dismissed L-1A Case: Rice Importation

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
MATTER OF S-I- INC. 
APPEAL OF VERMONT SERVICE CENTER DECISION 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
DATE: MAY 22, 2018 
PETITION: FORM I-129, PETITION FOR A NONIMMIGRANT WORKER 
The Petitioner imports rice from Maryam Rice Mills, identified as its parent company. The 
Petitioner seeks to continue the Beneficiary's temporary employment as its president under theL-IA 
nonimmigrant classification for intracompany transferees.' Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) 
section 10l(a)(15)(L), 8 U.S.C. § IIOI(a)(l5)(L). TheL-IA classification allows a corporation or other 
legal entity (including its affiliate or subsidiary) to transfer a qualifYing foreign employee to the United 
States to work temporarily in a managerial or executive capacity. 
The Director of the Vermont Service Center denied the petition, concluding that the record did not 
establish, as required, that: (I) the Petitioner has a qualifying relationship with the Beneficiary's 
foreign employer; and (2) the petitioning company can support a managerial or executive position. 
The matter is now before us on appeal. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that it has met its burden of 
proof, and that the Director erred by disregarding immigration programs for entrepreneurs. The 
Petitioner also states that the Beneficiary should not be held responsible for the actions of its former 
attorney. 
Upon de novo review, we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
To establish eligibility for the L-IA nonimmigrant visa classification, a qualifying organization must 
have employed the beneficiary in a managerial or executive capacity for one continuous year within 
three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(1)(3)(v)(B). In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to 
continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a 
managerial or executive capacity. !d. 
1 The Petitioner previously filed a "new office" petition on the Beneficiary's behalf which was approved for the period 
June 23,2016 until June 22,2017. A "new office" is an organization that has been doing business in the United States 
through a parent, branch, affiliate, or subsidiary for less than one year. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(l)(ii)(F). The regulation at 
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(v)(C) allows a "new office" operation one year within the date of approval of the petition to 
support an executive or managerial position. 
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Mauer of S-1- Inc. 
A petitioner seek.ing to extend an L-1 A petition that involved a new office must submit a statement 
of the beneficiary's duties during the previous year and under the extended petition; a statement 
. describing the ·staffing of the new operation and evidence of the numbers and types of positions held; 
evidence of its financial status; evidence that it has been doing business for the previous year; and 
evidence that it maintains a qualifying relationship with the beneficiary ' s foreign employer. 
8 C.F .R. § 214.2(1)( 14 )(ii). 
II. QUALIFYING RELATIONSHIP 
The Director found that 
the Petitioner 
did not establish that it has a qualifying relationship with the 
Beneficiary ' ~ foreign employer. To establish a "qualifying relationship " under the Act and the 
regulations, a petitioner must show that the beneficiary's foreign employer and the proposed U.S. 
employer are the same employer (i.e. one entity with "branch" offices) , or related as a "parent and 
subsidiary " or as "affiliates." See generally section l01(a)(15)(L) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1). 
The regulation and case law confinn that ownership and control are the factors that must be 
examined in determining whether a qualifying relationship exists between United States and foreign 
entities for purposes of this visa classification. See Matter of Church Scientology lnt '1, 19 I&N Dec. 
593 (BIA 1988); see also Matter ofSiemens Med. Syss., Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986); Maller 
of Hughes, 18 l&N Dec. 289 (Comm ' r. 1982). In the context of this visa petition , ownership refers 
to the direct or indirect legal right of possession of the assets of an entity with full power and 
authority to control; control means the direct or indirect legal right and authority to direct the 
establishment, management , and operations of an entity . Maller of Church Scientology lnl 'I, 19 l&N 
Dec. at 595. 
The Petitioner initially submitted copies of documents relevant to the company's structure and 
ownership , including its bylaws ; 2016 income tax return; certificate of formation ; and three stock 
certificates, each referring to "a total authorized amount of l 00 shares" with 51 shares held by 
44 held by the Beneficiary ; and 5 ·held by The certificates are 
unsigned , and the lines recording the payment received for the certificate s are blank. The certificate s 
identified the Beneficiary as the president, secretary, and treasurer. 
The Director issued a request for evidence (RFE), noting discrepancies in the Petitioner 's 
documentation. For instance , the certificate of formation authorized the issuance of 1000 shares of 
stock, rather than the 100 shares shown on the stock certificates. Also, the Petitioner's 2016 tax 
return indicated that the Beneficiary owned all of the company's stock , and that the company was 
not a subsidiary of any other company. The Director asked for additional evidence to establi sh the 
ownership and control of the petitioning entity, including documentation of the purchase of shares. 
In response , the Petitioner submitted new versions of its bylaws, tax returns , and share certificate s, 
all different from the versions submitted initially. The Petitioner's new attorney of record blamed 
any discrepancies or deficiencies in the initial filing ~n attorney who prepared the 
2 
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Matter ofS-1-/nc . 
petition and who was subsequently convicted on charges relating to immigration fraud. Counsel 
stated that the Beneficiary "adv ised me that he never saw the documents of his filing until after 
filed them." Counsel asserted that the information on the 2016 tax return "was also based 
on the bad servic e (the Beneficiary] received from however it has now been fixed as well." 
Assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 n.2 
(BIA 1988) (citing Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980)). Counsel's 
statements must be substantiated in the record with independent evidence, which may include 
affidavits and declarations. In this case, counsel has not established direct knowledge of the 
relationship or agreements between the Petitioner and or between the Beneficiary and 
The Petitioner did not show that was involved in the preparati on of the 
Petitioner's tax returns in April 2017, or that he altered those tax returns before submitting them with 
the petition. (Those returns identified the preparer as a certified public accountant.) 
The revised tax returns, prepared in September 2017 by the same accountant named on the prior 
version of the 2016 return , reflected the same claimed percentages of ownership shown on the share 
certificates. The accountant did not claim that the initial return had been altered, or that 
had provided any information to the accountant when the first return was being prepared . 
Key differences between the two versions of the bylaws include the following: 
· Version 1 (submitted June 2017) Version 2 (submitted SeQ_tember 201 7) 
Dated October 15, 2015 Dated October 14,20 15 
12 pages, 11 articles 11 pages, 22 articles 
The Board of Directors shall "cons ist[] of one "The number of Directors . . . shall be at least 
person." A quorum consists of "the whole Board two but not more than seven." A quorum 
of Directors." consists of a majority of directors. 
Corporate officers: Corporate officers: 
• President • President 
• Vice-President(s) • Chief Executive Officer 
• Secretary • "Directors (the number to be 
• Optional Assistant Secretary(ies) determined by the Board of Directors)" 
• Treasurer • Secretary 
• Optional Assistant Treasur er(s) 
Share certificates must be signed by (1) the Share certificates must be signed by the president 
president or vice president, and (2) the secretary or chief executive officer, with the names and 
or assistant secretar y. addresses of shareholders entered into the s tock 
transfer books 
Signatures (photocopied): Signatures (original): 
• The Beneficiary • The Benefici ary 
• • 
• I on behalf of -
'3 
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Matter ofS-1- Inc. 
The Petitioner stated that the initial stock certificate s showed 1 00 shares rather than 1 000 due to "a 
printing error ." New certificat es showed the same proportions of claimed ownership, divided among 
I 000 shares rather than 100. The new versions of the certificates are entirely differe nt from the prior 
versions; .they are not simply duplicates with " 1 00" changed to " 1000." These certificates are dated 
October 14th, 2015, even though the Petitioner appears to acknowledge that the certificates did not 
exist until 2017 when the Director observed discrepancies in the first versions of the documents. 
Similarly , the original signatur es on the newly-submitted bylaws suggest that the document was 
newly printed and signed for submission to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service s (USCIS). 
Both versions of the Petitioner ' s bylaws stated that the same person cannot serve as both president 
and secretary at the same 
time , but both versions of the share certificates named the Beneficiary as 
both president and secretary. 
The Petitioner's accountant stated that the Beneficiary paid about $854,000 for his 44% interest in 
the petitionin g entity, and that the foreign entity paid about $250,000 in cash and provided about 
$241,000 in inventory for its 51% share. (The third sharehold er provided no investment.) A 
separate document attributed 16 wire transf ers, totaling over $940,000 , to the Beneficiary. The 
Petitione r' s bank statements reflected some of these incoming transactions from the foreign entity. 
The depo sits that the Petitioner attributed to the Beneficiary, howe ver, are listed in the bank 
statement s as having come from and 
In the denial notice, the Director found that the Petitioner had not esta blished "tha
t the claimed 
shareholders have purcha sed any 
stock or made capital contributions in exchange for owne rship 
and/or membership interests." The Director found that the Petitioner had not show n that the 
Beneficiary provided the funds transferred from and 
Also, the Director determined that signatures on the two sets of bylaws do not resembl e one another, 
even though the same people purportedly signed both documents , and that the share certificates do 
not conform to the requir ements in those bylaws. The Director further noted that the new tax returns 
were unsigned , with no evidence that the Petitio~er had actually filed those returns with th e Internal 
Revenue Service. 
On appeal, counsel makes additional claims about the Beneficiar y's knowledge of the record, 
without corroboration from the Beneficiary. There is an apparent discrepancy between counsel's 
two statements in this regard. In response to the RFE, counsel claimed that the Beneficiary "never 
saw the documents of his filing until after filed them," which indicates that the Beneficiary 
did see the documents "after filed them ." But on appeal , counsel states that, after receiving 
the RFE, the Beneficiary "did not have sufficient time to obtain his file from prior counsel and 
analyze all of the supporting documents that were submitted in order to discover and/or rectify any 
inconsistencies. " 
The Benefic iary, in his capacity as president of the petitioning entity , signed the Form 1-129 petition. 
By signing it, he attested to the accuracy of the claims and docum ents assoc iated with that petition. 
4 
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Matter ofS-1- Inc. 
If the Beneficiary had not actually seen the supporting documents, then he was not in a position to 
attest to their accuracy. Counsel claims that the Beneficiary has effectively repudiated the 
documents that accompanied the petition. Counsel does not explain why the Beneficiary should, 
nevertheless , qualify for benefits that preserve the filing date of the admittedly flawed tiling. 
Counsel asserts that the Beneficiary provided the funds for the wire tran sfers from and 
but the Petitioner submits no evidence to support this assertion. Counsel states: "As a second 
request for evidence was not issued, the Petitioner/Beneficiary was not afforded the opportunity to 
explain this matter." The Petitioner could have submitted supporting evidence on appeal , but did not 
do so, despite having requested and received additional time to prepare a substantive appeal. 
Regarding the other discrepancies, counsel states: "While conflicting operating agreements may 
have been inadvertently submitted ... , [the Beneficiary] should not be penalized for relying on the 
expert advice and instruction of his prior attorney." The Petitioner has not resolved the conflicts 
between the various documents ; simply disavowing the earlier versions cannot suffice . 
When, as here, the original petition was prepared and submitted by an attorne y known to have 
committed fraud on behalf of his clients, the Petitioner does not dispel the resul ting credibility 
concerns simply by creating new documents that conflict with the original submission. The 
Petitioner must resolve these inconsistencies with independent, objective evidence pointing to where 
the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 l&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BlA 1988). Unresolved material 
inconsistencies may lead us to reevaluate the reliability and sufficiency of other evidence submitted 
in support of the requested immigration benefit. !d. 
The Petitioner has submitted conflicting versions of key documents relating to corporate ownership 
and governance, and proven involvement in immigration fraud does not absolve the 
Petitioner of responsibility. We will not presume that arbitrarily substituted false 
documents for real ones provided by the Petitioner, particularly when the RFE response included 
new documents rather than copies of documents that could be reliably dated to 2015. 
In light of the serious discrepancies and omissions in the Petitioner ' s evidence, the Petitioner has not 
established a qualifying relationship with ' 
III. u:s. EMPLOYMENT IN AN EXECUTIVE CAPACITY 
The Director found that the Petitioner did not establish that it will employ the Beneficiary in an 
executive capacity under the extended petition. The Petitioner does not claim that it seeks to emplo y 
the Beneficiary in a managerial capacity. Therefore, we restrict our analysis to whether the 
Petitioner will employ the Beneficiary in an exec"utive capacity. 
"Executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily 
directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the organization; 
establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component , or function ; exercises wide 
5 
Malter of S-1- Inc. 
latitude in discretionary decision-making; and receives only general supervision or direction from 
higher-level executives, the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. Section 
IOI(a)(44)(8) of the Act. 
A. Staffing 
A petition to extend L-1 A status, following the approval of a new office petition, must establish the 
staffing of the new operation, including the number of employees and types of positions held. See 
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(ii)(D). USCIS reviews the totality of the record when examining the claimed 
managerial or executive capacity of a beneficiary, including the company's organizational structure, 
the duties of a beneficiary's subordinate employees, the presence of other employees to relieve a 
beneficiary from performing operational duties, the nature of the business, and any other factors that 
will contribute to understanding a beneficiary's actual duties and role in a business. If staffing levels 
are used as a factor in determining whether an individual is acting in a managerial or executive 
capacity, USCIS must take into account the rea~onable needs of the organization, in light of the 
overall purpose and stage of development of the organization. See section IOI(a)(44)(C) of the Act. 
The statutory definition of the term "executive-capacity" focuses on a person's elevated position 
within a complex organizational hierarchy, including major components or functions of the 
\ 
organization, and that person's authority to direct the organization. Section 10 !(a)( 44)(8) of the 
Act. Under the statute, a beneficiary must have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish 
the goals and policies" of that organization. Inherent to the definition, the organization must have a 
subordinate level of managerial employees for. a beneficiary to direct and a beneficiary must 
primarily focus on the broad goals and policies of the organization rather than the day-to-day 
operations of the enterprise. An individual will not be deemed an executive under the statute simply 
because they have an executive title or because they "direct" the enterprise as an owner or sole 
managerial employee. A beneficiary must also exercise "wide latitude in discretionary decision 
making" and receive only "general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board 
of directors, or stockholders of the organization." !d. 
A new office petition can take future growth into account, but the Petitioner must already be able to 
support an executive or managerial petition when it files an extension petition. An extension 
petition, unlike a new office petition, cannot rely on the assertion that the company continues to 
grow and develop. 
In the initial filing, the Petitioner's organizational chart showed the following information: 
President [the Beneficiary] 
Administrative Manager 
I 
Sales Manager 
I 
Accountant Warehouse Manager 
Office Assistant 2 Sales Assistants Warehouse Clerk Delivery Man 
6 
Matter ofS-1- Inc. 
The Petitioner's response to the RFE identified· more positions, but the larger organizational chart 
did not reflect the petitioning entity as it existed at the time of filing. For reasons already explained, 
the Petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing the petition for the extension; growth or 
change after the filing date cannot establish that eligibility. 
The Petitioner claimed that three managers report to the Beneficiary, whose stated duties are 
summarized below: 
Administrative Manager (also called "Admin Incharge"): $20,800 per year2 
• Recruits, trains, and disciplines administrative employees 
• Initiates and enforces policies and procedures 
• Monitors costs and expenses 
Sales Manager: $650 per week 
• Establishes and adjusts prices 
• Generates leads and finalizes sales contracts 
• Resolves customer complaints 
Warehouse Manager (also called "Warehouse Incharge"): $54,000 per year 
• Recruits, trains, and disciplines warehouse employees 
• Monitors and tracks inventory, placing purchase orders as needed 
• Ensures timely delivery 
In the denial notice, the Director found that the job descriptions for the Beneficiary's. subordinates 
were too vague to establish that the high-level subordinates were actually managers, and that the 
staff relieved the Beneficiary from primarily performing non-executive tasks. The Director also 
found that the Petitioner had not established that the Beneficiary's subordinate "[m]anagers are 
overseeing professional employees." 
A first line supervisor is not considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the 
supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised are professional. Section 
IOI(a)(44)(A) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(1)(ii)(B)(4). To determine whether the subordinate 
positions are professional, we must evaluate whether the subordinate positions require a 
baccalaureate degree as a minimum for entry into the field of endeavor. Cf 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2) 
( defil)ing "profession" to mean "any occupation for which a United States baccalaureate degree or 
its foreign equivalent is the minimum requirement for entry into the occupation"). Section 
IOI(a)(32) of the Act states that "[t]he term profession shall include but not be limited to architects, 
engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and teachers in elementary or secondary schools, colleges, 
academies, or seminaries." 
2 The Petitioner initially claimed to pay its administrative manager $30,000 per year, but later submissions show that this 
employee left the company in March 2017. The salary shown is what the replacement manager was earning at the time 
of filing. 
7 
Malter of S-1- Inc. 
On appeal, the Petitioner states it would have submitted more documentatio!l of the subordinates' 
academic degrees if asked. (The Director, in the RFE, had noted the absence of "documentation ... 
to establish the academic credentials and qualifications of the Beneficiary's proposed direct and 
indirect subordinates.") The only second-level subordinate said to have a bachelor's degree is the 
office assistant, whose duties include reception and mail distribution. The Petitioner has not shown 
that the position requires at least a bachelor's degree. If the position requires no such degree, then it 
is not relevant whether or not the person holding that position has a degree. 
The claimed professional status of the Beneficiary's direct subordinates is irrelevant to the question 
of the Beneficiary's eligibility as an executive, because direct supervision of professionals is an 
element of a managerial capacity, not an executive capacity. A petitioner cannot combine elements 
of a managerial capacity and an executive capacity; a beneficiary's position must meet all applicable 
requirements of one or the other. 
The Petitioner states on appeal. that the Director did not explain or support the conclusion that the 
Petitioner has "an insufticient number of employees to prevent the beneficiary from performing non­
essential duties." This is not what the Director concluded, however. Rather, the Director 
determined that the Petitioner had provided insufficient details in the job descriptions for the 
Beneficiary and his subordinates, and thereby had not shown that the Beneficiary's duties are 
primarily executive, and those of his direct subordinates primarily managerial. We find that despite 
the job titles, the positions described by the Petitioner appear to be for first-line supervisors of non­
professional subordinates, rather than for managers. 
The Director also found that the Petitioner had not established sufficient "organizational complexity" 
to warrant an executive position, but this is a matter of company structure rather than the number of 
employees. An executive directs the management of a company, which is only possible if there is 
some kind of management structure to direct. First-line supervisors of non-professional employees 
are not managers, and the Petitioner has not established that the Beneficiary directs the company's 
management in some other way. 
For the above reasons, we agree with the Director, that the Petitioner has not established the 
organization can support an executive position following the one-year "new office" period. 
B. Duties 
When examining the claimed executive capacity of a given beneficiary, we will look to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. The petitioner's description of the job duties must clearly 
describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary: See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(ii). 
Based on the statutory definition of executive capacity, the petitioner must first show that the 
beneficiary will perform certain high-level responsibilities.· Champion World, Inc. v. INS, 940 F.2d 
1533 (9th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table decision). Second, the petitioner must prove that the 
8 
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Maller of S-1- Inc. 
beneficiary will be primarily engaged in executive duties, as opposed to ordinary operational 
activities alongside the petitioner's other employees. See Family Inc. v. USC!$, 469 F.3d 1313, 
1316 (9th Cir. 2006); Champion World, 940 F.2d 1533. 
In the matter at hand, the Petitioner stated that the Beneficiary's position has the following 
responsibilities: 
• Develop and implement marketing plans, pricing and payment policies and long 
term success goals ... ; 
• Establish, fine-tune , and direct company operating procedure and policies ... ; 
• Chair appeals hearings in respect to disciplinary matters; 
• Monitor, through the corresponding manager, the appropriate application of labor 
laws and related regulations and codes of good practice; 
• Direct, monitor, and improve productivity and performance levels at the executive 
and managerial levels; ensuring consistent, fair and immediate corrective action is 
taken where necessary; 
• Approve final selection of key suppliers of service and goods ; 
• Monitor legal and moral compliance in all ... company policies , procedures and 
practices; 
• Oversee and manage company operations ... ; insure customer satisfaction and 
effective utilization of resources; 
• Direct and guide the management tier of the organization ... ; 
• Review weekly activity reports from all department managers ... ; 
• Evaluate performance of managers ... ; 
• Promote the brand by educating clients about products attributes and also personal 
appearance at buyer conferences; 
• Present company financial and management reports to stakeholders; 
• Keeping in touch with (p]arent company overseas for daily updates on production 
planning and inventory levels. 
A longer list of responsibilities appeared in an introductory letter by but given the 
subsequent emphatic repudiation of involvement and the lack of direct corroboration 
of the assertions in that first letter, we will not closely consider the statements in that letter. 
In the RFE, the Director asked tor more information about the Beneficiary's intended positiOn, 
because the initial description lacked detail. In response , the Petitioner stated that the· Beneficiary 
was the company ' s chief executive officer until he became president in June 2017 (the month of 
filing). The Petitioner listed nine functions; several of which specifically dealt with the 
Beneficiary's authority over the chief executive officer, At the time of filing, the 
Petitioner did not claim to employ a chief executive officer subordinate to the Beneficiary; 
was identified as the Petitioner's accountant. ' 
Matter of S-1- Inc. 
The Petitioner submitted copies of meeting minutes dated between October 2015 and July 2017. 
The minutes placed the Beneficiary at the meetings but offered minimal information about what 
happened at the meetings. The complete discussion of the October 2015 meeting, for instance, is: 
"We finalize our initials plans and discuss bylaws in details [sic]." 
In the denial notice, the Director found that the Beneficiary's duties, as described, are either "overly 
broad and vague" or reflect tasks below the level of an executive. The Director concluded that the 
Petitioner had "not established that [its] business requires an executive position" or that the 
Beneficiary has and will continue to serve in an executive capacity. 
On appeal, the Petitioner states that the Beneficiary's "duties ... are to clearly manage the function 
of the business that is being established in the U.S. . . . [H]e controls the essential function of an 
organization." Managing an essential function is an element of a managerial capacity, not an 
executive capacity. See section 10l(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. As noted previously, the Petitioner 
cannot combine elements of managerial and executive capacities. 
The Petitioner also has not articulated a specific function that the Beneficiary will manage. The term 
"function manager" applies generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a 
subordinate staff but instead is primarily responsible for managing an "essential function" within the 
organization. If a petitioner claims that a beneficiary will manage an essential function, it must 
clearly describe the duties to be performed in managing the essential function. In addition, the 
petitioner must demonstrate that: 
(1) the function is a clearly defined activity; (2) the function is "essential,'' i.e., core 
to the organization; (3) the beneficiary will primarily manage, as opposed to perform, 
the function; (4) the beneficiary will act at a senior level within the organizational 
hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and (5) the beneficiary will 
exercise discretion over the function's day-to-day operations. 
Matter ofG- Inc., Adopted Decision 2017-05 (AAO Nov. 8, 2017). In this matter, the Petitioner has 
not described or provided evidence that the Beneficiary manages an essential function. The 
assertion that the Beneficiary "controls the essential function of an organization" cannot suffice. 
Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties are primarily 
executive or managerial in nature, otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of 
reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), 
aff'd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). The actual duties themselves reveal the true nature of the 
employment. !d. Therefore, reciting a beneficiary's vague job responsibilities or broadly-cast 
business objectives is not sutlicient; the regulations require a detailed description of the 
beneficiary's daily job duties. 
The newly-claimed change in organization, in response to the RFE, cannot now meet eligibility 
requirements if the Petitioner did not already meet those requirements at the time of filing. When 
10 
Matter ofS-1-Inc. 
responding to an RFE, a petitioner cannot change its organizational hierarchy or the beneficiary's 
job responsibilities. A petitioner must establish that the position offered to a beneficiary meets 
applicable requirements at the time the petition was filed. See Mauer of Michelin Tire Corp., 17 l&N 
Dec. 248, 249 (Reg'! Comm'r 1978); see also 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(l). The information provided by 
the Petitioner in its response to the Director's RFE did not clarify or provide more specificity to the 
original duties of the position, but rather substituted a riew list of generic duties such as "Oversee the 
implementation of the Company's vision, mission and overall direction"; "Oversee the complete 
operation of the Company"; and "Oversee forming, staffing, guiding, leading, and management of 
the Company." 
Based on the deficiencies and inconsistencies discussed above, the Petitioner has not established that 
it will employ the Beneficiary in an executive capacity under the extended petition 3 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Petitioner did not establish a qualifying relationship with the Beneficiary's foreign employer. 
The Petitioner also did not show that it will employ the Beneficiary in an executive capacity. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
Cite as Mauer ofS-1-lnc., ID# 1129057 (AAO May 22, 2018) 
3 The ,Petitioner also contends on appeal that the Director's "decision ... is contrary to the USCIS' 'Entrepreneurs in 
Resid~nce' Initiative (Section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)," and to 
the International Entrepreneur Rule published in 2017. The Entrepreneurs in Residence Initiative, which ended in 2013, 
did not involve any changes to the statute or regulations, and did not alter the eligibility requirements for L-1 A status. 
Funher, in the preamble to the International Entrepreneur Rule, the Depanment of Homeland Security explained that the 
rule did not amend the regulations relating to L-1 A petitions, because those regulations "are not necessarily relevant to 
the requirements set fonh in this rule, which are specifically designed to provide the framework by which USC IS will 
determine whether to grant parole to cenain individuals for significant public benefit." 82 FR 5238, 5248 (Jan. 17, 
20 17). 
II