dismissed L-1A Case: Technology

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
MATTER OF I-T-, LLC 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
DATE: JULY 9, 2018 
APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER DECISION 
PETITION: FORM 1-129, PETITION FOR A NONIMMIGRANT WORKER 
The Petitioner, a company "engaged in the business of technology development and sales," seeks to 
continue the Beneficiary's temporary employment as chief executive officer (CEO) under the L-lA 
nonimmigrant classification for intracompany transferees. 1 Immigration and Nationality Act (the 
Act) section 101(a)(15)(L), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(L). The L-lA classification allows a corporation 
or other legal entity (including its affiliate or subsidiary) to transfer a qualifying foreign employee to 
the United States to work temporarily in a managerial or executive capacity. 
The Director of the California Service Center denied the petition, concluding that the record did not 
establish, as required, that the Beneficiary would be employed in a managerial or executive capacity 
under the extended petition. 
On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the Director overlooked an extensive duty description 
submitted for the Beneficiary, duties provided for his asserted subordinates, and tax documentation 
indicating that he has professional subordinates who relieve him from primarily performing non­
qualifying tasks. 
Upon de nova review, we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
To establish eligibility for the L-lA nonimmigrant visa classification, a qualifying organization must 
have employed the beneficiary in a managerial or executive capacity for one continuous year within 
three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(1)(3)(v)(B). In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to 
continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a 
managerial or executive capacity. Id. 
1 The Petitioner previously filed a "new office'' petition on the Beneficiary's behalf which was approved for the period 
September 15, 2016, until September 14, 2017. A "new office" is an organization that has been doing business in the 
United States through a parent, branch, affiliate, or subsidiary for less than one year. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(l)(ii)(F). The 
regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(v)(C) allows a "new office" operation one year within the date of approval of the 
petition to support an executive or managerial position. 
Matter of 1-T-, LLC 
A petitioner seeking to extend an L-lA petition that involved a new office must submit a statement 
of the beneficiary's duties during the previous year and under the extended petition; a statement 
describing the staffing of the new operation and evidence of the numbers and types of positions held; 
evidence of its financial status; evidence that it has been doing business for the previous year; and 
evidence that it maintains a qualifying relationship with the beneficiary's foreign employer. 
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(14)(ii). 
IL U.S. EMPLOYMENT IN AN EXECUTIVE CAPACITY 
The first issue to be addressed is whether the Petitioner established that the Beneficiary would be 
employed in an executive capacity under the extended petition. The Petitioner does not claim that 
the Beneficiary would be employed in a managerial capacity. Therefore, we restrict our analysis to 
whether the Beneficiary would be employed in an executive capacity. 
The statute defines an "executive capacity" as an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of 
the organization; establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and receives only general supervision or 
direction from higher-level executives, the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
Section 10l(a)(44)(B) of the Act. · 
When examining the executive capacity of a given beneficiary, we will review the petitioner's 
description of the job duties. The petitioner's description of the job duties must clearly describe the 
duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are in an executive 
capacity. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(ii). Beyond the required description of the job duties, we 
examine the company's organizational structure, the duties of a beneficiary's subordinate 
employees, the presence of other employees to relieve a beneficiary from performing operational 
duties, the nature of the business, and any other factors that will contribute to understanding a 
beneficiary's actual duties and role in a business. Accordingly, we will discuss evidence regarding 
the Beneficiary's job duties along with evidence of the nature of the Petitioner's business, its staffing 
levels, and its organizational structure. 
A. Duties 
Based on the definition of executive capacity, the Petitioner must first show that the Beneficiary will 
perform certain high-level responsibilities. Champion World, Inc. v. INS, 940 F.2d 1533 (9th Cir. 
1991) (unpublished table decision). Second, the Petitioner must prove that the Beneficiary will be 
primarily engaged in executive duties, as opposed to ordinary operational activities alongside the 
Petitioner's other employees. See Family Inc. v. USCIS, 469 F.3d 1313, 1316 (9th Cir. 2006); 
Champion World, 940 F.2d 1533. 
2 
Matter of 1-T-, LLC 
The Petitioner stated that it and its foreign parent are "engaged in the business of technology 
development and sales." In support of the petition, the Petitioner indicated that the Beneficiary 
would supervise managers "who provide technology solutions to customers," provide "key strategic 
technology and project management directives," develop human resources policies, "set guidelines 
for quality management," and "identify potential trading deals and contracts." In a separate duty 
description, the Petitioner further explained that the Beneficiary was tasked with establishing the 
"goals and policies of the company," formulating "strategic planning," making all the decisions from 
an executive standpoint, directing and supervising management, reviewing and approving contracts, 
and representing the company at public events. 
In response to the Director's request for evidence (RFE), the Petitioner provided a duty description 
relevant to the duties the Beneficiary would perform under the extended petition. The Petitioner 
stated that the Beneficiary would spend 25% of his time on "executive strategic planning," including 
building "alliances and partnerships" and recommending "yearly budgets." The Petitioner also 
indicated that the Beneficiary would devote 25% of his time to establishing operational and human 
resources goals and policies and another 25% on directing the management of the company, 
including implementing "long and short term plans," developing "culture and vision," and directing 
"public relations." In addition, the Petitioner explained that the Beneficiary would be responsible 
20% of the time for making "executive decisions," consisting of providing "executive leadership" 
and updating the company "strategic plan, policies and its implementations." Lastly, the Petitioner 
stated that the Beneficiary would spend 5% of his time on reporting to the company's members. 
The Petitioner did not submit a sufficiently detailed duty description describing the Beneficiary's 
day-to-day executive-level duties that credibly establishes he would devote his time primarily to 
qualifying tasks. The Beneficiary's duty description includes several generic duties that could apply 
to any executive acting in any business or industry and they do not provide insight into the actual 
nature of his role. The Petitioner provided insufficient examples and little supporting documentation 
to demonstrate the Beneficiary's performance of qualifying duties, such as strategic planning he 
established, alliances and partnerships he built, yearly budgets he recommended, or operational and 
human resources policies he established. Further, the Petitioner did not articulate or document long 
and short term plans the Beneficiary implemented, culture and vision he developed, public relations 
he directed, or "executive decisions" he made. 
We acknowledge that the Petitioner submitted two memorandums issued by the Beneficiary in 
November and December 2017; however, this documentation does not sufficiently demonstrate that 
he devoted a majority of his time to executive-level tasks. One letter reflects the Beneficiary 
instructing the company's employees not to impose their religious beliefs on others during the 
holidays while the other extended the Thanksgiving holiday. These memorandums do not 
substantiate the Beneficiary's primary focus on strategic executive matters, including those duties 
mentioned in his duty description, such as strategic planning he established, alliances and 
partnerships he built, yearly budgets he recommended, operational and human resources policies he 
established, amongst others. Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's 
Matter of I-T-, LLC 
duties are primarily executive or managerial in nature, otherwise meeting the definitions would 
simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 
1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
To the extent that the Beneficiary submits detail and documentation regarding the Beneficiary's 
daily duties, this evidence reflects his involvement in non-qualifying operational tasks. For instance, 
the Petitioner submits several quotations for website and application design services which state that 
they were "prepared by" the Beneficiary. However, the Petitioner questionably does not include the 
operational-level duties inherent in providing proposals for his clients in his duty description. The 
Petitioner also does not submit documentary evidence reflecting the Beneficiary's delegation of non­
qualifying operational duties to subordinates, such as the company's website and application 
development services. The Petitioner provides few examples and little documentation to 
substantiate the Beneficiary's day-to-day executive-level tasks. 
Whether a beneficiary is an executive employee turns on whether the petitioner has sustained its 
burden of proving that their duties are "primarily" executive. See section 101 (a)( 44 )(B) of the Act. 
Here, the Petitioner does not document what proportion of the Beneficiary's duties would be 
executive functions and what proportion would be non-qualifying. The Petitioner submits evidence 
indicating the Beneficiary's involvement in operational-level tasks that do not fall directly under 
executive duties as defined in the statute, but does not quantify the time he spends on these duties. 
For this reason, we cannot determine whether the Beneficiary is primarily performing the duties of 
an executive. See IKEA US, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of.Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22, 24 (D.D.C. 1999). 
Even though the Beneficiary holds a senior position within the organization, the fact that he will 
manage or direct a business does not necessarily establish eligibility for classification as an 
intracompany transferee in an executive capacity within the meaning of section 101(a)(44)(B) of the 
Act. By statute, eligibility for this classification requires that the duties of a position be "primarily" 
executive in nature. Id. The Beneficiary may exercise discretion over the Petitioner's day-to-day 
operations and possess the requisite level of authority with respect to discretionary decision-making; 
however, the position descriptions alone are insufficient to establish that his actual duties would be 
primarily executive in nature. 
B. Staffing 
If staffing levels are used as a factor in determining whether an individual is acting in an executive 
capacity, we take into account the reasonable needs of the organization, in light of the overall 
purpose and stage of development of the organization. See section 101(a)(44)(C) of the Act. 
As noted above, the Petitioner asserts that the Beneficiary qualifies as an executive. The statutory 
definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated position within a complex 
organizational hierarchy, including major components or functions of the organization, and that 
person's authority to direct the organization. Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act. Under the statute, a 
beneficiary must have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish the goals and policies" 
4 
Matter of l-T-, LLC 
of that organization. Inherent to the definition, the organization must have a subordinate level of 
managerial employees for a beneficiary to direct and they must primarily focus on the broad goals 
and policies of the organization rather than the day-to-day operations of the enterprise. An 
individual will not be deemed an executive under the statute simply because they have an executive 
title or because they "direct" the enterprise as the owner or sole managerial employee. A beneficiary 
must also exercise "wide latitude in discretionary decision making" and receive only "general 
supervision or direction from higher-level executives, the board of directors, or stockholders of the 
organization." Id. 
In support of the petition, the Petitioner provided an organizational chart indicating that the 
Beneficiary supervised a chief operating officer (COO) who oversaw an educational consultant. In 
response to the Director's RFE, the Petitioner provided another organizational chart reflecting that it 
had hired a programmer subordinate to the COO. 
First, we note that the Petitioner must establish that all eligibility requirements for the immigration 
benefit have been satisfied from the time of the filing and continuing through adjudication. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 103.2(b)(l). As such, the organizational chart we must analyze is that in place at the time the 
petition was filed on September 5, 2017. Submitted evidence indicates that the Petitioner only 
employed the COO and educational consultant subordinate to the Beneficiary as of the date the 
petition was filed. 
The Petitioner submitted substantial documentation indicating that it provided a wide range of 
information technology services, including creating mobile applications· and web pages, collecting 
specifications for this purpose, and providing preventative maintenance, installation services, design 
work, digital artwork, coding, testing, and technical support to clients. However, the Petitioner did 
not have operational-level employees in place to perform these services as of the date the petition 
was filed. 
The Petitioner asserts on appeal that these services were performed by foreign entity employees; 
however, it provides no supporting documentation to substantiate this assertion. The Petitioner does 
not: identify these claimed foreign employees by name or title; list their educations and duties; 
account for them in the provided organizational charts; or describe how they contribute to the 
operational activities of the U.S. company. Therefore, it does not appear that the Petitioner had 
sufficient operational-level employees to provide its information technology services as of the date 
the petition was filed. Without sufficient operational employees, it is not clear how the Beneficiary 
primarily performs executive-level duties and how the COO acts in his asserted managerial role. In 
fact, as we have discussed, the Petitioner submits several proposals drafted by the Beneficiary and 
emails reflecting him and the COO working together to formulate solutions for clients. 
The Petitioner also asserts that it hired a programmer after the date the petition was filed, leaving 
question as to who was performing this employee's duties prior to his hiring. An employee who 
"primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not 
considered to be "primarily" employed in an executive capacity. See, e.g., section 101(a)(44)(B) of 
5 
Matter of 1-T-, LLC 
the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated executive duties); Matter of Church 
Scientology Int'!, 19 l&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm'r 1988). 
The Petitioner has not demonstrated that it has sufficient operational employees to relieve the 
Beneficiary from primarily performing non-qualifying tasks. It also has not substantiated that it 
grew sufficiently during its first year to support the Beneficiary in an executive capacity. In fact, the 
Petitioner provided little evidence as to its financial status at the time the petition was filed. The 
regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(v)(C) only allows the "new office" operation one year within the 
date of approval of the petition to support an executive position. There is no provision in the 
regulations that allows for an extension of this one-year period. If a business does not have the 
necessary staffing to sufficiently relieve the beneficiary from performing operational and 
administrative tasks, the petitioner is ineligible for an extension. 
Further, the duties of the Beneficiary's subordinates and the supporting documentation do not 
support a conclusion that they act in their asserted capacities. As noted, the Petitioner states that the 
Beneficiary oversees a COO and an educational consultant; however, it has not credibly established 
that it required an executive and managerial level employee as of the date the petition was filed. The 
duty description submitted for the COO indicates that he was primarily involved in operational-level 
tasks, stating that he "collaborated efforts for all the startup process" and "provided support," and 
submitted emails also indicate his focus on providing services to clients. As such, the evidence does 
not indicate that the COO acts in a subordinate managerial role as claimed. Further, although the 
organizational chart reflected that the COO supervised the educational consultant, this managerial 
responsibility is not reflected in his very brief duty description. 
In addition, the Petitioner also did not sufficiently substantiate the educational consultant position 
subordinate to the COO. For instance, the Petitioner states that the educational consultant creates 
"adequate curriculum for the projected educational software," implements and researches 
educational requirements and "improved techniques" relevant to educational software, and helps and 
guides the programmers. First, we note that the Petitioner did not corroborate that it employed 
programmers as of the date the petition was filed. Further, it provides little supporting 
documentation to establish that it required a fulltime educational consultant to develop educational 
software and applications. 
The Petitioner also asserts that the COO and educational consultant are professional subordinates 
because they hold bachelor's degrees. However, even if the Petitioner had demonstrated that the 
COO and educational consultant were professional subordinates, this does not establish that the 
Beneficiary would act primarily in an executive capacity. The regulatory definition of an executive 
does not provide that a beneficiary qualifies as an executive merely based on the supervision of 
professional subordinates, but his or her elevated position within a complex organizational hierarchy 
and a primary focus on directing the management and establishing the goals and policies of the 
organization. Therefore, the Petitioner's contention that the Beneficiary qualifies as an executive 
merely based on his supervision of professional subordinates is not convincing. 
f, 
Matter of I-T-, LLC 
The Petitioner has not substantiated that it had sufficient subordinate managerial employees as of the 
date the petition was filed to allow the Beneficiary to primarily focus on the broad goals and policies 
of the organization rather than the day-to-day operations of the business. Submitted documentation 
indicates that the Beneficiary was engaged in non-qualifying operational duties and the Petitioner 
has not documented that he was relieved of these tasks at the time the petition was filed. Likewise, 
the Petitioner did not credibly describe and document the Beneficiary's day-to-day executive-level 
duties and substantiate that he had managerial subordinates to direct. For these reasons, the 
Petitioner has not established that the Beneficiary would act in an executive capacity under the 
extended petition. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The appeal must be dismissed because the Petitioner has not established that the Beneficiary would 
be employed in an executive capacity under the extended petition. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
Cite as Matter of 1-T-, LLC, ID# 1383932 (AAO July 9, 2018)