial or professional employees by claiming the beneficiary is a 
multinational executive rather than a multinational manager. Neither of counsel's claims is supported by the 
record. 
The term "function manager" applies generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a 
subordinate staff but instead is primarily responsible for managing an "essential function" within the 
organization. See section 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 lOl(a)(44)(A)(ii). If a petitioner claims 
that the beneficiary is managing an essential function, the petitioner must identify the function with 
specificity, articulate the essential nature of the function, and establish the proportion of the beneficiary's 
daily duties attributed to managing the essential function. In addition, the petitioner must provide a 
comprehensive and detailed description of the beneficiary's daily duties demonstrating that the beneficiary 
manages the function rather than performs the duties relating to the function. An employee who primarily 
performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be employed in a 
managerial or executive capacity. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. In this 
matter, counsel has not provided evidence that the beneficiary manages an essential function. 
Moreover. counszi's ciain1 that the facts in the instant matter are analogous to those in an unpublished AAO 
decisiorl is misplaced. Counsel refers to an ullp~lblished decision conccning an ir~lmjgrant petition. As the 
instant matter involves a nonirnmigrant petition, the uripublished decisiou is not cc~ntrolljng. tllso, while 8 
C.F.R. 3 103.3(c) provides that AAO precedent decisions are binding on all CIS employees in the 
administration of the Act, unpublished decisions are not sinilarly binding. 
Ful-thermore, following the filing of the nonimmigrant petition, counsel nlay not alter the employinent 
capacity of the 5eneficiat-y in order to conform to the requirements of either a lnanager or executive. See 
Matter of lzummi, 22 I&N Dec. 169, 176 (Assoc. Cornm. 1998) (determining that a petitloner may not make 
material changes to a petition in an effort to make a deficient petition conform to CIS requirements). The 
purpose of the request for evidence is to elicit further information that clarifies whether eligibility for the 
benefit sought has been established. 8 C.F.R. 8 103.2(b)(8). When responding to a request for evidence, a 
petitioner cannot offer a new position to the beneficiary, or materially change a position's title, its level of 
authority within the organizational hierarchy, or its associated job respo~~sibilities. The pztitioner inust 
establish that the position offered to the beneficiary when the petition was filed merits classification as a 
managerial or executive position. Matter of Michelin Tire Coy.. 17 I&N Dec. 248, 249 (Reg. Conlm. 1978). 
if significant cha~iges are made to the initial request for approval, the petitioner must file a new petition rather 
than seek approval of a petition that is not supported by the facts in the record. Counsel improperly clained 
that the beneficiary would be employed as an executive after the petitioner had indicated in documentation 
submitted with the nonirnmigrant petition that the beneficiary would be employed as a manager. A visa 
petition may not be approved based on speculation of future eligibility or after the petitioner becomes eligible 
under a new set of facts. See Matter of Michelin Tire Corp., 17 I&N Dec. at 249; Matter of Katigbak, 14 I&N 
Dec. 45,49 (Cornm. 1971). 
Lastly, as noted previously, counsel repeatedly references incorrect sections of the regulations in support of 
the beneficiary's qualifying employment. This blatant error not only confuses the record, but also undermines 
the legitimacy of the petition. Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a 
reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. 
Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582,591 (BIA 1988). 
EAC 02 197 50308 
Page 9 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the record does not support a finding that the beneficiary would be 
employed by the United States entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. For this reason, the 
appeal will be dismissed. 
Beyond the decision of the director, an additional issue is whether the beneficiary was employed by the 
foreign corporation in a qualifying capacity. In its May 2002 letter, the petitioner identified non-qualifying 
tasks performed by the beneficiary abroad, such as determining clothing styles, arranging customs orders, 
determining methods of manufacturing, analyzing market trends, and meeting with store executive and 
personnel to initiate sales. An employee who primarily performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or 
to provide services is not considered to be employed in a managerial or executive capacity. Matter of Church 
Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. For this additional reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
In addition, the director did not address the issue of whether the beneficiary's foreign employer and the 
petitioning entity are qualifying organizations as required in the Act at section 101(a)(15)(L), 8 U.S.C. 
?j 1101(a)(15)(L). The regulations and case law confirm that the key factors for establishing a qualifying 
relationship between the U.S. and foreign entities are ownership and control. Matter of Siemens lMedical 
Systems, Inc. 19 IdtN Dec. 362 (BIA 1986); Matter of Huglzes, 18 I&N Dec. 389 (Comm. 1982): sea niso 
Matter of Church Scizntology International, 19 I&N Dec. 592 (BIA 1988) (in immigrant visa proceedings). . 
In the context of this visa petition, awnership rzfers to the direct and indirect legal right of possessiolr of the 
aqsets of an 3ncity with full power and authority to control; control means the direct or indirect legal right anti 
authority to direct the establishment, management, and operations of an entity. rZ'latter of Church Scientology 
International, 19 I&N Dec. at 595. Here, although the petitioner submitted a stock certificate identifying the 
beneficiary's foreign employer as the parent of thz United States company, the record contains conflicting 
evidence. Schedule K of the petiticner's 2000 corporate tax return fails to indicate that at any time. during the 
tax year an individual or corporation owned a portion of the petitioner's stock. The petitioner is obligated to 
clarify the incansistent and conflicting testimony by independent and objective evidence. Matter of Ho, 19 
I&N Dec. 582,591-92 (BL4 1988). The appeal will be dismissed for this additional reason. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the A40 even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer E~iterprises, Inc. 11. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afJ. 335 F.3d 483 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor V. INS. 891 F.2~1 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals 011 a de novo basis). 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(14)(i) provides, in pertinent part, that a petition extension may be filed 
only if the validity of the original petition bas not expired. In the present case, the beneficiary's original 
petition expired on May 20, 2002. However, the petition for an extension of the beneficiary's L-1A status 
was filed on May 21, 2002, one day following the expiration of the beneficiary's status. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 
5 214.1(~)(4), an extension of stay may not be approved for an applicant who failed to maintain the previously 
accorded status or where such status expired before the application or petition was filed. As the extension 
petition was not timely filed, the beneficiary is ineligible for an extension of stay in the United States. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
director's decision will be affirmed and the petition will be denied. 
EAC 02 197 50308 
Page 10 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.