sustained L-1A Case: Advertising Technology

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
Non-Precedent Decision of the
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date: DEC. 31, 2024 In Re: 35455023 
Appeal of California Service Center Decision 
Form 1-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker (L-lA Manager or Executive) 
The Petitioner is a provider of an advertising technology platform and related products. It seeks to 
continue temporarily employing the Beneficiary in the United States as vice president of business 
development. The company requests extension of his L-lA nonimmigrant visa classification as an 
intracompany transferee working in an executive capacity. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the 
Act) section 10l(a)(l5)(L), 8 U.S.C. § 110l(a)(l5)(L). 
The Director of the California Service Center denied the petition, concluding that the record did not 
establish that the Petitioner's proposed continued employment of the Beneficiary would be in an 
executive capacity as claimed. Importantly, the Director determined that "the evidence in the record 
does not support your [the Petitioner's] claim that the beneficiary's subordinates perform primarily 
managerial duties." Essentially, the Director applied elements of the term "managerial capacity" to 
the Beneficiary's subordinates, even though a petitioner is only required to show that the beneficiary 
of the visa petition meet the statutory criteria of managerial or executive capacity. See sections 
10l(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act; see also 2 USCIS Policy Manual L.6(C) and (D) (stating that a 
petitioner must only prove that "the beneficiary will be primarily engaged in managerial duties," when 
claiming managerial capacity, and that "the beneficiary will be primarily engaged in executive duties," 
when claiming executive capacity, respectively). 
Because the Petitioner claims that the Beneficiary will be employed in an executive capacity, the 
Petitioner must establish that the Beneficiary meets all elements of that statutory definition, which 
states that a beneficiary's employment in an executive capacity must "primarily" involve: (1) directing 
the management of an organization or a major component or function of it; (2) establishing the goals 
and policies of the organization, component, or function; (3) exercising wide latitude in discretionary 
decision-making; and ( 4) receiving only general supervision or direction from higher-level executives, 
a board of directors, or stockholders ofan organization. Section 10l(a)(44)(B) of the Act. There is 
no requirement that a beneficiary's subordinates "primarily" perform managerial duties, a requirement 
that applies to a petitioner seeking to employ a beneficiary in a managerial capacity. See section 
10l(a)(44)(B) of the Act. Therefore, whether the Beneficiary's subordinates are primarily performing 
managerial or supervisory duties is not relevant for the purpose of determining the executive nature of 
the Beneficiary's proposed position. 
Further, on appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the Director placed undue emphasis on the Beneficiary's 
number of subordinates. The Petitioner highlights other relevant factors and previously submitted 
evidence concerning the Beneficiary's own role and duties as well as the roles and duties of his 
subordinates explaining how they manage the Petitioner's sales subdivisions in the eastern, south 
central, and western districts of the United States. The record also shows that the Petitioner adequately 
described the various stages of its sales process and offered an account of who assumes which roles 
within that process and the duties they carry out. Importantly, evidence in the record explains how 
the Beneficiary directs the management of the critical sales component through a subordinate staff 
comprised of regional sales directors, sales development representatives, a sales engineer, and an 
account manager, who work together in carrying out key functions within that component. In addition, 
the record contains the Petitioner's organizational chart which shows the company's staffing hierarchy 
and that of the sales division that the Beneficiary directs. The Petitioner therefore adequately 
illustrated the Beneficiary's role as top executive of the sales division and adequately explained how 
the Beneficiary directs the management of the critical sales component through employees who 
execute that component's key functions. 
Therefore, not only did the Petitioner further expound on the Beneficiary's role and job duties within 
the context of its organizational hierarchy, but it also explained how the staffing of the sales division 
relieves the Beneficiary from having to perform primarily non-executive functions. In sum, the 
Petitioner provided sufficient evidence which shows that the Beneficiary will more likely than not 
perform duties where he will primarily: (1) direct the management of the Petitioner's sales division, a 
major component of the organization; (2) establish the goals and policies of that component; and 
(3) exercise wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; while (4) receiving only general 
supervision or direction from the Petitioner's top executives, i.e., its CEO/board of directors and its 
managing director. The Petitioner has therefore satisfied the elements of the term "executive 
capacity." Section 10l(a)(44)(B) of the Act. 
The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to demonstrate eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Matter ofChawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375-76 (AAO 2010). We review the questions in this matter 
de novo. Matter of Christo 's, Inc., 26 I&N Dec. 53 7, 53 7 n.2 (AAO 2015). Upon de novo review, 
and pursuant to the above, we conclude that the Petitioner has met its burden of proof, and we will 
therefore sustain the appeal. 
ORDER: The appeal is sustained. 
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