dismissed L-1A

dismissed L-1A Case: Religion

📅 Date unknown 👤 Organization 📂 Religion

Decision Summary

The appeal was dismissed because the petitioner failed to establish a qualifying relationship with the beneficiary's foreign employer. The petitioner did not provide sufficient evidence of common ownership and control between the U.S. and foreign entities, and its claim that control was established by having two directors in common was not substantiated with documentary evidence.

Criteria Discussed

Qualifying Relationship Ownership Control

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U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
MATTER OF A-H-0-W-, INC. 
APPEAL OF VERMONT SERVICE CENTER DECISION 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
DATE: OCT. 4, 2016 
PETITION: FORM I-129, PETITION FOR A NONIMMIGRANT WORKER 
The Petitioner, a religious organization, seeks to extend the Beneficiary's temporary employment as its 
general manager under the L-1A nonimmigrant classification for intracompany transferees. See 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 10l(a)(15)(L), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(L). The 
L-1A classification allows a corporation or other legal entity (including its affiliate or subsidiary) to 
transfer a qualifying foreign employee to the 'united States to work temporarily in a managerial or 
executive capacity. 
The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petition. The Director concluded that the 
Petitioner did not establish that it has a qualifying relationship with the Beneficiary's former 
employer abroad. 
The matter is now before us on appeal. In its appeal, the Petitioner disputes the denial and asserts 
that the Director erred in requiring evidence of a qualifying relationship in support of a petition to 
extend approval of a previously approved nonimmigrant petition, wh~re circumstances had not 
changed from the time of the prior petition's filing. 
Upon de novo review, we will dismiss t.he appeal. 
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, a qualifying organization must 
have employed the Beneficiary in a managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge 
capacity, for one continuous year within three years preceding the Beneficiary's application for 
admission into the United States. Section 101 (a)( 15)(L) of the Act. In addition, the Beneficiary 
must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same 
employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge 
capacity. !d. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form I-129, 
Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker, shall be accompanied by: ' 
Matter of A-H-0-W-, Inc. 
(i) Evidence that the petitione~ and the organization which employed or will 
employ the alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph 
(l)(l)(ii)(G) ofthis section. 
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or 
sp~cialized knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the 
services to be performed. 
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time 
employment abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years 
preceding the filing of the petition. 
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position 
that was managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that 
the alien's prior education, training, and employment qualifies him/her to 
perform the intended services in the United States; however, the work in the 
United States need not be the same work which the alien performed abroad. 
II. QUALIFYING RELATIONSHIP 
The Director denied the petition based on a finding that the Petitioner did not establish that it has a 
qualifying relationship with the Beneficiary's foreign employer. 
To establish a "qualifying relationship" under the Act and the regulations, a petitioner must show 
that the beneficiary's foreign employer and the proposed U.S. employer are the same employer (i.e. 
one entity with "branch" offices), or related as a "parent and subsidiary" or as "affiliates." See 
generally section 101 ( a)(l5)(L) of the Act; 8 C.F .R. § 214.2(1). 
The pertinent regulations at 8 C.F .R. § 214.2(1)(1 )(ii) define the term "qualifying organization" and 
related terms as follows: 
(G) Qualifying organization means a United States or foreign firm, corporation, or 
other legal entity which: 
(1) Meets exactly one of the qualifying relationships specified in the 
definitions of a parent, branch, affiliate or subsidiary specified in 
paragraph (1)(1 )(ii) of this section; 
(I) Parent means a firm, corporation, or other legal entity which has subsidiaries. 
(J) Branch means an operating division or office of the same organization housed in a 
different location. 
2 
(b)(6)
Matter of A-H-0-W-, Inc. 
\ 
(K) Subsidiary means a firm, corporation, or other legal entity of which a parent 
owns, directly or indirectly, more than half of the entity and controls the entity; or 
owns, directly or indirectly, \half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, 
/ directly or indirectly, 50 percent of a 50-50 joint venture and has equal control 
and veto power over the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, less than half of the 
entity, but in fact controls the entity. 
(L) Affiliate means 
/ 
(1) One of two subsidiaries both ofwhich are owned and controlled by the 
same parent or individual, or 
(2) One of two legal entities owned and controlled by the same group of 
individuals, each individual owning and controlling approximately the 
same share or proportion of each entity .... 
A. Evidence of Record 
On the L Classification Supplement to Form I-129, the Petitioner stated that it is a subsidiary of 
located in Brazil, the Beneficiary's last foreign employer abroad. The 
Petitioner referred to its supporting statement where it explained that it is a non-profit organization 
that "is operated and controlled by its members and directors" rather than by shareholders. The 
Petitioner further explained that the Brazilian entity maintains its control over the Petitioner by 
virtue of the fact that two out of three of the Petitioner's "member-directors" are also "agents and 
appointees" of the Brazilian entity. Accordingly, the Petitioner asserted that the Brazilian entity 
derived its "two thirds controlling stake" in the U.S. entity by virtue of appointing the two 
"Brazilian-based managers" to direct the U.S. operation. 
The Director subsequently issued a request for evidence (RFE), 1 informing the Petiti~ner that it must 
provide evidence to show that it has a qualifying relationship with the Beneficiary's employer 
abroad. 
The Petitioner's response included a statement where/ the Petitioner claimed that it continues to 
maintain the same parent-subsidiary relationship with the Beneficiary's former employer in Brazil. 
The Petitioner once again pointed out that it is a non-profit entity that is controlled by its members 
and directors, as opposed to shareholders. 
1 The record shows that the Director issued a total of two RFEs on January 30, 2014, and April 30, 2014, respectively. 
Only the second RFE addressed the issue of a qualifying relationship. 
3 
'Matter of A-H-0-W-, Inc. 
c/ 
After reviewing the Petitioner's submissions, the Director denied the Petition, concluding that the 
Petitioner did not submit sufficient evidence to establish that it and the Beneficiary's former 
employer in Brazil share common ownership as claimed. 
On appeal, the Petitioner submits a statement disputing the Director's decision accompanied by the 
foreign entity's by-laws and the Petitioner's incorporation documents. 
B. Analysis 
Upon review of the petition and the evidence of record, including materials submitted in support of 
the appeal, we conclude that the Petitioner has not established that it has a qualifying relationship 
with the foreign entity. 
The regulation and case law confirm that ownership and control are the factors that must be 
examined in determining whether a qualifying relationship exists between United States and foreign 
entities for purposes of this visa classification. See Matter of Church Scientology Int 'l, 19 I&N Dec. 
593 (BIA 1988); see also Matter of Siemens Med. Syss., Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986); Matter 
of Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 (Comm'r. 1982). In the context of this visa petition, ownership refers 
to the direct or indirect legal right of possession of the assets of an entity with full power and 
authority· to control; control means the direct or indirect legal right and authority to direct the 
establishment, management, and operations of an entity. Matter of Church Scientology Int 'l, 19 I&N 
Dec. at 595. 
In the present matter, the Petitioner has consistently stressed that unlike a for-profit co'rporation, 
which is generally controlled by its shareholders, the Petitioner, to the extent that it claims to -be a 
non-profit corporation, is controlled by its members and directors. The Petitioner also emphasized 
that the Brazilian entity has control over the leadership of the petitioning entity by virtue of having 
appointed two of the Petitioner's directors who are also members of the foreign entity. The 
Petitioner pointed out that its board chairman is the same individual who serves as president of the 
foreign entity. Regardless of the claim that the Petitioner and the Brazilian have two directors in 
common, this claim is not sufficient to satisfy the element of common control. The Petitioner has 
not provided information to establish how the alleged common control is exercised or what specific 
functions the two directors actually control. Going on record without supporting documentary 
evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the_ burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter 
ofSoffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) (quoting Matter ofTreasure Craft of California, 14 
I&N Dec. 190 (Reg'l Comm'r 1972)). 
Further, neither the appeal nor any of the previously submitted documents properly address the other 
critical element, which is the matter of ownership of the two entities. Ra~her, the Petitioner 
seemingly indicates that ownership requirements should not apply in the present matter based on the 
fact that the instant Petitioner is a non-profit organization. First, the Petitioner has not provided 
evidence to establish that it is a designated non-profit organization. Moreover, the Petitioner's 
assertion that non-profit designation would excuse it from meeting its evidentiary burden, is not 
4 
Matter of A-H-0-W-, Inc. 
' ' 
supported by either case law precedent or by any statute or regulation. The same statutory and 
regulatory criteria apply universally to every petitioner seeking the L-1 visa classification, regardless 
of whether that petitioner is a for-profit or a non-profit organization. See Matter of Church 
Scientology Int'l, 19 I&N Dec.at 597 ("In view ofthe congressional intent that the 'L-1' provisions 
be used for personnel transferred by international businesses, the only appropriate standards for 
determining 'L-1' eligibility are those applied to businesses."). As noted above, a determination of 
whether or not a qualifying relationship exists between two entities necessarily involves an analysis 
of two factors - ownership and control. Here, the Petitioner has not demonstrated that the two 
entities have common control, as the Petitioner claims, and has not properly addressed the issue of 
ownership, thereby neglecting to establish that the U.S. and Brazilian entities are similarly owned. 
Accordingly, in light of the above deficiencies, we find that the Petitioner has not provided sufficient 
evidence to establish that is has a qualifying relationship with the Beneficiary's foreign employer 
and on the basis of this determination the instant petition cannot be approved. 
III. EMPLOYMENT IN A MANAGERIAL OR EXECUTIVE CAPACITY 
Beyond the Director's decision, the record does not establish that the Beneficiary would be 
employed in the United States and that he was previously employed abroad, in a managerial or 
executive capacity. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) ofthe Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" 
as "an assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily": 
\ 
(i) manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or 
component of the organization; 
(ii) supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or 
managerial employees, or manages an essential function within the 
organization, or a department or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the 
authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel 
actions (such as promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee 
is directly supervised, functions at a senior level within the organizational 
hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and 
(iv) exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or 
function for which the employee has authority. 
Further, "a first-line supervisor is not considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by 
virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised are professional." !d. 
5 
Matter of A-H-0-W-, Inc. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" 
as "an assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily": 
(i) directs the management of the organization or a major component or 
function of the organization; 
(ii) establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or 
function; 
(iii) exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(iv) receives only general supervision or direction from higher-level executives, 
the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
If staffing levels are used as a factor in determining whether an individual is acting in a managerial 
or executive capacity, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) must take into account 
the reasonable needs of the organization, in light of the overall purpose and stage of development of 
the organization. See section 101(a)(44)(C) ofthe Act. 
A. U.S. Employment in a Managerial or Executive Capacity 
1. Evidence of Record 
In support of the Form I-129, the Petitioner provided a statement in which Petitioner stated that 
under the extended petition, the Beneficiary would "essentially perform the same duties as perform 
[sic] during the initial startup period" with some difference in allocating more time to some duties 
and less time to others. The Petitioner provided the following list of the Beneficiary's proposed job 
duties reflecting the changes, where applicable: 
1. Supervising and directing activities of subordinate managers and personnel (No 
change); 
2. supervising [sic] and directing the recruitment of volunteers and their roles and 
scope of operations. It is expected that responsibilities under this category will be 
decreased owing to hiring, training and delegation of these responsibilities to 
appropriate personnel .... 
3. planning [sic], developing, and establishing policies and procedures in accordance 
with corporate objectives regarding the start up [sic] of the U[.]S[.] operations; 
Working [sic] with the Board of Directors to determine strategy and the effective 
execution and formulation of corporate policy, and coordinating, executing, and 
managing company policy as it relates to the marketing and fundraising strategy (the 
determination and implementation of the business plan of the company as it seeks to 
develop U.S. activities). Responsibilities under this category will also become 
relaxed since most of the planning, developing and establishing of policies and 
6 
Matter of A-H-0-W-, Inc. 
procedures have been implemented. To the extent that policy and procedure going 
forward may change owing to the developmynt of new fundraising strategy, [the 
Beneficiary]' s responsibilities under this category may fluctuate between substantial 
to minimal time under this category. 
4. working [sic] with recipients on charitable contributions and evaluating which 
needy persons and individual merit Church assistance. [The Beneficiary]'s 
responsibilities under this category will shift from individuals to group and 
organizational assistance as fundraising is slated to increase during the extended 
period in accordance with corporate goals and Board resolution. Accordingly, [the 
Beneficiary]'s responsibilities under this category will probably no [sic] change in 
the amount of time devoted .... 
5. directing [sic] and coordinating financial and fiscal policies (No change); [sic] 
6. supervising [sic] compilation of financial data and reporting of same to the 
respective authorities (Little or no change); [sic] 
7. establishing [sic] hiring and firing standards and administering the same (Little or 
no change); [sic] 
8. negotiating [sic] and signing of all significant contracts entered into between the 
U.S. entity and third parties in the U.S. marketing (Some change). Responsibilities 
under this category will be delegated to the accountant; [sic] 
9. examining [sic] fund raising [sic] reports and goals· and reporting to [the foreign 
entity] (No change); 
10. collaborating [sic] with subordinate managers and supervisors regarding new 
fundraising strategies and ideas, new company's goals and markets, and training 
programs required, as well as budgetary requirements to accomplish those goals (No 
change); and 
11. creating [sic] and developing new alliances with other churches and charitable 
organizations (No change). 
The Petitioner also provided a list of employees and their respective job descriptions in the following 
positions: administrative assistant, accountant, co-pastor, counselor, and event planner. 
In the first RFE, the Director instructed the Petitioner to submit evidence that the Beneficiary will be 
employed in a managerial or executive capacity in the United States. The Director instructed the 
Petitioner to provide an additional job description, listing the Beneficiary's job duties and their 
respective time allocations. 
In response to the RFE, the Petitioner provided the following hourly breakdown of job duties: 
1. Supervising and directing activities of subordinate managers and personnel and 
supervising and directing the recruitment of volunteers and their roles and scope of 
operations. (2 hrs.) 
2. Coordinating, executing, and managing company policy as it relates to the 
marketing and fundraising strategy[.] (2 hrs.) 
Matter of A-H-0-W-, Inc. 
3. Working with recipients of charitable contributions and evaluating which needy 
persons and individuals merit Church assistance. (3 hrs.) 
4. Directing and coordinating financial and fiscal policies[.] (45 min); [sic] 
5. Supervising compilation of financial data and reporting of same to the respective 
authorities[.] (15 min); [sic] 
6. Establishing hiring and firing standards and administering the same[.] (30 min); 
[sic] 
7. Examining fund raising [sic] reports and goals and reporting same to [the foreign 
entity.] (1 hr.); [sic] 
8. Collaborating with subordinate managers and supervisors regarding new fundraising 
strategies and ideas, new company's goals and markets, and training programs 
required, as well as budgetary requirements to accomplish those goals[.] (1-2 hrs); 
and [sic] 
9. Creating and developing new alliances with other churches and charitable 
organizations[.] (1 hr.). 
The Petitioner added that the "paid employees of the organization" and the "pool of volunteers" will 
relieve the Beneficiary from having to perform the non-managerial job duties of the organization. 
The Petitioner contended that the positions of accountant, co-pastor, counselor, and event planner are 
all professional positions. 
2. Analysis 
Upon review of the petition and the evidence of record, we conclude that the Petitioner has not 
established that the Beneficiary will be employed in a managerial or executive capacity under the 
extended petition. 
When examining the, 'managerial or executive capacity of the Beneficiary, we will look first to the 
Petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.P.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The Petitioner's description 
of the job duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the Beneficiary and indicate 
whether such duties are in a managerial or executive capacity. ld. 
The definitions of managerial and executive capacity each have two parts. First, the Petitioner must 
show that the Beneficiary will perform certain high-level responsibilities. Champion World, Inc. v. 
INS, 940 F.2d 1533 (9th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table decision). Second, the Petitioner must prove 
that the Beneficiary will be primarily engaged in managerial or executive duties, as opposed to 
ordinary operational activities alongside the Petitioner's other employees. See Family Inc. v. USCIS, 
469 F.3d 1313, 1316 (9th Cir. 2006); Champion World, 940 F.2d 1533. 
In the present matter, the Petitioner claimed on Form I -129 Supplement L, section 1 ( 5), that the 
Beneficiary's primary responsibility would be to manage a place of worship. However, the hourly 
breakdown the Petitioner provided to describe how the Beneficiary would go about managing a 
church is vague and therefore does not establish that the position would be primarily comprised of 
8 
Matter of A-H-0-W-, Inc. 
managerial or executive job duties. While the Petitioner claimed that the Beneficiary would allocate 
3-4 hours of his time to overseeing and working with subordinate managers, the Petitioner did not 
list specific daily tasks that comprise overseeing subordinate managers, nor did the Petitioner 
establish that it had managerial personnel for the Beneficiary to manage. The Petitioner's list of 
employees includes an administrative assistant, an accountaqt, a co-pastor, a counselor, and an event 
planner. Looking to the job descriptions of these individuals, none would be assigned any 
managerial or supervisory tasks. Therefore, it is unclear how the Beneficiary would oversee 
"subordinate managers" when there is no evidence that any subordinate managerial positions existed 
in the Petitioner's staffing at the time of filing .. USCIS may reject any assertion of fact that it finds 
reason to believe is untrue. Section 204(b) ofthe Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b); see also Anete~hai v. INS, 
876 F.2d 1218, 1220 (5th Cir.1989); Lu-Ann Bakery Shop, Inc. v. Nelson, 705 F. Supp. 7, 10 
(D.D.C.1988); Systronics Corp. v. INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2001). While the Petitioner 
also contends that these positions are of a professional nature, the record lacks evidence to support 
this claim. The Petitioner has not provided evidence to establish that any of the subordinate 
positions require a baccalaureate degree to perform the assigned duties. 2 Going on record without 
supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in 
these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) (citing Matter of 
Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm'r 1972)). 
Further, the Petitioner has not established that the Beneficiary's role with regard to marketing and 
fundraising, working with recipients of charitable contributions, and creating alliances with other 
religious and charitable organizations (which would cumulatively consume another six hours per day 
of the Beneficiary's time) would result in the performance of managerial or executive job duties. 
The Petitioner has not provided evidence to show that it employs any personnel who would relieve 
the Beneficiary from having to actually carry out the organization's fundraising and marketing tasks; 
nor do we find that working with actual and potential recipients of charitable contributions, or 
collaborating with charitable organizations can be readily deemed as tasks to be performed within a 
managerial or executive capacity. Rather, these duties appear to be part of the daily operational 
functions of a church, thereby indicating that the Beneficiary's performance of such duties would be 
deemed as time spent outside the realm of a managerial or executive capacity. An employee who 
"primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not 
considered to be "primarily" emplpyed in a managerial or executive cap,acity. See sections 
101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial 
or executive duties); see also Matter ofChurch Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. 
Beyond the required description of the job duties, USCIS reviews the totality of the record when 
examining the claimed managerial or executive capacity of a beneficiary, including the company's 
organizational structure, the duties of a beneficiary's subordinate employees, the presence of other 
2 In evaluating whether the Beneficiary manages professional employees, we must evaluate whether the subordinate 
positions require a baccalaureate degree as a minimum for entry into the field of endeavor. Cf 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2) 
(defining "profession" to mean "any occupation for which a United States baccalaureate degree or its foreign equivalent 
is the minimum requirement for entry into the occupation"). · 
9 
Matter of A-H-0-W-, Inc. 
employees to relieve a beneficiary from performing operational duties, the nature of the business, 
and any other factors that will contribute to understanding a beneficiary's actual duties and role in a 
business. 
As discussed above, the Petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence of an organizational 
hierarchy capable of relieving the Beneficiary from having to allocate his time primarily to 
nonmanagerial or nonexecutive tasks. While the job descriptions of the Petitioner's support 
personnel indicate that certain operational tasks ,~ould be assigned to individuals other than the 
Beneficiary, the Petitioner has not establish that its current staffing is sufficient to support the 
Beneficiary ip a primarily managerial or executive capacity. Based on the evidence submitted, the 
wages paid to the Petitioner's support staff, ranging from $200-$400 per month, are commensurate 
wi~h those of part-time employment. This calls into question the likelihood that a part-time staff 
would be capable of relieving the Beneficiary from having to carry out the Petitioner's operational 
and administrative functions on a daily basis. The Petitioner's claim that it would have "a pool of 
volunteers of varying backgrounds and credentials" is similarly dubious, as the Petitioner has 
provided no evidence establishing that it has access to "a pool of volunteers" or that the volunteers 
would have the credentials to meet the Petitioner's needs and the capacity to relieve the Beneficiary 
from having to carry out primarily operational and administrative tasks. In fact, the Petitioner 
offered no meaningful information as to the specific tasks the alleged "pool of volunteers" would be 
asked to perform. As stated earlier, going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not 
sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of So.ffici, 22 
I&N Dec. at 165. 
The various staffing deficiencies discussed above give further cause to question how the Petitioner 
planned to relieve the Beneficiary from having to allocate his time primarily to nonmanagerial and 
nonexecutive job duties when the support staff it employed at the time of filing was comprised of 
part-time employees who lacked the educational credentials and work experience to carry out the job 
duties that were listed in their respective job descriptions. In fact, it is unclear who, if not the 
Beneficiary, would provide the full-time services of a pastor, given that the individual the Petitioner 
named as the assistant pastor not only Jacks the credentials to assume the position, but is also 
employed on a limited part-time basis. As previously stated, an employee who "primarily" performs 
the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily" 
employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act 
(requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also 
Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. 
Given the above described deficiencies, we find that the Petitioner has not established that the 
Beneficiary would be employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
10 
Matter of A-H-0-W-, Inc. 
B. Foreign Employment in a Managerial or Executive Capacity 
Upon reviewing the record, we find no evidence to support the conclusion that the Beneficiary was 
employed abroad in a, managerial or executive capacity. Although the Petitioner writes "See 
[P]etitioner letter" at section 1(6) of the Form I-129 Supplement L when asked to provide a 
' description of the job duties the Beneficiary performed during his claimed employment abroad, the 
supporting statement included only a description of the Beneficiary's proposed job duties. As stated 
in our prior discussion of the Beneficiary's proposed employment, a detailed job description is 
equally critical to the issue of whether the Beneficiary's position abroad fits the statutory definition 
of managerial or executive capacity. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(iii). Given that this critical 
information is missing from the Petitioner's supporting documents, we cannot conclude that the 
Beneficiary primarily performed tasks within a managerial or executive capacity. 
Further, the Petitioner did not provide evidence or information about the foreign entity's 
organizational hierarchy that would establish who, if anyone, served as the Beneficiary's 
subordinates and who was performing the daily operational tasks of the foreign organization so that 
the Beneficiary could allocate his time primarily to the performance of managerial or executive 
tasks. 
'Accordingly, in light of the evidentiary deficiencies described above, the Petitioner has not 
established that the Beneficiary was employed abroad in a managerial or executive capacity. 
IV. PRIOR APPROVALS 
Finally, the Petitioner asserts that USCIS previously granted the requested status, thereby 
recogmzmg that the Petitioner and the Beneficiary meet the applicable eligibility 
requirements. However, it must be emphasized that each petition filing is a separate proceeding with 
a separate record. In making a determination of statutory eligibility, USCIS is limited to the 
information contained in that individual record ofproceeding. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16)(ii). That 
said, if the previous nonimmigrant petition was approved based on the same unsupported assertions 
that are contained in the current record, the approvals would constitute material error on the part of 
the Director. We are not required to approve applications or petitions where eligibility has not been 
demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals that may have been erroneous. See Matter of 
Church Scientology Int'l, 19 I&N Dec. at 597. USCIS is not required to treat acknowledged errors 
as binding precedent. Sussex Eng'g. Ltd. v. Montgomery, 825 F.2d 1084, 1090 (6th Cir. 
1987). Furthermore, we are not bound to follow a contradictory decision of a service center. See La. 
Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS, 44 F. Supp. 2d 800, 803 (E.D. La. 1999). 
II 
Matter of A-H-0-W-, Inc. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The petition will be denied and the appeal dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each 
considered as an independent and alternative b~sis for the decision. In visa petition proceedings, the 
burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains with the petitioner. Section 291 of the 
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361; Matter ofOtiende, 26 I&N 127, 128 (BIA 2013). Here, that burden has not 
been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
Cite as Matter of A-H-0-W-, Inc., ID# 98164 (AAO Oct. 4, 2016) 
12 
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