dismissed L-1A Case: Transportation

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
In Re : 8088883 
Appeal of California Service Center Decision 
Form 1-129, Petition for L-lA Manager or Executive 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date : APR. 17, 2020 
The Petitioner, describing itself as a transportation company, seeks to temporarily employ the Beneficiary 
in the United States as its chief financial officer (CFO) under the L-lA nonimmigrant classification for 
intracompany transferees . Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 101(a)(15)(L), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(15)(L). 
The Director of the California Service Center denied the petition, concluding that the record did not 
establish, as required, that the Beneficiary was employed abroad in a managerial or executive capacity. 
Further, the Director also determined that the Petitioner did not demonstrate that the Beneficiary would 
be employed in a managerial or executive capacity in the United States. 
On appeal, the Petitioner contends the Director erred by not considering evidence of its U.S. employees 
submitted in response to a request for evidence (RFE) . In addition, the Petitioner asserts that the 
Beneficiary's foreign duty description is sufficiently detailed to establish that she acts in an executive 
capacity abroad. 
In these proceedings , it is the Petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the requested benefit. 
Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S .C. § 1361. Upon de nova review , we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
To establish eligibility for the L-lA nonimmigrant visa classification , a qualifying organization must 
have employed the beneficiary "in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized 
knowledge," for one continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for 
admission into the United States . Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. In addition, the beneficiary must 
seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same 
employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial or executive capacity . Id. The petitioner 
must also establish that the beneficiary's prior education, training, and employment qualify him or her 
to perform the intended services in the United States. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3). 
II. U.S. EMPLOYMENT IN AN EXECUTIVE CAPACITY 
The first issue we will address is whether the Petitioner established that the Beneficiary would be 
employed in a managerial or executive capacity in the United States. The Petitioner does not claim 
that the Beneficiary would be employed in a managerial capacity in the United States. Therefore, we 
restrict our analysis to whether the Beneficiary would be employed in an executive capacity. 
"Executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily 
directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the organization; 
establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; exercises wide latitude 
in discretionary decision-making; and receives only general supervision or direction from higher-level 
executives, the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. Section 101 (a)( 44 )(B) of the 
Act. 
When examining the executive capacity of a given beneficiary, we will review the petitioner's 
description of the job duties. The petitioner's description of the job duties must clearly describe the 
duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are in an executive capacity. 
See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(ii). Beyond the required description of the job duties, we examine the 
company's organizational structure, the duties of a beneficiary's subordinate employees, the presence 
of other employees to relieve a beneficiary from performing operational duties, the nature of the 
business, and any other factors that will contribute to understanding a beneficiary's actual duties and 
role in a business. Accordingly, we will discuss evidence regarding the Beneficiary's job duties along 
with evidence of the nature of the Petitioner's business, its staffing levels, and its organizational 
structure. 
A. Duties 
Based on the definition of executive capacity, the Petitioner must first show that the Beneficiary will 
perform certain high-level responsibilities. Champion World, Inc. v. INS, 940 F.2d 1533 (9th Cir. 
1991) (unpublished table decision). Second, the Petitioner must prove that the Beneficiary will be 
primarily engaged in executive duties, as opposed to ordinary operational activities alongside the 
Petitioner's other employees. See Family Inc. v. USCIS, 469 F.3d 1313, 1316 (9th Cir. 2006); 
Champion World, 940 F.2d 1533. 
The Petitioner stated that "the core of the company is long-distance commercial transportation." In 
denying the petition, the Director emphasized that in an RFE she requested the Petitioner submit more 
information about the Beneficiary's proposed position in the United States and that it had not provided 
an updated or detailed list of duties for her U.S. position. On appeal, the Petitioner does not address 
or remedy this material discrepancy, but only reiterates the Beneficiary's claimed foreign duties. 
Therefore, without a comprehensive and detailed U.S. duty description for the Beneficiary we cannot 
determine whether she would act primarily in an executive capacity in the United States. Whether the 
Beneficiary is an executive employee turns on whether the Petitioner has sustained its burden of 
proving that their duties are "primarily" executive. See section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act. Specifics 
are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties are primarily executive in nature, 
otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a matter ofreiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. 
Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), ajf'd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
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Even though the Beneficiary holds a senior position within the organization, the fact that they will 
manage or direct a business does not necessarily establish eligibility for classification as an 
intracompany transferee in an executive capacity within the meaning of section 10l(a)(44)(B) of the 
Act. By statute, eligibility for this classification requires that the duties of a position be "primarily" 
executive in nature. Id. The Beneficiary may exercise discretion over the Petitioner's day-to-day 
operations and possess the requisite level of authority with respect to discretionary decision-making; 
however, the position descriptions alone are insufficient to establish that his actual duties would be 
primarily executive in nature. 
B. Staffing 
If staffing levels are used as a factor in determining whether an individual is acting in an executive 
capacity, we take into account the reasonable needs of the organization, in light of the overall purpose 
and stage of development of the organization. See section 101 (a)( 44 )( C) of the Act. 
As noted, the Petitioner claims the Beneficiary has, and would, act in an executive capacity in the 
United States. The statutory definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated 
position within a complex organizational hierarchy, including major components or functions of the 
organization, and that person's authority to direct the organization. Section 10l(a)(44)(B) of the Act. 
Under the statute, a beneficiary must have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish the 
goals and policies" of that organization. Inherent to the definition, the beneficiary must primarily 
focus on the broad goals and policies of the organization rather than the day-to-day operations of the 
enterprise. An individual will not be deemed an executive under the statute simply because they have 
an executive title or because they "direct" the enterprise as the owner or sole managerial employee. A 
beneficiary must also exercise "wide latitude in discretionary decision making" and receive only 
"general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of directors, or stockholders 
of the organization." Id. 
The Petitioner provided a "proposed" organizational chart in support of the petition reflecting that as 
CFO the Beneficiary would report to a president overseen by a "Board" member. The chart indicated 
the Beneficiary would supervise an "Auditor (future)" and another untranslated position also identified 
as "future." In addition, the chart reflected that the board member would further supervise a secretary 
and a vice president and that the aforementioned president supervising the Beneficiary would oversee 
a manager, a human resources employee, a transportation manager, an accounting manager "(future)," 
and an investment manager "(future)." Lastly, the transportation manager was shown to supervise 16 
employees identified by name, but whose position titles were not provided. In total, the U.S. 
organizational chart identified 24 employees by name, suggesting they were already employed by the 
Petitioner as of the date the petition was filed. 
The Petitioner provided conflicting evidence on the record leaving substantial uncertainty as to its 
claimed organizational chart. First, in a submitted business plan the Petitioner provided a completely 
different U.S. organizational chart showing a chief operating officer overseeing operations, finance, 
marketing, and customer services departments in apparent conflict with the organizational chart 
provided in support of the petition. The Petitioner further provided a 2017 IRS Form 1120, U.S. 
Corporation Income Tax Return indicating it paid only $28,000 as "compensation of officers" to the 
claimed "manager" in its asserted organizational chart and only $18,000 in other wages and salaries 
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during that year. 1 Likewise, the most recent state quarterly wage form from the fourth quarter of 201 7 
reflected that the Petitioner paid wages to only one employee, the aforementioned manager, who was 
also referred to in invoices elsewhere on the record as the "owner" of the company. 
Later in response to the RFE, the Petitioner provided IRS Forms 1099, Miscellaneous Income specific 
to 14 individuals and one transportation company. On appeal, the Petitioner emphasizes the 
aforementioned IRS Forms 1099 and asserts these employees were added after the date the petition 
was filed. It forth er notes that it did not respond to the RFE until May 2019, nearly one year after the 
date the petition was filed. First, we note that the Petitioner must demonstrate the Beneficiary's 
eligibility as of the date the petition was filed; as such, even if we accept that it added 14 employees 
after the date the petition was filed this is not relevant to establishing her eligibility. The Petitioner 
must establish that all eligibility requirements for the immigration benefit have been satisfied from the 
time of the filing and continuing through adjudication. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(l). 
Regardless, it is questionable that out of the 14 IRS Form 1099 contractors provided in response to the 
RFE, only four are listed on the Petitioner's U.S. organizational chart and it otherwise provided no 
comprehensive organizational chart in response to the RFE with titles, duty descriptions, or other 
information related to these claimed employees. Further, the Petitioner also submitted numerous 
trucking invoices from throughout 2017 and up past the date the petition was filed; however, several 
of these listed an I I dispatcher, an employee or contractor not listed in its organizational chart 
or included in its state quarterly wage forms or IRS Forms 1099. In addition, as we noted, the trucking 
invoices also listed the claimed "manager" from the organizational chart, but questionably identified 
this claimed manager as the "owner." The claimed organizational chart provided in support of the 
petition also did not reflect that the Beneficiary would have any subordinates in the United States, but 
indicated she would only two proposed "future" employees. 
These numerous discrepancies leave substantial uncertainty as to whether the Petitioner had, or has, a 
sufficient organizational structure to support the Beneficiary within a complex organizational 
hierarchy where she would be primarily focused on the broad goals and policies of the organization 
rather than its day-to-day operations. The Petitioner must resolve this inconsistencies and 
discrepancies in the record with independent, objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. 
Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). Lastly, as previously discussed, without a 
comprehensive duty description specific to the Beneficiary's proposed U.S. employment it has not 
established that the Beneficiary would primarily perform executive-level duties in the United States. 
Again, it is the Petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. 
Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361; Matter ofSkirball Cultural Ctr., 25 I&N Dec. at 799, 806. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Petitioner has not established that the Beneficiary would act in an 
executive capacity in the United States. 
III. FOREIGN EMPLOYMENT IN AN EXECUTIVE CAP A CITY 
As we have discussed, the Director also denied the petition concluding that the Petitioner did not 
establish that the Beneficiary was employed in a managerial or executive capacity abroad. Because 
1 The petition was filed on June 15, 2018. 
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of the dis positive effect of the above finding of ineligibility, we will only briefly address whether the 
Beneficiary acted in a managerial or executive capacity abroad. The Petitioner does not claim that 
the Beneficiary was employed in a managerial capacity abroad. Therefore, we restrict our analysis to 
whether the Beneficiary was employed in an executive capacity. 
In denying the petition on these grounds, the Director determined that the submitted evidence did not 
substantiate the Beneficiary's foreign position and duties, emphasizing that the provided supporting 
documentation did not mention her or demonstrate her involvement in tasks or projects abroad. On 
appeal, the Petitioner does not sufficiently address this conclusion, but only reiterates the Beneficiary's 
generic foreign duties and generically references one office building construction project she "led" 
while employed in China. However, as noted by the Director, the Petitioner submits no supporting 
documentation to substantiate the Beneficiary's involvement in this project or her performance of any 
other executive-level duties abroad. 
The Petitioner also submitted a vague foreign duty description that did not credibly convey the 
Beneficiary's actual day-to-day executive-level duties within the context of the foreign employer's 
asserted construction business. For instance, the duty description generically indicated that the 
Beneficiary is tasked with "continuously improv[ing] the company's financial management system," 
"coordinating, supervising and tracking the company's main customers and key projects," and 
managing "internal procurement bidding approval." It also ambiguously stated that the Beneficiary 
was tasked with overseeing the "company's spending, debt service, investment strategies, and profits" 
and noted that she establishes "lines of credit with banks." However, as discussed by the Director, the 
Petitioner provides no credible details and supporting documentation to substantiate the financial 
management systems the Beneficiary improved, main customers or key projects she supervised, 
budgets she compiled, bidding approvals she was involved with, or investment or financial decisions 
that she made. The Petitioner's vague statements and the lack of documentation relative to the 
Beneficiary's asserted role abroad did not sufficiently substantiate her actual day-to-day executive­
level tasks. Again, specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties are 
primarily executive in nature, otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a matter ofreiterating 
the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. at 1103, 1108. 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Director's conclusion that the Petitioner did not establish that 
the Beneficiary acts in an executive capacity abroad. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
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