dismissed L-1A

dismissed L-1A Case: Property Management

๐Ÿ“… Date unknown ๐Ÿ‘ค Company ๐Ÿ“‚ Property Management

Decision Summary

The appeal was dismissed because the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary would be employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. The director originally denied the petition for this reason, and the petitioner did not overcome this finding on appeal.

Criteria Discussed

Managerial Capacity Executive Capacity

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U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
Of$ce ofAdministrative Appeals, MS 2090 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
FILE: EAC 08 184 5 18i9 OFFICE: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER Date: 2 $ 2010 
PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. ยง 1 101(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5 for 
the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by 
filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 
days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
Perry Rhew 
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office 
EAC 08 184 51889 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the nonimmigrant visa petition. The matter is 
now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to extend the employment of its presidentlchief 
executive officer as an L- 1 A nonimmigrant intracompany transferee pursuant to section 10 1 (a)( 15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. tj 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner, a Florida limited 
liability company, states that it is engaged in the property management business. It claims to be an affiliate of 
- located in the United Kingdom. The petitioner states that it has employed the 
beneficiary in L-1A status since 2005 and it now seeks to extend his status for two additional years. 
The director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary would be 
employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity under the extended petition. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director erroneously 
denied the petition, and based the decision on improper factors such as the beneficiary's proffered salary and 
the staffing levels of the U.S. company. Counsel submits a brief and additional evidence in support of the 
appeal. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within the three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the U.S. temporarily to continue rendering his or her 
services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate in a managerial, executive or specialized knowledge 
capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training and employment qualifies hider to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
EAC 08 184 51889 
Page 3 
The sole issue addressed by the director is whether the petitioner established that the beneficiary would be 
employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity under the extended petition. 
Section 101 (a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 I 10 1 (a)(44)(A), provides: 
The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily-- 
(i) manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or 
component of the organization; 
(ii) supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or 
managerial employees, or manages an essential function within the 
organization, or a department or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the 
authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel 
actions (such as promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee 
is directly supervised, functions at a senior level within the organizational 
hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and 
(iv) exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function 
for which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not 
considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the 
supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised are 
professional. 
Section 10 l(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 10 l(a)(44)(B), provides: 
The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily-- 
(i) directs the management of the organization or a major component or function 
of the organization; 
(ii) establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or 
function; 
(iii) exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(iv) receives only general supervision or direction from higher-level executives, 
the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
The petitioner filed Form 1-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker, on June 20,2008. The petitioner stated 
on Form 1-129 that it has four full-time employees and utilizes the services of numerous contractors. The 
EAC 08 184 51889 
Page 4 
petitioner indicated that the beneficiary's role as president and chief executive officer is to "oversee 
operations." 
On July 28, 2008, the director issued a request for additional evidence (RFE), in which he instructed the 
petitioner to submit the following additional evidence to establish that the beneficiary will be employed in a 
managerial or executive capacity: (1) a comprehensive description of the beneficiary's duties; (2) a list of the 
U.S. company's employees which identifies each employee by name and job title; (3) complete position 
descriptions for all U.S. employees, including a breakdown of the number of hours each employee devotes to 
hislher duties on a weekly basis; (4) copies of educational credentials for the beneficiary's subordinates; and 
(5) evidence of wages paid to employees in 2007 and the first half of 2008, including IRS Forms W-2, W-3, 
1096, 1099 and 94 1. 
In a response dated September 5, 2008, counsel for the petitioner provided the following description of the 
beneficiary's duties: 
Plan, direct and coordinate the operational activities of the US organization. (20%) 
Define the objectives and policies of the business organizations. (10%) 
Supervise the General Manager. (20%) 
Receive inpudreports from subordinate managers upon which to base decisions. 
(1 5%) 
Approve firing and hiring of employees and contractors (5%) 
Review and approve contracts with new clientele and subcontractors (10%) 
Conduct periodic inspections of properties to ensure customer satisfaction (5%) 
Meet with legal and accounting representatives (5%) 
Evaluate the performance of subordinate executives with regard to their compliance 
with business objectives and goals and hirelfire additional subordinate managerial 
staff as necessary. (5%) 
Coordinate and direct weekly staff meetings. (5%) 
Counsel stated that the general manager reports directly to the beneficiary and performs the following duties: 
Oversee & direct operation. (40%) 
Define and implement company's goals and policies. (10%) 
Oversee and direct managerial personnel. (1 0%) 
Overseelapprove contracts [with] independent contractors for services (2.5%) 
Determine financial goals and establish expenditure projections. (5%) 
Oversee and approve department budgets. (2.5%) 
Visit properties and client premises to assure quality of services. (20%) 
Meedconfer with accounting and legal representatives. (5%) 
Report status of company directly to owner. (5%) 
Finally, counsel stated that the administration and marketing manager reports to the general manager and 
performs the following duties: 
Oversee and control all office administration and marketing of the enterprise. (35%) 
EAC 08 184 5 1889 
Page 5 
Manageloversee document and records control. (2.5%) 
Coordinate, develop, manage, implement, and oversee the marketing plan for [the 
petitioner] (1 5%) 
Propose and implement, under general manager's supervision, marketing budget. 
(2.5%) 
Plan and prepare promotional material and advertising. (2.5%) 
Monitor market fluctuations and adjust strategies as necessary. (2.5%) 
Oversee and coordinate quality control measures. (2.5%) 
Visit properties and client premises to assure quality of services. (5%) 
Oversee, direct, and coordinate the activities of all subcontractors. (20%) 
Negotiate contracts with subcontractors for services. (2.5%) 
Authorize billing and payouts to subcontractors. (2.5%) 
Interface with clients as necessary to determine needs and concerns. Decide how best 
to address those needs and concerns. Assign subcontractors as required to ensure 
customer satisfaction. (5%) 
Report to General Manager. (2.5%) 
Counsel stated that a subcontracted accountant performs the petitioner's "office administration" including 
receiving payments, counting daily receipts, preparing daily banking, preparing billing invoices, tracking and 
filing billings from subcontractors, preparing and distributing payments to subcontractors, payroll, and 
preparing and submitting quarterly tax forms. In support of this claim, the petitioner submitted a letter dated 
September 22,2006 from a C.P.A. firm, which states that the firm has 
prepared the petitioner's tax returns since 2002 and "performed all necessary bookkeeping procedures 
required in order to complete the federal tax returns." 
The petitioner submitted an organizational chart which indicates that the petitioner utilizes the services of six 
individuals and companies to provide services including housecleaning, pool cleaning and maintenance, 
general maintenance, landscaping and yard maintenance, and pest and termite control. The petitioner 
submitted letters from two pool maintenance companies and pest control companies to confirm their 
relationship with the petitioning company. 
The petitioner submitted copies of its IRS Forms 941, Employer's Quarterly Federal Tax Return, and latest 
state quarterly wage report confirming the full-time employment of the beneficiary and his two subordinates. 
The petitioner also submitted copies of its IRS Forms 1099, Miscellaneous Income, issued to eight individuals 
and entities in 2007, including counsel, two cleaning service contractors, a general maintenance contractor, a 
pest control specialist, a landscaping company, and the administration and marketing manager. 
Counsel emphasized that all of the petitioner's advertising is done by word of mouth and through the internet, 
and that most of the business for the U.S. entity is obtained through the petitioner's United Kingdom affiliate. 
The petitioner provided a list of five websites maintained by the companies. 
The director denied the petition on December 18, 2008, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that 
the beneficiary would be employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity under the extended 
petition. In denying the petition, the director observed that the petitioner provided only a general outline of the 
beneficiary's general managerial functions insufficient to establish exactly what the beneficiary will be doing 
EAC 08 184 51889 
Page 6 
on a day-to-day basis. The director noted that neither the beneficiary's position nor the subordinate positions 
appear to be professional in nature, and questioned whether the beneficiary's proffered Salary, or that of his 
subordinates is "at a rate indicative of managerial or executive employment." The director also noted that the 
beneficiary's subordinates both received a higher salary than he did in 2007, possibly "indicating greater job 
authority than the beneficiary." The director further determined that it was not clear who was responsible for 
the company's sales, and thus found that "it seems likely that the beneficiary has performed or will perform or 
help to perform these duties," rather than performing primarily managerial or executive duties. 
While the AAO finds that the director's adverse determination was warranted based on the evidence of record, it 
is noted that the director's underlying analysis, in part, was flawed, as the director issued an adverse finding on the 
basis of the beneficiary's salary. The AAO notes, however, that a beneficiary's salary is an admissibility factor and 
not a criterion to be used in determining his or her prospective employment capacity. The director's finding with 
regard to the latter is not supported by any statute, regulations or precedent decision. 
Further, the director based the decision, in part, on a finding that the beneficiary and his subordinates are not 
professionals, and based on a finding that the petitioner's business would not require the services of professional 
workers. As discussed further below, a beneficiary need not supervise professionals in order to qualify as a 
manager or executive, nor is there any statutory or regulatory requirement that the position held by an L-1A 
manager or executive be classifiable as "professional." 
On appeal, counsel emphasizes that the petitioner provided ample evidence that the petitioner's day-to-day 
tasks and services are performed by contractors while the petitioner's employees, including the beneficiary, 
are responsible for the management of the company. With respect to the director's finding that the petitioner 
failed to establish who is generating sales for the company, counsel emphasizes that the majority of the 
petitioner's sales are generated by the foreign entity, by word of mouth, and through the company's websites. 
Counsel contends that the director displayed a negative bias based on the size of the company and incorrectly 
assumed that the beneficiary would be engaged in day-to-day tasks that are not executive or managerial in 
nature. Finally, counsel asserts that "evidence was provided to clearly show that the CEO beneficiary directs 
the organization and the functional managers of the United States entity oversee and direct the operations of 
this successful business." 
Upon review, and for the reasons stated herein, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will be 
employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity under the extended petition. 
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner's description of the job 
duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are 
in either an executive or a managerial capacity. Id. The definitions of executive and managerial capacity 
each have two parts. First, the petitioner must show that the beneficiary performs the high-level 
responsibilities that are specified in the definitions. Second, the petitioner must show that the beneficiary 
primarily performs these specified responsibilities and does not spend a majority of his or her time on day-to- 
day functions. Champion World, Inc. v. INS, 940 F.2d 1533 (Table), 1991 WL 144470 (9th Cir. July 30, 
1991). 
EAC 08 184 5 1889 
Page 7 
The fact that the beneficiary manages a business does not necessarily establish eligibility for classification as 
an intracompany transferee in a managerial or executive capacity within the meaning of sections 
101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. See 52 Fed. Reg. 5738, 5739-40 (Feb. 26, 1987) (noting that section 101(a)(l5)(L) 
of the Act does not include any and every type of "manager" or "executive"). While the AAO does not doubt 
that the beneficiary exercises discretion over the petitioner's day-to-day operations, the petitioner has failed to 
show that his duties will be primarily in a managerial or executive capacity. 
The petitioner's description of the beneficiary's duties is extremely vague and fails to establish that the 
beneficiary performs primarily managerial or executive duties. For example, in response to the director's 
request for "a comprehensive description" of the beneficiary's duties, counsel indicated that the beneficiary 
will "plan, direct and coordinate the operational activities of the U.S. organization," "define the objectives and 
policies of the business organization," and "supervise the General Manager," duties which counsel indicates 
require 50 percent of the beneficiary's time. These responses were only marginally responsive to the 
director's request for a comprehensive description of the proffered position and provided little insight into the 
nature of the beneficiary's daily duties. The petitioner has not identified the tasks the beneficiary performs to 
"coordinate the operational activities" of the company, described what is entailed by supervising the general 
manager, or provided examples of policies the beneficiary is expected to define on a day-to-day basis. 
Reciting the beneficiary's vague job responsibilities or broadly-cast business objectives is not sufficient; the 
regulations require a detailed description of the beneficiary's daily job duties. The petitioner failed to provide 
any detail or explanation of the beneficiary's activities in the course of his daily routine. The actual duties 
themselves will reveal the true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 
1 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), afd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
Although the director specifically noted the lack of a comprehensive description of the beneficiary's duties as 
a basis for the adverse finding, neither counsel nor the petitioner has attempted to further define the 
beneficiary's duties on appeal. The petitioner's failure to provide a detailed description of the proffered 
position is sufficient reason to deny the petition. 
Beyond the required description of the job duties, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 
reviews the totality of the record when examining the claimed managerial or executive capacity of a 
beneficiary, including the petitioner's organizational structure, the duties of the beneficiary's subordinate 
employees, the presence of other employees to relieve the beneficiary from performing operational duties, the 
nature of the petitioner's business, and any other factors that will contribute to a complete understanding of a 
beneficiary's actual duties and role in a business. 
The statutory definition of "managerial capacity" allows for both "personnel managers" and "function 
managers." See section 101 (a)(44)(A)(i) and (ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 10 l(a)(44)(A)(i) and (ii). Personnel 
managers are required to primarily supervise and control the work of other supervisory, professional, or 
managerial employees. Contrary to the common understanding of the word "manager," the statute plainly 
states that a "first line supervisor is not considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of 
the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised are professional." Section 
lOl(a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. !j 214.2(1)(1)(ii)(B)(2). If a beneficiary directly supervises other 
employees, the beneficiary must also have the authority to hire and fire those employees, or recommend those 
actions, and take other personnel actions. 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(B)(3). 
EAC 08 184 51889 
Page 8 
The petitioner claims that the beneficiary supervises a general manager, who in turn supervises the "functional 
manager" of administration and marketing. The AAO notes that the petitioner's descriptions of the general 
manager's duties and the beneficiary's duties are very similar and suggest that the duties of the beneficiary and 
his subordinate overlap significantly. For example, the petitioner indicates that the beneficiary will "direct and 
coordinate" the operational activities of the U.S. organization," while the general manager will "oversee & 
direct operations." The petitioner states that the beneficiary "defines the objectives and policies of the 
organization," while the general manager "defines and implements the company's goals and policies." The 
beneficiary "reviews and approves contracts" and the general manager "oversees/approves contracts." Both 
employees are responsible for meeting with accounting and legal representatives and visiting properties to 
ensure quality of services. While the petitioner indicates that the beneficiary supervises this employee, it 
appears that the beneficiary and his subordinate are performing essentially the same poorly delineated 
responsibilities. The AAO finds it reasonable to question whether a company with only three employees 
would reasonably require that two employees perform essentially the same duties, or whether it feasibly 
operates with the claimed three-tier management structure. 
Furthermore, although the petitioner indicates that the general manager will "oversee and direct managerial 
personnel," and that the marketing and administration manager will "oversee, direct and coordinate the 
activities of all subcontractors, the AAO notes that an employee will not be considered to be a manager or 
supervisor simply because of a job title, because he or she is arbitrarily placed on an organizational chart in a 
position superior to another employee, or even because he or she supervises daily work activities and 
assignments. See generally Browne v. Signal ~ouitain Nursery, L.P., 286 F.Supp.2d 904, 907 (E.D. Tenn. 
2003) (cited in Hayes v. Laroy Thomas, Inc., 2007 WL 128287 at *16 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 1 1,2007)). Rather, the 
employee must be shown to possess some significant degree of control or authority over the employment of 
subordinates. While the petitioner has documented its use of contractors, including professionals such as an 
accounting firm, the petitioner has not established the petitioner's employees' supervisory authority over 
individual workers employed by the contracted companies. The petitioner has not provided evidence of 
contracts with terms that would give the petitioning company's employees any significant degree of 
supervisory control over the contractors' employees. 
Therefore, the petitioner has not established that either of the beneficiary's subordinates actually supervise 
subordinate staff members or manage a clearly defined department or function of the petitioner, such that they 
could be classified as managers or supervisors. Furthermore, the petitioner has not established that either of 
these positions require, or that the position-holders possess, a bachelor's degree, and thus the petitioner has 
not established that the beneficiary's subordinates could be classified as professionals. 1 
' In evaluating whether the beneficiary manages professional employees, the AAO must evaluate whether the 
subordinate positions require a baccalaureate degree as a minimum for entry into the field of endeavor. 
Section 10 1(a)(32) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. fj 1 10 1 (a)(32), states that "[tlhe term profession shall include but not 
be limited to architects, engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and teachers in elementary or secondary 
schools, colleges, academies, or seminaries." The term "profession" contemplates knowledge or learning, not 
merely skill, of an advanced type in a given field gained by a prolonged course of specialized instruction and 
study of at least baccalaureate level, which is a realistic prerequisite to entry into the particular field of 
endeavor. Matter of Sea, 19 I&N Dec. 8 1 7 (Comm. 1988); Matter of Ling, 13 I&N Dec. 35 (R.C. 1968); 
Matter of Shin, 11 I&N Dec. 686 (D.D. 1966). Therefore, the AAO must focus on the level of education 
required by the position, rather than the degree held by a subordinate employee. 
EAC 08 184 5 1889 
Page 9 
The term "function manager" applies generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a 
subordinate staff but instead is primarily responsible for managing an "essential function" within the 
organization. See section 10 l(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 10 l(a)(44)(A)(ii). The term "essential 
function" is not defined by statute or regulation. If a petitioner claims that the beneficiary is managing an 
essential function, the petitioner must furnish a detailed description of the duties to be performed in managing 
the essential function, i.e. identify the function with specificity, articulate the essential nature of the function, 
and establish the proportion of the beneficiary's daily duties attributed to managing the essential function. See 
8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). In addition, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's daily duties must 
demonstrate that the beneficiary manages the function rather than performs the duties related to the function. 
Here, as discussed above, the beneficiary's duties have not been described in sufficient detail and therefore, it 
cannot be affirmatively determined that his duties are primarily managerial in nature. Absent a clear and 
credible breakdown of the actual duties the beneficiary performs and the amount of time spent by the 
beneficiary performing his duties, the AAO cannot determine what proportion of his duties would be 
managerial or executive, nor can it determine whether the beneficiary is primarily performing the duties of a 
function manager. See IKEA US, Inc. v. US. Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22,24 (D.D.C. 1999). 
The AAO notes that a company's size alone, without taking into account the reasonable needs of the 
organization, may not be the determining factor in denying a visa to a multinational manager or executive. 
See 5 101(a)(44)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(44)(C). However, in reviewing the relevance of the 
number of employees a petitioner has, federal courts have generally agreed that USCIS "may properly 
consider an organization's small size as one factor in assessing whether its operations are substantial enough 
to support a manager." Family Inc. v. US. Citizenship and Immigration Services 469 F. 3d 13 13, 13 16 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (citing with approval Republic of Transkei v. INS, 923 F 2d. 175, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Fedin Bros. 
Co. v. Sava, 905 F.2d 41, 42 (2d Cir. 1990)(per curiam); Q Data Consulting, Znc. v. INS, 293 F. Supp. 2d 25, 
29 (D.D.C. 2003)). It is appropriate for USCIS to consider the size of the petitioning company in conjunction 
with other relevant factors, such as a company's small personnel size, the absence of employees who would 
perform the non-managerial or non-executive operations of the company, or a "shell company" that does not 
conduct business in a regular and continuous manner. See, e.g. Systronics Corp. v. INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 
(D.D.C. 2001). 
At the time of filing, the petitioner was an eight-year-old property management company which employed the 
beneficiary as president and CEO, a general manager, and a marketing and administration manager. As 
discussed above, there is a great deal of overlap between the vague duties attributed to the beneficiary and the 
general manager. While the petitioner has indicated that routine tasks such as bookkeeping, property 
maintenance, housecleaning, lawn maintenance, pest control and pool services are carried out by contractors, 
the AAO notes that there are several key non-managerial functions that do not appear to have been attributed 
to any of the petitioner's employees. Furthermore, according to one of the websites referenced in counsel's 
response to the RFE, the individual identified by the petitioner as the marketing and administration manager 
is a "housekeeper and maid coordinator," while the general manager is also acting as a realtor. (See 
http://www.floridalstservices.com (last accessed on February 9, 2010)). Doubt cast on any aspect of the 
petitioner's proof may undermine the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support 
of the visa petition. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591 (BIA 1988). 
EAC 08 184 51889 
Page 10 
The petitioner manages dozens of Florida vacation properties; however, it does not claim that any of its 
employees spend any significant amount of time performing duties such as communicating with property 
owners, obtaining new clientele, or communicating with the guests staying at the properties. While the 
petitioner indicates that the foreign entity is responsible for referrals, it has not been established that the 
foreign entity's activities obviate the need for the U.S. entity to have any contact with property owners and 
guests. Overall, the petitioner has not adequately explained or documented the actual duties performed by its 
staff on a day-to-day basis, and it cannot be determined that the petitioner has a reasonable need for the 
beneficiary to perform primarily managerial or executive duties. 
Based on the foregoing, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will be employed in a primarily 
managerial or executive capacity under the extended petition. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed. 
The AAO acknowledges that USCIS previously approved an L-1A nonimmigrant petition filed on behalf of 
the beneficiary. In matters relating to an extension of nonimmigrant visa petition validity involving the same 
petitioner, beneficiary, and underlying facts, USCIS will generally give deference to a prior determination of 
eligibility. However, the mere fact that USCIS, by mistake or oversight, approved a visa petition on one 
occasion does not create an automatic entitlement to the approval of a subsequent petition for renewal of that 
visa. Royal Siam Corp. v. Chertoff, 448 F.3d 139, 148 (1st Cir 2007); see also Matter of Church Scientology 
Int'l., 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Comm. 1988). Each nonimmigrant petition filing is a separate proceeding with 
a separate record and a separate burden of proof. See 8 C.F.R. fj 103.8(d). In making a determination of 
statutory eligibility, USCIS is limited to the information contained in that individual record of proceeding, See 
8 C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(16)(ii). 
In the present matter, the director reviewed the record of proceeding and concluded that the petitioner was 
ineligible for an extension of the nonimmigrant visa petition's validity based on the petitioner's failure to 
establish that the beneficiary will be employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. In both the 
request for evidence and the final denial, the director clearly articulated the objective statutory and regulatory 
requirements and applied them to the case at hand. If the previous petition was approved based on the same 
minimal evidence of the beneficiary's eligibility, the approval would constitute gross error on the part of the 
director. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
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