dismissed L-1A Case: Retail

&a&@ 
prevent clearty unw~anted 
invasion of ponal privacy 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
b 
File: EAC 07 094 53032 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER Date: MAY 3 0 2m8 
IN RE: Petitioner: 
Beneficiary: 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonirnmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1 101 (a)(l5)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
Thls is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
Robert P. Wiemann, Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
EAC 07 094 53032 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonirnmigrant petition seeking to extend the employment of its director as an L-IA 
nonirnmigrant intracompany transferee pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 
 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner, a Texas corporation, states that it is engaged in 
retail trade and investment. It operates a gas station and convenience store. The petitioner claims to be a 
subsidiary of M/S Shree Collections, located in Maharashtra, India. The beneficiary was initially granted a 
one-year period of stay to open a new office in the United States in 2002 and was subsequently granted two 
extensions of status. The petitioner now seeks to extend the beneficiary's L-1A status for three additional 
years. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish that the beneficiary would be 
employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director 
erred by overlooking and misinterpreting certain evidence and by failing to recognize the beneficiary's 
executive and managerial role within the petitioning company. Counsel submits a brief and additional 
evidence in support of the appeal. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section I0 1 (a)(lS)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his 
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
EAC 07 094 53032 
Page 3 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The sole issue addressed by the director is whether the petitioner established that the beneficiary will be 
employed by the United States entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1 101(a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
the organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department 
or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to 
hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as 
promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised, 
functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the 
function managed; and 
(iv) 
 exercises discretion over the day to day operations of the activity or function for 
which the employee has authority. A first line supervisor is not considered to be 
acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory 
duties unless the employees supervised are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 1 101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) 
 establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision making; and 
(iv) 
 receives only general supervision or direction fiom higher level executives, the board 
of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
EAC 07 094 53032 
Page 4 
The nonirnmigrant petition was filed on February 15, 2007. The petitioner indicated on Fonn 1-129 that the 
beneficiary would serve as the director of the U.S. company, which was stated to have five employees. In 
support of the petition, the petitioner submitted a letter dated February 12, 2007, in which it described the 
beneficiary's duties as follows: 
She functions in a managerial and executive capacity. [The beneficiary] continues to 
supervise and control the work of other supervisory, professional and managerial employees. 
She functions at the senior most level within the organizational hierarchy and exercises 
discretion over the day-to-day operations of this organization. 
The petitioner submitted an organizational chart for the U.S. company which identifies the beneficiary as 
president, with responsibility for supervising a store manager and one proposed employee of "Wash-n-Shop," 
a San Antonio, Texas-based laundromat the petitioner claims to have acquired in January 2005. The 
organizational chart shows that the store manager supervises one "assistant," who in turn supervises two 
cashiers. 
The petitioner submitted a copy of its Texas Form C-3, Employer's Quarterly Report, for the fourth quarter of 
2006, which indicates that the company employed four employees during each month. When comparing the 
quarterly wage report to the organizational chart, it is noted that there is one employee, mil, listed on 
the quarterly report who does not appear on the organizational chart, and one employee on the organizational 
chart, Mohamadur Saheen, who does not appear on the quarterly report for the fourth quarter of 2006. 
The director issued a request for additional evidence on March 16, 2007, in which he instructed the petitioner 
to submit the following to establish that the beneficiary would be employed in a primarily managerial or 
executive capacity: (1) a comprehensive description of the beneficiary's duties with an explanation as to 
which duties would be managerial or executive in nature; (2) a list of all U.S. employees which identifies each 
employee by name and job title; (3) a complete position description for all employees in the United States, to 
include a breakdown of the number of hours devoted to each employee's job duties on a weekly basis; (4) 
copies of all payroll records for the petitioner's employees for the months of December 2006 and January 
2007; (5) copies of IRS Forms 941, Employer's Quarterly Federal Tax Return, for all four quarters of 2006; 
and (6) copies of IRS Forms W-2 and W-3 for 2005 and 2006. 
In a response dated May 8, 2007, counsel for the petitioner stated that the petitioner employs a total of six 
4 
employees as of the most recent quarter, "which allows [the beneficiary] to spend her workdays running the 
company rather than handling the ordinary tasks of the business." Counsel fkther described the beneficiary's 
duties as follows: 
[The beneficiary] handles all of the directorial and executive aspects of the business as she 
has been appointed to this position by the foreign entity which owns 100% [the petitioning 
company]. Exhibit 5, which is a Business Resolution and experience letter from [the foreign 
entity] proves that she has been granted the authority to set up this business and operate it as 
an executive would. In other words, she has final authority to make all executive and 
managerial decisions with regard to the US subsidiary. 
EAC 07 094 53032 
Page 5 
As executive, [the beneficiary's] day-to-day duties include making decisions with regard to 
employee hiring and firing, promotions and advertising. That is to say, she spends her time 
promoting the image of the business. She handles customers' concerns and complaints when 
they arise, makes marketing decisions, selects various products to sell in order to maximize 
the profits. This is also done in conjunction with [the store manager's] efforts, who confers 
with her and makes recommendations regarding which items to sell and which items to stop 
selling, how much to sell, etc. [The beneficiary] spends almost no time working behind the 
cash register, and she does not generally deal with things such as maintenance, cleaning, or 
even purchasing/sales. 
[Hler work is clearly that of an executive. She directs the store; she does not handle the day- 
to-day menial tasks that would make her an ordinary worker. She has complete control of 
executive decisions; she spends her time making the business stronger by networking, by 
increasing product profitability, by streamlining the financial issues, etc. 
The petitioner provided the requested list of its employees by name and position title, but did not provide the 
requested detailed position descriptions for the beneficiary's subordinates. Failure to submit requested 
evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 5 
103.2(b)(14). The petitioner's employee list included the following individuals: 
It is noted that 
 and 
 were not included on the organizational chart submitted at the 
time the petition was filed, and the petitioner has not explained this apparent discrepancy. The petitioner 
provided a copy of its Texas Form C-3 for the first quarter of 2007 which lists all employees named on the 
employee list. Four of the six employees earned wages of $1,500 for the quarter; the store manager earned 
$2,880; and the beneficiary earned $9,000. 
The petitioner also submitted copies of its Texas Forms C-3, Employer's Quarterly Report, and IRS Forms 
W-2, Wage and Tax Statement, for 2006. The AAO notes that the employeeas issued a 
Form W-2 from the petitioner indicating that he earned wages of $1,500 in 2006; however, this employee was 
not listed on any of the company's state quarterly wage reports during that year. Similarly, the petitioner 
issued a Form W-2 to 
 showing that he earned wages of $1,500 in 2006 
 is not 
- on its listed on any of the petitioner's 2006 quarterly wage reports. The petitioner did list an 
Texas Form C-3 for the fourth quarter of 2006, but this individual has a different U.S. Social Security 
Number and is clearly not the same person. The record shows that the petitioner did not issue a Form W-2 to 
EAC 07 094 53032 
Page 6 
based on a review of the petitioner's wage records, it is noted that the employee 
who was listed on the organizational chart submitted at the time of filing, was 
employed by the U.S. company only during the second quarter of 2006. 
Overall, the discrepancies between the petitioner's payroll records, tax documentation and organizational 
chart raise serious questions regarding the credibility of its claims regarding its staffing and organizational 
structure as of the date of filing. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the 
record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not 
suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of 
Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582,591-92 (BIA 1988). Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, 
lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa 
petition. Id. 
It appears that the company has consistently employed the beneficiary, a store manager, a part-time 
"assistant" whose duties have not been identified, and one or more part-time cashiers. However, the petitioner 
has not adequately supported its claim that it employed six workers as of February 2007 when the petition 
was filed. Although specifically requested by the director, the petitioner failed to provide copies of its payroll 
records for all employees for the month of January 2007. Again, failure to submit requested evidence that 
precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(14). 
The director denied the petition on September 21, 2007, concluding that the petitioner had failed to establish 
that the beneficiary would be employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity under the extended 
petition. The director noted the discrepancies in the record with respect to the number of employees working 
for the petitioning company, and further observed that the petitioner had failed to submit the requested 
detailed position descriptions for the beneficiary's subordinate staff. The director observed that it was not 
clear who was providing the goods and services of the U.S. company on a full-time basis, other than the 
beneficiary. The director concluded that the petitioner had failed to establish that the beneficiary would be 
primarily engaged in supervising a subordinate staff of managerial, supervisory or professional workers, or 
that she would be managing an essential function of the organization. Rather, the director found that the 
beneficiary would be engaged in the non-managerial, day-to-day operations of the business, such as providing 
a service or selling a product. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director erred when he failed to recognize the 
beneficiary's managerial and executive position within the company, and also "misinterpreted and overlooked 
certain exhibits." Counsel concedes the small size of the petitioning company, but argues that "the fact 
remains that [the beneficiary] was acting in an executive capacity while exercising her job duties." With 
respect to the "confusion over the number of workers," counsel asserts that it is clear that there have been four 
to six employees working for the company at any given time, and that the beneficiary "exercised complete 
authority over all aspects of the employees listed." Counsel notes that the beneficiary "paid their salaries, she 
ensured that they performed their duties professionally and adequately, and she made executive decisions 
regarding the direction of the firm on a weekly basis." Counsel fiuther emphasizes that the beneficiary "made 
all final decisions with regard to the hiring and firing of employees, the types of products to be sold, and the 
types of contractors with whom to deal." 
EAC 07 094 53032 
Page 7 
Counsel acknowledges that the beneficiary is sometimes required to perform some non-qualifying duties, but 
states that "it is equally true that she worked on a daily basis as an executive of a successful US business." 
Counsel outlines the following "executive" duties, and emphasizes that such duties are consistent with the 
statutory definition provided at section 10 1 (a)(44)(B) of the Act: 
[The beneficiary] negotiated all contracts with landlords, product providers, employees, 
franchisors, etc., and made all final decisions as to what kind of product [the petitioner] 
provided and how it provided these products. Further, [the beneficiary] was at all times 
in possession of the legal right to conduct the business. 
She set all goals and made all determinations as to the shape of the business. 
[The beneficiary] had full authority and discretion over all aspects of the business. 
[The beneficiary] received no supervision from the foreign parent. Further, as 50% 
owner of the foreign parent, she had every right to operate as an executive in an 
executive capacity. 
Counsel asserts that the beneficiary clearly exercises executive authority over the petitioner, and notes that 
"although she did perform an occasional non-qualifying duty, she was always busy researching new products, 
dealing with new clients, making advertising decisions, and otherwise guiding the business to success." 
Finally, counsel indicates that the petitioner is submitting documentation related to "a second enterprise" that 
is controlled by the beneficiary, noting that the new enterprise is "intimately linked" with the petitioner. The 
attached documentation includes a Texas Certificate of Filing for Maasb Enterprises, Inc. with an effective 
date of February 1, 2007, a lease for a convenience store entered into by this company on January I, 2007, 
and business permits issued to the company in July 2007. 
Counsel's assertions are not persuasive. Upon review, and for the reasons discussed herein, the petitioner has 
not established that the beneficiary would be employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity under 
the extended petition. 
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner's description of the job 
duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are 
either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. 
In the instant matter, counsel and the petitioner have repeatedly described the beneficiary's proposed position 
in very broad terms. The petitioner initially stated in its letter dated February 12, 2007 that the beneficiary 
"continues to supervise and control the work of other supervisory, professional and managerial employees," 
and that she "functions at the senior most level within the organizational hierarchy and exercises discretion 
over the day-to-day operations of this organization." These duties merely paraphrase the statutory definition 
of managerial capacity. See section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act. Conclusory assertions regarding the 
beneficiary's employment capacity are not sufficient. Merely repeating the language of the statute or 
regulations does not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1 103, 
EAC 07 094 53032 
Page 8 
1 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), afd, 905 F. 2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990); Avyr Associates, Inc. v. Meissner, 1997 WL 
188942 at *5 (S.D.N.Y.). 
Accordingly, the director specifically requested that the petitioner submit a comprehensive description of the 
beneficiary's duties and an explanation as to how her duties qualify as managerial or executive in nature. In 
response, counsel emphasized that the beneficiary spends her days "running the company," that she has 
authority to operate the company "as an executive would," and that she "has final authority to make all 
executive and managerial decisions" with respect to the company. The AAO cannot accept an ambiguous 
position description and speculate as to the related managerial or executive duties to be performed. Specifics 
are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties are primarily executive or managerial in 
nature, otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. 
Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. at 1108. 
counsel also indicated that the beneficiary is responsible for hiring and firing, advertising and promotions, 
"promoting the image of the business," handling customer concerns and complaints, making marketing 
decisions, "directing the store," "streamlining the financial issues," and selecting products to sell. The 
petitioner's description does not clearly identify the managerial or executive duties to be performed by the 
beneficiary with respect to the purchasing, marketing, customer service, finance and advertising fhctions of 
the petitioner's gas station and convenience store. Reciting the beneficiary's vague job responsibilities or 
broadly-cast business objectives is not sufficient; the regulations require a detailed description of the 
beneficiary's daily job duties. The petitioner has failed to provide any detail or explanation of the 
beneficiary's activities in the course of her daily routine. The actual duties themselves will reveal the true 
nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. at 1108. 
At the same time, counsel acknowledged that the beneficiary does spend some time operating a cash register 
or involved in purchasing and sales activities, but offered no detailed breakdown of her duties or how much 
time she spends on managerial and non-managerial tasks. Accordingly, the record before the director 
contained no concrete description of what the beneficiary does on a day-to-day basis as the director of the 
petitioning company. The definitions of executive and managerial capacity have two parts. First, the petitioner 
must show that the beneficiary performs the high-level responsibilities that are specified in the definitions. 
Second, the petitioner must prove that the beneficiary primarily performs these specified responsibilities and 
does not spend a majority of his or her time on day-to-day functions. Champion World, Inc. v. INS, 940 F.2d 
1533 (Table), 1991 WL 144470 (9th Cir. July 30, 1991). Here, while the AAO does not doubt that the 
beneficiary exercises decision-malung authority and overall oversight over the petitioning company as its 
director, the petitioner has not met its burden to show that the beneficiary primarily performs managerial or 
executive duties. The AAO cannot accept a managerial or executive job title and broad, conclusory assertions 
regarding the beneficiary's responsibilities in lieu of the required detailed description of the beneficiary's 
duties. The petitioner has not adequately described the beneficiary's actual duties, such that they could be 
classified as managerial or executive in nature. Nor has the petitioner submitted a more detailed description of 
the beneficiary's duties for consideration on appeal. 
When examining the managerial or executive capacity of a beneficiary, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS) reviews the totality of the record, including descriptions of a beneficiary's duties and those 
EAC 07 094 53032 
Page 9 
of his or her subordinate employees, the nature of the petitioner's business, the employment and remuneration 
of employees, and any other facts contributing to a complete understanding of a beneficiary's actual role in a 
business. The evidence must substantiate that the duties of the beneficiary and his or her subordinates 
correspond to their placement in an organization's structural hierarchy; artificial tiers of subordinate 
employees and inflated job titles are not probative and will not establish that an organization is sufficiently 
complex to support an executive or manager position. Contrary to the common understanding of the word 
"manager," the statute plainly states that a "first line supervisor is not considered to be acting in a managerial 
capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised are 
professional." Section 10 1 (a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. 9 2 14.2(1)(1)(ii)(B)(2). 
In the present matter, the totality of the record does not support a conclusion that the beneficiary's 
subordinates are supervisors, managers, or professionals. At the time the petition was filed in February 2007, 
the petitioner employed the beneficiary as director, a store manager, a part-time assistant, and one or more 
part-time cashiers. Although requested by the director, the petitioner has failed to clearly identify the job 
duties, and educational backgrounds of its employees. Any failure to submit requested evidence that precludes 
a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 8 103.2(b)(14). The 
organizational chart submitted with the petition identified three tiers of management or supervision to oversee 
two cashiers. The petitioner has not established that any of the beneficiary's employees were employed in 
managerial, supervisory, or professional positions. USCIS will not conclude that the beneficiary manages 
supervisory or professional employees based on an uncorroborated organizational chart that is unaccompanied 
by requested job descriptions for subordinate personnel. Going on record without supporting documentary 
evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soflci, 
22 I&N Dec. at 165. 
While the petitioning company purportedly has a "store manager," the evidence of record suggests that all of 
the employees would be required to perform the actual day-to-day tasks of operating the gas 
stationlconvenience store in order for the store to remain open for business. The petitioner has not provided 
evidence of an organizational structure sufficient to elevate the beneficiary to a supervisory position that is 
higher than a first-line supervisor of non-professional employees. Pursuant to section 10 1 (a)(44)(A)(iv) of 
the Act, the beneficiary's position does not qualify as primarily managerial under the statutory definition. 
Counsel correctly observes that a company's size alone, without taking into account the reasonable needs of 
the organization, may not be the determining factor in denying a visa to a multinational manager or executive. 
See 5 101 (a)(44)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $j 1 101 (a)(44)(C). However, it is appropriate for USCIS to consider 
the size of the petitioning company in conjunction with other relevant factors, such as a company's small 
personnel size, the absence of employees who would perform the non-managerial or non-executive operations 
of the company, or a "shell company" that does not conduct business in a regular and continuous manner. See, 
e.g. Systronics Corp. v. INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2001). The absence of a subordinate staff 
sufficient to perform the non-qualifying duties of the petitioner's business is a proper consideration in the 
analysis of the beneficiary's employment capacity. See Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS. 293 F. Supp. 25, 29 
(D.D.C. 2003). 
EAC 07 094 53032 
Page 10 
At the time of filing, the petitioner was operating a gas station and convenience store that is open for business 
for 115 hours per week, from 6:30 a.m. until 11:OO p.m. on weekdays, from 7:00 a.m. until 12:OO a.m. on 
Saturdays, and from 7:30 a.m. until 11:OO p.m. on sundays.' The beneficiary and the store manager earned 
wages consistent with full-time employment. The petitioner employs a part-time "assistant" who receives a 
monthly salary of $500 and typically employs one or two part-time cashiers who receive the same salary. A 
monthly salary of $500 is equivalent to approximately 20 hours of employment at minimum wage. Therefore, 
the lower-level workers charged with performing the most routine functions of the business; i.e., handling 
customer transactions during operating hours, work a combined total of approximately 60 hours on a weekly 
basis. Given the minimal number of hours worked by the subordinates, and the petitioner's extensive 
operating hours, the record does not support the petitioner's claim that it employs sufficient lower-level 
personnel, to relieve the beneficiary from primarily working in the petitioner's store. The record does not 
establish who among the petitioner's staff would be responsible for purchasing and monitoring inventory, 
receiving deliveries, stocking and maintaining store displays, cleaning and maintenance, day-to-day 
administrative, financial and banking functions, and other routine tasks associated with operating a retail 
store. Based on the totality of the record, it is reasonable to conclude, and has not been shown otherwise, that 
the beneficiary is primarily engaged in the day-to-day tasks associated with operating a retail store, rather than 
primarily performing the claimed managerial or executive duties. Furthermore, the reasonable needs of the 
petitioner serve only as a factor in evaluating the lack of staff in the context of reviewing the claimed 
managerial or executive duties. The petitioner must still establish that the beneficiary is to be employed in the 
United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity, pursuant to sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of 
the Act. As discussed above, the petitioner has not established this essential element of eligibility. 
Collectively, the lack of specifics in the beneficiary's job description and the absence of subordinates to 
perform many of the duties that are reasonably required in the daily operation of this type of business raise 
questions as to how much of the beneficiary's time can actually be devoted to managerial or executive duties. 
As stated in the statute, the beneficiary must be primarily performing duties that are managerial or executive. 
See sections 10 1 (a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act. 
The petitioner claims for the first time on appeal that the beneficiary will also be involved in the management 
of a second U.S. company. The petitioner has provided no explanation for the late introduction of this 
information, nor has it submitted sufficient documentation to establish that the beneficiary's unidentified 
duties with the new company should be considered in determining whether the petitioner would continue to 
employ the beneficiary in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. Going on record without supporting 
documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. 
Matter of Soflci, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 
I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary would be employed 
in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed. 
1 
 The petitioner's business hours are indicated on photographs of the petitioner's storefront, which were 
submitted in response to the director's request for evidence. 
EAC 07 094 53032 
Page 11 
The AAO acknowledges that USCIS approved other L-1 nonimmigrant petitions that had been previously 
filed on behalf of the beneficiary. It must be emphasized that each petition filing is a separate proceeding 
with a separate record. See 8 C.F.R. 5 103.8(d). In malung a determination of statutory eligibility, CIS is 
limited to the information contained in that individual record of proceeding. See 8 C.F.R. 4 103.2(b)(l6)(ii). 
The prior approvals do not preclude CIS from denying an extension of the original visa based on reassessment 
of the petitioner's qualifications. Texas A&M Univ. v. Upchurch, 99 Fed. Appx. 556,2004 WL 1240482 (5th 
Cir. 2004). 
If the previous nonimmigrant petitions were approved based on the same unsupported assertions that are 
contained in the current record, the approval would constitute material and gross error on the part of the 
director. The AAO is not required to approve applications or petitions where eligibility has not been 
demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals that may have been erroneous. See, e.g. Matter of Church 
Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Comm. 1988). It would be absurd to suggest that CIS or 
any agency must treat acknowledged errors as binding precedent. Sussex Engg. Ltd. v. Montgomery, 825 F.2d 
1084, 1090 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988). Based on the lack of required evidence of 
eligibility in the current record, the AAO finds that the director was justified in departing from the previous 
petition approvals by denying the instant petition. 
Furthermore, the AAO's authority over the service centers is comparable to the relationship between a court 
of appeals and a district court. Even if a service center director had approved the nonimrnigrant petitions on 
behalf of the beneficiary, the AAO would not be bound to follow the contradictory decision of a service 
center. Louisiana Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS, 2000 WL 282785 (E.D. La.), affd, 248 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir. 
2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 5 1 (2001). 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.