dismissed L-1A Case: Real Estate Development

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U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
MATIER OF P-E-1- LTDA 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrat _ive Appeals Office 
DATE : JUNE 20, 2018 
APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER DECISION 
PETITION: FORM 1-129, PETITION FOR A NONIMMIGRANT WORKER 
The Petitioner is the foreign parent' company of a real estate dev elopment 
company. It seeks to continue the Beneficiary 's temporary employment as general manager 
under the L-lA nonimmigrant classification for intracompany transferee s. Immigr ation and Nationality 
Act (the Act) section 10l( a)(15)(L), 8 U.S.C. . § 110l(a)(l5)(L). The L-lA classification allows a 
corporation or other legal entity (including its affili ate or subsidiary) to transfer a qualifying foreign 
employee to the United States to work temporarily in a managerial or executive capacity. 
The Director of the California · Servic e Center approved the petition but later r evo ked the approval, 
concluding that the record did not establish , as requir ed, that the company emp loyed the Beneficia ry 
in the United States in a man age rial or executive capacity. 
The matter is now before us on appeal. In its appeal, the Peti tioner submits additional evidence and 
asserts that the Director erred because the Petitioner previously addressed the Director' s concerns. 
Upon de novo review, we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 A nonimmigrant visa classific ation, a qualifyin g o rgani zation must 
have employed the benefici ary " in a capacity that is managerial , executive, or involves specialized 
knowledge ," for one continuous year within three years preceding the ben efici ary' s application for 
admission into the Unit ed. States. Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. In addi tion, the benef iciar y 
must seek to enter the Unit ed States temp orarily to continue rend ering his or her serv ices to the sa me 
employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a man agerial or exec utive capacity. !d. 
II. DEFINITIONS 
"Managerial capacity " means an assignment within an organization in which the emp loyee primarily 
manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or compon ent of the organization; 
sup ervises and controls the work of oth er supervisory, profession al, or manag erial emplo yees, or 
manages an esse ntial function within the organization , or a department or subdivision of the 
organization; has authority over personnel actions or functions at a se nior ·leve l w ithin the 
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Matter of P-E-1- Lcda 
organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function manag ed; and exercises discretion over the 
day-to-day operations of the activity or function for which the employ ee has authority. Section 
101( a)(44)(A) of the Act. 
" Executive capacity "' means an assignment within an organization in which the employee primar ily 
directs the management of the organization or a major component or functi on of the organizat ion; 
establishes the goals and policies of" the organization, compon ent, or function; exe rcises wide 
latitude in discretionary decision-making ; and receives only general supervision or direction from 
higher-level execu tives, the board of directo rs, or stockhold ers of the organization. Section 
101(a)(44)(B) of the Act. 
Based on the stat utory definitions of managerial and executi ve capaci ty , the Petitioner must first 
show that the Beneficiary will perform certain high-l eve l respon sib ilities . Champion World, inc. v. 
INS , 940 F.2d 1533 (9th Cir. 199 1) (unpublished table decision) . Second, the Petitioner must prove 
that the Ben eficiar y will be primarily engag ed in managerial or exec utive duties, as opposed to 
ordinary oper ationa l activities alongsid e the Petitioner ' s o ther emp loyees. See Family Inc. v. USCJS, 
469 F.3d 1313, :1316 (9th Cir. 2006); Champion World , 940 F.2d 1533. 
-Ill. U.S. EMPLOYMENT IN A MANAGERIAL OR EXECUTIVE CA PACITY 
The Director denied the petition based on a finding that the Petiti one r did not establish that the U.S. 
company employed the Beneficiary in a managerial or executive capacity. 
When examining the manager ial or executive capacity of a given beneficiary , we w ill look to the 
petitioner's description of the job duti es. The petiti oner's description of the job duties must clearly 
describe the duti es to be perfor med by the Ben eficiary and indicate whether such duties are in a 
managerial or exec utive capacity. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(ii). Beyond the requ ired d esc ription of 
the job dutie s, we examine the comp any's organizational structu re, the duties of a benefic iary's 
subord inate employees , the presence of other employ ees to relieve a benefici ary from performing 
operat ional duties, the nature of the business, and any other factors that will cont ribute to 
understanding a beneficiary's act ual duties and role in a busine ss. 
Accordingly, we will discu ss evidence regarding the Beneficiary's job duties a long w ith evidence of 
the nature of the Petitioner ' s business and its staffing level s. We will begin with staffing, because 
that issue was the focus of the Director's decision. 
A. Staffing 
On the petition form, asked the "Current Number of Employee s in the United States," the Petitioner 
answered "3 1." In an accompanying letter, the Petiti oner stated: employs approximately 
45 persons, primarily contractors of various types." The Petitioner submitted a "Workers List" with 
37 names, including an arc hitect, re'altors, and several individu als involv ed in various s teps of 
construction such as excavation, maso nry, and lumb er sales . 
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Matter of 1'-E-1- Ltda 
The Petitioner submitted copies of contracts with a building company, a realtor, and a provider of 
"management and accounting services." Bank statements included reproductions of checks payable 
to these and other contractors. 
The Director approved the petition, but then issued a notice of intent to revoke because the Petitioner 
did not appear to have any employees, and lacks "the complexity to elevate the beneficiary to the 
level· of a manager or executive." 
In response, the Petitioner stated that it "hires contractors and sub-contractors to perform the many 
construction tasks involved in building a home." The Petitioner asserted that "[t)he amount of 
capital, the number and quality of [contractors] and the number of significant real est!lle transactions 
required, make this business extremely complex." 
In the decision revoking the approval of the petition, the Director acknowledged the company's 
reliance on contractors but found that the Petitioner did not show that the company has sufficient 
organizational complexity to warrant a managerial or executive position, or that the Beneficiary 
exercises a managerial or executive level of control over the contractors. 
On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the contractors perform all the operational functions and many 
administrative tasks. The record supports this conclusion, but a closer look at the Beneficiary's 
claimed duties supports the Director's decision to revoke the approval of the petition. Ultimately, 
the issue is not that the Petitioner lacks sufficient staff to relieve the Beneficiary from performing 
non-qualifying tasks. Rather, the issue is that the record identifies few qualifying tasks for the 
Beneficiary to perform on more than an occasional or incidental basis. 
As we will further discuss below, the record does not show continuous business activity. Instead, 
the record portrays the Beneficiary as an investor or speculator who has purchased a few 
undeveloped lots, arranged for third parties to build houses, and then sold the developed properties. 
Performing this activity through a limited liability company rather than under his own name is not 
sufficient to make the Beneficiary a manager or executive. 
B. Duties 
The definitions of managerial and executive capacity each have two parts. First, the Petitioner must 
show that the Beneficiary will perform certain high-level responsibilities. Champion World, Inc. v. 
INS, 940 F.2d 1533 (9th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table decision). Second, the Petitioner must prove 
that the Beneficiary will be primarily engaged in managerial or executive duties, as opposed to 
ordinary operational activities alongside the Petitioner's other employees. See Family Inc. v. USCIS, 
469 F.3d 1313, 1316 (9th Cir. 2006); Champion World, 940 F.2d 1533. 
The Petitioner initially stated that the Beneficiary's work in the United States "has involved setting 
up of a physical office, marketing, hiring and firing of personnel, establishment of professional 
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Matter of P-E-1- Ltda 
contacts (attorneys, account ants, engineers , contractors) , creating U.S. comp any policies, ove rsight 
of initial homebuilding projects and strategic planning for the future. " The Petitioner also claimed 
that the Benefi ciary would work full-tim e. 
In response to the notice of intent to revoke, the Petition er m aintained that it had accura tely 
described the Beneficiary's duties. None of tho se duties, howe ver, demonstrabl y placed significant 
continuing dem ands on the Beneficiary 's time during the validity period establish ed by the extension 
petition (June 2015-June 2017). The Beneficiary had already established a n etwor k of contractors to 
perform con struction and some admini strative tasks. 
With respect to "se tting up a physical office," the Beneficiar y works from an office in his home a nd 
the Pet i~ioner sometimes used the addr ess · of its management consultant for its maili ng add ress. 
(Invoices s how that, on average, the consultant work s for the Petition er for less than 11 hou rs per 
month .) The Petitioner has not shown that the Beneficiary spends a signif icant amount of time 
setting policie s, or explained how a comp any with no other employees would require the Beneficiar y 
to se t policie s. 
Concerning "strategic plannin g" and "ove rsight of initi al hom ebuildin g projects," the Petitioner 
oversaw the construction of two houses between June 2015 and June 2017 , and sold one of them 
during that time. (The sal e of the second house was pending as of Octob er 2017.) The Peti tio ner 
has not established that this volume of business activity warrant s a full-time manage r as claimed. 
Even if the Beneficiar y actively monitor s the work of doze ns of con tractors as claimed , the 
Petitioner has not establi shed that the construction of two houses kept those contractors full y 
occupied for two years. 
The Director concluded that, while co ntractors handl e man y tasks, the Benefic iary himse lf must 
perfo rm "all marketing , contract negotiation, customer servic e, secretarial, and data entry duties." 
On appeal, the management consultant who works part-time for· the Petiti oner stated that 
has little secretarial work to do. (The Beneficiary] prepares neces sary corre spondenc e a nd uses 
email frequently , I believ e." It· may be true that the Beneficiary "has little secretarial work to do," 
but the Petiti one r has not shown that he perform s mu ch of other t ypes of work either. The 
Beneficiary purchases land , e ngages contractors to deve lop it, and periodi ca lly c hecks on the work 
of the contractor s. The Petitioner has not shown· that the volum e o f act ivity that took place betwee n 
. June 2015 and June 2017 amounted to continuous business activity that warranted manage rial or 
executi ve oversight. 
The appeal includes a new list of the Beneficiary's responsibil ities: 
• Identi fy and purch ase land on which to build (10% of time spent on this dut y) 
• Sales (10% of time spent on this ·dut y) 
• Plan the cons tructi on of reside ntial projects (20% o f time spent on this dut y) 
• Oversee the construction (20 % of time spent on this duty) 
• Financial manag ement and reporting (20 % of time spent on this dut y) 
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Matter of P-E-1- Ltda 
• Responsible for legal compliance (20% of time spent on this duty) 
The Petitioner does not explain why this description is so different from the one submitted at the 
time of filing, or show that the new job description is more accurate than the earlier version. As 
noted above, the record identifies only two construction projects that were underway during the two­
year validity period established by the petition. The Petitioner does not explain how the sale of a 
single house could reasonably have taken up I 0% of the Beneficiary's working hours between June 
2015 and June 2017. The Petitioner also does not explain how the Beneficiary's duties related to 
finance occupy 20% of his time, when invoices show that a consultant spends only a fraction of that 
time actually compiling and preparing the financ[al documents. 
For the above reasons, we find that the Petitioner has not demonstrated that the Beneficiary worked 
primarily as a manager or executive under the extended petition from June 2015 to June 2017. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Petitioner did not establish that the Beneficiary worked primarily as a manager or executive 
during the term of the extended petition; therefore, the approval of the petition was properly 
revoked. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
Cite as Matter of P-E-1- Ltda, lD# 1264664 (AAO June 20, 2018) 
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