dismissed L-1A Case: Timber/Lumber

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetls Ave , N W., Rm A3042 
Wash~ngton. DC 20529 
Mbamb@ data il0Md lo U.S. Citizenship 
llm0Dtmmmd and Immigration 
m@m(I-rdw 
FILE: LA 04 174 52767 Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER Date: 0 7 
IN RE: Petlttoner: 
Beneficiary: 
I rn 
PETITION: Petition for a Nonimm~grant Worker Pursuant to Section 10l(a)(15)(L) of the Immi~~at~on 
and Nat~onality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L) 
This is the decisibn of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. . 
Robert P. Wiemann, D~rector 
Administrat~ve Appeals Ofice 
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DISCUSSION: 'I'he Director, Nebraska Servlce Center, denled the pet~tion for a non~mmlgrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administratrve Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO wlll d~smlss the appeal. 
The petltloner seeks to extend ~ts authorization to employ ~ts manager temporarily m the Un~ted States 
pursuant to sectjon 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immlgration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 
9; 11 01 (a)(15)(L). The petltloner is a corporat~on organized m the State of Ohlo that clalms to be engaged In 
the sourcing, treatment, processing and export of raw timber. It claims to be a subsld~ary of 0 
located m Inchon, Korea. The benefic~ary was initially granted 1,-1A classificat~on m order to 
open a new office m the Unlted States and the petitioner now seeks to extend hu stay for a three-year penod. . 
The dlrector denled the petition concluding that the petitloner had not established that (1) the beneficiary 
would be employed in a managenal or executlve capacity; or that (2) the U.S. company is "domg bus~ness" as 
the term 1s defined in the regulations at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(l)(il)(H). 
On appeal, counsel for the petltloner asserts that the director erred in his dec~sion and clalms that the 
petltloner submitted sufficient evldence to establish that the beneficiary 1s employed tn a managenal or 
executlve capacity, and that the petitioner IS dolng business through the regular, systematic and continuous 
provlslon of goods and senoces as required by the regulattons. 
To establish L-1 ellgbll~ty under sectlon 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immlgration and Natlonal~ty Act (the Act), 
8 U.S.C. 8 1101(a)(15)(L), the petitloner must demonstrate that the beneficraw, wlthin three years preced~ng 
the beneficlaw's application for admission Into the Un~ted States, has been employed abroad In a qualifying 
managenal or executtve capacity, or in a capaclty rnvolvlng special~zed knowledge, for one contlnuous year 
by a quahfymg organlzatlon and seeks to enter the Unlted States temporarrly m order to contlnue to render hls 
or her servlces to the same employer or a subsldlary or affil~ate thereof m a capaclty that 1s managerial, 
execut~ve, or involves specialized knowledge. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petitlon filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(1) Evldence that the petitioner and the organizat~on which employed or w~ll employ the 
allen are quallfylng organizations as defined m paragraph (I)(l)(li)(G) of thls sectron. 
(11) Evldence that the alien wII be employed In an executive, managenal, or speaahzed 
knowledge capacity, lncludlng a detailed description of the servlces to be performed. 
(111) Ev~dence that the allen has at least one contlnuous year of full-time employment 
abroad w~th a qualify~ng organrzation wlthln the three years preceding the fillng of 
the petltlon. 
(IV) Evldence that the ahen's pnor year of employment abroad was m a positlon that was 
managerial, executlve or ~nvolved specialized knowledge and that the allen's prlor 
education, training, and employment qual16es h~m/her to perform the Intended 
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services in the Unlted States; however, the work in the Unlted States need not be the 
same work wh~ch the allen performed abroad. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(14)(1i) also provides that a visa petit~on, which involved the openlng of a 
new office, may be extended by filing a new Form 1-129, accompanied by the following: 
(A) Evidence that the United States and foreign entities are still qualify~ng organizations 
,as defined in paragraph (l)(!)(ii)(G) of this section; 
(8) Evidence that the United States ent~ty has been do~ng business as defined in 
paragraph (I)(l)(li)(H) of this section for the previous year; 
(C) A statement of the duties performed by the beneficiary for the previous year and the 
dut~es the benefic~ary will perform under the extended petit~on; 
(D) A statement describing the staffing of the new operation, including the number of 
employees and types of ppsit~ons held accompanied by evidence of wages paid to 
employees when the beneficiary will be employed in a management or executive 
capacity; and 
(E) Evidence of the financial status of the United States operation. 
The first Issue m thejpresent matter is whether the beneficiary will be employed by the United States ent~ty In 
a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Sect~on 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. g 1101(a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" as an 
assignment wlthin an organ~zation in which the employee primarily: 
(1) manages the organization, or a department, subdivislon, function, or component of 
the organizatron; 
(11) supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, profess~onal, or managerla1 
employees, or manages an essential funct~on w~thln the organization, or a department 
or subdivislon of the organization; 
(I~I) if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to 
h~re and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as 
promotton and leave authorization), or if no other employee is dtrectly supew~sed, 
functions at a senior level within the organlzatlonal hierarchy or with respect to the 
function managed; and 
(iv) exercises discretion over the day to day operations of the activity or function for 
which the employee has authority. A first line supervisor 1s not considered to be 
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act~ng In a managerial capacity merely by vlrtue of the supew~sor's supervisory 
duties unless the employees supervtsed are professional. 
Sect~on 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" as an 
assignment wlthln an organization m which the employee primarily: 
(i) d~rects the management of the organization or a major component or funct~on of the 
organization; 
Y 
(i~) establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
D 
(iii) exercises wide latitude in discretionary dec~sion making; and 
(iv) receives only general supervision or direction fiom higher level executives, the board 
of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
I 
The petition was sdbmitted on May 28, 2004. In a May 18, 2004 letter, the petttioner indicated that the 
beneficiary the following duties as manager of the company: 
His job duties entail him to be responsible for the management of all business operations of 
the company, including the purchase and sale of finished veneer logs fiom saw mills to be 
ultimately used in furniture manufacturing or residential construction; establishment of 
branch offices; staffing; identification of sources for the purchase of lumber such as quality 
oak, hard mab~e, cheny, and walnut from the eastern portion of the United States and quality 
soft maple from the western portion of the United States; conducting quality assurance 
examinationstand tests of the various,available products to select the appropriate sources. 
grades, quantities, and prices for purchase and shipment of quality wood products to the 
parent company; negotiation and execution of contracts and purchase orders for the purchase 
of quality timber; selection, cutting, and loading of the lumber; payment and shipment of the 
. products to the Korean company; development and implementation of skategic marketing 
plans for the; ongoing sourclng of quality timber products, and exploration of potential 
markets in the, United States for the products of the Korean company for future export. In his 
employment, [the beneficiary] will have complete discretionary latitude in any necessary 
decision-making involved wtth the business with the ultimate goal to improve business 
operations ankmaximize revenues of the Korean and American companies. 
On jkte 3, 2004, the director issued a request for evidence instructing the petition& to submit, in part: (I) a 
statement of the specific' duties performed by the beneficiary for the previous year and the duties the 
beneficiary will perfofm under the extended petition, including the routine day-to-day tasks performed by the 
beneficiary as well as the percentage of weekly hours expended in the performance of each task identified; 
and (2) a statement describing the. staffing of the company, including the number of employees, their job 
titles, their specific job duties, and evidence of wages paid to each employee. 
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In response, the pe&tioncr submitted a June 22, 2004 letter, signed by the beneficiary, which restated the job 
description providikd with the initial petition, and included two additional duties: procurement of export 
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certificates from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and supemision of employees and independent 
It contractors. The beneficiary further described his duties as follows: 
I1 
~pprox~m$tel~ 70% of my worlung hme n dedtcated to the ldentlficatron of potentral Il sources, negot~atlons for the purchase of lumber, and entenng m final agreements. I vlsrt 
many lumb'kr mills around the country to examlne thelr products. Another 5% of my worklng 
II t~me is allocated to inspecting the lumber and conducting quality assurance tests. Another ll 20% of my, worlung bme is spent on amngmg for the loadlng and transportation of the 
lumber to the Korean parent company. Lastly, the remaining 5% of my worklng tlme IS 
/I dedrcated to admlnlstratlve dut~es such as entenng logistical data, maklng reports and fil~ng 
II appllcat~ons to the AES and the U.S. Department of Agriculture to comply wlth Amer~can /I 
, law regarding the export of lumber products. In order to obtarn final approval for sh~pment, 'I we must ob\ain a Cerhficate from the U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
11 
'\ Furthermore I supervise our present staff of two employees and one independent contractor. 
0s our Driver and Assistant. He IS responsible for preparing the Log List for 
purchases and operating small life machinery. - appmpnate lumber for purchase and asslsts in 
experience with lumber is integral to the success of our company. He cuts the lumber 11 utdizing horses and operates high lift and small lifi machinery for shipment loading- 
s an independent contractor who also identifies appropriate lumber for purchase. 
11 
1 
The petitioner submidted its IRS Form 941, Employer's Quarterly Federal Tax Return, and Ohio Form UCO- 
2QR Employer's ~ebort of Wages, for the fmt quarter of 2004, confimng employment of the beneficlav, 
the purchaser and the]driver/assistant. 
The director denied tfie petition on ~une 30, 2004, determining that the pstitioner had not established that the 
I1 beneficiary will be employed in a managerial or executive capacity. The director noted that while the 
I1 beneficiary has the authority to'hire and fire employees and undertake other personnel actions, the petitioner 
II failed 'to demonstrate that the beneficiary is supervising professional employees. The director also observed I that the beneficiary exercises discretion over a function of the organization, 'but appears to be primarily 
I1 performing rather thy managing or directing the function.. The director concluded that the beneficiary's 
duties would not be primarily managerial or executive. 
li On appeal, counsel for the petttroner clarms that the beneficiary qualrfies under the statutory defin~t~on of 
"managenal capacity" based on his management of the ent~re organizat~on and management of the "major r function" of the organization, namely the sourcing, negotlatmg, purchas~ng and shlpplng of lumber products 11 to the cla~med parent company. 
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1 Counsel's assertions are not persuasive. When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the 
beneficiary, the dk0 will look first to the petitioner's job description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(1)(3)(ii). Fhe petitioner's descriptidn of the job duties must clearly describe the duties to be 
performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. 
Based on the job description provided by the petitioner, it is evident that the beneficiary devotes the majority 
of his time to perfo!hing non-qualifying duties related to the identification, purchase and export of lumber on 
behalf of the com$iny, rather than performing primarily managerial or executive duties. For eridmple, the I\ beneficiary states th,at he spends 20 percent of his time "arranging for the loading and transportation of lumber 
to the Korean pareht company," 5 percent of his time "entering logistical data, making reports and filing 
I' applications to the AES and the U.S. Department of Agriculture," and.5 percent of his time "inspecting the 
lumber and conducting quality assurance tests." These duties, which constitute 30 percent of the beneficiary's 
time, have not been managerial or executive duties as contemplated by the statutory definitions. . 
See sechon 
of his time to the broad responsibility of 
sources of lurnbei, negotiations for the purchase of lumber, and entering into final . 
agreements." responsibility for entering into final agreements may be considered 
sources of lumber and negotiate routine purchase agreements are 
routine operational tasks, and in fact overlap with the 
Although requested by the director, the petitioner 
in the performance of each identified task, and 
therefore did hot addquately distinguish between the beneficiary's qualifying and non-qualiEying duties. The 
beneficiary's other claimed managerial duties, including supervision, development and R implementation of a strategic marketing plan, and exploration of potential markets, have not been adequately 
described and are nod included in the breakdbwn of the beneficiary's weekly duties. Going on record without II supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these 
proceedings. ~ofrer!lof ~oflci, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Trearure Crajl of 
Callfiorniu. 14 I&N 1 ~ec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Regardless, the petitioner'i description of the' 
beneficiary's duties depicts an employee who is directly involved in all of the day-to-day operations of the 'I business. An employ$e who primarily performs the tasks necessary to produce. a product or to provide ' 
services is not considered to be employed in a managerial or execut~ve capacity. Matter of Church Y Scieniology International, 1 9 I&N Dec. 593,604 (Comm. 1988). 
I 
The definitions of exe=utive and managerial capacity have two parts. First, the petitioner must show that the 
beneficiary performs the high-level responsibilities that are specified in the definitions. Second, the petitioner 
II must show ihat the beneficiary primarily performs these specified responsibilities and does not spend a 
majority of his or herltimi on day-today functions. Champion World, Inc v. INS, 940 F.2d 1533 (Table), 
1991 WL 144470 (9th Cir. July 30, 1991). Where an individual is primarily performing the tasks necessary to 
produce a product or !ti provide a service, that individual cannot also primarily perform managerial or i : executive duties. In the ~nstant matter, the petitioner has failed to show that non-qualifying duties will not 
I1 constitute the majority of the .beneficiary's time. Although counsel claims that the beneficiary manages the 
'I entire organization, the evidence does not support a conclusion that the beneficiary will be employed in a li managerial or executive capacity for immigration purposes. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not 
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constitute evidenc;. Morter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dee. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); Matter of Laureano, 19 I&N 
Dec. I (BIA 1983); Matter of Ramirei-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). Rather, when 
I\ determining whether a beneficiary is employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity, the actual I1 duties themselves reveal the true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 
1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), afd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). It is evident,from the record that any managerial I1 duties performed by the beneficiary at the time of filing were incidental to his responsibility for providing the 
petitioner's service!,of sourcing, inspecting, purchasing, transporting and exporting lumber for the petitioner's I[ parent company. . ,, 
I1 
Counsel claims thad the beneficiary is a hnction manager and therefore qualified for an extension of his L-lA 
il 
status. The term "function manager" applies generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the 
iI work of a subordinate staff but instead is primarily responsible for managing an "essential function" within 
II the organization. See section 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(44)(A)(ii). The term "essential 
function" is not defined by statute or .regulation. If a petitioner claims that the beneficiary is managing an 
I' 
essential function, the petitioner must provide a detailed job description that identifies the hnction with 
II specificity, articulat~s the ess&~tjal name of the function, and establishes the proportion of the*benefciaryts 
daily duties attributed to managing the essential function. 8 C.F.R. 214.2(1)(3)(ii). In addition, the 'I petitioner's description of the beneficiary's daily duties must demonstrate that the beneficiary manages the ' 
function rather than\Per$om the duties related to the function. An employee who primarily performs the 
tasks necessaty to p$pduce a product or to provide services is not considered to be employed in a managerial 
or executive capacit$. Boyang, Ltd. v. I.N.S., 67 F.3d 305 (Table), 1995 WL 576839 (9th Cir, 1995)(citing 
Matter of Church ~=ientologv International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 1988)). In this matter, while the 
/I beneficiary may exercise discretion over the petitioner's major hnction, the petitioner's description of his 
11 duties indicate that he also performs, most of the administrative and operational duties associated with the 
function. 1, 
1: 
Finally, as noted. by the director, the beneficiary serves as a first-line supervisor of two employees, a 11 drivertassistant who operates small lift machnery and prepares lists for purchases, and a purchaser, who 
I1 identifies lumber for qurchase, cuts lumber, and operates machinery for shipment loading. The petitioner also 
claims to employ an independent contractor, but has not provided documentary evidence of any payments to 
him. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the 
burden of proof in tl;'ese proceedings. Matter of Sofici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. A managerial or executive 
II employee must have authority over day-to-day operations beyond the level normally vested in a first-line 
II supervisor, unless the supervised employees are professionals. See Matter of Church Scientology. 
International, 19 I&v Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 1988). In evaluating whether the beneficiary manages 11 professional employees, the AAO must evaluate whether the subordinate positions require a baccalaureate 
degree as a minimum for entry into the field .of endeavor. Section 101(a)(32) of the Act, 8 L1.S.C. 5 
1101(a)(32), states: "The term profession shall include but not be limited to architects, engineers, lawyers, 
li 
physicians, surgeons, and teachers in elementary or secondary schools, colleges, academies, or seminaries." 
The term "profession" 'contemplates knowledge or learning, not merely skill, of an advanced type in a given II field gained by a prolonged course of specialized instruction and study of at least baccalaureate level, which is 
a realistic prerequisite to entry into the particular field of endeavor. Mafter of Sea, 19 I&N Dec. 817 (Comm. 
1988); Matter ofLing,l13 I&N Dec. 35 (R.C. 1968); Matter of Shin, 11 I&N Dec. 686 (D.D. 1966). The 
petitioner has not established that a. bachelor's degree is necessary to perform the duties of a driver or 
(I 
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li purchaser. PursuFt to section 101(a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act, the beneficiary's position does not qualify as 
primarily managerial under the statutory definition. 
// 
' il Finally, counsel notes that the petitioner's business had only been operational for a few months at the time the I' extension request was filed, .but had achieved considerable success under .the beneficiary's management 11 within this short time period. The AAO notes that the initial new office petition (LTN 03 219 52391) was 'I approved for a period of approx'imately nine months, from October 6,2003 to June 30,2004. If a beneficiary 
is coming to the Uvted States to open a new office, the petition may be approved for a period "not to exceed 
one year." 8 C.F.~? 4 214.2(1)(7)(i)(3). There is no indication in the current record of how much time the 
petitioner initially &quested. Regardless, any request for an extension of a petition that was originally approved 
/I 
as a new office must be evaluated under the criteria set forth at 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(14)(ii). In the instant matter, 
I1 the petitioner has nP reached the point that it can employ the beneficiary in a predominantly managerial or 
executive position. For this reason, the appeal'will be dismissed. 
The second issue m'this proceeding is whether the petitioner is a qualifying organization doing business in the 11 United States. Pursuant to the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 4 214,2(l)(ii)(G)(2) in order for an entity to be 
considered a quali&~ng organization, the petitioner must show that it: 
Is or will belldoing business (engaging in international trade is not required) as an employer m 
the Un~ted States and at least one other country directly or through a parent, branch, affihate, \I or subsidiary for the duration of the alien's stay in the United States as an intracompany 
I transferee . .I. . 
The regulation at 8 c,.F.R. 214.2(l)(ii)(H) defines the term "doing business" as: 
I 
[Tlhe regulah, systematic, and continuous provision of.goqds andlor services by a qualifying 
11 organization land does not include the mere presence of an agent or office of the qualifying 
organization jn the United States and abroad. 
' ' 
I\ ll The petltloner states that it sources and purchases raw timber and exports it to its clalmed parent company in 
'I Korea. In support of the petlt~on, the petitioner submitted: (1) its statement of revenues for the three months 11 
ended March 3 I, 2004, show~ng gross sales of $358,366; (2) recent bank statements; and (3) purchase orders, 
comrnerclal invo~us,~bills of lad~ng, and packing IIN for lumber purchased and sent to the parent company 
between December 2003 and Apnl2004. 
ii ' 
In his June 3, 2004 request for evidence, the director instructed the petitioner to submit hrther evidence that 
the United States endp has been doing business for the previous year. The director requested evidenee of 
corporate tax returns'; and active contractual or sales agreements &tween the petitioner and specific li 
clients/customers that clearly indicate that the petitioning organization has been providing identifiable goods 
andlor services. 
In response, the petltidner submitted its 2003 IRS Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return showlng 
gross sales of 1690.534;kopies of business cards from over 30 lumber companler contacted by the petitloner in 
the course of doing buaness; copies of four phytosanitary certificates issued by the U.S. Dennm~nt fif 
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Apculture in connection with shipments of lumber exported to Korea by the petitioner; and copies of recent I[ bank statements, purchase orders, commercial invoices, packing lists and bills of lading. 
11 In his June 30, 2004 decision, the director acknowledged the evidence submitted by the petitioner but 
determined that tq petitioner is not "doing business" as the term is defined at 8 C.F.R. 9: 214.2(I)(ii)(H). 
Specifically, the director concluded: "Instead of providing any goods and/or services, the petitioning entity 
appears to be simply acting as an "agent" or "administrative conduit" for arranging material transfers between 
U.S. suppliers a& its parent organization abroad and therefore does not constitute a "qualifying 
organization.. .." " 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitloner submitted voluminous evldence of the petitioner's buslness 
actlvit~es, notlng that the company expected to purchase and export over $1 4 million tn lumber during ~ts first 
twelve months of operations. Counsel asserts that th~s evidence was suffictent to establish that the pettt~oner 11 has engaged In a "regular and systematic stream of transact~ons" and IS clearly doing business in the Un~ted 
States. 
I 
Upon review, the IMO concurs with counsel's arguments. The fact that the petitioner is engaged in' 
purchasing and transporting raw materials to its parent company, or acting as a "conduit," should not be the 
determinative factdi in deciding whether theL company is doing business. A representative office is not 
'I 
specifically excluded by the definition of "doing business," provided that it shows that it is engaged in the 
provision of 'Lr services, albeit on behalf of a related foreign entity. The petitioner, to date, has been 
engaged in purchasibg products from United States suppliers in order to export raw materials to Korea for use 
bythe foreign entidl Although the foreign entity will actually manufacture the final product, the U.S. entity is 
engaged in the provi'sion of services by facilitating the export of goods to the Korean market. Thus, under the 
Ii business model adopted by the petitioner and its Korean parent company, the U.S. company would be deemed 
I1 to be "doing business" pursuant to 8 C:F.R. § 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(H). The director's comments with respect to this 
Il issue will therefore be withdrawn. 
Beyond the decisioq, of the director, the record contains conflicting information regarding the petitioner's 
ownership which precludes a finding that the U.S. company maintains a qualifying relationship with the 
Il foreign entity pursuant to 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(I)(ii)(G). On the Form I-129,'the petitioner indicated that it is the 
wholly owned subsidiary of the foreign entity, and that the foreign entity is wholly owned by an individual, 
The petitioner did not submit supporting documentation to substantiate the claimed 
-re, as required by 8 C.F.R. fj 214.2(1)(14)(ii)(A): Accordingly, the director instructed the 
petitioner to provide "specific evidence to establish that the United States firm and the foreign .firm continue 11. . to be qualifying organlzat~ons" in his June 3, 2004 request for evidence. The petitioner did not submit any 
evidence in response to this request. The regulation states that the petitioner shall submit additional evidence 
as the director, in hislor her discretion, may deem necessary. The purpose of the request for evidence is to 
elicit further infonnation that clarifies whether eligibility for the benefit sought has,been established, as of the 
time the petition is fil4d. See 8 C.F.R. $5 103.2@)(8) and (12). The failure to submit requested evidence that 
precludes a material line of inquiry shall. be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. $ 103.2(b)(14). 
Furthermore. the petitloner's 2003 Form 1120, U.S. Corporation hcome Tax Return, at Schedule K indicates 
I1 that thebeneficiary oyns 100 percent of the U.S. company. It 'is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any 
inconsistencies in the 'record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such 
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Page 10 
lnconslstencles will not suffice unless the pet~tloner subm~ts competent objective ev~dence polntmg to where 
the truth lies. ~kjterer of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). The pet~tloner has not cstabl~shed that a 'I ma~ntalns a qualtfylng relat~onship w~th the fore~gn ent~ty. For thls add~tional reason, the petltlon may not be , approved. 
An application or qetit~on that falls to comply wlth the technical requirements of the law may be denled by the . 
AAO even ~f the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for den~al In the ~nltial decis~on. See Il Spencer Enterprises. Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), affd. 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cr. 2003); seL olro Dw v. INS, 891 F.2d 997. 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(notmg that the AAO revlewr 
II appeals on a de novo basts). 
The petlt~on will be denied for the above stated reasons, w~th each considered as an independent and 
altemat~ve basls for denial. In visa petition proceed~ngs, the burden of proving el~g~bility for the benefit 
sought remalns entlrely with the petitloner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 4 1361. Here, that burden has 
not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dumissed.