dismissed
L-1A
dismissed L-1A Case: Technology Consulting
Decision Summary
The appeal was dismissed because the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary would be employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. The director denied the petition on this basis, and on appeal, the petitioner's arguments about 'job scope broadening' and the hiring of additional employees were not sufficient to overcome the finding.
Criteria Discussed
Managerial Capacity Executive Capacity
Sign up free to download the original PDF
Downloaded the case? Use it in your next draft →View Full Decision Text
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 20 Massachusetts Ave , N W , Rm A3042 Washington. DC 20529 PUBWC COPY U.S. Citizenship and Immigration FILE: WAC 04 070 50422 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: MOY 0 8 2005 IN RE: Pet~tioner: Benefic~ary: PETITION: Pet~tion for a Nonlmmigrant Worker Pursuant to Sect~on 101(a)(15)(L) of.the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 I lOl(a)(lS)(L) ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: INSTRUCTIONS: Thls 1s the dec~slon of the Administrative Appeals Office In your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally declded your case. Any further 1nqu1r-y must be made to that office. Ll, 4 Robert P. W~emann, D~rector dmlmstrat~ve Appeals Office WAC 0h 070 50422 Page 2 DISCUSSION:- The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The, AAO will dismiss the appeal. The petltroner seeks to contlnue to employ ~ts branch office manager/technology consulting manager temporanly in the Untted States pursuant to sect~on 101(a)(15)(L) of the Irnm~grat~on and Nat~onaltty Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C 5 1 101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner 1s a Caltfom~a corporat~on that clalms to be engaged m Import and export of fuel cell technology and raw materials, and provlslon of technology consult~ng servlces It cla~ms to be a subsldtary of, located In South Korea. The benefictary was ~nitially granted a one-year pertod of stay m I.-IA status in order to open a new office In the Un~ted States and subsequently recelved a two-year extension of stay. The pet~t~oner filed the instant petlt~on tn order to advise Cmzensh~p and Imm~gratlon Servlces (CIS) of a change m the beneficiary's prev~ously approved employment, and to request an amendment of h~s current L-l A status. The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner had not established that the beneficiary would be employed in a'managenal or executive capacity. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director overlooked the fact that the- beneficiary was already granted an extension of his L-1A status, and states that the instant petition was filed for the purpose of requesting approval for "job scope broadening" Counsel suggests that the director misunderstood the nature of the beneficiary's duties, provides further justification for the expansion of the beneficiary's role, and explains that "[the beneficiary's] duties have never left the scope of being an effective manager." Counsel also claims that the petitioner recently hired two additional drnployees and provides a new 'organizational chart and job descriptions for the petitionerls current staff'in support of the appeal. To establish L-1 eligibility under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality kct (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 4 1 lOl(a)(lS)(L), the petitioner must demonstrate that the beneficiary, within three years preceding the beneficiary's application' for admission into the united States, has been employed abroad in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a' capacity involving specialized knowledge, for one continuous year by a qualifying organization and seeks to enter the United States temporarily in-order to continue to render his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized knowledge. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be accompanied by: (1) Evldence that the petitioner and'the organ~zation whlch employed or wlll employ the allen are qualifying organlzat~ons as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this sect~on. (ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. (iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of .' the petition. WAC 04 070 50422 Page 3 (IV) Evidence that the ahen's pnor year of employment abroad was in a positlon that was managerial, executive or involved speclallzed knowledge and that the alren's pr~or educatron, training, and employment qualifies h~mlher to perform the ~ntended services in the Unlted States; however, the work in the United States need not be the same work whrch the alien performed abroad. The pnmary Issue m the present matter is whether the beneficiary w~ll be employed by the Un~ted States entity in a pnmarlly managenal or executive capacity. Sectlon 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1101(a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacrty" as an asslgnment w~thin an organ~zation rn whlch the employee pnmarily: (i) manages the organlzatlon, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of the organization; (11) supenrises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerla1 employees, or manages an essential function withln the organizatlon, or a department or subd~v~sion of the organization; (111) ~f another employee or other employees are directly superv~sed, has the authority to h~re and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actlons (such as , promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised. functions at a senlor level within the organ~zatlonal hierarchy or wlth respect to the function managed; and (iv) exerclses dlscretlon over the day to day operations of the act~vrty or functron for whlch the employee has authonty. A first line supwvlsor 1s not considered to be actlng in a managenal capacity merely by v~rtue of the superv~sor's supervisory dutles unless the employees supervised are profess~onal. Section 101 (a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 1 101 (a)(44)(B), defines the term "execut~ve capac~ty" as an asslgnment withrn an organlzatlon m which the employee pnmarily: (I) d~rects the management of the organization or a major component or functlon of the organlzatlon; (11) establishes the goals and polic~es of the organlzat~on, component, or functlon; (iii) exercises wlde latitude in discretionary decision making; and (IV) receives only general supervision or d~rection from h~gher level execut~ves, the board of directors, or stockholders of the organizatlon. WAC 04 070 50422 Page 4 The pet~tion was submltted on January 13, 2004. The pet~tioner lndlcated on Form 1-129 that ~t has sceklng approval of a change In previously approved L-IA employment, and submltted evidence that the benefic~ary had been granted an extension of L-1A status for a two-year penod commencing on June 19, 2003. The petitloner lndlcated that the beneficlary would serve as "Branch Office Manager and Technology Consulting Manager." In a January 12, 2004 letter, counsel for the petitioner explained that the beneficiary was transferred to the United States in order to open a branch office to purchase raw materials needed for fuel cell manufacturing and export them to the parent company in Korea. Counsel described the beneficiary's duties in this regard as follows: As the manager of [the petitioner], [the beneficiary] utilized his discretion and authority based on his experience and knowledge for exploring the niche market in the emerging substitution Energy Source. . .. It requiresithe beneficiary]; a) develop local customer's volume'and profit in the united ~taies in accordance with [policies] and guidelines set by the company, including overall marketing plan .and philosophies of the corporation; b) identify niche market for penetration and establish a confident [relationship] with the customers; c) develop marketing . .' strategy to reach out [to] the potential customer; d) develop local raw material suppliers for purchasing and exporting.thern to Korea; e) protect.[the foreign entity's] fuel cell technology from infringement with other U.S. Patented technologies; f) manage [the petitioner] financially , profitable; and g) maintain regular communication with the parent company regarding ongoing activities. To perform these speclfic duties, he communicated wlth major fuel-cell companies and raw material suppl~ers. He hired two employees to asslst him for ma~ntaming the office and penetrating the nlche market. Counsel further explained that slnce January 21,2003, the petlt~oner had also been engaged In preparing and prosecut~ng U S. patent appllcatlons through an agreement wlth counsel's law office. Counsel stated that slnce that t~me, the beneficlary has performed preparation and prosecutron of over 60 U S Patent Appl~cat~ons, resulting In Income of $36,000 for the petitloner. Counsel lndlcated that the beneficlary would cont~nue to manage the he1 cell technology and U.S. Patent bus~ness umts for the pehboner. Counsel stated that the benefic~ary had hired two employees slnce September 2003 "due to the successful result from U S. Patent Appl~cation preparation bus~ness," and that two more employees would be hired "after the contract agreement of ~mport~ng raw materials." In support of the petition, the petitioner submitted a copy of the "Technology Service Providing Agreement7' made between the petitioner and Eugene Oak Law Office, whereby the petitioner agrees to provide services including preparation and' prosecution of U.S. Patent and Trademark Applications, and related technology license agreements and technology transfer agreements. Article 111 of the agreement provides that all services outlined and all technological is'sues related with the services shail be bared, reviewed and authorized by the beneficiary. The services include: WAC 04 070 50422 Page 5 1) Search related prevlous technology and trademarks clalmed in an [SIC] U.S. Patent and Trademark Appl~catlon bnef provlded by the Cllent and prov~des the result to the Cllent m a document form. 2) Translate the information from an Inventor of an [SIC] U.S. Patent Appllcatlon Into English. 3) Summarize clalms requested by the Investor In a format of [sic] applicable to U.S. Patent Appllcat~on. 4) Prepare a draft of U.S. Patent Appllcahon following the related patent rules and In terrnrnolog~es currently using [SIC] In the field of area of the lnventlon based on the ~nformat~on from the Applicant. 5) Provlde all the result m a proper document form. 6) Fill up an [SIC] U.S. Patent Application Forms [SIC] based on the finallzed form prov~ded by the Cllent and mail the whole package, after authorized by the Cl~ent, to the Unlted States Patent and Trademark Office (U.S.P.T.O.). 7) Prepare drafts of responses to Offices Actlons from the U.S.P.T.O. 8) Fill up an [SIC] U.S. Trademark and Serv~cemark Forms based on the lnformatlon provlded by the cllent and mall the whole package, after authorized by the Cllent, to the [U.S.P.T.O.] The petltloner submitted a payroll chart for the fourth quarter of 2003 whlch shows wages pald to the benefictary and two other employees, but the pet~ttoier dld not descnbe ~ts staffing On January 23, 2004, the dlrector requested additional evidence. Specifically, the dlrector requested a copy of the pebtloner's organlzatlonal chart descnblng ~ts managenal hierarchy and staffing levels. The dlrector lndlcated that the chart should ~nclude the names of all executives, managers, and supervisor, the number of employees w~thln each department, and a description of job duties, educational level, annual salanes/wages, and ~mm~grat~on status for all employees of the organlzatlon. In a response dated February 2, 2004, the petitioner submitted an organizational chart depicting the benefic~ary as branch manager over the "U.S. Patent Dlv~slon" and "Fuel Cell Divis~on." The chart also dep~cts the benefic~ary as manager of each dlvlsion. The chart shows that one employee serves as "asastant manager" of both dlvlslons, wh~le the petlttoner's third employee serves as secretary of the fuel cell d~vrslon and accountant of the U.S. patent dlv~sron. The petitioner indicated that the assistant manager is a full-time contractor and is responsible for: (1) researching fuel cell related information from the media; (2) communicating with fuel cell companies to investigate changing policies and situations; (3) prepa;ing reports on researched data for the beneficiary's review; and (4) correcting the English of draft U.S. patent applications prepared by the beneficiary. The petitioner stated that the secretary works on a partLtime basis and performs the following duties:. (1) ' organizing documents and schedules; (2) receiving incoming calls from clients and associates; (3) arranging and administering paper work; and (4) preparing and keeping an accounting report. The director denled the petition on February 10,2004 concluding that the benefictary would not be employed m a managerla1 or executive capacity. The director observed that the beneficiary's duties, as descnbed by the WAC 04 070 50422 Page 6 petitioner, reflect that he is responsible for sales, marketing, purchasing and patent application preparation and non-qualifying duties related to these functions. The director noted that the petitioner had not been able to incorporate enhancements in structural complexity and personnel that would allow it to support a managenal or executive position. The director concluded that, given the description of the company, .the duties of the beneficiary's subordinates, and the descriptiori' of the beneficiary's duties, the beneficiary would be engaged in all aspects of the petitioner's day-to-day operations. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner emphasizes that the petitioner was merely seeking to amend. the beneficiGYs previously approved L-IA extension, and claims that the director misunderstood the'reason for filing the petition. Counsel contends that the purpose of the petition was only to advise CIS of the beneficiary's additional job duties related to the petitioner's U.S. patent application business unit, and asserts that the beneficia j's role has been and will remain managerial in nature. Counsel further explains that the petitioner filed the instant petition after the U.S. Patent Office informed the beneficiary that he would require CIS approval in order to apply for the Patent Agent Examination. Counsel claims that the beneficiary requires the patent agent license in order to legally hire and manage a qualified employee to execute patent preparation services in accordance with the petitioner's technical service agreement. Counsel states that the beneficiary "is managing the branch office of [the foreign entity] while investigating the field of patent application preparation." Counsel, claims that petitioner hired an additional employee to prepare drafts of patent, applications in February 2004, and would hire a sales manager for the fuel cell technology component of the business as of March 1, 2004. counsel suggests that the director misunderstood the beneficiary's situation, and contends that his job duties "will always be limited to the effective hiring, directing and managing of [the petitioner's] employees.. ..In order to execute his job accordingly, [the beneficiary] must first be authorized by the U.S. government in the specific business interests of [the petitioner]." Counsel's assertions are not persuasive. When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the petitioner's job description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. , . The petitioner's description of the job duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. Based on the evidence of record, it is evident that the beneficiary allocates the majority of his time to researching, drafting and preparing patent applications for an attorney, rather than performing managerial or executive duties as defined at section 10l(a)(44) of the Act. According to the 2004 business plan submitted with the petition, the petitioner had not yet begun exporting raw materials for fuel cells to Korea or importing fuel cells from Korea; these activities were anticipated to begin between June and December 2004. It is apparent that the petitioner's only source of income at the time the petition was filed was from preparation of patent applications. As the beneficiaiy is solely responsible for preparing patent applications within the petitioner's organization, the ~~~'assurnes, and it has not been shown otherwise, that these are his primary duties. This~conclusion is supported by counsel's statement that the beneficiary personally prepared 60 U.S. patent applications in the year preceding the filing of the petition. An employee who primarily performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered lu be employed in a managerial or executive capacity. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec 593,604 (Comm. 1988): WAC 04 070 50422 Page 7 Furthermore, as noted by the director, the beneficiary's job description includes a number of other non- qualifying duties, including market research, networking with potential suppliers of raw materials, and "developing new business." The definitions of executive and managerial capacity have two parts. First, the , ,, petitioner must sEGw that the b;eneficiary .performs the high-level responsibilities that are specified in the .definitions. Second, the petitioner must show that the beneficiary primarily performs these specified responsibilities and does,not spefid a majority of his or her time on day-to-day functions. Champion World, . 'Inc. v. INS, 940 F.2d 1533 (Table), 1991 WL 144470 (9th: Cir. July 30, 1991). Where an individual is . primarily performing the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide a service, that individual cannot also primarily perform manageiial or executive duties. In the instant matter, the petitioner has failed to'show that nonqualifying duties will not constitute the majority of thk beneficiary's time. Although counsel claims that the beneficiary is "purely a manager," without documentary evidence to support the claim, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); Matter of Laureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). Rather, when determining whither a beneficiary is employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity, the actual duties themselves reveal the true nature, of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1 103, 1108 (E.D.NY. 1989), afld, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). It is evident from the record that any managerial ' , . duties performed by the beneficiary at the time of filing were incidental to his responsibility for providing the petitioner's patent application preparation services. The AAO notes that counsel has presented th~s petition as an amendment of the beneficlary's prev~ously approved L-1A petition, and only seeks to "broaden the scope" of the beneficlary's dut~es. However, the evldence of record shows that the beneficiary has been preparing patent appl~cations since January 2003 The previous petltlon to extend the beneficiary's status was filed in June 2003 (See WAC 03 184 50895). Counsel's argument that the beneficlary's responsibll~ty for prepanng patent appllcatlons represents a "substantial change In job duties" strongly lmplies that the petlboner failed to provlde an accurate account of the beneficmy's actual dutles when tt submitted the previous petitlon on his behalf. Doubt cast on any aspect of the pet~tioner's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the rellabll~ty and sufficiency of the remalnlng evldence offered m support of the visa petition. Matter of No, 19 I&N Dec. 582,591 (BIA 1988). On ~ppeal,~'counsel attempts to mitigate the extent of the beneficiary's responsibility for providing the services of. the organization, suggesting that the beneficiary is merely "investigating the field of patent application preparation" and only seeking to obtain a U.S. Patent Agent license so that he may legally hire and manage additional patent agents., This argument is not persuasive, as the evidence submitted with the initial petition clearly indicates that, the beneficiary had been personally preparing patent applications, apparently without the proper license, for a year pnor to the filing of this petition. . > The AAO acknowledges counsels claim that the petitioner has hired a sales manager for its fuel cell division and a .manager for its U.S. Patent division subsequent to the filing of the petition. However, the petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing the nonimmigrant visa petition. A visa,petition may not be approved at a future date aker the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of facts. Matter of ~~chelin Tire Corp., 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. Comm. 1978). The evidence submitted on appeal is not probative of the beneficiary's eligibility at the time of filing and will not be considered in this proceeding. WAC 04 070 50422 Page 8 ' The petitioner noted that CIS approved other petitions that had been previously filed on behalf of this beneficiary. Each nonirnniigrant petition is a separate record of proceeding with a separate burden of proof; each petition must stand on its own individual merits. The prior nonimmigrant approvals do not preclude CIS from denying an extension petition. See,e.g. T&as A&M Univ. v. Upchurch, 99 Fed. Appx. 556, 2004 WL 1240482 (5'h Cir. 2004). ~urthermore, if the previous nonimmigrant petitions were approved based on the same unsupported assertions that are.contained in the current record, the approval would constitute material and gross error on the part of the director. The AAO is not.required to approve applications or petitions . where eligibility has not been demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals that may have been erroneous. See, e.g. Matrer of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Comm. 1988).' It would be absurd to suggest that CIS 'or any agency must treat acknowledged errors as binding precedent. Sussex Engg. Lfd. v. Montgomery, 825 F.2d 1084, 1090 (6th Cir. 198?), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988) Furthermore, the AAO's authority over the service centers is comparable to the relationsh~p between a court of appeals and a dlstrict court. Even if a service center director had approved the nonimmigrant pet~t~ons on behalf of the beneficiary, the AAO would not be bound to follow the contradictory decision of a service center. Louisiana Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS, 22000 WL 282785 (E.D. La.), affd, 248 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir. 200 1 ), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 5 1 (2001). ' Flnally, as noted above, the ev~dence contalned m the Instant record suggests that the pet~tioner faded to prov~de an accurate account of the beneficiary's dutles In rts prevlous request to extend h~s L-1A status. The approval of the prevlous petlt~on may be subject to revocation based on the evldence submitted w~th thls petltlon. See 8 C.F.R. $3 214.2(1)(9)(111) and (IV). The pet~ttoner has not submitted evidence on appeal to overcome the director's detemnat~on that the beneficiary will not be employed In a pnmar~ly managerla1 or execut~ve capacity. For th~s reason, the appeal will be dlsm~ssed. Beyond. the deckion,of the director, the record contains conflicting information regarding the petitioner's 'ownership which precludes a finding that the U.S. company maintains 'a qualifying relationship with the foreign entity pursuant to 8 C.F.R. tj 214.2(l)(ii)(G). The petitioner claims to be a branch office of the ~' beneficiary's' foreign employer in Korea. However, the petitioner was incorporated in the State of California. If the peiitioner submits evidence to show that it is incorporated in the United States, then .that entity will not qualify as "an . . . office of the same organization housed in. a different location," since that corporation is a distinct legal entity separate aid-apart fiom the foreign organization. See Matter ofM, 8 I&N Dec. 24, 50 (BLA 1958, AG 1958); Matter ofAphrodife Investments Limited, 17 I&ND~C. 530 (~oinm. 1980); and Mafter of Tessel, f 7 I&N Dec. 631 (Act. Assoc. Comm. 1980). If the claimed branch is incorporated in thellnited states, CIS must examine the ownership and control of that corporation to determine whether it qualifies as a subsidiary or affiliate of the overseas employer. The pet~tloner submitted its stock certificate number one and stock transfer ledger, whrch ind~cate that the company ~ssued 60,000 shares of common stock w~thout par value to CNL (Korea) on July 23, 2002 In exchange for conslderat~on valued at $24,000 The petlt~oner submitted the minutes of the first rneetlng of the board of d~rectors, which ~nd~cates that the company's d~rectors agreed to Issue all 60,000 of ~ts authonzed shares to the forelgn enoty for $60,000. The petitioner's 2004 busmess plan refen to its pres~dentm WAC 04 070 50422 Page 9 as the owner of 67 percent of the company's stock. The petitloner's 2002 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return, ~ndicates at Schedule K, quest~on 4 that the petitloner is a substdiary of but tndlcates at Schedule K, questlon five that the company 1s 100 percent owned by - Schedule L of the 2002 Form 1120 ~ndicates the initla1 value of the petitioner's common stock as $10,000, rather than $24,000 or $60,000 as stated elsewhere m the petltloner's evldence. It IS incumbent upon the pehtloner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by ~ndependent objective evtdence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such rnconsrstencles will not suffice unless the petitloner submlts competent objective evidence pointtng to where the truth Ires Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582,591 -92 (BIA 1988). Based on th~s contrad~ctory evldence, the AAO is unable to ascertain the actual ownership and control of the petlt~oner and therefore cannot determine whether the petitioner has a qual~fying relatlonshtp with the foreign entity. For thls add~tlonal reason, the pehtion may not be approved. An appllcat~on or petltion that falls to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denred by the AAO even lf the Service Center does not ~dentify all of the grounds for denial in the inlt~al declwon. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), affd 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cn. 1989)(notmg that the AAO revlews appeals on a de novo bags). The petltlon will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an ~ndependent and alternative basis for demal. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of provlng eligibihty for the benefit sought remains enhrely w~th the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the previous declsion of the AAO w~ll be affirmed, and the petitlon will be denied. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.
Avoid the mistakes that led to this denial
MeritDraft learns from dismissed cases so your petition avoids the same pitfalls. Get arguments built on winning precedents.
Avoid This in My Petition →No credit card required. Generate your first petition draft in minutes.