dismissed L-1A Case: Real Estate / Vacation Rentals

ideIltifyiDgdatadelfMdto
preventclearly unwarranted
invasionofpcnooalpivacy
'PUBLICCOpy
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. A3000
Washington, DC 20529
u.S.Citizenship
and Immigration
Services
File: SRC 05 25051812 Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: SEP 0 7 Z001
IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary
Petition: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(l5)(L)
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER:
SELF-REPRESENTED
INSTRUCTIONS:
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.
1{~~~;m~f
Administrative Appeals Office
www.uscis.gov
SRC 0525051812
Page 2
DISCUSSION : The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The matter
is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal.
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant visa petition seeking to extend the employment of its president as an L­
IA nonimmigrant intracompany transferee pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is a corporation organized under the laws
of the State of Florida and is allegedly engaged in the business of vacation rentals, services, real estate, and
interior design . The beneficiary was initially granted two one-year periods of stay to open a new office in the
United States, and the petitioner now seeks to extend the beneficiary's stay .
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish that the beneficiary will be
employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity.
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, the petitioner asserts that the director erred and that
the beneficiary's duties are primarily those of an executive or manager.
To establish eligibility for the L-I nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria
outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United
States. In addition , the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial , executive, or
specialized knowledge capacity.
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be
accompanied by:
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(I)(ii)(G) of this section.
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized
knowledge capacity , including a detailed description of the services to be performed.
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of
the petition.
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien 's prior
education , training , and employment qualifies him/her to perform the intended
services in the United States; however , the work in the United States need not be the
same work which the alien performed abroad.
SRC 0525051812
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The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(l4)(ii) also provides that a visa petition, which involved the opening ofa
new office, may be extended by filing a new Form 1-129, accompanied by the following:
(A) Evidence that the United States and foreign entities are still qualifying
organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section;
(B) Evidence that the United States entity has been doing business as defined in
paragraph (l)(l )(ii)(H) of this section for the previous year;
(C) A statement of the duties performed by the beneficiary for the previous year
and the duties the beneficiary will perform under the extended petition;
(D) A statement describing the staffing of the new operation, including the
number of employees and types of positions held accompanied by evidence
of wages paid to employees when the beneficiary will be employed in a
managerial or executive capacity; and
(E) Evidence of the financial status of the United States operation.
The primary issue in the present matter is whether the beneficiary will be employed by the United States
entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity.
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" as an
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily:
(i) manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of
the organization;
(ii) supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department
or subdivision of the organization;
(iii) if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to
hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as
promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised,
functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the
function managed; and
(iv) exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function for
which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be
acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory
duties unless the employees supervised are professional.
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" as an
SRC 0525051812
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assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily:
(i) directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the
organization;
(ii) establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function;
(iii) exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and
(iv) receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board
of directors, or stockholders of the organization.
The petitioner does not clarify in the initial petition whether the beneficiary is claiming to be primarily
engaged in managerial duties under section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, or primarily executive duties under
section 101 (a)(44)(B) of the Act. A beneficiary may not claim to be employed as a hybrid
"executive/manager" and rely on partial sections of the two statutory definitions. If the petitioner is indeed
representing the beneficiary as both an executive and a manager, it must establish that the beneficiary meets
each of the four criteria set forth in the statutory definition for executive and the statutory definition for
manager.
The petitioner described the beneficiary's job duties in an undated letter appended to the initial petition as
follows:
Complete discretionary authority over the activities of all staff and contractors, including
hiring and training. Supervision of all projects to completion[.] Discretionary authority over
the day-to[-]day operations of [the petitioner]. Financial and strategic planning, including
creation of financial projections reports and General Business management.
While the petitioner provided job descriptions for three other employees and several independent contractors,
the petitioner also submitted a letter from an accountant dated September 12, 2005 which reveals that the
petitioner employs two individuals, the "property manager" and the "cleaner." The "property manager" and
the "cleaner" are described as maintaining and cleaning the properties which are available for rental.
On September 28, 2005, the director requested additional evidence. The director requested, inter alia, an
organizational chart for the petitioner, more detailed descriptions of the petitioner's staff and the beneficiary's
job duties, and wage information for employees and independent contractors.
In response, the petitioner submitted an organizational chart showing the beneficiary at the top of the
organization supervising a vice president, a sales and marketing manager, the property manager, the cleaner,
and a variety of independent contractors. However, as indicated above, only the property manager and the
cleaner are employees of the petitioner. The method of compensation of the beneficiary and the sales and
marketing manager, who apparently are not employees of the petitioner, is not revealed. Also, the petitioner
failed to provide any evidence confirming the existence and/or compensation of the various independent
contractors despite the request made by the director.
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In an undated letter submitted in response to the Request for Evidence, the petitioner further described the
beneficiary as performing interior decorating tasks. The petitioner also provided the following breakdown of
the beneficiary's duties in a document appended to the undated letter:
1. Create and communicate a vision for the future of the business. 10% of
beneficiary's time will be spent on this duty
2. Establish a culture and work environment that promotes and inspires an active,
continuous improvement philosophy in regard to products and services. 1 0% of
beneficiary's time will be spent on this duty
3. Direct the development of action plans and financial reports/budgets that drive and
support all and any efforts that meet the visionary goal. 15% of beneficiary's time
will be spent on this duty
4. Ensure that all company employees, suppliers, and customers, new or prospective,
are continually aware of the commitment to excellence of quality and service and of
the specific role each is expected to play in meeting the stated goals. 50/0 of
beneficiary's time will be spent on this duty
5. Develop internal business practices that sustain freedom of expression for individuals
in an atmosphere of open, risk-free communication. 5% of beneficiary's time will
be spent on this duty
6. Define measurable goals that develop and enhance processes, systems and practices
and provide the means and resources needed to accomplish the goals. 10% of
beneficiary's time will be spent on this duty
7. Present an overview of company activity and results at a monthly plant meeting[.]
Provide reports results of activities to the Partners of the Company and to the UK
[e]ntity[.] 10% of beneficiary's time will be spent on this duty
8. Review and monitor organizational development. 10% of beneficiary's time will be
spent on this duty
9. Oversee all employee evaluations and Assist in the defining of individual
responsibilities. 5% of beneficiary's time will be spent on this duty
10. Oversee the hire and fire probes. 2.5% of beneficiary's time will be spent on this
duty
11. Monitor compliance to personnel policy and oversee the currency of such policy.
Ensure fair and equitable treatment for all employees, including the issues of
discrimination and harassment. 7.5% of beneficiary's time will be spent on this
duty
12. To assist in the building of the Interior Decor division, overseeing [that] final projects
are completed on time, and monitoring the activities of both the Sales and Marketing
Manager along with our Property Manager - both of whom deal directly with the day
to day proceedings of the Interior Decor devision. 10% of beneficiary's time will
be spent on this duty
On April 27, 2006, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that the petitioner failed to
establish that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in a managerial or executive capacity.
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On appeal, the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary's duties are primarily those of an executive or manager.
Upon review, the petitioner's assertions are not persuasive.
Title 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(3)(v)(C) allows the "new office" operation one year within the date of approval of
the petition to support an executive or managerial position. There is no provision in Citizenship and
Immigration Services (CIS) regulations that allows for an extension of this one-year period. If the business
does not have sufficient staffing after one year to relieve the beneficiary from primarily performing
operational and administrative tasks, the petitioner is ineligible by regulation for an extension. In the instant
matter, the United States operation has not reached the point that it can employ the beneficiary in a
predominantly managerial or executive position even after receiving two one-year "new office" approvals.
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(3)(ii). The petitioner's description of the job
duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are
either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. The petitioner must specifically state whether the
beneficiary is primarily employed in a managerial or executive capacity. As explained above, a petitioner
cannot claim that some of the duties of the position entail executive responsibilities, while other duties are
managerial. A beneficiary may not claim to be employed as a hybrid "executive/manager" and rely on partial
sections of the two statutory definitions.
As a threshold issue, the petitioner attempts to supplement the record on appeal with information concerning
various independent contractors. As indicated above, the director requested in the Request for Evidence that
the petitioner produce evidence regarding all employees and contractors. The petitioner was put on notice of
required evidence and given a reasonable opportunity to provide it for the record before the visa petition was
adjudicated. The petitioner failed to submit the requested evidence and now submits it on appeal. However,
the AAO will not consider this evidence for any purpose. See Matter of Soriano, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA
1988); Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533 (BIA 1988). The appeal will be adjudicated based on the
record of proceeding before the director.
The petitioner's description of the beneficiary's job duties has failed to establish that the beneficiary will act
in a "managerial" capacity. In support of its petition, the petitioner has provided a vague and nonspecific
description of the beneficiary's duties that fails to demonstrate what the beneficiary will do on a day-to-day
basis. For example, the petitioner states that the beneficiary will create a "vision for the future," establish a
"culture and work environment," direct the development of "action plans," develop "internal business
practices," and define goals. However, the petitioner never defines with any specificity the vision being
created, the work environment being established, the actions plans or business practices being developed, or
the goals being defined. The fact that the petitioner has given the beneficiary a managerial title and has
prepared a vague job description which includes inflated duties does not establish that the beneficiary is
actually performing managerial duties. Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a
beneficiary's duties are primarily executive or managerial in nature; otherwise meeting the definitions would
simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y.
1989), aff'd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not
SRC 0525051812
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sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of
California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972).
Likewise, some of the duties listed by the petitioner appear to be non-qualifying administrative or operational
tasks which do not rise to the level of being managerial or executive in nature. For example, the petitioner
described the beneficiary as overseeing the interior decor division of the business. However, it is clear from
the letter submitted in response to the Request for Evidence that the beneficiary has been and will continue to
perform the tasks necessary to provide this service. Moreover, as the organizational chart and job
descriptions for the subordinate employees fail to identify any employees or contractors who will relieve the
beneficiary of the need to perform the non-qualifying tasks inherent to the business in general, it must be
concluded that she will perform these tasks. The petitioner has only established that it employs a cleaner and
a property manager. While this establishes that it is likely that the beneficiary does not clean or maintain the
rental properties, the petitioner has not identified any employees who will relieve the beneficiary of
performing the many other non-qualifying duties associated with the business described.
Finally, the breakdown of the beneficiary's duties submitted by the petitioner is so vague that it cannot be
discerned whether the beneficiary will primarily perform qualifying duties. While the petitioner ascribes
inflated duties to the beneficiary such as "create and communicate a vision for the future of the business" and
"establish a culture and work environment," undefined, broad duties are not probative of the beneficiary
actually performing qualifying duties. A breakdown of a beneficiary's duties is only useful in ascertaining
whether he or she will primarily perform qualifying duties if the breakdown clearly defines what the
beneficiary will do and the record establishes who will perform the non-qualifying tasks inherent to any
potentially qualifying duties ascribed. As the petitioner has not established how much time the beneficiary
will devote to non-qualifying tasks, it cannot be confirmed that she will be "primarily" employed as a
manager. An employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide
services is not considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections
101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or
executive duties); see also Matter ofChurch Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm, 1988).
The petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary will supervise and control the work of other
supervisory, managerial, or professional employees, or will manage an essential function of the organization.
As explained in the organizational chart, wage reports, and job descriptions for the subordinate staff members,
the beneficiary appears to supervise a staff of three employees and, indirectly, the provision of certain
specialized services by several contracted service providers. However, the petitioner has not established that
one of the purported employees, the sales and marketing manager, is actually an employee. The sales and
marketing manager does not appear to have been compensated by the petitioner, and the scope of her
commitment to the petitioner has not been defined. Likewise, the petitioner has also not established the
existence, compensation, or nature of the various independent contractors claimed in the petition. It is unclear
what services many of these contractors provide, how often their services are needed, and how they are
compensated. Again, going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes
of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec.
190 (Reg. Comm. 1972).
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In view of the above, the petitioner has only established that it employs two individuals, a cleaner and a
property manager. However, it has not been established that these two employees are primarily engaged in
performing supervisory or managerial duties. To the contrary, it appears that these employees are performing
the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide a service. Also, the supervision or management of
independent contractors will not qualify a beneficiary to be classified as a managerial employee as a matter of
law. See section 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(l)(ii)(B)(2). The Act is quite clear that
only the management of employees may be considered a qualifying managerial duty for purposes of this visa
classification. In view of the above, the beneficiary would appear to be primarily a first-line supervisor of
non-professional employees, the provider of actual services, or a combination of both. A managerial
employee must have authority over day-to-day operations beyond the level normally vested in a first-line
supervisor, unless the supervised employees are professionals. 101(a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act; see also Matter
of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. Moreover, as the petitioner did not reveal the skill
level or educational background required to perform the duties of the two subordinate positions, the petitioner
has not established that the beneficiary will manage professional employees.' Therefore, the petitioner has not
established that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in a managerial capacity?
lIn evaluating whether the beneficiary manages professional employees, the AAO must evaluate whether the
subordinate positions require a baccalaureate degree as a minimum for entry into the field of endeavor.
Section 101(a)(32) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(32), states that "[t]he term profession shall include but not
be limited to architects, engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and teachers in elementary or secondary
schools, colleges, academies, or seminaries." The term "profession" contemplates knowledge or learning, not
merely skill, of an advanced type in a given field gained by a prolonged course of specialized instruction and
study of at least baccalaureate level, which is a realistic prerequisite to entry into the particular field of
endeavor. Matter of Sea, 19 I&N Dec. 817 (Comm. 1988); Matter of Ling, 13 I&N Dec. 35 (R.C. 1968);
Matter ofShin, 11 I&N Dec. 686 (D.D. 1966).
2While the petitioner has not clearly argued that the beneficiary will manage an essential function of the
organization, the record nevertheless would not support this position even if taken. The term "function
manager" applies generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a subordinate staff
but instead is primarily responsible for managing an "essential function" within the organization. See section
101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. The term "essential function" is not defined by statute or regulation. If a
petitioner claims that the beneficiary is managing an essential function, the petitioner must furnish a written
job offer that clearly describes the duties to be performed in managing the essential function, i.e., identify the
function with specificity, articulate the essential nature of the function, and establish the proportion of the
beneficiary's daily duties attributed to managing the essential function. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(ii). In
addition, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's daily duties must demonstrate that the beneficiary
manages the function rather than performs the duties related to the function. In this matter, the petitioner has
not provided evidence that the beneficiary will manage an essential function. The petitioner's vague job
description fails to document what proportion of the beneficiary's duties would be managerial functions, if
any, and what proportion would be non-managerial. Also, as explained above, the record establishes that the
beneficiary is primarily a first-line supervisor of non-professional employees and/or is engaged in performing
non-qualifying operational or administrative tasks. Absent a clear and credible breakdown of the time spent
by the beneficiary performing her duties, the AAO cannot determine what proportion of her duties would be
managerial, nor can it deduce whether the beneficiary will primarily perform the duties of a function manager.
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Similarly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will act in an "executive" capacity . The
statutory definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated position within a complex
organizational hierarchy, including major components or functions of the organization, and that person's
authority to direct the organization. Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act. Under the statute, a beneficiary must
have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish the goals and policies" of that organization.
Inherent to the definition, the organization must have a subordinate level of employees for the beneficiary to
direct, and the beneficiary must primarily focus on the broad goals and policies of the organization rather than
the day-to-day operations of the enterprise. An individual will not be deemed an executive under the statute
simply because they have an executive title or because they "direct" the enterprise as the owner or sole
managerial employee . The beneficiary must also exercise "wide latitude in discretionary decision making"
and receive only "general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of directors, or
stockholders of the organization." Id. For the same reasons indicated above, the petitioner has failed to
establish that the beneficiary will be acting primarily in an executive capacity. The job description provided
for the beneficiary is so vague that the AAO cannot deduce what the beneficiary will do on a day-to-day
basis. Moreover, as explained above, the beneficiary appears to be primarily employed as a first-line
supervisor and to be performing tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide a service. Therefore, the
petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in an executive capacity.
It is appropriate for CIS to consider the size of the petitioning company in conjunction with other relevant
factors, such as a company's small personnel size, the absence of employees who would perform the non­
managerial or non-executive operations of the company, or a "shell company" that does not conduct business
in a regular and continuous manner. See, e .g., Systronics Corp. v . INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D .D.C. 2001).
Moreover, in reviewing the relevance of the number of employees a petitioner has, federal courts have
generally agreed that CIS "may properly consider an organization's small size as one factor in assessing
whether its operations are substantial enough to support a manager." Family, Inc. v . U.s. Citizenship and
Immigration Services , 469 F.3d 1313 , 1316 (9
th
Cir. 2006) (citing with approval Republic of Transkei v. INS,
923 F.2d 175, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Fedin Bros. Co. v . Sava, 905 F.2d 41,42 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam); Q
Data Consulting , Inc. v. INS, 293 F. Supp . 2d 25, 29 (D .D.C. 2003).
Accordingly , in this matter, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will be primarily
performing managerial or executive duties, and the petition may not be approved for that reason.
Beyond the decision of the director , the petitioner has failed to establish that it has a qualifying relationship
with the foreign entity.
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(i) states that a petition filed on Form 1 -129 shall be accompanied by :
Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the alien are
qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(1)(ii)(G) of this section.
See also 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(l4)(ii)(A). Title 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(l)(ii)(G) defines a "qualifying organization"
See IKEA US, Inc. v . U.s. Dept. ofJustice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22, 24 (D.D.C. 1999).
SRC 05 25051812
Page 10
as a finn, corporation, or other legal entity which "meets exactly one of the qualifying relationships specified in
the definitions of a parent, branch, affiliate or subsidiary specified in paragraph (l)(l)(ii) of this section" and "is or
will be doing business." A "subsidiary" is defined in pertinent part as a corporation "of which a parent owns,
directly or indirectly, more than half of the entity and controls the entity."
The regulation and case law confirm that ownership and control are the factors that must be examined in
determining whether a qualifying relationship exists between United States and foreign entities for purposes
of this visa classification. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593; see also Matter of
Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986); Matter of Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 (Comm.
1982). In the context of this visa petition, ownership refers to the direct or indirect legal right of possession of
the assets of an entity with full power and authority to control; control means the direct or indirect legal right
and authority to direct the establishment, management, and operations of an entity. Matter of Church
Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 595.
As general evidence of a petitioner's claimed qualifying relationship, stock certificates alone are not sufficient
evidence to determine whether a stockholder maintains ownership and control of a corporate entity. The
corporate stock certificate ledger, stock certificate registry, corporate bylaws, and the minutes of relevant
annual shareholder meetings must also be examined to determine the total number of shares issued, the exact
number issued to the shareholder, and the subsequent percentage ownership and its effect on corporate
control. Additionally, a petitioning company must disclose all agreements relating to the voting of shares, the
distribution of profit, the management and direction of the subsidiary, and any other factor affecting actual
control of the entity. See Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., supra. Without full disclosure of all
relevant documents, CIS is unable to determine the elements of ownership and control.
In this matter, the only evidence submitted by the petitioner addressing its ownership and control is a single stock
certificate. The record contains no other organizational documents addressing the petitioner's ownership and
control. Once again, going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes
of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter ofSofJici, 22 I&N Dec. 158,165 (Comm. 1998)
(citing Matter of Treasure Craft ofCalifornia, 14 I&N Dec. 190).
Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to establish that it has a qualifying relationship with the foreign entity,
and the petition may not be approved for this additional reason.
The initial approvals of L-1A new office petitions do not preclude CIS from denying an extension of the
original visas based on a reassessment of the petitioner's qualifications. Texas A&M Univ., 99 Fed. Appx.
556, 2004 WL 1240482 (5th Cir. 2004). Despite any number of previously approved petitions, CIS does not
have any authority to confer an immigration benefit when the petitioner fails to meet its burden of proof in a
subsequent petition. See section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361.
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), aff'd, 345 F.3d 683
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews
appeals on a de novo basis).
SRC 0525051812
Page 11
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and
alternative basis for denial. When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can
succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's
enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043.
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the appeal will be
dismissed.
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.