dismissed L-1A Case: Retail

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
MATTER OF N- INC. 
APPEAL OF VERMONT SERVICE CENTER DECISION 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Admini1strative Appeals Office 
DATE: JAN. 18,2017 
PETITION:~ FORM I-129, PETITION FOR A NONIMMIGRANT WORKER 
The Petitioner, gas station and convenience store, seeks to temporarily employ the Beneficiary as its 
chief executive director under the L-lA nonimmigrant classification for intracompany transferees. 
See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 101(a)(l5)(L), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(L). 
The L-1 A classification allows a corporation or other legal entity (including its affiliate or subsidiary) to 
transfer a qualifying foreign employee to the United States to work temporarily in a managerial or 
executive capacity. 
The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petitiOn. The Director concluded that the 
evidence of record did not establish that: (1) the Beneficiary had at least 1 continuous year of full­
time employment abroad with a qualifying organization within the 3 years preceding the filing of the 
petition; (2) the Beneficiary was employed abroad in a managerial or executive capacity; and (3) the 
Beneficiary would be employed in a managerial or executive capacity in the United States. 
The Petitioner filed an appeal, which we summarily dismissed after determining that the Petitioner 
did not submit a brief or statement of the basis for the appeal. We have since received a copy of the 
Petitioner's timely-filed brief and reopened the matter sua sponte in order to consider the merits of 
the appeal. Accordingly, we will reinstate the appeal in order to consider the Petitioner's brief and 
evidence. 
However, upon de novo review, we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. LAW 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, a qualifying organization must 
have employed the beneficiary in a managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge 
capacity, for 1 continuous year within 3 years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission 
into the United States. Section 101(a)(l5)(L) of the Act. In addition, the Beneficiary must seek to 
enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or 
a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. ld. 
An individual petition filed on Form I-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker, shall be 
accompanied by: 
Matter of N- Inc. 
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will 
employ the alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph 
(1)(1 )(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or 
specialized knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the 
services to be performed. 
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time 
employment abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years 
preceding the filing of the petition. 
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position 
that was managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the 
alien's prior education, training, and employment qualities him/her to perform 
the intended services in the United States; however, the work in the United 
States need not be the same work which the alien performed abroad. 
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3). An "intracompany transferee" is: 
An alien who, within three years preceding the time of his or her application for 
admission into the United States, has been employed abroad continuously for one 
year by a firm or corporation or other legal entity or parent, branch, affiliate or 
subsidiary thereof, and who seeks to enter the United States temporarily in order to 
render his or her services to a branch of the same employer or a parent, affiliate, or 
subsidiary thereof in a capacity that is managerial, executive or involves specialized 
knowledge. Periods spent inJthe United States in lawful status for a branch of the 
same employer or a parent, affiliate, or subsidiary thereof and brief trips to the 
United States for business or pleasure shall not be interruptive of the one year of 
continuous employment abroad but such periods shall not be counted toward 
fulfillment of that requirement. 
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(l)(ii)(A). A petitioner must provide "[e]vidence that the alien has at least one 
continuous year of full-time employment abroad with a qualifying organization within the three 
I 
years preceding the filing of the petition." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3). 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 110l(a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" 
as "an assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily": 
(i) manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or 
component of the organization; 
2 
Matter of N- Inc. 
(ii) supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or 
managerial employees, or manages an essential function within the 
organization, or a department or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the 
authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel 
actions (such as promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is 
directly supervised, functions at a senior level within the organizational 
hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and 
(v) exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function 
for which the employee has authority. 
In addition, "[a] first-line supervisor is not considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely 
by virtue of the supervisor's. supervisory duties unless the employees supervised are professional." 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" 
as "an assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily": 
(i) directs the management of the organization or a major component or function 
of the organization; 
(ii) establishes the goals and 'policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(iv) receives only general supervision or direction from higher-level executives, 
the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization . 
... 
If staffing levels are used as a factor in determining whether an individual is acting in a managerial 
or executive capacity, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) must take irito account 
the reasonable needs of the organization, in light of the overall purpose and stage of development of 
the organization. See section 1 01 (a)( 44 )(C) of the Act. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. One Year Foreign Employment Requirement 
The Director denied the petition, in part, based on a finding that the evidence of record did not 
establish that the Beneficiary had at least 1 continuous year of full-time employment abroad with a 
qualifying organization within the 3 years preceding the filing of the petition. 
\_ 
3 
(b)(6)
Matter of N- Inc. 
Upon review, the Petitioner has not established that the Beneficiary was employed by a qualifying 
organization abroad for at least 1 continuous year in the relevant 3-year period. 
The Petitioner states that its claimed parent company , employed the Beneficiary 
in India from August 2000 until November 27, 2006 . The record shows that the Beneficiary was 
admitted to the United States in F-1 nonimmigrant status on December 27, 2006, was granted a 
change of status to H-1 B status on October 1, 2008 , was the Beneficiary of two subsequent H-I B 
petitions and had been continuously maintaining H-lB status at the time the instant petition was filed 
on March 27, 2015. The Beneficiary's H-lB employers, and 
have no claimed relationship with the petitioning company or the foreign employer. The record 
shows that the Beneficiary was last admitted to the United States on December 7, 2009. 
In denying the petition , the Director emphasized that the Beneficiary was not employed by the 
foreign entity for any period of time in the 3 years preceding the filing of this petition and in fact had 
not worked for the claimed foreign qualifying organization during the 8 years preceding the filing of 
the petition. , 
The Petitioner cites section 10l(a)(15)(L) ofthe Act and a portion of8 C.F.R.§ 214.2(1)(1)(ii)(A) in 
support of its assertion that USCIS should look to the 3-year period preceding the Beneficiary's 
admission to the United States: 
The [B]eneficiary's application for admission into the U.S. occurred in late 2006, and 
he was subsequently admitted. The evidence submitted, not challenged by USCIS, 
established that the beneficiary was working for a qualifying organization from 
August 2000- November2006. Therefore prior to the [B]eneficiary ' s application for 
admission into the U.S., he was working for a qualifying organization tor over 6 
years, enough to establish that this criteria has been established . 
In the plain language reading of the statute and the regulation, the USCIS' 
characterization of law that the employment must have ·occurred within three years of 
filing the current petition is inconsistent with the statute , regulation, and 
congressional intent. Moreover , it is inconsistent with the theory behind the plain 
language of the statute and regulation . The plain reading of the law allows for 
situations like the current petition , in that an employee may come to the U.S. for a 
period of time and later develop additional skills or education that would allow the 
. beneficiary ' s prior employe[r] to rehire the beneficiary and avail themselves [sic] of 
the laws ofthe United States. 
We do not agree with the Petitioner's assertion that USCIS should reach over the Beneficiary's 
December 2006 admission to the United States and subsequent stay of more than 8 years in 
determining whether he meets the 1 year of foreign employment requirement. 
4 
)'vfatter of N- Inc. 
As noted, the language of the statute indicates that the relevant 3-year period to be used as a 
reference point in determining whether the beneficiary had 1 year of continuous full-time 
employment with a qualifying entity abroad is the 3 years "preceding the time of his application for 
admission into the United States." Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. The statute, however, is silent 
with regard to those beneficiaries who have already been admitted to the United States in a different 
nonimmigrant classification. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(iii) clearly requires that an individual petition tiled on 
Form I -129 be accompanied by evidence that the beneficiary "has at least 1 continuous year of full 
time employment abroad with a qualifying organization within the 3 years preceding the filing of the 
petition." The definition of "intracompany transferee" also indicates that, if the beneficiary has been 
employed abroad continuously for 1 year by a qualifying organization within 3 years preceding the 
time of the beneficiary's "application for admission into the United States," the beneficiary may be 
eligible for L-1 classification. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(l)(ii)(A). 
When the definition of "intracompany transferee" is construed together with the regulation at 
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3) and section 101(a)(15)(L) ofthe Act, the phrase "preceding the time of his or 
her application for admission into the United States" refers 19 a beneficiary whose admission or 
admissions were "for a branch of the same employer or a parent, affiliate, or subsidiary thereof' or 
for "brief trips to the United States for business or pleasure." 
Therefore, according to the plain purpose of the Act and regulations, USCIS· will not reach back to 
the 3-year period preceding the Beneficiary's admission as a nonimmigrant in all circumstances. 
Unless the authorized period of stay in the United States is either brief or "for" a qualifying 
employer, the period of stay will be interruptive. See 52 Fed. Reg. 5738, 5742 (Feb. 26, 1987) 
("Time Spent in the United States Cannot Count Towards Eligibility for L Classification"). It 
logically follows that any non-qualifying period of stay in the United States that is longer than 2 
years would prevent a Beneficiary from meeting the "one-in-three" requirement at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(1)(3)(iii). 
The principal focus of section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1) is on the continuity 
of the beneficiary's employment with the same international qualifying organization in the United 
States. The 3-year window established by the statute ensures that there \Vill be no significant 
interruptions in employment within the same organization and is consistent with the purpose of this 
nonimmigrant classification. Allowing the "transfer" of employees who had worked outside of the 
organization for several years would be contrary to Congress' intent that international businesses 
will use this nonimmigrant classification· solely to temporarily transfer their foreign executive, 
managerial, and specialized knowledge employees to their United States operations. 
The Beneficiary in this case had been in the United States attending university and working for 
unrelated U.S. employers for more than 8 years at the time the Petition was filed. For the reasons 
discussed above, we find that the statute and regulations support a finding that only time spent in the 
United States working for a branch, subsidiary, affiliate, or parent of the foreign employer will be 
5 
(b)(6)
Matter of N- Inc. 
deemed non-interruptive. Here, at the time the Petitioner filed the petition , more than 8 years had 
passed since his employment with the foreign entity had been terminated. 
Therefore , we consider the Beneficiary's periods of stay as an F-1 nonimmigrant student and as an 
H-1B temporary worker for unrelated employers to be interruptive . Because none of the time he 
spent in the United States was spent working for a qualifying organization, we must look at the 3-
year period preceding the filing of the petition and will not adjust or reach back over this period to 
the period that preceded his admission as an F -1 student. The Petitioner did not establish that the 
Beneficiary had l year of full-time , continuous employment with a qualifying foreign entity in the 3 
years preceding the filing ofthe petition. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(iii). 
B. Foreign Employment in a Managerial or Executive Capacity 
In addition to finding that the Beneficiary did not meet th~ I year of foreign employment 
requirement, the Director also determined that, even if the Petitioner had established that the 
Beneficiary had l year of foreign employment in the 3 years preceding the filing of the petition, his 
employment was not in a managerial or executive capacity. 
Upon review of the petition and evidence , including the Petitioner ' s brief and evidence submitted on 
appeal, we conclude that the evidence does not establish that the foreign entity employed the 
Beneficiary in a managerial or executive capacity. 
When examining the managerial or executive capacity of the Beneficiary , we first review the 
Petitioner's description of the job duties . See 8 C .F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The definitions of executive 
and managerial capacity have two parts. First, the Petitioner must show that the Beneficiary will 
· perform certain high-level responsibilities . Champion World, Inc. v. INS, 940 F.2d 1533 (Table), 1991 
WL 144470 (9th Cir. July 30, 1991). Second , the Petitioner must prove that the Beneficiary will be 
primarily engaged in managerial or executive duties, as opposed to ordinary operational activities 
alongside the Petitioner's other employees. See. e.g., Family Inc. v. USCIS, 469 F.3d 1313, 1316 (9th 
Cir. 2006); Champion World. Inc., 940 F.2d at 1533. 
In addition, beyond the required description of the job duties , USCIS reviews the totality of the 
record when examining the claimed managerial or executive capacity of a beneficiary, including the· 
company's organizational structure, the duties of a beneficiary ' s subordinate employees, the 
presence of other employees to relieve a beneficiary from performing operational duties , the nature 
of the business , and any other factors that will contribute to understanding a beneficiary's actual 
duties and role in a business. 
In support of the petition, the Petitioner provided a letter from the foreign entity, signed by a 
who stated that the company employed the Beneficiary as its executive marketing officer with 
responsibility for the following duties: 
6 
Matter of N- Inc. 
1. Plan, direct and evaluate the activities of sales departments m commercial, 
industrial, wholesale and other non-retail establishments. 
2. Prepare reports of marketing regularly. 
3. To advertise the product of company and direct and evaluate the activities of sales 
departments in commercial, industrial, wholesale and other non-retail 
establishments. '-
4. Initiate market research studies and analyze their finding. 
5. Maintain records of all marketing in industry premises, distributor premises and at 
retail outlets. 
6. Assist in product development and evaluate the marketing strategies. 
7. To establish distribution networks for products and services and implement 
communication strategies and information programs, publicize activities and 
events. 
While these duties suggest that the Beneficiary p1ay have had some authority over planning or 
managing sales activities, the description is too general to establish that the Beneficiary primarily 
performed managerial or executive duties associated with the company's sales and marketing 
functions. The description lacked specific details regarding the Beneficiary's responsibilities for 
planning and directing departments and activities, lacked information regarding the strategies he 
developed or implemented, and did not reflect that the Beneficiary supervised any subordinate 
personnel in carrying out his duties. Conclusory assertions regarding the Beneficiary's employment 
capacity are not sufficient. Merely repeating the language of the statute or regulations does not 
satisfy the Petitioner's burden of proof. Fedin Bros. Co .. Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 
(E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905 F. 2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990); Avyr Assocs .. Inc. v. Meissner, 1997 WL 
188942 at *5 (S.D.N.Y.). 
( 
Further, the position description included a number of duties which, without further explanation, 
appear to be non-qualifying sales, marketing and administrative tasks, such as preparing marketing 
reports, advertising the company's products, initiating and analyzing market research studies, 
maintaining company records, assisting in product development, and publicizing activities and 
events. Whether the Beneficiary is a managerial or executive employee turns on whether the 
Petitioner has sustained its burden of proving that their duties are "primarily" managerial or 
executive. See sections 10l(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act. Here, the Petitioner did not document 
how the Beneficiary allocated his time between qualifying and non-qualifying duties. 
In a request for evidence (RFE), the Director advised the Petitioner that this list of duties was too 
general and did not provide sufficient detail to establish whether the Beneficiary's duties were 
primarily managerial or executive in nature. The Director requested a more detailed description of 
the Beneficiary's managerial or executive duties and the percentage of time he spent on specific 
tasks as well as a detailed organizational chart for the foreign entity depicting the Beneficiary's 
position and the names, job titles, job duties, educational levels, and salaries of any employees he 
supervised. 
7 
(b)(6)
}.fatter of N- Inc. 
In response, the Petitioner re-submitted letter and provided· no further information 
regarding the Beneficiary's job duties. As a result, based on the current record, we are unable to 
determine whether the claimed managerial duties constituted the majority of the Beneficiary's 
duties, or whether the Beneficiary primarily performed non-qualifying administrative or operational 
duties related to the marketing and sale of the foreign entity's products. Although the Director 
specifically requested this information, the foreign entity's description of the Beneficiary's job 
duties does not establish what proportion of the duties was managerial in nature, and what proportion 
is actually non-managerial. See Republic ofTranskei v. INS, 923 F.2d 175, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
Further, in reviewing the totality of the evidence, the record contains no information regarding the 
foreign entity's staffing levels or organizational structure during the Beneficiary's period of 
employment abroad, despite the Director's specific request for this evidence. In response to the 
RFE, the Petitioner provided an employee list dated "11-05-2015" which provides the names, titles, 
salaries, and duties of employees as of that date. 1 The Petitioner did not provide the requested 
evidence of the foreign entity's staffing levels or structure during the relevant time period. As a 
result, the record does not show that the foreign company actually had a "sales department," or any 
subordinate sales or marketing staff to support the Beneficiary's claimed managerial or executive 
position. 
On appeal, the Petitioner refers to letter and states "[i]t's hard to imagine that the duties 
listed in the letter are not executive in their rnature as the duties listed carry with them an executive 
nature." It further contends that "[i]t is oxymoronic to require an executive to provide a letter with 
'sufficient detail' of another executive's responsibilities." 
Again, we emphasize that simply reciting the Beneficiary's vague job responsibilities or broadly cast 
business objectives is not sufficient; the regulations require a detailed description of the 
Beneficiary's daily job duties. The Petitioner has not provided any detail or explanation of the 
Beneficiary's activities in the course of his daily routine. The actual duties themselves will reveal 
the true nature of the employment. Fed in Bros. supra, 724 F. Supp. at 1108, a.ff'd, 905 F .2d 41 (2d. 
Cir. 1990). An individual will not be deemed an executive under the statute simply because the 
individual has an executive title. 
A petitioner's unsupported statements are of very limited weight and normally \Vill be insufficient to 
carry its burden of proof. See Afatter of So.ffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) (citing 
Afatter of Treasure Craft of Cal., 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg'l Comm'r 1972)); see also Matter of 
Chmvathe, 25 l&N Dec. 369, 376 (AAO 2010). The Petitioner must support its assertions with 
relevant, probative, and credible evidence. See Matter ofChmvathe, 25 I&N Dec. at 376. Here, the 
Petitioner's claims that the Beneficiary was employed in a qualifying managerial or executive 
capacity abroad rest entirely on a general job description that includes a number of non-managerial 
duties. 
1 
The 2015 employee list includes a president, a manager, a supervisor, two workers, and an accountant; the company did 
not appear to employ anyone in the Beneficiary's former position of "executive marketing officer" or otherwise employ 
any sales and marketing staff. 
8 
(b)(6)
Matter ofN- Inc. 
Accordingly, based on the deficiencies addressed above, the Petitioner has not established that the 
Beneficiary's employment with the foreign entity was in a managerial or executive capacity. 
C. U.S. Employment in a Managerial or Executive Capacity 
The Director also denied the petition ba'sed on a finding that the Petitioner did not establish that the 
Beneficiary will be employed in the United States in a managerial or executive capacity. The 
Petitioner does not claim that the Beneficiary will be employed in a managerial 
capacity. Therefore , 
we restrict our a_nalysis to whether the Beneficiary \vill be employed in an executive capacity. 
Upon review of the petition and the evidence of record, including materials submitted in support of 
the appeal, we conclude that the Petitioner has not established that the Beneficiary will be employed 
in the United States in an executive capacity. 
When examining the managerial or executive capacity of the Beneficiary, we first review the 
Petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F .R. § 214.2(1)(3)(ii). 
In support of the petition, the Petitioner submitted a job offer letter indicating that the company, 
which operates a gas station and convenience store in Oklahoma, plans to expand into 
other regions of Oklahoma and Texas under the Beneficiary's leadership. It described his proposed 
duties as chief executive director as follows: 
1. Evaluate our product lines, budgets, expenditures, and providing profit/loss 
projections; 8% 
2. Provide direction to the company Certified Public Accountant for company goals, 
· investment projects, and staffing; 2% 
3. Immediately put current expansion ideas into pn'tctice, including expansion into 
north and northwestern Texas, and western and southwestern Oklahoma; 20% 
4. Develop relationships and attend meetings with current and prospective investors, 
bank management and leadership personnel, and community organizations; 15% 
5. Establish community ties with local chambers of commerce , leadership and 
community service organizatioms such as 
schools, and other community event and planning organizations ; 5% 
6. Attend charity, fundraising, and business development semmars , events, and 
business education workshop; 5% 
7. Research new development projects; 8% 
8. Select and hire advertising and marketing agencies for billboard, television, and 
radio advertisements; 8% 
9. Select and hire contractors for development projects; 2% 
10. Attend job sites to ensure timely and efficient production; 1% 
11. Coordinate marketing activities, such as participation in local events and 
functions; 3~1J 
9 
Matter of N- Inc. 
12. Report to [the foreign entity's] ownership monthly and at such times discussed by 
the Chief Executive Director and ownership, as well as providing information to 
consultants; 3% 
13. Compile our service and product data and convert the data into a workable 
marketing plan; 3% 
14. Review sales staff reports by the store managers and advise and direct the 
management via teleconferences and in-person meetings; 4% 
15. Evaluate company management on a semi-monthly basis, including discretionary 
termination and commencement as needed; 3% and, 
16. Devise company goals and policies to ensure the direction, scope and continuity 
of [the foreign entity] and [the Petitioner]. 10% 
The definitions of managerial and executive capacity each have two parts. First, the Petitioner must 
show that the Beneficiary will perform certain high-level responsibilities. Champion World, supra, 
940 F.2d 1533. Second, the Petitioner must prove that the Beneficiary will be primarily engaged in 
managerial or executive duties, as opposed to ordinary operational activities alongside the \ 
Petitioner's other employees. See Family Inc., supra, 469 F.3d at 1316; Champion World, 940 F.2d 
1533. 
Here, the Petitioner indicates that the Beneficiary would be responsible for overall management of 
the petitioning company and overseeing its expansion to include other locations. However, the 
Petitioner has not provided sufficient detail'regarding the Beneficiary's proposed day-to-day duties 
to establish that such duties will be primarily executive ih nature. For example, the Petitioner states 
that the Beneficiary will allocate 20 percent of his time to "put current expansion plans into practice" 
but it does not describe the actual executive tasks he would perform in pursuit of these plans nor has 
it submitted a business plan or other information providing details of the planned expansion or 
current stage of planning and investment. Similarly, the Petitioner states that he will spend 10% of 
his time devising company goals and policies but has not further explained this broad responsibility 
or identified the goals and policies he will implement. Specifics are an important indication of 
whether a beneficiary's duties are primarily executive or managerial in nature; otherwise, meeting 
the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros., supra, 724 F. 
Supp. at 1108, aff'd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
In addition, several of the Beneficiary's duties, without further specifics, appear to involve research 
analytical and marketing tasks, rather than executive-level tasks. For example, the Petitioner 
indicates that the Beneficiary will be evaluating product lines, budgets and expenditures, researching 
new development projects, compiling service and product data and converting this data into a 
marketing plan, coordinating marketing activities, participating in local events and functions, and 
working with advertising and marketing agencies. These non-executive duties account for another 
30 percent of the Beneficiary's time. Although the Director noted deficiencies with the submitted 
position description and provided an opportunity for the Petitioner to supplement the record to 
establish that the Beneficiary would be employed in an executive capacity, it did not submit 
additional evidence in response to the Director's request and instead simply stated that it had already 
10 
(b)(6)
Matter of N- Inc. 
provided "a probative explanation of the duties and need for [the Beneficiary] to work m an 
executive capacity." 
Overall, while the Petitioner provided a list of duties with percentages of time to broad areas of 
responsibility, the combination of overly vague and non-qualifying duties included in the list 
prevents us from concluding , based on the job description alone, that the Beneficiary's actual duties 
would be primarily executive in nature. 
Beyond the required description of the job duties , USCIS reviews the totality of the record when 
examining the claimed managerial or executive capacity of a beneficiary , including the company's 
organizational structure , the duties of a beneficiary's subordinate employees, the presence of other 
employees to relieve a beneficiary from performing operational duties , the nature of the business , 
and any other factors that will contribute to understanding a beneficiary ' s actual duties and role in a 
business. 
At the time of filing, the Petitioner submitted a proposed organizational chart depicting the 
Beneficiary ' s proposed position within the company hierarch y. The chart shows that, as chief 
executive director, the Beneficiary would report to the owner and supervise an 
administrative assistant position (currently vacant), and the company' s contracted CPA. The chart 
also depicts the store staff and identifies two store managers ( and 
who supervise a total of five cashiers. As evidence of wages paid to its employees, the Petitioner 
provided pay statement s for the period ending January 31, 2015, which appears to be a one-week pay 
period. The Petitioner documented payments to four of the tive cashiers listed on the organizational 
chart, and payments to four part-time workers who did not appear on the chart. Of the four cashier s 
who received wages , one . worked 21 hours, two worked 25 hours, and one worked 39 hours. The 
Petitioner did not provide evidence of wages paid to the store managers or to the fifth cashier 
depicted on the chart. As noted, the Petitioner declined to submit additional evidence pertaining to 
the Beneficiary's proposed U.S. employment in response to the RFE, in which the Director had 
requested additional evidence regarding the Beneficiary's duties and the Petitioner's stafting and 
structure. 
Based on the limited evidence submitted , the Petitioner has documented its employment of one full­
time and three part-time cashiers and has not established how this staff would relieve the Beneficiar y 
from involvement in the day-to-day operations of the Petitioner 's existing gas station and 
convenience store or support his employment in an executive capacity . The Petitioner has not 
submitted evidence that it employs or as its store managers or 
otherwise sufficiently corroborated the information provided in its organizational chart. A 
petitioner's unsupported statements are of very limited weight and normally will be insufficient to 
carry its burden of proof , particularly when supporting documentary evidence would reasonably be 
available. See Matter ofSoffici, 22 I&N Dec . 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) (citing Matter ofTreasur e 
Craft ofCal. , 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg'l Comm 'r 1972)); see also Matter o(Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 
369, 376 (AAO 2010) . The Petitioner must support its assertions with relevant , probative , and 
credible evidence . See Matter o.fChawathe , 25 l&N Dec. at 376. 
II 
(b)(6)
Matter of N- Inc. 
The statutory definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated position 
within a complex organizational hierarchy, including major components or functions of the 
organization, and that person's authority to direct the organization. Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the 
Act. Under the statute, a beneficiary must have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish 
the goals and policies" of that organization. Inherent to the definition, the organization must have a 
subordinate level of managerial employees for a beneficiary to direct and they must primarily focus 
on the broad goals and policies of the organization rather than the day-to-day .operations of the 
enterprise. An individual will not be deemed an executive under the statute simply because the 
individual has an executive title or because the individual ''directs" the enterprise as the owner or 
sole managerial employee. A beneficiary must also exercise "wide latitude in discretionary decision 
making" and receive only "general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board 
of directors, or stockholders of the organization." !d. 
Here, despite the Beneficiary's job title of "chief executive director," the record does not contain 
sufficient information regarding his actual proposed job duties , documentation of the Petitioner's 
planned expansion , or evidence of the company's staffing and structure as of the date of filing . 
Without this infom1ation , we cannot determine that the Beneficiary ' s would be primarily focused on 
the broad goals and policies of the organization rather than on the day-to-day operations of the 
business. 
Based on th,e deficiencies discussed above, the Petitioner has not established that the Beneticiary 
would be employed in the United States in an executive capacity. 
D. Qualifying Relationship 
Although not addressed in the Director's decision , the evidence of record does not support the 
Petitioner's claim that it has a qualifyingrelationship with the Beneficiary's foreign employer. To 
establish a "qualifying relationship" under the Act and the regulations, the Petitioner must show that 
the Beneficiary's foreign employer and the proposed U.S. employer are the same employer (i.e. one 
entity with "branch" offices), or related as a "parent and subsidiary" or as "affiliates." See section 
101(a)(15)(L) of the Act; see also 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(l)(ii) (providing definitions of the terms 
"parent," ."branch ," "subsidiary," and "affiliate "). 
On the Form I-129 , the Petitioner stated that it is a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
the foreign entity. In its supporting letter , the Petitioner explained that the foreign entity purchased 
all 1000 shares of the company on March 25, 2015, and that, prior to that date, the company was 
owned in equal parts by four individual shareholders: and 
.__ ___ _ However, the Petitioner has not adequately documented this change in ownership . 
The record contains, in pertinent part, the following evidence: 
I. Stock purchase agreement between and (sellers) and 
(purchaser), indicating that the sellers owned and agreed to sell 
12 
(b)(6)
A1atter of N- Inc. 
all 1000 shares of the company's stock to the foreign entity in exchange for 
$70,000 on 
March 25, 2015; 
2. The Petitioner's stock certificate number 1, which indicates that 500 shares \Vere 
issued to on March 25, 2015 and transferred to on 
that date; 
3. The Petitioner's stock certificate number 2, which indicates that 500 shares \vere 
issued to on March 25, 2015 and transferred to on 
that date; 
4. Copies of two checks issued by the claimed proprietor of 
from his U.S. bank account on March 25, 2015, indicating that 
he paid $35,000 to both and on March 25, 2015; 
5. Copies of the Petitioner's IRS Forms 1120-S, U.S. Income Tax Return for an S 
Corporation, for the years 2012 through 2014, \Vhich indicate that the Petitioner 
had four shareholders: and 
and 
6. Affidavits from and indicating that they had relinquished 
their ownership interest in the petitioning company prior to March 25, 2015. 
Upon revie\v of the totality of the evidence, the Petitioner has not documented that and 
owned 1 00 percent of the company's shares at the time the stock purchase agreement 
was executed, which calls into question the Petitioner's claim that all 1000 shares were sold to the 
foreign entity. The evidence indicates that the Petitioning company was owned by four individual 
shareholders as of December 31, 2014. While and indicated that they 
extinguished their ownership interests prior to March 25, 2015, the Petitioner did not submit 
supporting evidence of these stock transactions or any documentation showing that that their 
ownership interests were in fact transferred to and Further, the Petitioner 
has not explained why the only stock certificates issued to date were issued on the date of the 
claimed stock purchase, nearly 5 years after the company was established. 
In addition, while the Petitioner claims that is the current owner and proprietor of 
and there is some secondary evidence in support of this claim (specifically, the 
foreign entity's 2012 rental agreement), the record also contains evidence that the foreign entity was 
established as a sole proprietorship owned by in 2003. The record does not 
contain an official Indian government registration document identifying as the 
current proprietor. A petitioner's unsupported statements are of very limited weight and normally 
will be insufficient to carry its burden of proof See 1\Jatter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165 (citing 
Matter of Treasure Craft of Cal., 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg'l Comm'r 1972)); see also Matter of 
Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 376 (AAO 2010). The Petitioner must support its assertions with 
relevant, 
probative, and credible evidence. See Matter ofChawathe, 25 I&N Dec. at 376. 
Based on these deficiencies and inconsistencies, we cannot conclude that the Petitioner has a 
qualifying relationship with the Beneficiary's foreign employer. For this additional reason, the 
petition cannot be approved. 
13 
~. 
Matter of N- Inc. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The petition will be denied and the appeal dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each 
considered as an independent and alternative basis for the decision. In visa petition proceedings, the 
burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains with the petitioner. Section 291 of the 
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
Cite as Matter o.fN- Inc., ID# 106321 (AAO Jan. 18, 2017) 
14