dismissed L-1A Case: Restaurant Administration

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Mass. Ave, N.W. Rrn. A3042 
Washington. DC 20529 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Imrnigratio~i 
File: WAC 04 064 52100 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: 
Petition: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 1 Ol(a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1 10 1 (a)( 1 5)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned 
to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
Robert P. Wiemann, Director 
Administrative Appeals Office 
WAC 04 064 52 100 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. 
The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss 
the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to extend the employment of its president as im L- 
1A nonimrnigrant intracompany transferee pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigratiorl and 
Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. fj 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is a corporation organized in the 
State of Califomia that claims to be engaged in restaurant administration, management, and services.' 
The petitioner claims that it is the subsidiary o located in Anzoategui, Venezuela. The 
beneficiary was initially granted a five and one-half month period of stay to open a new office, and the 
petitioner now seeks to extend the beneficiary's stay for two more years. 
The director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner did not establish that (1) the beneficiary 
will be employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity; or that (2) a 
qualifying relationship existed between the United States organization and a company abroad. 
The petitioner filed an appeal in response to the denial. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner cont.ends 
that the petitioner did in fact establish that the beneficiary would be employed in a primarily managerial 
or executive capacity, and that the evidence contained in the record clearly established that a qualifying 
relationship existed between the U.S. and foreign entities. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the cnteria 
outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have empl'oyed 
the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, 
for one continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the 
United States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to con1:inue 
rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, 
executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. fj 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ 
the alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this 
section. 
(ii) Ev~dence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or 
specialized knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services 
to be performed. 
I It should be noted that, according to California State corporate records, the petitioner's corporate status 
in California has been suspended. Although the reason for this suspension is unclear, it raises the issue of 
the company's continued existence as a legal entlty in the United States. 
WAC 04 064 52100 
Page 3 
I 
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing 
of the petition. 
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that 
was managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's 
prior education, training, and employment qualifies hirnlher to perform the 
intended services in the United States; however, the work in the United States 
need not be the same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 214.2(1)(14)(ii) also provides that a visa petition, which involved the opening 
of a new office, may be extended by filing a new Form 1-129, accompanied by the following: 
(a) Evidence that the United States and foreign entities are still qualifying 
organizations as defined in paragraph (I)(l )(ii)(G) of this section; 
(b) Evidence that the United States entity has been doing business as defined in 
paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(H) of this section for the previous year; 
(c) A statement of the duties performed by the beneficiary for the previous year and 
the duties the beneficiary will perform under the extended petition; 
(d) A statement describing the staffing of the new operation, including the number of 
employees and types of positions held accompanied by evidence of wages paid to 
employees when the beneficiary will be employed in a managerial or executive 
capacity; and 
(e) Evidence of the financial status of the United States operation. 
The first issue in this matter is whether the beneficiary will be employed by the United States entity in a 
primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1 101 (a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" as 
an assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component 
of the organization; 
(ii) supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or 
managerial employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, 
or a department or subdivision of the organization; 
(ii~) if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority 
to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as 
WAC 04 064 52100 
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promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly 
supervised, functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with 
respect to the function managed; and 
(iv) exercises discretion over the day to day operations of the activity or function for 
which the employee has authority. A first line supervisor is not considered to be 
acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory 
duties unless the employees supervised are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of 
the organization; 
(ii) establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision making; and 
(iv) receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the 
board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
In the initial petition, the petitioner submitted a business plan 
petitioner intended to operate in a local shopping mall. The 
acquired 100 square feet of retail space in a local mall, which included a seating area for approximately 
15-20 patrons. In an accompanying letter dated December 17, 2003, the petitioner indicated that the 
beneficiary would serve as its president and presented the following overview of her duties: 
During the past five months, [the beneficiary] has acted on behalf of [the petitioner] in 
driving activities that resulted in the signing a long-term lease for business premises (with 
term expiring on January 3 1,2008), contracting for the improvements and construction of 
facilities, obtaining all necessary city and State permits and licenses, patents and 
trademarks, and hiring the staff for this kiosk. A menu of offerings has been created as 
well. Six employees have been hired to date, since the opening date of the kiosk on 
December 1" of the current year. 
[The beneficiary] will continue to use her independent discretion and authority in 
developing the Valley Fair Mall venture, as well as any other business opportunities that 
present themselves and that are in line with [the petitioner's] objectives. She will be 
responsible for all management and day-to-day supervision of the venture, as well as 
supervis[ing] the sales strategy of her employees, setting the standards for the financial 
WAC 04 064 52100 
Page 5 
and accounting departments of the corporation. She will have final authority on all 
contracts with suppliers, utilities, equipment leasers, and such. 
The director found the initial evidence submitted to be insufficient and consequently issued a request for 
additional evidence on January 14, 2004. In the request, the director asked counsel to submit the 
following: a specific statement describing the U.S. employment of the beneficiary; including her specific 
duties, the names and positions of other employees she directed as well as their titles and duties; a colpy of 
the petitioner's Forms DE-6, quarterly wage reports, for the past four quarters; and copies of the 
petitloner's payroll summary including Forms W-2 and W-3. 
In a response dated February 18, 2004, the petitioner, through counsel, addressed the director's query. 
With regard to the director's request for information on the beneficiary's duties and the percentage of time 
devoted to each, counsel stated that the beneficiary worked forty hours per week and submitted the 
following statement: 
Personnel Training (10% of worked hours) 
Selection of Menu Items (10% of hours worked) 
Inventory Management (20% of worked hours) 
Personnel Management (20% of worked hours) 
Process Supervision/Evaluation (20% of worked hours) 
Administrative Tasks (20% of worked hours) 
In addition to a brief description of the above-referenced tasks, the petitioner further stated: 
[The beneficiary] is among the first ones to arrive in the morning and the last to leave. At 
the conclusion of each day, or sometimes each shift, [the beneficiary] tallies the cash and 
charges receipts received and balance[s] them against the record of sales. In most cases, 
she is responsible for depositing the day's receipts at the bank. Finally, she is responsible 
for locking up, checking that the crepe griddles, and lights are off, and all food is 
properly stored. 
On March 3, 2004, the director denied the petition. The director, who reviewed the record to determine 
eligibility under both managerial and executive capacity, found that the evidence in the record failed to 
establish that the beneficiary would be functioning in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Specifically, the director concluded that the description of the beneficiary's duties was not detailed 
enough to establish what she did on a daily basis. The director further concluded that the petitioning 
entity did not possess the organizational complexity to warrant an executive position. On appeal, counsel 
asserts that the beneficiary is in fact an executive and that the director erroneously concluded otherwise 
WAC 04 064 52100 
Page 6 
due to the small size of the petitioning entity. Maintaining that the director's decision was erroneous, 
counsel submits additional evidence in support of this position. 
The director concluded in part that the recitation of the beneficiary's duties was insufficient and vague. 
The AAO disagrees with this portion of the director's reasoning. The response to the request for evidence 
provided a significantly detailed list of the beneficiary's duties as well as the percentage of time she spent 
performing each duty in her average forty-hour workweek. The issue, therefore, is not that the listed 
duties were too general and nonspecific; instead, the question is whether the duties she performed were 
primarily managerial or executive in nature. 
Whether the beneficiary is a manager or executive employee turns on whether the petitioner has sustained 
its burden of proving that his duties are "primarily" managerial or executive. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) 
and (B) of the Act. In this case, the initial description of duties was vague and insufficient. The director 
consequently requested a more detailed list of all of the beneficiary's duties in the request for evidence. 
The petitioner's response, as discussed above, supplied an overview of the beneficiary's duties as well as a 
breakdown of the percentages of time the beneficiary devoted to each of these duties. 
According to the petitioner, the beneficiary often opens and closes the kiosk, totals the receipts for the 
day, and ensures that machinery is turned off and that food is properly stored. In addition, the beneficiary 
devotes much of her time to selecting menu items, managing inventory, and administrative tasks, in 
addition to overseeing food preparation and hiring and overseeing personnel. Based on these duties, it 
appears that the beneficiary is performing a large amount of non-qualifying duties which directly result in 
the petitioner's ability to provide its customers with the goods and services in which it is engaged. An 
employee who primarily performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not 
considered to be employed in a managerial or executive capacity. Matter of Church Scientology 
International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 1988). The actual duties themselves reveal the true nature 
of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), affd: 905 
F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
While counsel argues that the direction provided by the beneficiary to the other employees affirm!; her 
executive position, it appears to the AAO that the beneficiary is merely a first-line supervisor. By counsel 
and the petitioner's own admissions, the beneficiary is engaged in the daily routines essential to the 
operation of the petitioner's kiosk. It is evident, therefore, from the beneficiary's clearly stated duties that 
her position is not primarily managerial or executive. A managerial or executive employee must have 
authority over day-to-day operations beyond the level normally vested in a first-line supervisor, unless the 
supervised employees are professionals. See Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 
604 (Comm. 1988). 
Since the petitioner claims that the beneficiary oversees other employees, it is essential for the AAlO to 
examine this claim as an alternative method through which the beneficiary could qualify for the benefit 
sought. Although the beneficiary is not required to supervise personnel, if it is claimed that her duties 
involve supervising employees, the petitloner must establish that the subordinate employees are 
supervisory, professional, or managerial. See 3 10 1 (a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. 
WAC 04 064 52 100 
Page 7 
Though requested by the director, the petitioner did not provide the level of education required to perform 
the duties of its other employees. Although the petitioner provided an organizational chart listing each 
subordinate employee's name and any degree they possessed, the petitioner did not clarify whether such a 
degree was necessary to perform the duties of each stated position. The possession of a bachelor's d'egree 
by a subordinate employee does not automatically lead to the conclusion that an employee is employed in 
a professional capacity as that term is defined by section lOl(a)(32) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a,)(32). 
In the instant case, the petitioner has not, in fact, established that a bachelor's degree is actually necessary, 
for example, to perform the duties of the business development manager or the cashier, who are among 
the beneficiary's subordinates. 
Furthermore, the petitioner failed to completely answer the director's questions regarding the suborclinate 
employees, which specifically requested a list of their duties in addition to their position titles. Any 
failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying 
the petition. 8 C.F.R. 9 103.2(b)(14). Since the petitioner has failed to elaborate on the actual duties of 
the business development manager and the treasurer, the AAO cannot conclude that these employees are 
supervisory or managerial, since we do not know what their duties include. The petitioner, therefore, has 
not shown that either of these employees supervise subordinate staff members or manage a clearly 
defined department or function of the petitioner, such that they could be classified as managers or 
supervisors. Thus, the petitioner has not shown that the beneficiary's subordinate employees are 
supervisory, professional, or managerial, as required by section 10l(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. 
Counsel asserts on appeal the crux of the director's error was her reliance on the fact that the petitioning 
entity was small in size. Counsel correctly observes that a company's size alone, without taking into 
account the reasonable needs of the organization, may not be the determining factor in denying a visa to a 
multinational manager or executive. See $ 101(a)(44)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101(a)(44)(C). 
However, it is appropriate for CIS to consider the size of the petitioning company in conjunction with 
other relevant factors, such as a company's small personnel size, the absence of employees who would 
perform the non-managerial or non-executive operations of the company, or a "shell company" that does 
not conduct business in a regular and continuous manner. See, e.g. Systronics Corp. v. INS, 153 F. Supp. 
2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2001). The size of a company may be especially relevant when CIS notes discrepancies 
in the record and fails to believe that the facts asserted are true. Id. 
In this case, however, the director did not rely on the petitioner's lack of employees or small size, as 
counsel contends, as a basis for denial. Instead, the director concluded that "the petitioning entity does 
not possess the organizational complexity to warrant having an executive." Counsel makes no specific 
reference to any direct statements by the director which deny the petition on this claimed basis. Counsel's 
assertions, therefore, are misplaced. 
At the time of filing, the petitioner was a restaurant administration, management, and services company 
just over a year old (it was incorporated on December 15,2002). The petitioner claims consideration as a 
new office, because it recently acquired a crepe business and intended to commence operations at a local 
mall. However, at the time of filing the extension request, the petitioner was more than one year old. 
Furthermore, the documentation in the record confirms that at the time of filing, the petitioner employed 
two cashiers, two cooks, a business operations manager, and a treasurer. The description of' the 
WAC 04 064 52100 
Page 8 
beneficiary's duties, however, indicates that she is responsible for nearly all of the day-to-day cluties 
involved in the operation of the kiosk, from depositing money in the bank to storing food to planning 
menus and managing inventory. The petitioner has not explained how the reasonable needs of the 
petitioning enterprise justify the beneficiary's performance of non-managerial or non-executive duties at 
this stage of development. The petitioner must establish that the beneficiary is to be employed in the 
United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity, pursuant to sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) 
or the Act. Other than counsel's assertions and the statements of the petitioner, the record contains no 
independent evidence establishing that the beneficiary is an executive. Going on record without 
supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these 
proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Cr(zjl of 
California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Without documentary evidence to support the claim, 
the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. The unsupported assertions of 
counsel do not constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); Matr'er of 
Laureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). 
As discussed above, the petitioner has not established this essential element of eligibility. 
Other than the assertions of counsel and the petitioner, there is no clear evidence establishing tha.t the 
beneficiary has been and will be acting in a primarily managerial capacity. Thus, in the instant matter, the 
petitioner has not established that it will employ the beneficiary in a predominantly managerial or 
executive position. For this reason, the petition may not be approved. 
The second issue in the present matter is whether the petitioner and the foreign organization are qualified 
organizations as defined by 8 C.F.R. 5 214,2(1)(l)(ii)(G). The regulation defines the term ''qualifying 
organization" as a United States or foreign firm, corporation, or other legal entity which: 
(I) Meets exactly one of the qualifying relationships specified in the definitions of a parent, 
branch, affiliate or subsidiary specified in paragraph (l)(l)(ii) of this section; 
(2) Is or will be doing business (engaging in international trade is not required) as an employer in 
the United States and in at least one other country directly or through a parent, branch, affiliate, 
or subsidiary for the duration of the alien's stay in the United States as an intracompany 
transferee; and 
(3) Otherwise meets the requirements of section 10l(a)(15)(L) of the Act. 
Additionally, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(l)(ii) provides: 
(I) "Parent" means a firm, corporation, or other legal entity which has subsidiaries. 
(J) "Branch" means an operating division or office of the same organization housed in a different. 
location. 
(K) "Subsidiary" means a firm, corporation, or other legal entity of which a parent owns, directly 
or indirectly, more than half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, 
WAC 04 064 52100 
Page 9 
half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, 50 percent of a 50-50 
joint venture and has equal control and veto power over the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, 
less than half of the entity, but in fact controls the entity. 
(L) "Affiliate" means 
(I) One of two subsidiaries both of which are owned and controlled by the same parent or 
individual, or 
(2) One of two legal entities owned and controlled by the same group of individuals, each 
individual owning and controlling approximately the same share or proportion of each 
entity, or 
(3) In the case of a partnership that is organized in the United States to provide accounting; 
services along with managerial andlor consulting services and that markets its accounting 
services under an internationally recognized name under an agreement with a worldwide 
coordinating organization that is owned and controlled by the member accounting firms, a 
partnership (or similar organization) that is organized outside the United States to provide 
accounting services shall be considered to be an affiliate of the United States partnership if ii: 
markets its accounting services under the same internationally recognized name under the 
agreement with the worldwide coordinating organization of which the United States 
partnership is also a member. 
In this case, the petitioner claims in the initial petition that the U.S. entity is the wholly-owned subsidiary 
of the foreign entity. 
The director found that the initial evidence submitted with the petition to be insufficient to qualify the 
petitioner for the benefit sought, and consequently issued a request for evidence on January 14, 2004. In 
the request, the director specifically asked the petitioner to submit evidence that definitively established 
its qualifying relationship with the foreign company. On February 18, 2004, the petitioner submitted a 
detailed response to the director's request which was accompanied by numerous corporate documents for 
the U.S. and foreign companies, as well as additional documentary evidence in support of the claimed 
parent-subsidiary relationship. 
Upon review of the evidence submitted, the director concluded that the evidence in the record did not 
reflect the parent-subsidiary relationship claimed by the petitioner. Specifically, the director noted that 
financial evidence of the purchase of the claimed shares was not supplied in the record and that the 
circumstances surrounding the foreign entity's alleged acquisition of the shares was questionable. 'The 
director subsequently concluded that the petitioner's claim of a qualifying relationship with the foreign 
entity was invalid and, as a result, the petition was denied. 
WAC 04 064 52 100 
Page 10 
The petitioner appealed the decision, asserting that the in fact showed that a qualified relationship 
existed between the two entities.' In support of the petitioner provides corporate 
documents establishing the correct percentages of in the U.S. and foreign entities. 
The regulation and case law confirm that ownership and are the factors that must be examined in 
determining whether a qualifying relationship exists United States and foreign entities for 
purposes of this visa classification. Matter of Clzurch International, 19 I&N Dec. 592;; see 
also Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N 1986); Matter of Hughes, 18 I&N 
Dec. 289 (Comm. 1982). In context of this visa to the direct or indirect legal 
right of possession of the assets of an entity to control; control means the 
direct or indirect legal right and authority to and operations of an 
entity. Matter of Church Scientology, 19 I&N Dec. at 595. 
In this case, the petitioner has provided conflicting evidence in response to the request for 
evidence. First, the petitioner submitted its Articles filed on November 15, 2002, which 
indicated that 2,000 shares of stock were The evidence also included a :stock 
certificate affirming that these 2,000 the foreign entity. No evidence of 
consideration was submitted despite the director's request. 
In addition, the petitioner submitted minutes from the fir shareholder's meeting and accomparlying 
documents, dated October 18, 2003, which amend Article of the petitioner's Articles of Incorporation 
to authorize the issuance of 100,000 shares of stock. Th minutes further indicate that these newly 
authorized shares have been distnbuted as follows: 
1 
The petitioner further submitted a document from the authorizing reimbursement to1 the 
beneficiary for her personal contribution in the amount toward the U.S. petitioner. The 
document indicates that this is a means to avoid the regulations in Venezuela. 
The director's denial relies heavily on this document, a the director challenged the petitioner's 
credibility slnce the manner of disbursement of the $10,000 to be a covert way to avoid the laws 
of Venezuela. On appeal, counsel discusses the history of currency exchange, in addition to 
several ownership changes in the foreign entity in the 
"he AAO notes that the director also examined the petitioner's 
affiliation in addition to a parent-subsidiary relationship. Or 
use of the term "affiliates;" however, the AAO notes that th: 
matter is a determination of whether the U.S. entity is the 
the AAO will proceed in this manner in evaluating the appeal. 
relationship with the foreign entity as an 
appeal, the petitioner adopts the director's 
proper analysis of the relationship in this 
subiidiary of the foreign entity. Consequently, 
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Page 11 
Upon review, the AAO notes that neither the director nor the petitioner addressed the proper issue here. 
As stated above, ownership and control are the factors that must be examined in determining whether a 
qualifying relationship exists between United States and foreign entities for purposes of this visa 
classification. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593; see also Matter of Siemens 
Medicul Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362; Matter ofHughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289. 
On its face, the documentation submitted in the record indicates that the foreign entity owns a majority 
interest in the U.S. petitioner. The director, however, specifically requested evidence to corroborate the 
ownership of these shares, in the form of wire transfers, cancelled checks, etc. The petitioner, however, 
submitted evidence of a $10,000 reimbursement check to the beneficiary for personal funds she used to 
open a commercial banking account for the U.S. petitioner. There is nothing in the record to indicate that 
this $10,000 was used to purchase the foreign entity's shares of stock in the U.S. petitioner. Furthennore, 
according to the petitioner's articles of Incorporation, the shares of stock were sold at $.01 each. 
Consequently, persuasive evidence of the foreign entity's ownership of 30,600 shares would be a 
monetary transaction in the amount of $306.~ 
The director specifically requested evidence of consideration paid for the acquisition of the !stock 
interests. In response, the petitioner merely submitted evidence of a $10,000 reimbursement check paid 
to the beneficiary. Since there is no evidence of a direct allocation of funds or acknowledgement that 
$306 of this $10,000 was for stock purchases, the petitioner has failed to satisfy its burden of pro'of of 
stock ownership. Failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry sha.11 be 
grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(14). Furthermore, the manner in which funds were 
delivered to the beneficiary for purposes of commencing the petitioner's U.S. operations is questionable. 
Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability 
and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N 
Dec. 582, 591 (BIA 1988). Based on the evidence presented, the petitioner has failed to prove that it 
established and maintained a qualifying relationship as required by the regulations with the foreign entity 
as of the filing date of this petition. 
Beyond the decision of the director, it remains to be determined that the beneficiary's services are for a 
temporary period. Specifically, the petitioner contends that the foreign entity is the petitioner's sole 
owner, and further contends that the beneficiary is a 50% owner of the foreign entity. The regulation at 8 
C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(vii) states that if the beneficiary is an owner or major stockholder of the company, 
the petition must be accompanied by evidence that the beneficiary's services are to be used for a 
temporary period and that the beneficiary will be transferred to an assignment abroad upon the 
completion of the temporary services in the United States. In the absence of persuasive evidence, it 
cannot be concluded that the beneficiary's services are to be used temporarily or that she will be 
transferred to an assignment abroad upon completion of her services in the United States. For this 
additional reason, the petition may not be approved. 
3 The AAO further notes that it is unclear whether the foreign entity retained the initial 2,000 shares 
allegedly issued to it on November 15,2002 or if these shares were forfeited. 
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Page 12 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied 
by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial 
decision. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), 
affd. 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting 
that the MO reviews appeals on a de novo basis). 
When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a challenge 
only if she shows that the MO abused it discretion with respect to all of the AAO's enumerated grounds. 
See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), ago'. 345 
F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit 
sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Here, that burden 
has not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.