dismissed L-1A Case: Residential Care

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
File: 
 WAC 07 156 52 1 14 
 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER 
 Date: MAY 2 0 2008 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonirnrnigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 3 1 101(a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS : 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
-Robert P. Wiemann, Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
WAC 07 156 521 14 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimrnigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant visa petition seeking to extend the employment of its president as an L- 
1 A nonimmigrant intracompany transferee pursuant to section 1 O 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. tj 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is a corporation organized under the laws 
of the State of California that claims to operate a "residential care home." The beneficiary was granted a one- 
year period of stay to open a new office in the United States, and the petitioner now seeks to extend the 
beneficiary's stay. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish: (I) that the beneficiary will be 
employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity; or (2) that the petitioner has a 
qualifying relationship with the foreign employer in the Philippines. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel to the petitioner asserts that the director 
erred and that the beneficiary's duties are primarily those of an executive. Counsel also asserts that the 
petitioner has established that it and the foreign employer are qualifying organizations. In support, counsel 
submits a brief and additional evidence, including job descriptions for the beneficiary and the petitioner's 
employees as well as an amended tax return. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his 
or her.services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. tj 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
WAC 07 156 521 14 
Page 3 
education, training, and employment qualifies himlher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(14)(ii) also provides that a visa petition, which involved the opening of a 
new office, may be extended by filing a new Form 1-1 29, accompanied by the following: 
(A) 
 Evidence that the United States and foreign entities are still qualifying 
organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section; 
(B) 
 Evidence that the United States entity has been doing business as defined in 
paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(H) of this section for the previous year; 
(C) 
 A statement of the duties performed by the beneficiary for the previous year 
and the duties the beneficiary will perform under the extended petition; 
(D) 
 A statement describing the staffing of the new operation, including the 
number of employees and types of positions held accompanied by evidence 
of wages paid to employees when the beneficiary will be employed in a 
managerial or executive capacity; and 
(E) 
 Evidence of the financial status of the United States operation. 
The first issue in the present matter is whether the beneficiary will be employed by the United States entity in 
a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 1101(a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
the organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department 
or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to 
hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as 
promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised, 
functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the 
function managed; and 
(iv) 
 exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function for 
which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be 
WAC 07 156 521 14 
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acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory 
duties unless the employees supervised are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) 
 establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(iv) 
 receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board 
of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
The petitioner does not clarify in the initial petition whether the beneficiary will primarily perform managerial 
duties under section 101 (a)(44)(A) of the Act, or primarily executive duties under section 101 (a)(44)(B) of 
the Act. Although counsel appears to limit the beneficiary to the executive classification on appeal, counsel 
does not clearly indicate that the petitioner is not claiming that the beneficiary will be employed in a 
managerial capacity. Given the lack of clarity, the AAO will assume that the petitioner is asserting that the 
beneficiary will be employed in either a managerial or an executive capacity and will consider both 
classifications. 
The petitioner describes the beneficiary's proposed duties in the Form 1-129 as follows: 
Alien will continue to serve and perform as the PresidentIGeneral Manager of [the petitioner] 
and will remain responsible for the overall managemen[t] and direction of the company. 
The petitioner also claims in an attached list to employ the beneficiary, two "caregiverladrninistrators," one 
"caregiver," and one "caregiverldriver." 
Finally, the petitioner submitted an organizational chart. The chart shows the beneficiary at the top of the 
organization directly supervising a "vice presidentlsecretary," a worker who does not appear on the attached 
list of employees. The "vice presidentlsecretary" is, in turn, portrayed as supervising four "caregivers" and a 
"treasurerladministrator," who is described as a "caregiverladministrator" in the attached list of employees. 
The "treasurerladministrator" is described as supervising a contracted bookkeeper. 
On June 18, 2007, the director requested additional evidence. The director requested, inter alia, a more 
detailed description of the beneficiary's duties in the United States, including a breakdown of the percentages 
of time devoted to each duty; job titles and job descriptions for all subordinate employees, including 
breakdowns of the percentages of time devoted to each of the ascribed duties; copies of the petitioner's 
California wage reports for the first quarter of 2007; and copies of the petitioner's most recent Forms W-2 and 
W-3. 
WAC 07 156 521 14 
Page 5 
In response, counsel submitted a letter dated September 4,2007 in which he described the beneficiary's duties 
as follows: 
Overall management and direction of the U.S. Subsidiary; 
Overall operational control of the U.S. Subsidiary; 
Staff, supervise, and evaluate employees of the U.S. Subsidiary; 
Develop and manage financial policy and capital structure for the U.S. Subsidiary; 
Develop and manage expansion strategy for U.S. Subsidiary; 
Conduct site acquisition for future residential care facility location; 
Lead the planning process to develop goals for quality care, employee retention and 
financial performance; 
Ensure prompt corrective action is implemented for any compliance deficiencies by 
the two residential facilities; 
Building and strengthening the U.S. subsidiary infrastructure, personnel team, and 
additional locations; 
Manage governance and control programs to ensure business continuity, protect U.S. 
Subsidiary assets, and comply with corporate and regulatory policies; and; 
Accountable for overall performance of U.S. subsidiary. 
The petitioner also submitted a copy of its wage reports for the first quarter of 2007. These reports indicate 
that the petitioner employed three workers during this timeframe - the beneficiary, the treasurerladministrator 
(also described as caregiverladministrator), and a single "caregiver." The record does not contain evidence 
addressing the purported employment of the "vice presidentlsecretary" or the three additional "caregivers" 
that the petitioner claimed to employ. The record also does not contain copies of Forms W-2 or W-3, job 
descriptions for the subordinate employees, or breakdowns of the percentages of time devoted to each of the 
ascribed job duties for either the beneficiary or the subordinate workers. 
On November 5, 2007, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that the petitioner failed to 
establish that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in a managerial or executive capacity. 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the beneficiary's duties are primarily those of an executive. In support, 
counsel submitted a "revised" list of job duties for the beneficiary, a description of the duties of the 
subordinate employees, and personnel records. 
Upon review, counsel's assertions are not persuasive. 
Title 8 C.F.R. 4 214.2(1)(3)(v)(C) allows the "new office" operation one year within the date of approval of 
the petition to support an executive or managerial position. There is no provision in Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (CIS) regulations that allows for an extension of this one-year period. If the business 
does not have sufficient staffing after one year to relieve the beneficiary from primarily performing 
operational and administrative tasks, the petitioner is ineligible by regulation for an extension. Future hiring 
plans may not be considered. A visa petition may not be approved based on speculation of future eligibility 
or after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of facts. See Matter of Michelin Tire 
Corp., 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. Comm. 1978); Matter of Katigbak, 14 I&N Dec. 45,49 (Cornrn. 1971). In the 
WAC 07 156 521 14 
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instant matter, the United States operation has not reached the point that it can employ the beneficiary in a 
predominantly managerial or executive position. 
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner's description of the job 
duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are 
either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. 
As a threshold matter, it is noted that counsel's attempt on appeal to supplement the record with a "revised" 
job description for the beneficiary and, for the first time, to submit job descriptions for the petitioner's claimed 
subordinate employees was inappropriate, and these job descriptions will not be considered by the AAO. The 
director clearly requested job descriptions for the beneficiary and the petitioner's other employees in the 
Request for Evidence. However, the petitioner failed to submit the requested evidence. The only description 
of the beneficiary's job duties was provided by counsel, and the underlying record is devoid of any description 
of the subordinate employees. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. Matter of 
Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); Matter of Laureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); Matter of 
Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). Counsel now attempts to submit this evidence on 
appeal. However, the AAO will not consider this evidence for any purpose. See Matter of Soriano, 19 I&N 
Dec. 764 (BIA 1988); Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533. The appeal will be adjudicated based on the 
record of proceeding before the director. 
In this matter, the counsel's uncorroborated description of the beneficiary's job duties, to the extent this 
constitutes evidence, fails to establish that the beneficiary will act in a "managerial" or "executive" capacity. 
In support of the petition, the petitioner has submitted a vague and non-specific job description which fails to 
sufficiently describe what the beneficiary will do on a day-to-day basis. For example, counsel states that the 
beneficiary, in operating a residential care home employing between two and four additional workers, will 
develop and manage financial policy and expansion strategy; lead the planning process to develop goals for 
quality care, employee retention, and financial performance; and manage governance and control programs to 
ensure business continuity. However, the petitioner does not specifically define these financial policies, 
expansion strategies, care, retention, and financial performance goals, or governance and control programs. 
Furthermore, general managerial-sounding duties such as "overall management and direction of the 
[petitioner]" and "accountable for overall performance" are not probative of the beneficiary performing 
qualifying duties. 
The fact that the petitioner has given the beneficiary a managerial or executive title and has prepared a vague 
job description which includes inflated job duties does not establish that the beneficiary will actually perform 
managerial or executive duties. Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties 
are primarily executive or managerial in nature; otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a matter 
of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1 103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), afd, 905 
F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for 
purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 
I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comrn. 1972). Overall, the job description provided by counsel is not persuasive in 
establishing that any of the enumerated duties is a managerial or executive duty. 
WAC 07 156 52114 
Page 7 
Likewise, as the petitioner also failed to provide a breakdown indicating the percentages of time devoted to 
each of the beneficiary's, and his subordinate employees', ascribed duties, it cannot be concluded that the 
beneficiary will, be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. An employee who 
"primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be 
"primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act 
(requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also Matter of 
Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Cornrn. 1988). Failure to submit requested 
evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 
5 103.2(b)(14). Accordingly, even if the petitioner had established that any of the beneficiary's duties were 
managerial or executive in nature, which it has not, the petitioner has failed to explain how much time the 
beneficiary will devote to each of his duties or what, exactly, the claimed subordinate employees will do to 
relieve the beneficiary of the need to primarily perform non-qualifying tasks associated with the provision of 
a service. 
The petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary will supervise and control the work of other 
supervisory, managerial, or professional employees, or will manage an essential function of the organization. 
As asserted in the record, the beneficiary will directly or indirectly supervise between two and four workers. 
However, as noted above, the record is devoid of evidence addressing the duties or skills of these claimed 
workers even though this evidence was specifically requested by the director. Once again, any failure to 
submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 
8 C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(14). Absent job descriptions for these claimed workers, it is impossible to conclude that 
any of them is a supervisory, managerial, or professional employee. Regardless, given the size and nature of 
the petitioner's business, i.e., the operation of one or two residential care homes for the elderly, it is not 
credible that the enterprise has acquired an organizational complexity which would require the employment of 
a subordinate tier of managers or supervisors ultimately managed by a primarily managerial or executive 
employee. To the contrary, it appears more likely than not that the beneficiary and his claimed subordinate 
workers will primarily provide the services necessary to the enterprise. See generally Family, Inc. v. US. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, 469 F.3d 13 13, 13 16 (9th Cir. 2006). 
In view of the above, the beneficiary would appear to be primarily a first-line supervisor of non-professional 
workers, the provider of actual services, or a combination of both. A managerial employee must have 
authority over day-to-day operations beyond the level normally vested in a first-line supervisor, unless the 
supervised employees are professionals. 101 (a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act; see also Matter of Church Scientology 
International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. Moreover, as the petitioner failed to establish the skills and education 
required to perform the duties of the subordinate positions, the petitioner has not established that the 
beneficiary will manage professional employees.' Therefore, the petitioner has not established that the 
beneficiary will be employed primarily in a managerial capacity.2 
I 
In evaluating whether the beneficiary will manage professional employees, the AAO must evaluate whether 
the subordinate positions require a baccalaureate degree as a minimum for entry into the field of endeavor. 
Section 101 (a)(32) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 10 1 (a)(32), states that "[tlhe term profession shall include but not 
be limited to architects, engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and teachers in elementary or secondary 
schools, colleges, academies, or seminaries." The term "profession" contemplates knowledge or learning, not 
merely skill, of an advanced type in a given field gained by a prolonged course of specialized instruction and 
WAC 07 156 521 14 
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Similarly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will act in an "executive" capacity. The 
statutory definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated position within a complex 
organizational hierarchy, including major components or functions of the organization, and that person's 
authority to direct the organization. Section lOl(a)(44)(B) of the Act. Under the statute, a beneficiary must 
have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish the goals and policies" of that organization. 
Inherent to the definition, the organization must have a subordinate level of employees for the beneficiary to 
direct, and the beneficiary must primarily focus on the broad goals and policies of the organization rather than 
the day-to-day operations of the enterprise. An individual will not be deemed an executive under the statute 
simply because they have an executive title or because they "direct" the enterprise as the owner or sole 
managerial employee. The beneficiary must also exercise "wide latitude in discretionary decision making" 
and receive only "general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of directors, or 
stockholders of the organization." Id. 
For the same reasons indicated above, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will act 
primarily in an executive capacity. The job description provided for the beneficiary is so vague that the AAO 
cannot deduce what the beneficiary will do on a day-to-day basis. Moreover, as explained above, it appears 
that the beneficiary will be primarily employed as a first-line supervisor and will perform the tasks necessary 
to produce a product or to provide a service. Therefore, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary 
will be employed primarily in an executive capacity. 
study of at least baccalaureate level, which is a realistic prerequisite to entry into the particular field of 
endeavor. Matter of Sea, 19 I&N Dec. 817 (Corn. 1988); Matter of Ling, 13 I&N Dec. 35 (R.C. 1968); 
Matter of Shin, 11 I&N Dec. 686 (D.D. 1966). 
2 
While the petitioner has not argued that the beneficiary will manage an essential function of the organization, 
the record nevertheless would not support this position even if taken. The term "function manager" applies 
generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a subordinate staff but instead is 
primarily responsible for managing an "essential fbnction" within the organization. See section 
101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. The term "essential fbnction" is not defined by statute or regulation. If a 
petitioner claims that the beneficiary is managing an essential function, the petitioner must furnish a written 
job offer that clearly describes the duties to be performed in managing the essential function, i.e., identify the 
function with specificity, articulate the essential nature of the function, and establish the proportion of the 
beneficiary's daily duties attributed to managing the essential function. See 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). In 
addition, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's daily duties must demonstrate that the beneficiary 
manages the function rather than performs the duties related to the function. In this matter, the petitioner has 
not provided evidence that the beneficiary will manage an essential hction. The petitioner's vague job 
description fails to document that the beneficiary's duties will be primarily managerial. Also, as explained 
above, the record establishes that it is more likely than not that the beneficiary will primarily be a first-line 
supervisor of non-professional employees and will perform non-qualifying operational or administrative 
tasks. Absent a clear and credible breakdown of the time spent by the beneficiary performing his duties, the 
AAO cannot determine what proportion of his duties will be managerial, nor can it deduce whether the 
beneficiary will primarily perform the duties of a function manager. See IKEA US, Inc. v. US, Dept. of 
Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22,24 (D.D.C. 1999). 
WAC 07 156 521 14 
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The size of a company by itself, without taking into account the reasonable needs of the organization, may not 
be the determining factor in denying a visa to a multinational manager or executive. See 5 101(a)(44)(C) of 
the Act, 8 U.S.C. 4 1101(a)(44)(C). However, in reviewing the relevance of the number of employees a 
petitioner has, federal courts have generally agreed that CIS "may properly consider an organization's small 
size as one factor in assessing whether its operations are substantial enough to support a manager." Family, 
Inc. v. US. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 469 F.3d at 1316 (citing with approval Republic of 
Transkei v. INS, 923 F.2d 175, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1991)); Fedin Bros. Co. v. Suva, 905 F.2d 41,42 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(per curiam); Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 293 F. Supp. 2d 25, 29 (D.D.C. 2003). Furthermore, it is 
appropriate for CIS to consider the size of the petitioning company in conjunction with other relevant factors, 
such as a company's small personnel size, the absence of employees who would perform the non-managerial 
or non-executive operations of the company, or a "shell company" that does not conduct business in a regular 
and continuous manner. See, e.g. Systronics Corp. v. INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7,15 (D.D.C. 2001). 
Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will primarily perform managerial or 
executive duties, and the petition may not be approved for that reason. 
The second issue in the present matter is whether the petitioner has established that it has a qualifying 
relationship with the foreign employer in the Philippines. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(i) states that a petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be accompanied by 
"[elvidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the alien are qualifying 
organizations." 
 See also 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(14)(ii)(A). 
 Title 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(G) defines a 
"qualifying organization" as a firm, corporation, or other legal entity which "meets exactly one of the 
qualifying relationships specified in the definitions of a parent, branch, affiliate or subsidiary specified in 
paragraph (l)(l)(ii) of this section" and "is or will be doing business." "Subsidiary" is defined in pertinent part as 
a corporation "of which a parent owns, directly or indirectly, more than half of the entity and controls the entity." 
8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(K). "Doing business" is defined in part as "the regular, systematic, and continuous 
provision of goods andlor services.'' 8 C.F.R. 5 2 14.2(1)(l)(ii)(H). 
The regulation and case law confirm that ownership and control are the factors that must be examined in 
determining whether a qualifying relationship exists between United States and foreign entities for purposes 
of this visa classification. Matter of Church Scientology International, 1 9 I&N Dec. 593; see also Matter of 
Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 1 9 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1 986); Matter of Hughes, 1 8 I&N Dec. 289 (Comrn. 
1982). In the context of this visa petition, ownership refers to the direct or indirect legal right of possession of 
the assets of an entity with full power and authority to control; control means the direct or indirect legal right 
and authority to direct the establishment, management, and operations of an entity. Matter of Church 
Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 595. 
As general evidence of a petitioner's claimed qualifying relationship, stock certificates alone are not sufficient 
evidence to determine whether a stockholder maintains ownership and control of a corporate entity. The 
corporate stock certificate ledger, stock certificate registry, corporate bylaws, and the minutes of relevant 
annual shareholder meetings must also be examined to determine the total number of shares issued, the exact 
number issued to the shareholder, and the subsequent percentage ownership and its effect on corporate 
control. Additionally, a petitioning company must disclose all agreements relating to the voting of shares, the 
WAC 07 156 521 14 
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distribution of profit, the management and direction of the subsidiary, and any other factor affecting actual 
control of the entity. See Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362. Without full disclosure 
of all relevant documents, CIS is unable to determine the elements of ownership and control. 
Furthermore, the regulations specifically allow the director to request additional evidence in appropriate 
cases. See 8 C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(3)(viii). As ownership is a critical element of this visa classification, the 
director may reasonably inquire beyond the issuance of paper stock certificates into the means by which stock 
ownership was acquired. As requested by the director, evidence of this nature should include documentation 
of monies, property, or other consideration hrnished to the entity in exchange for stock ownership such as 
wire transfer receipts, cancelled checks, or deposit receipts. 
In this matter, the petitioner asserts that the foreign employer in the Philippines owns 70% of the petitioner's 
stock. In support, the petitioner submits organizational documents, a stock certificate representing the 
issuance of 70 shares to the foreign employer dated November 17, 2004, and a stock ledger recording the 
issuance of 70 shares to the foreign employer in exchange for a $10,000.00 investment. However, the 
petitioner also submitted a copy of its 2006 Form 1120-A, U.S. Corporation Short-Form Income Tax Return, 
which indicates that no single individual or entity owned more than 50% of the petitioner's stock and which 
fails to assign a value to its common stock. Accordingly, it appears from the 2006 Form 1120-A that the 
petitioner was not majority owned by the foreign employer. It is also noted that the instructions to the 2006 
Form 1120-A clearly prohibit its use for United States corporations having "foreign shareholders that directly 
or indirectly own 25% of more of its stock." I.R.S. Form 1120-A (Instructions) (2006). Finally, while the 
petitioner submitted evidence that the foreign employer has transferred money to the petitioner, this evidence 
refers to transfers made in 2007. The record does not contain evidence addressing the foreign employer's 
claimed purchase of the petitioner's stock in 2004. 
On June 18,2007, the director requested additional evidence. The director requested, inter alia, evidence that 
the foreign employer actually purchased its claimed 70% ownership interest in the petitioner. 
In response, counsel submitted a letter dated September 4,2007 in which he asserts the following: 
The Foreign Corporation paid $10,000 for the purchase of 70 percent of the common stocks 
of the U.S. Subsidiary. This amount was deposited into the business checking account of the 
U.S. Subsidiary. [Exhibit 3, Business Checking Account for November 20041. The 
requested copy of the wire transfer advice for this amount is not available as the fund was 
carried in cash by the Beneficiary, as PresidentIGeneral Manager of the Foreign Corporation, 
into the United States. 
The petitioner submitted a copy of its November 2004 bank statement indicating that $10,000.00 was 
deposited into its account on November 12, 2004 and a letter dated July 2004 from the foreign employer 
claiming that the beneficiary and his spouse "were provided by [the] company a business trip budget of 
$6000.00 each." 
On November 5, 2007, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that the petitioner failed to 
establish that it has a qualifying relationship with the foreign employer. Specifically, the director noted the 
WAC 07 156 521 14 
Page 11 
petitioner's failure to establish that .the foreign employer ever purchased its 70% interest and that, according to 
the petitioner's tax return, the petitioner has not issued any stock. 
On appeal, counsel argues that the foreign employer's payment of $10,000 to the petitioner is irrelevant 
because the petitioner has submitted a stock certificate indicating that the foreign employer owns 70% of the 
petitioner's stock. Counsel also argues that the record sufficiently establishes that the beneficiary and his 
spouse carried the foreign employer's initial investment in cash from the Philippines. Finally, counsel submits 
an amended tax return, a 2006 Form 1120, in which the petitioner claims that it "inadvertently" omitted 
shareholder information in the initially filed 2006 Form 1 120-A. 
Upon review, counsel assertions are not persuasive. 
The record in this matter is not persuasive in establishing that the foreign employer actually purchased its 
70% interest in the petitioner. Despite counsel's arguments to the contrary, stock certificates alone are not 
sufficient evidence to determine whether a stockholder maintains ownership and control of a corporate entity, 
and the director may reasonably inquire beyond the issuance of paper stock certificates into the means by 
which stock ownership was acquired. 
Here, the petitioner's claim that the beneficiary and his spouse carried the foreign employer's $10,000.00 
investment in cash from the Philippines is not credible and is not supported by the record as a whole. If CIS 
fails to believe that a fact stated in the petition is true, CIS may reject that fact. Section 204(b) of the Act, 8 
U.S.C. 8 1 154(b); see also Anetekhai v. I.N.S., 876 F.2d 121 8, 1220 (5th Cir. 1989); Lu-Ann Bakery Shop, Inc. 
v. Nelson, 705 F. Supp. 7, 10 (D.D.C. 1988); Systronics Corp. v. INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 15. While the 
petitioner submitted a letter fiom the foreign employer claiming that the beneficiary hand carried the foreign 
employer's alleged cash investment, the petitioner failed to submit a copy of its California Notice of 
Transaction Pursuant to Corporations Code Section 25102(f) evidencing this transaction. The non-existence 
or other unavailability of required evidence creates a presumption of ineligibility. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(2)(i). 
The petitioner also failed to explain how or why it "inadvertently" filed a 2006 Form 1120-A omitting stock 
valuation data and when the instructions to this form clearly prohibit its use if the taxpayer is principally 
owned by a foreign individual or entity. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in 
the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will 
not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter 
of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591 -92 (BIA 1988). Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of 
course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of 
the visa petition. Id. at 591. 
While it is noted that the petitioner submitted evidence on appeal that it submitted an amended tax return after 
the denial of the petition by the director, this filing does not resolve the inconsistency in the underlying 
record. As noted above, the petitioner failed to address how or why it "inadvertently" filed a tax form which 
is inappropriate for its purported ownershp structure and which contains averments which directly contradict 
its claim to be 70% owned by the foreign employer. The petitioner has failed to resolve this inconsistency. 
Like a delayed birth certificate, an amended tax return that was prepared years after the claimed transaction 
will not be given significant weight and raises serious questions regarding the truth of the facts asserted. C$ 
WAC 07 156 521 14 
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Matter of Bueno, 21 I&N Dec. 1029, 1033 (BL4 1997); Matter of Ma, 20 I&N Dec. 394 (BIA 
199l)(discussing the evidentiary weight accorded to delayed birth certificates in immigrant visa proceedings). 
Accordingly, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the petitioner and the foreign employer are 
qualifying organizations, and the petition may not be approved for this reason. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary was employed abroad 
for at least one continuous year in a position that was managerial or executive in nature. 8 C.F.R. $9 
2 14*2(1)(3)(iii)-(iv). 
Counsel described the beneficiary's duties abroad in a letter dated September 4, 2007. As this letter is in the 
record, the job description will not be repeated here verbatim. Generally, the beneficiary is described as being 
responsible for the "overall management and direction of the Foreign Corporation and its operations." The 
petitioner also submitted an organizational chart for the foreign entity. The chart shows the beneficiary at the 
top of the organization direction supervising an operational manager who, in turn, is portrayed as supervising 
three subordinate supervisors who, in turn, supervise the subordinate staff. 
Upon review, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary was employed abroad in a 
managerial or executive capacity. First, counsel submitted a vague description of beneficiary's job duties 
which fail to specifically describe the beneficiary's job duties abroad. Specifics are clearly an important 
indication of whether a beneficiary's duties were primarily executive or managerial in nature; otherwise 
meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 
724 F. Supp. 1103, aff'd, 905 F.2d 41. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to describe the duties of the 
beneficiary's purported subordinates abroad. Absent detailed descriptions of the duties of both the beneficiary 
and his purported subordinates, it is impossible for CIS to discern whether the beneficiary was "primarily" 
engaged in performing managerial or executive duties abroad. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act; 
see also Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. Finally, the director specifically 
requested in the June 18, 2007 Request for Evidence that the petitioner provide breakdowns of the 
percentages of time devoted to each of the duties ascribed to both the beneficiary and each subordinate 
employee. 
 The director also requested job descriptions for the subordinate employees. 
 The petitioner, 
however, chose not to submit this requested evidence. Once again, failure to submit requested evidence that 
precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(14). 
Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary was employed in a primarily managerial or 
executive capacity for one continuous year in the three years preceding the filing of the petition, and the 
petition may not be approved for this additional reason. 
The previous approval of an L-1A petition does not preclude CIS from denying an extension based on a 
reassessment of petitioner's qualifications. Texas A&M Univ. v. Upchurch, 99 Fed. Appx. 556, 2004 WL 
1240482 (5th Cir. 2004). Despite any number of previously approved petitions, CIS does not have any 
authority to confer an immigration benefit when the petitioner fails to meet its burden of proof in a subsequent 
petition. See section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. 
WAC 07 156 52114 
Page 13 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the techmcal requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afd, 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can 
succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's 
enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the appeal will be 
dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.