dismissed L-1A Case: Water Filtration

MATTER OF E-, INC. 
APPEAL OF VERMONT SERVICE CENTER DECISION 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
DATE: NOV. 22,2016 
PETITION: FORM I-129, PETITION FOR A NONIMMIGRANT WORKER 
The Petitioner, a retailer of water filtration systems with two employees, seeks to employ the 
Beneficiary as its vice president of sales, marketing, and business development under the L-1A 
nonimmigrant classification for intracompany transferees. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the 
Act) § 101(a)(l5)(L), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(l5)(L). The L-1A classification allows a corporati9n or 
other legal entity (including its affiliate or subsidiary) to transfer a qualifYing foreign employee to the 
United States to work temporarily in an executive or managerial capacity. 
The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petition based on the finding that the Petitioner 
did not establish that the Beneficiary would be employed in the United States in a managerial or 
executive capacity. 
The matter is now before us on appeal. In support of its appeal, the Petitioner disputes the Director's 
decision, asserting that the Beneficiary will be employed in a managerial capacity. The Petitioner 
relies on the definition of executive capacity as an alternate claim to eligibility. 
Upon de novo review, we will dismiss the appeal. · 
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, a qualifYing organization must 
have employed the Beneficiary in a managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge 
capacity, for one continuous year within three years preceding the Beneficiary's application for 
admission into the United States. Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. In addition, the Beneficiary 
must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same 
employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge 
capacity. Id. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129, 
Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker, shall be accompanied by: 
Matter of E-, Inc. 
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will 
employ the alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph 
(l)(l)(ii)(G) ofthis section. 
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or 
specialized knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the 
services to be performed . 
. 
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time 
employment abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years 
preceding the filing of the petition. 
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position 
that was managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that 
the alien's prior education, training, and employment qualifies him/her to 
perform the intended services in the United States; however, the work in the 
United States need not be the same work which the alien performed abroad. 
II. U.S. EMPLOYMENT IN A MANAGERIAL OR EXECUTIVE CAPACITY 
The primary issue to be addressed in this decision is whether the Petitioner provided sufficient 
evidence to establish that the Beneficiary would be employed in the United States in a managerial or 
executive capacity. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" 
as "an assignment within an organization inwhich the employee primarily": 
(i) manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or 
component of the organization; 
(ii) supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or 
managerial employees, or manages an essential function within the 
organization, or a department or subdivision of the organization; 
/ 
(iii) if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the 
authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel 
a~tions (such as promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is 
directly supervised, functions at a senior level within the organizational 
hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and 1 
(iv) exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function 
for which the employee has authority. 
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Matter of E-, Inc. 
Further, "a first-line supervisor is not considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by 
virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised are professional." !d. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" 
as "an assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily": 
(i) directs the management of the organization or a major component or 
function of the organization; 
(ii) establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or 
function; 
(iii) exercises wide latitude in discretionary decisipn-making; and 
(iv) receives only general supervision or direction from higher-level executives, 
the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
If staffing levels are used as a factor in determining whether an individual is acting in a managerial 
or executive capacity, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) must take into account 
the reasonable needs of the organization, in light of the overall purpose and stage of development of 
the organization. See section 10l(a)(44)(C) ofthe Act. 
The record shows that the petition was filed on February 9, 2016 claiming two employees and a 
gross annual income of $6 million. In support of the petition, the Petitioner submitted a cover letter 
stating that it wished to employ the Beneficiary in an "executive and managerial position," which 
would involve managing and directing the Petitioner's sales, marketing, and business development 
department. The Petitioner provided the following list of the Beneficiary's proposed job duties: 
1. Directing and coordinating company's sales, marketing and business development 
functions; 
2. Exercising discretion and authority over the daily operations of the sales, marketing 
and business development department of [the Petitioner], including hiring and firing 
personnel; 
3. Establishing goals and policies of [the Petitioner]'s sales, marketing and business 
development department; 
4. Developing business plans and strategies to maximize the company's sales and 
profits; 
5. Supervising development of [the Petitioner]'s marketing and communications 
materials for the U.S. water filtration market; 
6. Maintaining and developing strong executive-level relationships with partners and 
dealers in the U.S. water filtration market; 
7. Planning, delegating, coordinating, and controlling work assignments and special 
projects. 
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(b)(6)
Matter of E-, Inc. 
The Petitioner added that the Beneficiary will oversee the development and execution of the 
Petitioner's marketing and business development strategies, manage a team of managers and 
consultants once hired, and "exercise wide latitude in discretionary decision-making authority," the 
latter of which is a reference to the third prong of the definition for executive capacity. Section 
101(a)(44)(B)(iii) of the Act. The Petitioner claimed that 90% of the Benefieiary's time would be 
allocated to managerial duties and that the remaining 1 0% of her time would be allocated to 
"organizational duties." 
The Petitioner did not specify which duties would be ch:tssified as organizational and which would 
be classified as managerial. With regard to the above list of duties, the Petitioner's statements were 
overly broad and provided little probative information about the actual tasks the Beneficiary 
would 
perform on a daily basis. For instance, exercising discretion over the Petitioner's operations is not a 
job duty; rather, it is a characteristic that establishes the Beneficiary's level of authority. The claim 
that the Beneficiary will establish goals and policies and develop business plans is similarly vague, 
particularly with no information as to specific goals or policies or the means by which the 
Beneficiary will develop business plans. The Petitioner did not clarify how the Beneficiary will 
develop "strong executive-level relationships with partners" to establish that the Beneficiary is not 
directly involved in product sales; nor did the Petitioner specify any "work assignments" or "work 
projects" that the Beneficiary would plan, develop, and coordinate. 
The Petitioner 
also provided a business plan, which includes the Petitioner's proposed organizational 
chart and states that the Petitioner needs approximately ten people for its start-up. The chart shows 
the company's CEO at the top of the organization, overseeing in his position as vice 
president of operations, an outsourced financial controller and accounting person (vacant), and the 
Beneficiary in her proposed position. The chart shows the Beneficiary overseeing a head of 
operations and logistics and a head of sales and marketing (all vacant), each with three managerial 
positions as their respective subordinates (also vacant). 
After reviewing the evidence submitted, the Director issued a request for evidence (RFE) stating that 
the Petitioner did not establish that it would employ the Beneficiary in a managerial or executive 
capacity. The Director quoted the Petitioner's claim that the Beneficiary's position is "executive and 
managerial" and cautioned the Petitioner that it must establish that the Beneficiary meets all four 
prongs of either definition; the Director expressly stated that the Petitioner cannot rely on portions of 
each definition without fully showing that the Beneficiary's duties fully fall within the definition of 
managerial or executive capacity. The Director found the Beneficiary's original job description to 
be overly broad and asked that the Petitioner provide a more detailed list of the Beneficiary's job 
duties and to indicate what percentage oftime the Beneficiary would allocate to each job duty. The 
Director also asked the Petitioner to provide an organizational chart or diagram depicting its staffing 
structure, the Beneficiary's position, and all employees within the Beneficiary's department. 
In response, the Petitioner provided a statement with the following job description for the 
Beneficiary's proposed employment in the United States: 
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(b)(6)
Matter of E-, Inc. 
The duties of this position will require [the Beneficiary] to plan, organize, direct and 
control our company's major functions by working through other managerial and 
supervisory employees . . . . The duties of her position are managerial and executive 
in nature as she will manage the operations of [the Petitioner], supervise and control 
the work of other managerial and supervisory employees, have authority to hire and 
fire, establish the company's goals and policies and exercise wide latitude in 
discretionary decision-making. [The Beneficiary] will receive only general direction 
from the President and Board of Directors. 
The Petitioner stated that since filing the petition the Petitioner hired a sales account executive, 
thereby expanding its staff to three people. The Petitioner claimed that the new employee would 
perform professional and organizational tasks and that the Beneficiary, together with the Petitioner's 
vice president, would "manage and supervise" the new employee and the part-time consultant, 1 who 
would support the Beneficiary's position and allow her to "focus solely on the general management 
and business development of the company." The Petitioner claimed that all of its employees "have 
college degrees and/or special professional training." 
The Petitioner's letter also included a new organizational chart and a percentage breakdown of the 
Beneficiary's position. The organizational chart depicts a vertical hierarchy with the company's 
president at the top of the staffing structure, followed by the Beneficiary now overseeing 
in the position of vice president. We note that the proposed staffing hierarchy that was 
included in the Petitioner's business plan is inconsistent with the one depicted· in the instant RFE 
response statement. Namely, while the proposed staffing chart shows the Beneficiary at the same 
organizational level as and an outsourced financial controller/accountant, the latter chart 
depicts the Beneficiary as direct superior, thereby creating an organizational level that 
was not previously shown in the proposed chart. The proposed chart also indicated that the 
Beneficiary would oversee two department heads - an operations and logistics department and a 
sales and marketing department - each of whom would oversee employees within their own 
departments. Although the Petitioner's organizational chart in response to the RFE now reflects a 
part-time consultant and sales account executive, there is no evidt:;nce that either position fits within 
the organizational hierarchy that was depicted in the original chart, as neither the consultant nor sales 
account executive position was included in the proposed chart. 
The following is the percentage breakdown that was included in the same RFE response letter: 
• Manage the company operations, including management and supervision of 
subordinate employees- 50%; 
• Establish the U.S. office's goals and policies, including the company's general 
strategy in marketing, business development and sales- 20-25%; 
1 
While the part-time consultant was not included in the organizational chart submitted with the initial filing, the 
Petitioner submitted evidence in the form of a W-2 Wage and Tax Statement for2015 in response to the RFE, indicating 
that this employee earned $12,000, and therefore was employed at the time of filing. 
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(b)(6)
Matter of E-, Inc. 
• Plan, delegate, communicate and control work assignments and special projects - 10-
15%; 
• Direct the recruitment, hiring and supervising [ ofJ new staff, including managers, 
professionals, and sales consultants- 1 0%; 
• Attend industry meetings, conferences,. and other functions - 5%. 
Lastly, the Petitioner provided the requested wage reporting documents, which show that the 
Petitioner employed two people - and a part-time consultant - at the time of filing. The 
sales account executive, whom the Petitioner hired after filing the petition, will not be considered for 
the purpose of determining the Beneficiary's eligibility, which must be determined based on the 
facts and circumstances that existed at the time of filing. See Matter of Michelin Tire Corp., 1 7 I&N 
Dec. 248, 249 (Reg'l Comm'r 1978). 
After reviewing the Petitioner's submissions, the Director concluded that the Petitioner did not 
establish that the Beneficiary would be employed in a managerial or executive capacity. In denying 
the petition, the Director pointed to inconsistencies between the proposed organizational chart, 
which the Petitioner included in its business plan, and the updated organizational chart that the 
Petitioner provided in response to the RFE. The Director also noted that any additional staff hired 
after the filing of the petition ~ould not be considered in determining the Beneficiary's eligibility. 
Upon review of the petition and the evidence of record, including materials submitted in support of 
the appeal, we conclude that the Petitioner has not established that the Beneficiary will be employed 
in the United States in a managerial or executive capacity. 
In general, when examining the managerial or executive capacity of the Beneficiary, we will look 
first to the Petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.P.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The Petitioner's 
job description must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the Beneficiary and indicate 
whether such duties are in a managerial or executive capacity. Id. 
The definitions of managerial and executive capacity each have two parts. First, the Petitioner must 
show that the Beneficiary will perform certain high-level responsibilities. Champion World, Inc. v. 
INS, 940 F.2d 1533 (Table), 1991 WL 144470 (9th Cir. July 30, 1991). Second, the Petitioner must 
prove that the Beneficiary will be primarily engaged in managerial or executive duties, as opposed to 
ordinary operational activities alongside the Petitioner's other employees. See Family Inc. v. USCJS, 
469 F.3d 1313, 1316 (9th Cir. 2006); Champion World, Inc. v. INS, 940 F.2d 1533. 
In the present matter, the RFE expressly informed the Petitioner that a detailed job description is 
critical when deterrhining whether the proposed position would be in a managerial or executive 
capacity. Although the Petitioner supplemented the record with a response containing a percentage 
breakdown and a separate paragraph addressing the Beneficiary's proposed employment, neither 
document ·contained details about the Beneficiary's specific daily tasks within the scope of the 
Petitioner's two-person retail operation that was in place at the time the petition was filed. The 
Beneficiary's broadly stated job responsibilities do little to enhance our understanding of how the 
Petitioner would support the Beneficiary in a managerial or executive position and who would 
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Matter of E-, Inc. 
relieve the Beneficiary from having to primarily perform critical operational job duties, such as 
marketing and selling the Petitioner's products. The fact that the Beneficiary will manage or direct 
the business does not necessarily establish eligibility for classification as an intracompany transferee 
in a managerial or executive capacity within the meaning of section 101(a)(44) of the Act. By 
statute, eligibility for this classification requires that the duties of a position be "primarily" of an 
executive or managerial nature. Sections 101(A)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act. While the Beneficiary 
may exercise discretion over the Petitioner's day-to-day operations and possess the requisite level of 
authority with respect to discretionary decision-making, merely meeting this criteria is not sufficient 
to establish that the Beneficiary's actual duties, as of the date of filing, would be primarily 
managerial or executive in nature. 
( 
On appeal, the Petitioner objects to the notion that the Beneficiary must meet the statutory 
definitions of both managerial and executive capacity, contending that there is no such statutory 
requirement. While we agree with the Petitioner's assertion that there is no requirement for the 
Beneficiary to meet both statutory definitions, we find that the Petitioner's understanding of the 
Director's decision was incorrect and that the Director imposed no such undue burden upon the 
Petitioner. A thorough review of the decision shows that the Director's discussion of both statutory 
definitions was the direct result of the Petitioner simultaneously raising both claims by citing to 
portions ofthe statutory elements of managerial and executive capacity. Notwithstanding the lack of 
clarity in the Petitioner's statements, we will give the Petitioner the benefit of considering the 
evidence within the context of both statutory definitions to· determine whether the Beneficiary meets 
the criteria of either managerial or executive capacity, noting that the Petitioner need only meet the 
four prongs of one definition in order to qualifying for the immigration benefit sought herein. 
First, we will tum to the statutory definition of "managerial capacity," which allows for both 
"personnel managers" and "function managers." See section 101(a)(44)(A)(i) and (ii) of the Act. 
Personnel managers are required to primarily supervise and control the work of other supervisory, 
professional, or managerial employees. The statute plainly states that a "first line supervisor is not 
considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory 
duties unless the employees supervised are professional." Section 10l(a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act; 8 
C.P.R. § 214.2(1)(1)(ii)(B)(4). If a beneficiary directly supervises other employees, the beneficiary 
must also have the authority to hire and fire those employees, or recommend those actions, and take 
other personnel actions. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(l)(ii)(B)(3) 
In the matter at hand, the Petitioner has neither established, nor clearly claimed, that the Beneficiary 
would be a manager of supervisory, professional, or managerial personnel. As previously indicated, 
while the Petitioner's proposed organizational chart indicates that the Beneficiary would· directly 
oversee two department head positions (vacant) and, indirectly, their respective subordinates (also 
vacant), the record shows that at the time of filing the Petitioner had only two employees, one of 
which was superior to the Beneficiary on the organizational chart, and the other part-time consulting 
position which did not appear on the initial organization chart, and thus did not develop the staffing 
and organizational hierarchy that it originally projected. Despite offering a second organizational 
chart, which shows the Beneficiary as directly subordinate to the company's president with a single 
Matter of E-, Inc. 
subordinate who was previously listed as the Beneficiary's superior and is depicted in a managerial 
position with two subordinates of his own, this evidence does not support the Petitioner's claim that 
the Beneficiary would allocate 50% of her time to overseeing a subordinate personnel. If USCIS 
finds reason to believe that an assertion stated in the petition is not true, USCIS may reject that 
assertion. See, e.g., Section 204(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b); Anetekhai v. INS, 876 F.2d 1218, 
1220 (5th Cir. 1989); Lu-Ann Bakery Shop, Inc. v. Nelson, 705 F. Supp. 7, 10 (D.D.C. 1988); 
Systronics Corp. v. INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2001). Here, the Petitioner has not provided 
a detailed job description specifically explaining what tasks the Beneficiary would perform to justifY 
the claim that 50% of her time would be spent managing two subordinates. It is unclear how, with a 
staff of two employees, one of which was superior to the Benefic~ary at the time of filing, the 
Petitioner would have the ability to relieve the Beneficiary from having to allocate her time 
primarily to assisting with critical operational and administrative tasks required to market and sell 
the Petitioner's products. 
The Petitioner similarly did not establish that the Beneficiary would assume the role of a function 
manager. The term "function manager" applies generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or 
control the work of a subordinate staff but instead is primarily responsible for managing an 
"essential function" within the organization. See section 10l(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. The term 
"essential function" is not defined by statute or regulation. If a petitioner claims that the beneficiary 
will manage an essential function, that petitioner must furnish a written job offer that clearly 
describes the duties to be performed in managing the essential function, i.e., identity the function 
with specificity, articulate the essential nature of the function, and establish the proportion of a 
beneficiary's daily duties attributed to managing the essential function. See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(1)(3)(ii). In addition, the petitioner's description of a beneficiary's daily duties must 
demonstrate that the beneficiary will manage the function rather than perform the duties related to 
the function. In this matter, the Petitioner did not specify an essential function that the Beneficiary 
would manage. 
Merely stating that the Beneficiary would be charged with "daily management" and "business 
development" of the U.S. entity is not synonymous with specifying an essential function. Moreover, 
the Petitioner has not established that the Beneficiary would refrain from performing the duties 
related to managing the Petitioner and its business development. While the Petitioner's original 
supporting statement indicates that it intends to "hire a team of managers and sales consultants" who 
would carry out key marketing and sales functions of the organization, the record shows that the 
Petitioner did not have such a team in place at the time the petition was filed. A visa petition may 
not be approved at a future date after the Petitioner or Beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set 
of facts. See Matter of Michelin Tire Corp., 17 I&N Dec. at 249. As discussed above, the 
Petitioner's entire organization was comprised of two employees at the time of filing - the 
Petitioner's vice president and a part-time consultant. Moreover, the more recent organizational 
chart, which reflected the Petitioner's staffing structure at the time of its RFE response, shows that 
the Petitioner was not seeking to realize the organizational hierarchy that was depicted in its original 
projected organizational chart. In fact, the Petitioner did not explain who would actually sell its 
products and who would perform its daily administrative tasks or its other key operational functions. 
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Matter of E-, Inc. 
Without personnel in place to carry out critical tasks that are necessary to ensure the Petitioner's 
daily operation, we cannot ignore the likelihood that the Beneficiary would have to assume the 
burden of carrying out some of these tasks, pending the Petitioner's progression beyond this initial 
stage of development. While the Petitioner claims that the Beneficiary would allocate her time 
primarily to managerial job duties, it has not provided evidence to support this claim. A petitioner's 
unsupported statements are. of very limited weight and no:r:mally will be insufficient to carry its 
burden of proof, particularly when supporting documentary evidence would reasonably be 
available. See Matter ofSoffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) (citing Matter ofTreasure 
Craft of Cal., 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg'l Comm'r 1972)); see also Matter ofChawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 
369, 376 (AAO 201 0). The Petitioner must support its assertions with relevant, probative, and 
credible evidence. See Matter ofChawathe, 25 I&N Dec. at 376. 
Next, we will address the Petitioner's alternate claim, which is based on the definition of executive 
capacity. The statutory definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated 
position within a complex organizational hierarchy, including major components or functions of the 
organization, and that person's authority to direct the organization. Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the 
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(B). Under the statute, a beneficiary must have the ability to "direct the 
management" and "establish the goals and policies" of that organization. Inherent to the definition, 
the organization must have a subordinate level of managerial employees for a beneficiary to direct 
and a beneficiary must primarily focus on the broad goals and policies of the organization rather than 
the day-to-day operations ofthe enterprise. An individual will not be deemed an executive under the 
statute simply because they have an executive title or because they "direct" the enterprise as the 
owner or sole managerial employee. A beneficiary must also exercise "wide latitude in discretionary 
decision making" and receive only "general supervision or direction from higher level executives, 
the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization." !d. 
While the Petitioner in this case repeatedly claimed that the Beneficiary would establish its goals and 
policies and exercise wide latitude in making discretionary decisions, these restatements of portions 
of the statutory definition of executive capacity are not sufficient to establish that the Beneficiary's 
job duties in her proposed position embody the characteristics of an executive position and meet all 
four prongs of the definition. Merely repeating the language of the statute or regulations does not 
satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. See Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 
(E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905 F. 2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990); Avyr Associates, Inc. v. Meissner, 1997 WL 
188942 at *5 (S.D.N.Y.). Further, despite claiming on appeal that the Beneficiary "will direct the 
management of the Sales Marketing and Business Development Department," whose aim is to 
market and sell water filtration systems that are manufactured abroad, the Petitioner has not 
submitted sufficient evidence to support this claim. 
As previously discussed, the Petitioner neglected to specify what executive tasks the Beneficiary 
would perform or to establish that it possessed a subordinate staff sufficient to elevate the 
Beneficiary's position to that of c:tn executive. While the Petitioner's size is not the sole determining 
factor in this matter, we note that it is appropriate for US CIS to consider the size of the petitioning 
company in conjunction with other relevant factors, such as the absence of employees who would 
9 
Matter of E-, Inc. 
perform the non-managerial or non-executive operations of the company, or a "shell company" that 
does not conduct business in a regular and continuous manner. See, e.g. Family Inc. v. USCIS, 469 
F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 2006); Systronics Corp. v. INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2001). Here, the 
Petitioner has not established that its staff within the scope of a retail operation would be sufficient 
to relieve the Beneficiary from having to allocate her time primarily to the nonexecutive tasks of the 
organization. While no beneficiary is required to allocate 100% of his or her time to managerial- or 
executive-level tasks, the petitioner must establish ·that the non-qualifying tasks the beneficiary 
would perform are only incidental to the proposed position. An employee who "primarily" performs 
the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily" 
employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act 
(requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also 
Matter ofChurch Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593,604 (Comm. 1988). 
In the present matter, the Petitioner has not submitted sufficient evidence to establish that its 
organization would support the Beneficiary in either a managerial or executive capacity, thus 
precluding us from finding that the Beneficiary would allocate her time primarily to the performance 
of primarily managerial- or executive-level tasks. In light of the evidentiary deficiencies described 
above, the instant petition cannot be approved. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The petition will be denied and the appeal dismissed for the above stated reason. In visa petition 
proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361; Matter of Otiende, 26 I&N 127, 128 (BIA 
2013). Here, that burden has not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
Cite as Matter of E-, Inc., ID# 69923 (AAO Nov. 22, 2016) 
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