dismissed L-1A Case: Restaurant

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
In Re: 7675452 
Appeal of Texas Service Center Decision 
Form 1-129, Petition for L-lA Manager or Executive 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date : APR. 30, 2020 
The Petitioner , a foreign entity, seeks to operate a restaurant in the United States where the Beneficiary 
would be temporarily employed as "owner and general manager" of the new office I under the L-lA 
nonimrnigrant classification for intracompany transferees . See Immigration and Nationality Act (the 
Act) section 101(a)(15)(L), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(L) . The L-lA classification allows a corporation 
or other legal entity (including its affiliate or subsidiary) to transfer a qualifying foreign employee to 
the United States to work temporarily in a managerial or executive capacity. 
The Director of the Texas Service Center denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioner did not 
establish, as required, that the Beneficiary was employed abroad in a managerial or executive capacity 
and that he would be employed in the United States in a managerial or executive capacity within one 
year of approval of the new office petition. The matter is now before us on appeal. 
In these proceedings , it is the Petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the requested benefit. 
Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Upon de nova review, we will dismiss the appeal. 2 
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
To establish eligibility for the L-lA nonimrnigrant visa classification in a petition involving a new 
office, a qualifying organization must have employed the beneficiary in a managerial or executive 
capacity for one continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for 
admission into the United States . 8 C.F.R . § 214.2(1)(3)(v)(B). In addition, the beneficiary must seek 
to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer 
or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial or executive capacity. Id. 
The petitioner must submit evidence to demonstrate that the new office will be able to support a 
managerial or executive position within one year. This evidence must establish that the petitioner 
secured sufficient physical premises to house its operation and disclose the proposed nature and scope 
1 The term "new office" refers to an organization which has been doing business in the United States for less than one year. 
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(l)(ii)(F). The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214 .2(1)(3)(v)(C) allows a "new office" operation no more than 
one year within the date of approval of the petition to support an executive or managerial position. 
2 We follow the preponderance of the evidence standard . Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375-76 (AAO 20 I 0). 
of the entity, its organizational structure, its financial goals, and the size of the U.S. investment. See 
generally, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(v). 
II. ANALYSIS 
As indicated above, the Director denied this petition based, in part, on the finding that the Petitioner 
did not provide sufficient evidence demonstrating that the Beneficiary's employment abroad either 
involved specialized knowledge or that it was in a managerial or executive capacity. On appeal, the 
Petitioner argues that because it filed a petition seeking to classify the Beneficiary under the L-lA 
nonimmigrant visa category, the Director's discussion of the Beneficiary's foreign employment within 
the context of specialized knowledge "was unreasonable" and indicates that the Director incorrectly 
"applied the legal standard of an L-lB petition" in this instance. We disagree and note that the 
Director's contemplation of whether the Beneficiary's employment abroad required specialized 
knowledge was consistent with the regulatory provisions that govern the filing of an L-lA petition. 
Regardless of whether a petitioner seeks to classify a beneficiary as an L-lA or an L-lB nonimmigrant, 
the foreign employment criteria may be met either by establishing that the foreign position required 
specialized knowledge or that it was in a managerial or executive capacity. See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(1)(3)(iv). Thus, even though the Petitioner seeks to employ the Beneficiary in the United 
States in a managerial or executive capacity, the Petitioner may meet the foreign employment 
requirement by showing that the Beneficiary worked in a specialized knowledge abroad. The 
Director's references to the statutory framework and regulatory definition for specialized knowledge 
merely indicate that all relevant regulatory provisions were correctly applied in the adjudication of 
this petition. Moreover, the Director's statement, that the Petitioner "did not indicate" that the 
Beneficiary's employment abroad involved specialized knowledge, is consistent with the Petitioner's 
claim that the Beneficiary's employment abroad was in a managerial capacity and does not indicate 
that such employment required specialized knowledge. Thus, the Director did not err by referring to 
specialized knowledge in the denial decision. 
Further, as noted above, the Director denied the petition because the Petitioner did not establish: (1) 
that the Beneficiary was employed abroad in a managerial or executive capacity; and (2) that the 
Beneficiary would be employed in the United States in a managerial or executive capacity within one 
year of approval of the new office petition. Each ground stands as an independent basis for the denial 
of the petition. With respect to the first ground, on appeal, the Petitioner offers only a general 
statement in which it disagrees with the Director's conclusion but does not explain how that the 
conclusion was inconsistent with the presented evidence or how the Director otherwise erred with 
respect to that ground. As the Petitioner does not address this issue on appeal, it has abandoned its 
claims. Sepulveda v. US. Atty Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1228 n. 2 (11th Cir. 2005); Hristov v. Roark, 
No. 09-CV-27312011, 2011 WL 4711885 at *1, 9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011) (the court found the 
plaintiff's claims to be abandoned as he failed to raise them on appeal to the AAO). When an appellant 
fails to properly challenge one of the independent grounds upon which the Director based the overall 
determination, the filing party has abandoned any challenge of that ground, and it follows that the 
Director's adverse determination will be affirmed. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 
678,680 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Cooper, No. 17-11548, 2019 WL 2414405, at *3 (11th Cir. 
June 10, 2019); McCray v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 839 F.3d 354, 361-62 (4th Cir. 2016); In 
re Under Seal, 749 F.3d 276, 293 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding "an appellant must convince us that every 
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stated ground for the judgment against him is incorrect."); United States v. Kama, 394 F.3d 1236, 1238 
(9th Cir. 2005). It is, therefore, unnecessary to analyze the remaining independent ground when 
another is dispositive of the appeal. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (finding it 
unnecessary to analyze additional grounds when another independent issue is dispositive of the 
appeal); see also Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. 516, 526 n.7 (BIA 2015) (declining to reach 
alternative issues on appeal where an applicant is otherwise ineligible). 
Aside from the Petitioner's failure on appeal to challenge the Director's conclusion regarding the 
Beneficiary's foreign employment, the previously submitted evidence is insufficient to show that the 
Beneficiary was employed abroad in a managerial capacity. 3 The only job description on record is 
contained in the Petitioner's Form 1-129 L Classification Supplement and indicates that the 
Beneficiary performed a number of non-managerial job duties, including ordering goods, conducting 
research, addressing issues with shipping and vendors, promoting and marketing the business, and 
carrying out human resource functions, such as recruiting and training employees. As the Petitioner 
did not comply with the Director's request for evidence, which instructed the Petitioner to provide a 
more detailed job description and indicate how much time the Beneficiary spent on his various 
assigned job duties, it is unclear how much time the Beneficiary allocated to the non-managerial duties 
listed herein. Further, the Petitioner provided an organizational chart showing that it was comprised 
of three employees-the Beneficiary and his two subordinates. However, the Petitioner did not 
establish that a two-person support staff was sufficient to relieve the Beneficiary from having to 
allocate his time primarily to non-managerial job duties. An employee who "primarily" performs the 
tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily" 
employed in a managerial capacity. See, e.g., sections 10l(a)(44)(A) of the Act (requiring that one 
"primarily" perform the enumerated managerial duties); Matter of Church Scientology Int'!, 19 I&N 
Dec. 593, 604 (Comm'r 1988). In light of these deficiencies, the record as presently constituted 
precludes a finding that the Beneficiary was employed abroad in a managerial capacity. 
In conclusion, because the Petitioner did not contest the Director's finding that the Beneficiary was 
not employed abroad in a managerial capacity, we consider this issue to be abandoned, and the appeal 
will be dismissed for this reason. 4 Further, notwithstanding the Petitioner's lack of a challenge to this 
ground for denial, the evidence does not establish that the Beneficiary was employed abroad in a 
managerial capacity. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
3 The Petitioner does not claim that the Beneficiary was employed in an executive and refers to elements of the statutory 
definition of a managerial capacity on appeal. 
4 Since this issue is dispositive of the Petitioner's appeal, we decline to reach and hereby reserve the Petitioner's appellate 
arguments regarding the Beneficiary's U.S. employment in a managerial or executive capacity. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 
429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) ("courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is 
unnecessary to the results they reach"); see also Matter of L-A-C-, 26 l&N Dec. 516, 526 n.7 (BIA 2015) (declining to 
reach alternative issues on appeal where an applicant is otherwise ineligible). 
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