dismissed L-1A Case: Restaurant

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Room 3000
Washington, DC 20529
identifyingdatadeletedto
preventclearlyWlWalTanted
invasionofpersonalpriv8C1
PUBLICCOpy
SEP 18 2001
u.s.Citizenship
and Immigration
Services
Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date:SRC 05 235 51872File:
INRE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:
Petition: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.c. § 1101(a)(l5)(L)
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER:
INSTRUCTIONS:
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.
~Rof~ef
Administrative Appeals Office
www.uscis.gov
SRC 05 235 51872
Page 2
DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The matter is
now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.
The petitioner seeks to extend the temporary employment of the beneficiary as its general manager in the United
States as an L-IA nonimmigrant intracompany transferee pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner, a corporation organized in the state of
Florida, claims to operate a restaurant under the name of "Big Pete's Pizzeria." It also claims to be the subsidiary
of located in Penang, Malaysia. The director denied the petition
concluding that the petitioner did not establish that the beneficiary would be employed in the United States in a
primarily managerial or executive capacity.
Counsel for the petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the
director erred by concluding that the beneficiary was not employed in a qualifying capacity. Specifically, counsel
for the petitioner asserts that, despite its small size, the petitioning entity does in fact employ the beneficiary in a
primarily managerial capacity. Counsel further asserts that the beneficiary's duties also comply with regulatory
definition of executive capacity.
To establish eligibility for the L-l nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria outlined
in section lOl(a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the beneficiary in
a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one continuous year
within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States. In addition, the
beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same
employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity.
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be
accompanied by:
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the alien are
qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (1)(l)(ii)(G) of this section.
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed.
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment abroad with
a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of the petition.
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior education,
training, and employment qualifies himlher to perform the intended services in the United
States; however, the work in the United States need not be the same work which the alien
performed abroad.
SRC 05 235 51872
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The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(14)(ii) provides that a visa petition, which involved the opening of a new
office, may be extended by filing a new Fonn 1-129, accompanied by the following:
(A) Evidence that the United States and foreign entities are still qualifying organizations as
defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section;
(B) Evidence that the United States entity has been doing business as defined in paragraph
(l)(l)(ii)(H) of this section for the previous year;
(C) A statement of the duties perfonned by the beneficiary for the previous year and the duties
the beneficiary will perfonn under the extended petition;
(D) A statement describing the staffing of the new operation, including the number of employees
and types of positions held accompanied by evidence of wages paid to employees when the
beneficiary will be employed in a managerial or executive capacity; and
(E) Evidence of the financial status of the United States operation.
The primary issue in this matter is whether the beneficiary will be employed by the United States entity in a
primarily managerial or executive capacity.
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.c. § llOl(a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" as an
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily:
(i) manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of the
organization;
(ii) supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial employees,
or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department or subdivision of
the organization;
(iii) if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to hire and
fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as promotion and leave
authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised, functions at a senior level
within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and
(iv) exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function for which the
employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be acting in a managerial
capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees
supervised are professional.
Section lOI(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.c. § IIOI(a)(44)(B), defines the tenn "executive capacity" as an
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily:
SRC 0523551872
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(i) directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the
organization;
(ii) establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function;
(iii) exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and
(iv) receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of
directors, or stockholders of the organization.
The nonimmigrant petition was filed on August 25,2005. The petitioner indicated on Form 1-129 that it has three
employees. In a letter dated August 18, 2005, former counsel for the petitioner explained that the petitioner
employed three full-time employees and one part-time employee in addition to the beneficiary. Specifically, they
were identified as follows:
Waitress
Chef
Waiter/Clean-UplDelivery Person
Clean-UplKitchen Help (part-Time)
With regard to the beneficiary's duties, counsel stated:
[The beneficiary] manages these employees and primarily oversees the quality control, financial,
supply monitoring aspects of the store. He checks on and creates new menu additions, conducts
business to business communication (between suppliers/store signage/accountants/lawyers) and
generally manages the location day-to-day. [The beneficiary] also helps with the cooking and
ingredient selection. He also negotiates vending contracts with large institutions ....
Finally, the petitioner submitted its Form 940, Employer's Annual Federal Unemployment (FUTA) Tax Return
for 2004, demonstrating that the beneficiary was the petitioner's only employee during this period.
On November 23, 2005, the director requested additional evidence with regard to the beneficiary's managerial
and/or executive capacity. Specifically, the director requested an organizational chart for the U.S. and the foreign
entity including all employee names and position titles. The director also requested the petitioner's quarterly tax
returns for 2004 and 2005 as well as its payroll register. Finally, the director requested a statement explaining
how the beneficiary would not engage in the day-to-day tasks of the business, as well as evidence that he is
managing a staff of managerial or professional employees.
In a response dated February 2, 2006, the petitioner, through counsel, submitted a response to the director's
request. With regard to the beneficiary's duties, counsel stated that the beneficiary was employed in a primarily
managerial capacity, and that his duties required him to supervise a subordinate staff. Counsel alternatively
claimed that the beneficiary was acting as a function manager. Specifically, counsel claimed:
SRC 0523551872
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Our office wishes to clarify that the Beneficiary will not be engaged in the day to day operations of
the business, and that he will primarily be engaged in managerial duties as well as managing an
essential function of the restaurant. These managerial duties include the supervision, training, hiring
firing of the other managers in the establishment, namely the vice president: Nagarajan, the kitchen
manager: _ and the sales manager: ~ebeneficiary will also be in charge of
staff meetings, meetings with the company accountant to review accounts & balances, the review of
new marketing plans and sales strategies in conjunction with creation ofnew business
tactics and stratagems, scouting for new locations for an expansion of the business, and general
direction and development of the enterprise.
In addition, counsel stated:
Beneficiary also oversees the quality control, staff meetings, financials, advertising & promotional
overview and supply monitoring aspects of the store. He checks on menu additions, conducts
business to business communication (between suppliers/store signage/accountantsllawyers) and
generally manages the location day-to-day. These activities comprise 75% of his time. These are
specialized duties which can only be carried out by a qualified functional manager.
The petitioner also submitted an organizational chart. The chart listed five employees under the beneficiary:
Nagarajan, Vice President; Kitchen Manager; Sales Manager; Cook;
and Cashier. In addition, a list of their work schedules was provided, which provided that each
employee worked either from 10-4 pm or 11-4 pm Monday through Friday. The petitioner also submitted its
Florida Forms VCT -6, Employer's Quarterly Report, for the first 3 quarters of 2005, which indicated wages paid
to the beneficiary and all other employees except for the vice president. All four of the beneficiary's subordinates
earned a monthly salary of $600 for the first nine months of 2005, based on the quarterly reports.
On June 22, 2006 the director denied the petition. The director determined that the evidence in the record did not
establish that the beneficiary would be employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity while in the
United States. Specifically, the director concluded that although the petitioner claimed that the beneficiary
oversaw the employees listed on the organizational chart, there was no evidence to suggest that these employees
were in turn managerial employees.
On appeal, newly-appointed counsel for the petitioner argues that the director's focus on the small size of the
petitioner's staff in concluding that the beneficiary was not overseeing a subordinate staff of managers was
erroneous. In addition, counsel claims for the first time that the beneficiary is also an executive, thereby
qualifying under the regulatory definition of executive capacity. The petitioner submits a new organizational
chart and copies of IRS Form W-2 for 2005 in support of the appeal.
The AAO, upon review of the record of proceeding, concurs with the director's fmding. Specifically, upon
review of the beneficiary's stated duties and the current structure of the petitioner's enterprise, it appears that the
petitioner has failed to establish that it will employ the beneficiary in a capacity that is primarily managerial or
executive.
SRC 05 235 51872
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While the beneficiary is the intended general manager of the company, there is insufficient evidence to show that
he will be acting primarily in a managerial or executive capacity during his U.S. employment. When examining
the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the petitioner's description of
the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. § 2l4.2(l)(3)(ii). In this case, the petitioner fails to sufficiently document what
proportion of the beneficiary's duties would be managerial functions and what proportion would be non­
managerial. While the AAO notes that in response to the request for evidence the petitioner claimed that 75% of
the beneficiary's time is spent performing his duties as a general manager, many of the identified duties, such as
"check[ing] on menu additions," "negotiate[ing] vending contracts with large institutions," and "help[ing] with
the cooking and ingredient selection," are not traditionally considered managerial or executive duties. For this
reason, the AAO cannot determine, despite the petitioner's whether the beneficiary is primarily performing the
duties ofa function manager. See IKEA US, Inc. v. u.s. Dept. ofJustice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22, 24 (D.D.C. 1999).
Since this description of the beneficiary's duties, which includes both manageriaL and administrative or
operational tasks, fails to quantify the exact amount of time the beneficiary spends on them, the AAO cannot
determine what an average day or week consists of for the beneficiary. In addition, the fact that the record
contains numerous discrepancies regarding the beneficiary's alleged subordinate employees makes it difficult to
determine whether the beneficiary is relieved from performing non-qualifying duties associated with operating a
restaurant.
The initial letter of support, dated August 18, 2005, stated that the petitioner employed the following persons:
•••••• 1Waitress; Chef; Waiter/Clean-Up/Delivery Person; and_
Clean-UplKitchen Help (Part-Time). In response to the request for evidence, however, the petitioner provided a
completely different list of employees, which was corroborated by payroll records.1 In addition, the quarterly
reports and Form W-2 on record indicate that all employees earned, Furthermore, the petitioner initially claimed
on Form 1-129 that it employed three persons, in contrast to its letter of support. The petitioner has not explained
or acknowledged these inconsistencies. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the
record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not
suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter ofHo,
19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a
1 It is further noted for the record that the petitioner's quarterly reports for the first three quarters of 2005 indicate
that all of the beneficiary's subordinates consistently earned $1,800 per quarter. However, the W-2 forms for
these employees for 2005 indicate that these employees earned a total of $12,000 for the year. Assuming the W-2
forms are correct, it stands to reason that each of these employees must have earned $6,600 in the fourth quarter
of 2005. This unexplained inconsistency raises questions with regard to the validity of the petitioner's claims,
particularly since the petitioner omitted the quarterly report for the fourth quarter of 2005. Doubt cast on any
aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the
remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591 (BIA 1988). If
CIS fails to believe that a fact stated in the petition is true, CIS may reject that fact. Section 204(b) of the Act, 8
U.S.C. § 1154(b); see also Anetekhai v. I.NS., 876 F.2d 1218, 1220 (5th Cir.1989); Lu-Ann Bakery Shop, Inc. v.
Nelson, 705 F. Supp. 7, 10 (D.D.C.1988); Systronics Corp. v. INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2001).
SRC 05 235 51872
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reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. Id.
at 591.
Despite this unexplained inconsistency, the record contains sufficient evidence to show that the petitioner
employs the following persons: Kitchen Manager; Sales Manager;
Cook; and According to the employee schedule, each person works five days a week for five or
six hours per day, from 10 or 11 a.m. until 4 p.m. According to the payroll records, each employee earns $1,800
per quarter, or $600 per month. It is noted that the sales manager and kitchen manager earn the same wages as the
cook and the cashier. Although the beneficiary is not required to supervise personnel, if it is claimed that his
duties involve supervising employees, the petitioner must establish that the subordinate employees are
supervisory, professional, or managerial. See § 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act.
The petitioner did not provide the level of education required to perform the duties of its subordinate employees;
thus, the petitioner has not established that these employees possess or require a bachelor's degree, such that they
could be classified as professionals. Nor has the petitioner shown that any of these employees supervise
subordinate staff members or manage a clearly defmed department or function of the petitioner, such that they
could be classified as managers or supervisors. Although the organizational chart indicates that the kitchen
manager oversees the cook, and the sales manager oversees the cashier, there is insufficient evidence in the record
to support this contention. No position descriptions for the cook and cashier are provided, and the fact that all
employees earn the same compensation suggests that all employees are working on the same level. Without
further evidence to support a structured hierarchy, it cannot be determined whether these employees are
supervisors or managers. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for
purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter 0/Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm.
1998) (citing Matter a/Treasure Craft a/California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972». Thus, the petitioner
has not shown that the beneficiary's subordinate employees are supervisory, professional, or managerial, as
required by section 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act.
More importantly, although not addressed by the director, is the fact that the employment structure set forth by the
petitioner is not credible. It has been noted in the record that there are only five employees working at the
restaurant, each of whom allegedly end work at 4:00 p.m. each day, and that the beneficiary maintains a full-time
position. Although the initial letter of support identified a waitress and delivery person, the updated
organizational chart does not mention any such persons working for the petitioner. Most importantly, however, is
the petitioner's menu and advertisement submitted in support of the petition, which indicates that its restaurant is
open from 11 :00 a.m. until 11 :00 p.m. Monday through Friday. This advertisement also indicates that it offers
delivery services. Considering the petitioner's claim that one cook and one cashier are employed, along with
three other alleged managerial employees, it is difficult to believe that the pizza restaurant, with its extensive
menu including sandwiches, pastas, wings, and salads, can operate with one cook who ends work at 4:00 p.m.
each day.
Collectively, this brings into question how much of the beneficiary's time can actually be devoted to managerial
or executive duties. As stated in the statute, the beneficiary must be primarily performing duties that are
managerial or executive. See sections 10l(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act. Furthermore, the petitioner bears the
burden of documenting what portion of the beneficiary's duties will be managerial or executive and what
SRC 0523551872
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proportion will be non-managerial or non-executive. Rf/public of Transkei v. INS, 923 F.2d 175, 177 (D.C. Cir.
1991). The record indicates that the beneficiary earns the largest amount of money, namely, $7500 per quarter.
According to the petitioner, he is employed full-time. Since the record claims that no employee works past 4:00
p.m. and the restaurant is open until 11 :00 p.m. each day, it stands to reason that the beneficiary is performing
many of the required tasks, such as cooking, waiting tables, and delivering food, for which no employees are
delegated. Given the lack of specific details regarding the manner in which the petitioner can function with these
part-time employees, the record does not demonstrate that the beneficiary will function primarily as a manager or
executive. In either case, the AAO is left to question the validity of the petitioner's claim and the remainder of the
beneficiary's claimed duties. Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a
reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition.
Matter of Ro, 19 I&N Dec. at 591. If the beneficiary is performing the sales function, the AAO notes that an
employee who primarily performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not primarily
employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See §§ 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one
"primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or ex.ecutive duties); see also Matter of Church Scientology
International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 1988).
On appeal, counsel correctly observes that a company's size alone, without taking into account the reasonable
needs of the organization, may not be the determining factor in denying a visa to a multinational manager or
executive. See § 101(a)(44)(C) of the Act, 8 V.S.c. § 1101(a)(44)(C). However, it is appropriate for Citizenship
and Immigration Services (CIS) to consider the size of the petitioning company in conjunction with other relevant
factors, such as a company's small personnel size, the absence of employees who would perform the non­
managerial or non-executive operations of the company, or a "shell company" that does not conduct business in a
regular and continuous manner~ See. e.g. Systronics Corp. v. INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2001). The size
of a company may be especially relevant when CIS notes discrepancies in the record and fails to believe that the
facts asserted are true. Id. As discussed above, the numerous inconsistencies regarding job duties, work
schedules, and operating hours of the petitioner have not been resolved.
In the present matter, the regulations provide strict evidentiary requirements for the extension of a "new office"
petition and require CIS to examine the organizational structure and staffing levels of the petitioner. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 214.2(l)(14)(ii)(D). The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(3)(v)(C) allows the "new office" operation one year
within the date of approval of the petition to support an executive or managerial position. There is no provision in
CIS regulations that allows for an extension of this one-year period. If the business does not have sufficient
staffing after one year to relieve the beneficiary from primarily performing operational and administrative tasks,
the petitioner is ineligible by regulation for an extension. In the instant matter, the petitioner has not reached the
point that it can employ the beneficiary in a predominantly managerial or executive position.
Finally, counsel on appeal asserts for the first time that the beneficiary is an executive as well as a manager. On
appeal, however, a petitioner cannot offer a new position to the beneficiary, or materially change a position's title,
its level of authority within the organizational hierarchy, or the associated job responsibilities. The petitioner must
establish that the position offered to the beneficiary when the petition was filed merits classification as a
managerial or executive position. Matter ofMichelin Tire Corp., 17 I&N Dec. 248, 249 (Reg. Comm. 1978). A
petitioner may not make material changes to a petition in an effort to make a deficient petition conform to CIS
SRC 05 235 51872
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requirements. See Matter ofIzummi, 22 I&N Dec. 169, 176 (Assoc. Comm. 1998). For this reason, the AAO will
not analyze the beneficiary's duties for compliance with the regulatory definition of executive capacity.
The petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will be employed in the United States in a primarily
managerial or executive capacity. For this reason, the appeal will be dismissed.
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has failed to establish that a qualifying relationship exists
between the petitioner and the foreign employer. Although the petitioner claims that the foreign entity owns .51%
of the petitioner and thus maintains a parent-subsidiary relationship, the petitioner has failed to submit sufficient
evidence to support this claim.
The regulation and case law confirm that ownership and control are the factors that must be examined in
determining whether a qualifying relationship exists between United States and foreign entities for purposes of
this visa classification. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593 (BIA 1988); see also
Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986); Matter of Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289
(Comm. 1982). In the context of this visa petition, ownership refers to the direct or indirect legal right of
possession of the assets of an entity with full power and authority to control; control means the direct or indirect
legal right and authority to direct the establishment, management, and operations of an entity. Matter of Church
Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 595.
In this matter, the petitioner submits a non-traditional and unnumbered share certificate claiming that the foreign
entity owns 51% of the petitioner. No additional documentation, such as the stock ledger, meeting minutes, or
share certificates representing any other outstanding shares in the company was submitted. As general evidence
of a petitioner's claimed qualifying relationship, however, stock certificates alone are not sufficient evidence to
determine whether a stockholder maintains ownership and control of a corporate entity. The corporate stock
certificate ledger, stock certificate registry, corporate bylaws, and the minutes of relevant annual shareholder
meetings must also be examined to determine the total number of shares issued, the exact number issued to the
shareholder, and the subsequent percentage ownership and its effect on corporate control. Additionally, a
petitioning company must disclose all agreements relating to the voting of shares, the distribution of profit, the
management and direction of the subsidiary, and any other factor affecting actual control of the entity. See Matter
of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., supra. Without full disclosure of all relevant documents, Citizenship and
Immigration Services (CIS) is unable to determine the elements of ownership and control.
The AAO further notes that upon review of the documentation contained in the record, there are numerous
unexplained inconsistencies. For example, the petitioner's By Laws repeatedly refer to Kansas state law, yet the
petitioner is a corporation formed in and governed by the laws of the State of Florida. In addition, Line 2 of
Schedule L on the petitioner's Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return for 2004, indicates a figure of $0
for capital stock, despite the claim that 25,500 of the authorized 50,000 shares were issued, at $1.00 per share, to
the foreign entity on July 31, 2004. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the
record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not
suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter ofHo,
19 I&N Dec. at 591-92.
SRC 05 235 51872
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In addition, while not directly addressed by the director, the minimal documentation of the foreign entity's
business operations raises the issue of whether the foreign entity is a qualifying organization doing business
abroad. Specifically, under the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(1)(ii)(G)(2) a petitioner must demonstrate that it
is engaged in the regular, systematic, and continuous provision of goods or services and does not represent the
mere presence of an agent or office abroad. Although the director specifically requested evidence of the foreign
entity's business dealings in the request for evidence, the petitioner failed and/or refused to submit such evidence ..
Failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the
petition. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(l4). For these additional reasons, the petition may not be approved.
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the
AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See Spencer
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afJ'd. 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir.
2003); see also Dar v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a de
novo basis).
When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a challenge only ifhe
or she shows that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's enumerated grounds. See
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229F. Supp. 2d at 1043.
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative
basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains
entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 ofthe Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.
. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.