dismissed L-1A

dismissed L-1A Case: Real Estate

📅 Date unknown 👤 Company 📂 Real Estate

Decision Summary

The appeal was dismissed because the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary was primarily managing an essential function by the time the extension petition was filed. The AAO rejected the argument for deference to the prior 'new office' approval, clarifying that the eligibility requirements for an initial petition (supporting a managerial role within one year) are different and less stringent than for an extension (proving the role is currently managerial).

Criteria Discussed

Managerial Capacity Function Manager Personnel Manager New Office Extension Deference To Prior Approval

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U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
Non-Precedent Decision of the
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date: NOV. 8, 2023 In Re: 29077914 
Appeal of California Service Center Decision 
Form 1-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker (L-lA Manager or Executive) 
The Petitioner - a buyer, renovator, and reseller of homes - seeks to continue temporarily employing 
the Beneficiary as its chief executive officer (CEO). The company requests an extension of his 
classification under the L-lA nonimmigrant visa category as an intracompany transferee who would 
work in a "managerial capacity." See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 
101(a)(l5)(L), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(l5)(L). 
The Director of the California Service Center denied the petition. The Director concluded that the 
Petitioner did not demonstrate its proposed employment of the Beneficiary in the claimed managerial 
capacity. On appeal, the company contends that the Director did not properly consider the Beneficiary 
as a "function manager" and should have deferred to the approval of its prior L-1 A petition for him. 
The Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating eligibility for the requested benefit by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Matter of Chawathe, 25 l&N Dec. 369, 375-76 (AAO 2010). 
Exercising de novo appellate review, see Matter of Christo 's, Inc., 26 I&N Dec. 537, 537 n.2 (AAO 
2015), we conclude that the company has not established that, by the petition's filing, the Beneficiary 
primarily managed the claimed function. We will therefore dismiss the appeal. 
I. LAW 
An intracompany transferee is a noncitizen who - for at least one continuous year in the three years 
before their initial U.S. admission in nonimmigrant status - worked abroad and seeks to enter the 
country to temporarily work for a branch, parent, affiliate, or subsidiary of their foreign employer in a 
capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized knowledge. Section 101(a)(15)(L) of 
the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(1)(ii)(A). If a U.S. petitioner seeks to employ them in a managerial or 
executive capacity, they seek L-lA classification. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS), "Instructions for Petition for Nonimmigrant Worker," 16, www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/ 
document/forms/i-129instr.pdf. If the proposed U.S. work involves specialized knowledge, they seek 
L-lB classification. Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(l) (incorporating form instructions into the 
regulations). 
II. ANALYSIS 
The record shows that the Beneficiary, an Iranian native and Canadian citizen, began working as the 
CEO of t~e Petjtjo~er's affiliate in Canada in 2009. The petitioning U.S. limited liability company 
formed in~-~2022 and, about seven months later, initially petitioned for him to work in this 
country in L-lA status. The foreign company operates the same type of business as the Petitioner. 
The Beneficiary wholly owns both entities. 
At the time of the initial L-lA petition's filing, the Petitioner had been doing business in the United 
States for less than one year. For L-1 purposes, the company was therefore a "new office," see 
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(F), and had to demonstrate that, within one year of the petition's approval, 
the business would support a managerial or executive position. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(v)(C). 
USCIS approved the Petitioner's initial petition, which was valid from September 2022 to September 
2023. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(7)(i)(A)(3) (limiting the validity ofan L-lA new office petition to one 
year). 
In May 2023, the Petitioner filed this petition, seeking to extend the Beneficiary's L-lA status for an 
additional two years. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(15)(ii) (limiting the validity of L-1 extension petitions 
to two years). A petitioner seeking to extend an L-lA new office petition must: 
• Demonstrate that the U.S. and foreign entities remain "qualifying organizations;" 
• Establish that the U.S. entity has been "doing business" for the prior year; 
• Describe the beneficiary's duties for the prior year and those they would perform under the 
extended petition; 
• Describe the staffing of the U.S. operation, including the number of employees and their types 
of positions, along with evidence of the wages they would be paid when the beneficiary works 
in a managerial or executive capacity; and 
• Submit evidence of the U.S. operation's financial status. 
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(14)(ii)(A-E). 
The Director denied this L-lA new office extension petition, finding that the Petitioner did not 
demonstrate that it would employ the Beneficiary in the claimed managerial capacity. 
A. Deferral to the Approval of the Prior L-lA Petition 
On appeal, the Petitioner contends that there have been no material changes to the Beneficiary's 
position since he began working for the U.S. company in 2022. The company therefore argues for the 
first time that, when considering the claimed managerial nature of the proposed job, the Director 
should have deferred to the approval of the company's prior L-lA petition for the Beneficiary. 
USCIS generally defers to prior nonimmigrant visa petition approvals involving the same parties and 
underlying facts. See generally 2 USCIS Policy Manual A.(4)(B)(l), www.uscis.gov/policy-manual. 
But USCIS should not follow prior approvals if: they involved material errors; circumstances or 
eligibility requirements have changed; or new material information adversely affects eligibility. Id. 
2 
Here, the eligibility requirements have changed. In its initial L-lA new office petition, the Petitioner 
did not have to demonstrate that the Beneficiary would immediately work in the claimed managerial 
capacity. Rather, as previously indicated, the company had to establish only that "[t]he intended 
United States operation, within one year of the approval of the petition, will support an executive or 
managerial position." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(v)(C). In contrast, this L-lA new office extension 
petition requires the Petitioner to demonstrate that - by the petition's filing - the company would 
employ the Beneficiary in a managerial or executive capacity. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(14)(ii)(D) 
(requiring that a beneficiary "will be employed in a managerial or executive capacity"); see also 
8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b )(1) (requiring a petitioner to demonstrate eligibility "at the time of filing the benefit 
request"). 
Because the eligibility requirements of the Petitioner's prior and current L-1 A petitions for the 
Beneficiary differ, the record does not warrant deferral to the prior approval. We therefore decline to 
follow the prior decision. We will next determine whether the evidence demonstrates the claimed 
managerial nature of the proposed U.S. work. 
B. The Nature of the Proposed U.S. Work 
The term "managerial capacity" means work "primarily" involving: 
• Managing an organization or 
a department, subdivision, function, or component of it; 
• Supervising and controlling the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or managing an essential function with the organization, department, or 
subdivision; 
• If another employee or employees are directly supervised, having authority to hire and fire 
them or to recommend those and other personnel actions, or, if no employee is directly 
supervised, functioning at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to 
the managed function; and 
• Exercising discretion over the daily operations of the activity or function for which the 
employee has authority. 
Section 10l(a)(44)(A) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(l)(ii)(B). 
As the statutory definition indicates, managerial capacity may include either a "personnel manager" 
or a "function manager." Personnel managers must primarily supervise and control the work of other 
supervisory, professional, or managerial employees. Section 10l(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act; Matter of 
Z-A-, Inc., Adopted Decision 2016-02, *4 (AAO Apr. 14, 2016). In contrast, function managers must 
primarily manage an "essential function" within the organization. Id. 
The Petitioner contends that it would employ the Beneficiary as a function manager. The company 
states that he has and would continue to manage the business's renovation function by supervising 
independent contractors and subcontractors renovating homes that the company bought. See Matter 
ofZ-A-, Adopted Decision 2016-02 at **5-6 (recognizing that, under section 10l(a)(44)(C) of the Act, 
a petitioner's reasonable staffing needs may include reliance on the work of non-employees). 
3 
To establish a beneficiary's proposed employment in a managerial capacity as a function manager, a 
petitioner must demonstrate that: 
• the function is a clearly defined activity; 
• the function is "essential," i.e., "core" to the organization; 
• the beneficiary would primarily manage - as opposed to perform - the function; 
• the beneficiary would act at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect 
to the managed function; and 
• the beneficiary would exercise discretion over the function's daily operations. 
Matter of G- Inc., Adopted Decision 2017-05, *4 (AAO Nov. 8, 2017). 1 
The Director's analysis of the Beneficiary's qualifications as a function manager contained 
contradictions. For example, noting the Petitioner's hiring of an administrative assistant/receptionist, 
the Director found that the company "did not provide any evidence demonstrating that this subordinate 
qualifies as a professional, manager, or supervisor, as contemplated by the regulations." As previously 
discussed, however, only a personnel manager must primarily supervise and control the work of other 
supervisory, professional, or managerial employees. See section 10l(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act; Matter 
ofZ-A-, Adopted Decision 2016-02 at *4. The Petitioner contends that the Beneficiary is a function 
manager, which lacks such requirements. 
A preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the renovation function that the Beneficiary would 
manage is clearly defined and essential to the Petitioner's business. The company has also established 
that he would act at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy and exercise discretion over the 
function's daily operations. 
The Petitioner, however, has not demonstrated that, by the petition's filing, the Beneficiary primarily 
managed its renovation function, as opposed to performing operational tasks. The company states that 
he has and would continue to spend about 55% of his time managing the function, including: hiring 
contractors and subcontractors; overseeing their work; buying the materials for their use; overseeing 
their progress; and resolving unforeseen issues. But the record indicates that the Petitioner did not 
begin employing its administrative assistant/receptionist until two weeks after the petition's filing on 
May 8, 2023. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(l) (requiring a petitioner to establish eligibility "at the time of 
filing the benefit request"). The Beneficiary's stated duties do not include her tasks, which reportedly 
involve: answering telephone calls, emails, and inquiries; scheduling appointments; coordinating 
meetings; ordering office supplies; greeting office visitors; creating project binders; mailing checks; 
and paying online bills. Thus, the company has not explained who performed the duties of the 
administrative assistance/receptionist at the time of the petition's filing. Because the Beneficiary was 
then the Petitioner's only employee and in the absence of other evidence, we presume that he 
performed the other position's administrative tasks at that time. Thus, because of the additional 
nonmanagerial tasks that the Beneficiary apparently performed, the company has not demonstrated 
that, by the petition's filing, he "primarily" managed the renovation function. 
1 Unlike this matter, G- involved an immigrant visa petition for a multinational executive or manager. See section 
203(b)(l)(C). 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(l)(C). But "[t]he statutory definition for 'managerial capacity' found at [section] 
101(a)(44)(A) of the Act applies to both multinational managers and L-lA managers; therefore, the following analysis 
applies equally to both classifications." Matter of G-, Adopted Decision 2017-05 at *2 n.6. 
4 
C. Doing Business the Prior Year 
Although unaddressed by the Director, the Petitioner also has not demonstrated that it was "doing 
business" the year before this petition's filing. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(14)(ii)(B). The term "doing 
business" means "the regular, systematic, and continuous provision of goods and/or services by a 
qualifying organization and does not include the mere presence of an agent or office of the qualifying 
organization in the United States and abroad." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(l)(ii)(H). 
The Petitioner submitted documentation indicating that, before the petition's filing in May 2023, it 
bought, renovated, and sold two properties in the United States. The documents indicate that the 
company bought one property in April 2022 and sold it in December 2022. The record shows that the 
company bought the other property in November 2022 and sold it in April 2023. The record, however, 
lacks sufficient evidence that these two renovation projects kept the Petitioner engaged in "regular, 
systematic, and continuous" business the year before the petition's filing. 
Also, the Petitioner's financial information for 2022 casts doubt on the renovation project the company 
purportedly completed that year. Public records show that the company bought the property for 
$225,000 in April 2022 and sold it for $361,971 in December 2022, generating an apparent income of 
$136,971. See Denton CAD [Central Appraisal District], "Property Search," 
https://propaccess.trueautomation.com/clientdb/?cid= 19. But, as shown on Schedule C, Profit or Loss 
from Business, to the Beneficiary's 2022 IRS Form 1040, U.S. Individual Tax Return, the company 
reported "0" income that year. The Schedule C reflects only business expenses, reporting an annual 
loss of $201,850. The record does not explain why, in addition to the business's expenses, the 
Beneficiary did not also report the company's apparent income in 2022. See Matter of Ho, 19 I&N 
Dec. 582, 591 (BIA 1988) (requiring a petitioner to resolve inconsistencies with independent, 
objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies). The Beneficiary's tax return therefore also casts 
doubt on the Petitioner's claimed business operations in 2022. 
The Director did not notify the Petitioner of this evidentiary deficiency or provide the company with 
an opportunity to respond. Thus, in any future filings in this matter, the company must explain the 
evidentiary discrepancies discussed above and provide additional independent objective evidence that 
it was "doing business" the year before the petition's filing. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Petitioner has not demonstrated that, by the petition's filing, the Beneficiary primarily managed 
the company's renovation function. We will therefore affirm the petition's denial. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
5 
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