dismissed L-1A Case: Textile Manufacturing

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
In Re: 6898175 
Appeal of Texas Service Center Decision 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date : DEC. 4, 2019 
PETITION: Form I-129, Petition for L-lA Manager or Executive 
The Petitioner is a manufacturer of knitted garments and an exporter of textile machinery. It seeks to 
temporarily employ the Beneficiary as its chief executive officer under the L-lA non.immigrant 
classification for intracompany transferees who are coming to be employed in the United States in a 
managerial or executive capacity. Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 101(a)(15)(L), 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(L). 
The Director of the Texas Service Center denied the petition concluding that the Petitioner did not 
establish, as required, that: (1) the Beneficiary would be employed in a managerial or executive 
capacity in the proposed position with the U.S. entity; and (2) the Beneficiary's assignment in the 
United States would only be for a temporary period. The matter is now before us on appeal. 
In these proceedings , it is the Petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the requested benefit. 
Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Upon de nova review , we find that the Petitioner did not 
overcome the Director's finding regarding the Beneficiary's proposed employment in a managerial or 
executive capacity. Therefore, we will dismiss the appeal. Because of the dispositive effect of this 
finding, we will reserve the remaining issue. 
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
To establish eligibility for the L-lA nonimmigrant visa classification, a qualifying organization must 
have employed the beneficiary "in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized 
knowledge," for one continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for 
admission into the United States. Section 101(a)(l5)(L) of the Act. In addition, the beneficiary must 
seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same 
employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial or executive capacity. Id. 
II. U.S. EMPLOYMENT IN AN EXECUTIVE CAP A CITY 
The Petitioner claims that the Beneficiary's proposed U.S. employment will be in an executive 
capacity. As the Petitioner does not claim that the Beneficiary would be employed in a managerial 
capacity, we will only address the Petitioner's claim and will not discuss whether the Beneficiary's 
U.S. employment will be in a managerial capacity. 
"Executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily 
directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the organization; 
establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; exercises wide latitude 
in discretionary decision-making; and receives only general supervision or direction from higher-level 
executives, the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. Section 101 (a)( 44 )(B) of the 
Act. 
Based on the statutory definition of executive capacity, the Petitioner must first show that the 
Beneficiary will perform certain high-level responsibilities. Champion World, Inc. v. INS, 940 F.2d 
1533 (9th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table decision). The Petitioner must also prove that the Beneficiary 
will be primarily engaged in executive duties, as opposed to ordinary operational activities alongside 
the Petitioner's other employees. See Family Inc. v. USCIS, 469 F.3d 1313, 1316 (9th Cir. 2006); 
Champion World, 940 F.2d 1533. 
The description of the job duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the Beneficiary 
and indicate whether such duties are in an executive capacity. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(ii). Beyond 
the required description of the job duties, we examine the company's organizational structure, the 
duties of the Beneficiary's subordinate employees, the presence of other employees to relieve the 
Beneficiary from performing operational duties, the nature of the business, and any other factors that 
will contribute to understanding the Beneficiary's actual duties and role in a business. Accordingly, 
we will discuss evidence regarding the Beneficiary's job duties along with evidence of the nature of 
the Petitioner's business and its staffing levels. 
A. Staffing 
If staffing levels are used as a factor in determining whether an individual is acting in a managerial 
capacity, we take into account the reasonable needs of the organization in light of the overall purpose 
and stage of development of the organization. See section 101 (a)( 44 )( C) of the Act. 
In the petition, the Petitioner claimed 34 employees and provided a supporting statement discussing 
the business operations of its three U.S. subsidiaries - two transportation/logistics companies and one 
restaurant - as well as the Petitioner's purchase of a facility and equipment for its textile manufacturing 
operation. The Petitioner claimed that each U.S. subsidiary would be under the supervision of a 
general manager and that the Beneficiary's role with respect to each subsidiary is to "direct the 
management ... and establish[] the goals and policies." Although the Petitioner provided a staffing 
chart containing employee names, salaries/wages, and position titles, the chart is dated February 2018 
and lists only 26 employees and therefore does not support the Petitioner's claim that it had 34 
employees at the time of filing. In fact, the Petitioner did not provide evidence corroborating this 
claim and instead discussed its plans to staff its organization with at least 60 employees, including ten 
"top-level positions," once it becomes "fully up and running." The Petitioner described its own 
operation as "still at its early stages," claiming that.__ ________ ____. was charged with 
oversight of its daily functions, while I f's two subordinates - described as "experts in 
the textile industry" - would carry out those functions. The Petitioner did not provide corroborating 
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evidence showing that it employed eithe;:.:r'-'-1 ______ __,.__.I or his two claimed subordinates and 
instead provided Forms 1099-MISC thatl I was issued in 2017 and 2018 byl I 
I I one of the Petitioner's three subsidiaries. 
Although the Petitioner also provided a block organizational chart outlining the management and 
staffing structures of its three subsidiaries, this chart did not include the Beneficiary's name anywhere 
in the hierarchy and provided little detail with respect to its own organizational structure, showing 
"Managing" at the to tier followed b "Engineer Technologist Master's Degree in Textile." Further, 
despite claiming as its eneral manager in its supporting statement, the 
organizational chart did not list.__ ______ __.as the Petitioner's employee, nor did it name the 
two textile "experts" who were claimed to have been employed by the Petitioner at the time of filing. 
The chart also names~-----~ as the general manager of I I- another of the 
Petitioner's U.S. subsidiaries. However, the record contains no evidence of wages paid toEJ 
I I either by the Petitioner or by any of its subsidiaries. 1 As the record does not show that 
I lwas employed by the Petitioner or its subsidiaries at the time of filing, it is unclear who, if 
not the Beneficiary, was available to oversee I l's daily operational functions at the time this 
petition was filed. 
The record also shows that I . I issued Forms 1099-MISC in 2017 and 2018 to .... I __ _. I I who the Petitioner claimed as manager of I I another of its three 
subsidiaries. Although I I did issue two Forms 1099-MISC in 2017 and 2018,I 
I I was not the recipient of either of either wage document. As such, it is unclear what pos1 .... _t-io_n__. 
I I assumed withl L the issuer of his wage declarations. More importantly, it is 
unclear who, if not the Beneficiary, was available to oversee I I' daily operational 
functions at the time of filing, given that the individual who was supposed to be that entity's manager 
was paid wages by an entirely different, albeit related, entity. The Petitioner must resolve these 
discrepancies in the record with independent, objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. 
Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). 
Lastly, although the Petitioner provided six 2018 Forms 1099-MISC that were issued byl I, 
the restaurant that was the third of the Petitioner's subsidiaries, all six wage documents, including that 
ofl ts general manager, showed wages that were consistent with part-time employment. 
Further, to the extent that the above described wage documents show wages that are consistent with 
part-time employment, these documents undermine the reliability of the Petitioner's staffing chart, 
which indicates that as of February 2018, all 26 of the named employees assumed full-time positions. 
The chart also lists the Beneficiary's rate of compensation as $45/hour, which is equivalent to 
approximately $93,000 annually and is therefore inconsistent with the Petitioner's claim that the 
Beneficiary's proffered wage is $50,000 annually. 
In a request for evidence (RFE), the Director found that the record lacked evidence showing how the 
Beneficiary would be relieved from having to primarily carry out non-qualifying job duties and 
1 The record contains several documents signed by I lin 2015 and 2016 on behalf ofl'-:====--,1 However 
the Petitioner did not provide documents showing thatl " I continued to act on behalf oft I or that h~ 
assumed a role with respect to that entity at the time of filing or immediately prior to that time. 
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instructed the Petitioner to provide line and block organizational charts depicting its staffing and 
organizational structure and identifying the Beneficiary's subordinates and their job duties. 
In response, the Petitioner resubmitted the organizational chart and wage documents and asserted that 
the Director overlooked this evidence. The Petitioner explained that it currently has only two 
employees and one manager because it "is still at its early stages." The Petitioner again named0 
I I as its manager, but did not provide evidence to support this claim, nor did it submit 
any wage evidence reflecting its staffing or the staffing of its U.S. subsidiaries at the time this petition 
was filed. The Petitioner must support its assertions with relevant, probative, and credible 
evidence. See Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 376 (AAO 2010). The Petitioner also did not 
provide evidence resolving the discrepancy between its claimed employment of 
and the submitted wage documents, which indicate thatl r7as e._m_p-lo_y_e_d_b_y-.----1 
c=]rather than the Petitioner itself. Aside from this discrepancy, we note that~------~'s 
Forms 1099-MISC show wages that are consistent with part-time employment. In any event, the 
record indicates that neither the Petitioner nor its three subsidiaries were adequately staffed so that 
that the Beneficiary would have been relieved from having to directly oversee the mundane functions 
of their daily operations at the time of filing. 
Accordingly, despite finding that the Beneficiary assumes a high-ranking pos1t10n within the 
Petitioner's organization, the Director determined that the Petitioner did not provide sufficient 
evidence showing that the Petitioner was able to relieve the Beneficiary from having to primarily 
perform non-executive job duties at the time of filing. 
On appeal, the Petitioner claims that~------~was its consultant in 2018, explaining that 
"the [textile] business channel was redirected" based on its lack of profitability. The Petitioner does 
not, however, off er an explanation for not raising this claim in its April 2019 RFE response statement, 
where it maintained the claim that it has employed! las its manager. The Petitioner 
has not offered evidence to support either of these opposing claims, nor has it provided evidence 
resolving the inconsistency. See Ho, 19 I&N Dec. at 591-92. Moreover, the fact that the Petitioner 
did not disclose its changed circumstances until it filed this appeal indicates that the changes may not 
have taken place until after this petition was filed. We note that the Petitioner must establish that all 
eligibility requirements for the immigration benefit have been satisfied from the time of the filing and 
continuing through adjudication. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(l). As the Petitioner appears to have 
"redirected" its main business activity after having filed this petition, any details of its altered business 
circumstances would not be relevant for the purpose of establishing the Petitioner's eligibility as of 
the date this petition was filed. 
The statutory definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated position within 
an organization or major component or function of the organization, and that person's authority to 
direct the organization, major component, or function. Section 10l(a)(44)(B) of the Act. Under the 
statute, a beneficiary must have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish the goals and 
policies" of that organization. Thus, to show that a beneficiary will "direct the management" of an 
organization or a major component or function of that organization, a petitioner must show how the 
organization, major component, or function is managed and demonstrate that the beneficiary primarily 
focuses on the broad goals and policies of the organization, major component, or function, rather than 
the day-to-day operations of such. An individual will not be deemed an executive under the statute 
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simply because they have an executive title or because they "direct" the organization, major 
component, or function as the owner or sole managerial employee. A beneficiary must also exercise 
"wide latitude in discretionary decision making" and receive only "general supervision or direction 
from higher level executives, the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization." Id. 
We find that the Petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence demonstrating its eligibility at the time 
of filing. As noted earlier, the record contains no evidence that the Petitioner paid wages to employees 
who could have supported the Beneficiary in a position that would entail primarily executive-level 
tasks. It is therefore unclear how or if the Beneficiary would have been relieved from having to 
primarily perform the non-executive job duties that were likely critical to the Petitioner's daily 
operation at the time of filing. Although the Petitioner claimed that the Beneficiary's spouse 
volunteers her services to manage the restaurant that is one of the Petitioner's three subsidiaries, the 
Forms 1099-MISC for 2017 and 2018 indicate that the Beneficiary's spouse received monetary 
compensation, thus contradicting the claim that she volunteered her services. Further, the record 
contains no evidence showing that I I employed the Beneficiary's spouse as its restaurant 
manager at the time of filing. See Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. at 376. 
Likewise, the Petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence showing how it planned to relieve the 
Beneficiary from having to directly provide management services to its three U.S. subsidiaries. An 
employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is 
not considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See, e.g, sections 
101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial 
or executive duties); Matter of Church Scientology Int'!., 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm'r 1988). 
Although the Petitioner has claimed that a general manager would be assigned to manage each U.S. 
subsidiary, the outdated wage declarations that the Petitioner offered as supporting evidence do not 
corroborate the management structure described in the initial supporting statements. This lack of 
evidence leads us to question who, if not the Beneficiary, would oversee the daily operations of each 
subsidiary. As previously noted, the Petitioner must support its assertions with relevant, probative, 
and credible evidence. See id. Further, ifUSCIS finds reason to believe that an assertion stated in the 
petition is not true, it may reject that assertion. See, e.g., Section 204(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b); 
Anetekhai v. INS, 876 F.2d 1218, 1220 (5th Cir. 1989); Lu-Ann Bakery Shop, Inc. v. Nelson, 705 F. 
Supp. 7, 10 (D.D.C. 1988); Systronics Corp. v. INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2001). 
Lastly, with regard to the Petitioner's references to its early stage of development and its expectation 
that additional staff would be hired as development progresses, we reiterate that eligibility must be 
established on the basis of facts and circumstances that existed at the time a petition is filed. The 
Petitioner in this instance has not provided sufficient evidence showing whom it employed at the time 
of filing, nor has it demonstrated that its U.S. subsidiaries were duly staffed with managers who could 
relieve the Beneficiary from having to oversee their daily operations. The Petitioner's early 
developmental phase does not relieve it from having to meet basic eligibility criteria, which states that 
the proposed position must primarily consist of executive job duties. See section 101 ( a)( 44 )(B) of the 
Act. The evidence provided in support of this petition does not lead us to conclude that the Petitioner 
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had the necessary staffing to relieve the Beneficiary from having to primarily perform its operational 
and administrative tasks. 
B. Duties 
In addition to the above staffing analysis, we also examine the Beneficiary's proposed job duties. The 
actual duties themselves reveal the true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 
F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), ajf'd, 905 F.2d41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
In the initial supporting statement, the Petitioner claimed that the Beneficiary is responsible for 
directing the management of and setting the goals and policies for its three U.S. subsidiaries. The 
Petitioner also provided a general job duty breakdown claiming that the Beneficiary's time would be 
spent as follows: 10% "coordinating the operations" of the three subsidiaries, 10% "controlling and 
commanding" their operations, 20% "delegating tasks to the Management Team" of the subsidiaries, 
20% organizing their goals and policies, and 40% planning their operations. The Petitioner farther 
stated that the Beneficiary intends to "work towards the creation of new business" and "continue 
establishing new jobs" without performing the daily tasks of each subsidiary. 
In response to the RFE, the Petitioner explained that in an effort to compensate for its textile business's 
"slow start" it decided to expand its operations by setting up three U.S. subsidiaries whose operations 
the Petitioner would oversee by hiring a general manager to run the operations at the location of each 
subsidiary. The Petitioner asked the Director to consider the Beneficiary's role and duties "as they 
relate to each company," not just his role and duties with respect to its existing textile operation. The 
Petitioner claimed that the Beneficiary attributes "minimal attention to day-to-day tasks" of each 
subsidiary operation and reiterated the original claim that the Beneficiary focuses on directing the 
management and setting the goals and policies of each subsidiary. The Petitioner also discussed how 
each subsidiary functions and described the role of each subsidiary's manager, emphasizing the 
Beneficiary's role at the top of a chain of command overseeing the managers of the three subsidiaries. 
Although the Petitioner stressed the Beneficiary's leadership position and his discretionary authority 
over the Petitioner's plans to establish more businesses, it did not provide more detailed information 
about the Beneficiary's daily job duties within the context of a business operation, which at the time 
of filing included an underdeveloped textile business and three understaffed subsidiaries. 
On appeal, the Petitioner focuses on the Beneficiary's "direction and control" of the entity and his 
continued contribution towards "the development of business in the United States." The Petitioner 
explains that it used the foreign entity's fonds to purchase commercial property and obtain necessary 
permits for its use and claims that the property will house a "branch" of the restaurant business 
operated by one of its subsidiaries. The Petitioner also mentions a piece of proprietary equipment it 
seeks to patent and discusses a new business venture involving the processing of meat and dairy 
products, stating that this will lead to job creation and hiring more staff. The Petitioner asserts that 
the Beneficiary's ideas, experience, and direction are critical to the organization's ability to meet its 
business goals. 
We find that the arguments on appeal focus primarily on the Beneficiary's discretionary authority and 
leadership role within the organization, but they do not farther our understanding of the Beneficiary's 
prospective job duties or establish that the Beneficiary's time would be primarily spent performing 
6 
tasks of an executive nature. Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's 
duties are primarily executive or managerial in nature; otherwise, meeting the definitions would 
simply be a matter ofreiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. at 1108. 
The fact that the Beneficiary will manage or direct a business does not necessarily establish eligibility 
for classification as an intracompany transferee in an executive capacity within the meaning of section 
101 (a)( 44) of the Act. By statute, eligibility for this classification requires that the duties of a position 
be "primarily" executive in nature. Sections 101(A)(44)(B) of the Act. While a beneficiary may 
exercise discretion over the Petitioner's day-to-day operations and possess the requisite level of 
authority with respect to discretionary decision-making, these elements alone are not sufficient to 
establish that the actual duties to be performed would be primarily executive in nature. 
Here, the Petitioner was informed in the RFE that the job description it originally provided was 
insufficient and lacked adequate detail about the Beneficiary's daily job duties. However, the 
Petitioner has not provided a more comprehensive job duty breakdown nor imparted a meaningful 
understanding of the actual tasks the Beneficiary would perform in the normal course of the 
Petitioner's daily business operation. Although we acknowledge the Beneficiary's heightened degree 
of discretionary authority and top placement within the Petitioner's hierarchy, the record indicates that 
the Petitioner ultimately abandoned its original business endeavor of operating a textile manufacturing 
business, which, by the Petitioner's own admission, was in a nascent phase of operation at the time 
this petition was filed and thus does not appear to have had the capability to support the Beneficiary 
in a primarily executive capacity. In fact, at the time of filing, the Petitioner focused primarily on the 
business activities of its three U.S. subsidiaries whose staffing is unknown as the supporting evidence 
largely consists of outdated wage documents that do not establish whom the subsidiaries employed at 
the time of filing or demonstrate that the subsidiaries had designated managers to run their respective 
operations, as the Petitioner claims. 
In sum, the Petitioner has not provided sufficient information about the Beneficiary's day-to-day job 
duties within the scope of its organization at the time of filing. Therefore, the Petitioner has not 
established that at the time of filing it was able to employ the Beneficiary in a position that would 
primarily entail the performance of executive-level job duties. 
ORDER: The appeal will be dismissed. 
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