dismissed EB-1C Case: Airline

US. Department of Homeland Security 
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
Oflce ofAdministrative Appeals MS 2090 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
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 U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
SRC 07 277 58024 
PETITION: 
 Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to 
Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1153(b)(l)(C) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. C$ 103.5 for the 
specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the ofice that originally decided your case by filing a 
Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the 
decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required by 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
Appeals Office 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the employment-based immigrant visa petition. 
The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the 
appeal. 
The petitioner filed the instant immigrant petition to classify the beneficiary as a multinational manager or 
executive pursuant to section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 
5 1153(b)(l)(C). The petitioner, a commercial airline with headquarters in Korea, seeks to employ the 
beneficiary in the position of Deputy General Manager, Regional Passenger Traffic Office, based at JFK 
International Airport in New York. 
The director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary was 
employed by petitioner abroad in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts the beneficiary was employed by the petitioner's foreign 
operations in a primarily managerial capacity. Counsel contends that the director's decision to the contrary 
was "based on a selective and partial application" of the statutory definition of "managerial capacity." 
Section 203(b) of the Act states in pertinent part: 
(1) 
 Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified immigrants who 
are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C): 
(C) 
 Certain Multinational Executives and Managers. -- An alien is 
described in this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years preceding 
the time of the alien's application for classification and admission 
into the United States under this subparagraph, has been employed 
for at least 1 year by a firm or corporation or other legal entity or an 
affiliate or subsidiary thereof and who seeks to enter the United 
States in order to continue to render services to the same employer or 
to a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial or 
executive. 
The language of the statute is specific in limiting this provision to only those executives and managers who 
have previously worked for the firm, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate or subsidiary of that 
entity, and are coming to the United States to work for the same entity, or its affiliate or subsidiary. 
A United States employer may file a petition on Form 1-140 for classification of an alien under section 
203(b)(l)(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. No labor certification is required for this 
classification. The prospective employer in the United States must furnish a job offer in the form of a 
statement that indicates that the alien is to be employed in the United States in a managerial or executive 
capacity. Such a statement must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the alien. See 8 C.F.R. 
5 204.5(j)(5). 
The sole issue addressed by the director is whether the petitioner established that the beneficiary was 
employed by the foreign entity in a primarily managerial capacity. The petitioner does not claim that the 
beneficiary was employed in an executive capacity. 
Section 1 0 1 (a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S .C. 5 1 10 1 (a)(44)(A), provides: 
The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee 
primarily- 
(i) 
 Manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
the organization; 
(ii) 
 Supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential hnction within the organization, or a department or 
subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 Has the authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions 
(such as promotion and leave authorization) if another employee or other employees are 
directly supervised; if no other employee is directly supervised, functions at a senior 
level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and 
(iv) 
 Exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function for which 
the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be acting in a 
managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the 
employees supervised are professional. 
The petitioner filed the immigrant visa petition on July 30, 2007. 
 In a letter dated July 19, 2007, the 
petitioner stated that the beneficiary held the position of Manager, Check-in Counter and Administration for 
the airline at Incheon International Airport in Korea from April 2002 until September 2006, at which time he 
was transferred to the United States in E-1 nonimmigrant status. 
In support of the petition, the petitioner submitted an organizational chart which identified the beneficiary as 
"head manager" of "2 Group" within the airline's "check-in team" at Incheon International Airport. The chart 
indicates that the beneficiary reported to the station manager, but it did not list any subordinate staff. 
The director issued a request for additional evidence (WE) on April 16, 2008, in which he advised the 
petitioner as follows: 
You have not provided a list of duties in the former position abroad. Please provide a 
thorough list of dutiesttasks that describe the position. . . . Please describe the duties in much 
greater detail. . . . Please include what actual, specific day-to-day tasks [were] involved with 
the completion of each duty. Supplement these descriptions with an estimate of the 
percentage of time the beneficiary formerly dedicated . . . to each specific duty. 
Please provide a detailed organizational chart for the beneficiary's former employer abroad 
that corresponds with the beneficiary's qualifying employment abroad. Include the names of 
all departments and teams. Include the names and a detailed description of the job duties for 
the beneficiary's immediate supervisor and subordinate employees. 
In a response dated May 14, 2008, counsel for the petitioner provided the following additional information 
regarding the beneficiary's position with the foreign entity. 
The beneficiary's last position abroad was "Manager, Check-in Counter and Administration" 
at the Incheon airport. The responsibility for the check-in counters are divided into three 
shifts. The General Manager, as the chief handles one shift. The beneficiary along with the 
other assistant manager handles the other two shifts. As manager, beneficiary was in charge 
of the entire check-in service for about 5,000 passengers that depart during the duty hours. 
The specific duties of the position are as follows: 
Responsible for the operations of the check-in service, including manpower, job 
assignments, telex or document processing for first class, prestige, economy, high 
mileage (skypass elite members), group, and domestic counters. 
Reports to the station manager and head office on the latest development and changes 
in departure levels at each airline, security, and any response on request by the head 
office. 
Pre-monitors advance flights for special issues, booking status, and flight information 
- including weather and special passengers and baggage with after-flight works. 
Authorizes schedule adjustments, job progress, overtimes, etc. 
Meets with contracted companies regarding tagging for group baggage, security, and 
port authority and other airlines who have code-share agreements with [the petitioner]. 
Handles customer complaints, compliments and suggestions. 
Evaluates and monitors training status of employees. 
Coordinates with other departments especially with the 
Arrival/Departure team, 
baggage handling team, and operation team. 
Handles flight irregularities caused by maintenance, weather, etc. 
Counsel indicated that the beneficiary's supervisor was the general manager, check-in, who performed the 
same duties as the beneficiary during a different shift. With respect to the beneficiary's subordinates, counsel 
stated: 
The beneficiary's subordinate employees at the Incheon airport were the check-in agents. The 
agents have similar duties of providing check-in service to passengers such as handling 
Page 5 
first/prestige/economy, high mileage, group and domestic counters, etc., message kiosks, 
documents handling. 
The director denied the petition on June 6, 2008, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the 
beneficiary was employed abroad in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. In denying the petition, the 
director determined that, based on the evidence submitted, the beneficiary was primarily a supervisor of 
check-in agents. The director noted that the petitioner had not established that the beneficiary managed a 
subordinate staff of managerial, professional or supervisory personnel, or that he had the authority to hire or 
fire personnel. The director further observed that, although requested, the petitioner failed to assign 
percentages to the various duties and tasks the beneficiary performed in his role with the foreign entity. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director's conclusion "was based on a selective and 
partial application" of the statutory definition of "managerial capacity." Counsel contends that there is no 
dispute that the beneficiary's position meets the criteria at sections lOl(a)(44)(A)(i) and (iv) of the Act. 
Counsel claims that although the beneficiary did not have the authority to hire and fire personnel, he did in 
fact have the authority for personnel actions, such as responsibility for evaluations, schedule adjustments, job 
assignments, and overtime requests. Furthermore, counsel states that the director failed to consider whether 
the beneficiary managed an essential function of the foreign entity. In this regard, counsel states: 
The beneficiary's position abroad indisputably managed an essential function within the 
organization - check-in and administration. His duties were the same as the General Manager 
and he was responsible for over 5,000 passengers during his shift. The check-in service 
includes . . . .: ticketing and booking, basic check-in, baggage check-in, seat assignment, 
skypass, editing, codesharing with other airlines, family services, special meals, no 
flylselectee, among others. This is an essential function of an airline company. Without the 
check-in services, the company will not function. A mismanaged check-in services 
department will likewise cause the downfall of an airline company. 
Counsel asserts that "as the beneficiary's former position abroad managed an essential function of the 
organization, the position must be considered as having satisfied the second prong of the definition of a 
managerial position." 
Finally, counsel states that the beneficiary did in fact supervise professional employees. Counsel asserts that 
"the training needed to qualify as a [check-in] agent requires knowledge of an advanced type of specialized 
instruction and study of at least a baccalaureate level. Counsel further asserts that agents "are required to pass 
a specialized instruction and study program to be qualified." 
In support of the appeal, the petitioner attaches a chart labeled "The Subordinate Staffs - Korea" which lists 
90 individuals by name, title, hire date, degree, and major. The petitioner does not identify which employees 
are claimed to have worked under the beneficiary's supervision during his employment with the petitioner in 
Korea. In addition, many employees on the list were hired subsequent to September 2006. The AAO notes 
that most, but not all, of the employees identified as "agent" have bachelor's degrees, while some attended 
"technical school." 
Page 6 
Upon review, counsel's assertions are not persuasive. The petitioner has not established that the beneficiary 
was employed by the foreign entity in a primarily managerial capacity. 
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 5 204.56)(5). The petitioner's description of the job 
duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are 
either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. 
Here, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's duties fails to establish that he performed primarily 
managerial duties while employed by the foreign entity. For example, the petitioner indicated that the 
beneficiary is "responsible for the operations of the check-in service, including manpower, job assignments, 
telex, or documentation processing for first class, prestige, economy, high mileage, group and domestic 
counters." Generalities such as "responsible for" do not clearly indicate whether the beneficiary strictly 
managed these activities, or whether he was personally involved in routine document processing and check-in 
activities alongside check-in agents. Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's 
duties are primarily executive or managerial in nature, otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a 
matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), afd, 
905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
The AAO notes that counsel later stated that beneficiary's subordinate check-in agents "have similar duties of 
providing check-in service to passengers" including handling various check-in counters and "document 
handling." Based on this statement, it is reasonable to conclude that the beneficiary's duties include actually 
providing check-in services to customers, and not solely supervising the check-in agents' performance of such 
duties. An employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide 
services is not considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 
101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or 
executive duties); see also Matter of Church Scientology Intn 'l., 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 1988). 
The beneficiary's responsibilities for reporting check-in developments and departure levels to management, 
pre-monitoring advance flights, and handling customer complaints, comments and suggestions also have not 
been shown to rise to the level of managerial capacity. These are service-related duties that do not appear to 
require the exercise of discretion required by section 10 1 (a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act. Many of the beneficiary's 
remaining duties involve "coordinating" with other airline departments and with contracted companies, but 
the petitioner has not adequately explained for what purpose the beneficiary coordinates with others, what 
level of managerial authority or discretion is involved, or otherwise adequately explained how these duties 
fall under the statutory definition. The actual duties themselves reveal the true nature of the employment. 
Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1 103, 1 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), afd, 905 F.2d 4 1 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
Moreover, based on the current record, the AAO is unable to determine whether the claimed managerial 
duties constitute the majority of the beneficiary's duties, or whether the beneficiary primarily performs non- 
managerial administrative or operational duties. Although specifically requested by the director, the 
petitioner's description of the beneficiary's job duties does not establish what proportion of the beneficiary's 
duties is managerial in nature, and what proportion is actually non-managerial. See Republic of Transkei v. 
Page 7 
INS, 923 F.2d 175, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line 
of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(14). The petitioner lists the 
beneficiary's duties as including both managerial and administrative or operational tasks, but fails to quantify 
the time the beneficiary spends on them. This failure of documentation is important because several of the 
beneficiary's daily tasks, such as discussed above, do not fall directly under traditional managerial duties as 
defined in the statute. For this reason, the AAO cannot determine whether the beneficiary is primarily 
performing the duties of a manager. See e.g., IKEA US, Inc. v. US. Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22, 24 
(D.D.C. 1999). 
The statutory definition of "managerial capacity" allows for both "personnel managers" and "function 
managers." See section 10 l(a)(44)(A)(i) and (ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 10 l(a)(44)(A)(i) and (ii). Personnel 
managers are required to primarily supervise and control the work of other supervisory, professional, or 
managerial employees. Contrary to the common understanding of the word "manager," the statute plainly 
states that a "first line supervisor is not considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of 
the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised are professional." Section 
10 1 (a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act. If a beneficiary directly supervises other employees, the beneficiary must also 
have the authority to hire and fire those employees, or recommend those actions, and take other personnel 
actions. Section 10 l(a)(44)(A)(iii) of the Act. 
Counsel claims on appeal that the beneficiary was responsible for supervising professional personnel during 
his employment with the petitioner in Korea, and that he had the requisite authority to recommend personnel 
actions. According to the record, all of the beneficiary's subordinates held the position of "check in agent." 
The petitioner does not claim that the beneficiary's subordinates included any managers or supervisors. 
In evaluating whether the beneficiary manages professional employees, the AAO must evaluate whether the 
subordinate positions require a baccalaureate degree as a minimum for entry into the field of endeavor. 
Section 101(a)(32) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1 10 1(a)(32), states that "[tlhe term profession shall include but not 
be limited to architects, engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and teachers in elementary or secondary 
schools, colleges, academies, or seminaries." The term "profession" contemplates knowledge or learning, not 
merely skill, of an advanced type in a given field gained by a prolonged course of specialized instruction and 
study of at least baccalaureate level, which is a realistic prerequisite to entry into the particular field of 
endeavor. Matter of Sea, 19 I&N Dec. 817 (Comm. 1988); Matter of Ling, 13 I&N Dec. 35 (R.C. 1968); 
Matter of Shin, 11 I&N Dec. 686 (D.D. 1966). 
Therefore, the AAO must focus on the level of education required by the position, rather than the degree held 
by a subordinate employee. The possession of a bachelor's degree by a subordinate employee does not 
automatically lead to the conclusion that an employee is employed in a professional capacity as that term is 
defined above. In the instant case, the petitioner has not, in fact, established that a bachelor's degree in a 
specialized field is actually necessary to perform the duties of an airline check-in agent. Based on the 
evidence submitted on appeal, the petitioning company has a preference for hiring individuals who have 
completed a bachelor's degree. However, the degrees listed include foreign languages, sciences, arts, business 
administration and many others. Furthermore, the petitioner clearly hires some persons as agents who have 
not completed a bachelor's degree program. The petitioner has not established that the beneficiary supervised 
professional employees during his employment with the foreign entity, and therefore, the petitioner does not 
qualify for the benefit sought as a "personnel manager." 
The term "function manager" applies generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a 
subordinate staff but instead is primarily responsible for managing an "essential function" within the 
organization. See section 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 10 l(a)(44)(A)(ii). The term "essential 
function" is not defined by statute or regulation. If a petitioner claims that the beneficiary is managing an 
essential function, the petitioner must furnish a written job offer that clearly describes the duties to be 
performed in managing the essential function, i.e. identify the function with specificity, articulate the essential 
nature of the function, and establish the proportion of the beneficiary's daily duties attributed to managing the 
essential function. See 8 C.F.R. 5 204.5(j)(5). In addition, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's 
daily duties must demonstrate that the beneficiary manages the function rather than performs the duties 
related to the function. As stated above, an employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to 
produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or 
executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the 
enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also Matter of Church Scientology Intn 'l., 19 I&N Dec. 593, 
604 (Comm. 1988). 
Counsel states for the first time on appeal that the beneficiary managed the essential function of "check-in and 
administration," for the foreign entity. While the AAO does not doubt that the beneficiary held a key position 
as a manager in the check-in department, the petitioner has not failed to clearly describe the duties the 
beneficiary performed in managing the claimed function, nor has it established the proportion of the 
beneficiary's time devoted to managerial duties. As discussed above, the limited information in the record 
suggests that the beneficiary was directly involved in providing check-in services to airline passengers. Since 
the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary's duties were primarily managerial in nature, it cannot be 
concluded that he managed an essential function for the foreign entity. Moreover, the petitioner has not 
established that the beneficiary exercised the required level of discretionary authority over the claimed 
function. 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary was employed by the 
foreign entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the AAO finds that the petitioner also failed to establish that the 
beneficiary would be employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. In the 
notice of decision, the director stated that "the proposed position US position generally fits the criteria of a 
manager except for the personnel prong in Title 8, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 204.5(j)(2)(C)." 
The proffered position is that of Deputy General Manager of the Regional Passenger Traffic Office at JFK 
International Airport, which is described briefly as "assisting the manager of the regional passenger traffic 
office." The petitioner indicates that the beneficiary will spend 50% of his time performing "passenger 
service during flight operational hours in the areas of protocol, check-in counters, gate, baggage area, ramp, 
etc." If the beneficiary is directly providing "passenger service" and devoting half of his time to these 
activities, it cannot be concluded that he will be performing primarily managerial duties. His remaining duties 
include many of the duties listed in his foreign position description, several of which are not clearly 
managerial in nature. An employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to 
provide services is not considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See 
sections 10 l(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial 
or executive duties); see also Matter of Church Scientology Int 'l., 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 1988). 
Moreover, the petitioner has not clearly described the beneficiary's supervisory authority over subordinate 
professionals, managers or supervisors, or his management of an essential function of the U.S. organization. 
The petitioner provided a chart labeled "job analysis" listing 22 employees by first name, along with their 
abbreviated job functions, which include "PSM Administration," "UA Debit," "Catering," "Lounge," "OAL," 
"Admin," "In-bnd Md," "Facility," etc. The petitioner stated that the employees on the list are the 
beneficiary's subordinates. However, it is not evident from this limited information that the listed employees 
would relieve the beneficiary from providing services to passengers or performing other non-managerial 
duties associated with his areas of responsibility. The petitioner did not provide the requested detailed 
information regarding the beneficiary's subordinate staff. Going on record without supporting documentary 
evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soflci, 
22 I&N Dec. 1 5 8, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. 
Comm. 1972)). 
The evidence submitted is insufficient to establish that the beneficiary will perform primarily managerial or 
executive duties. For this additional reason, the petition cannot be approved. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the 
AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afyd. 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
The petition will be denied and the appeal dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an 
independent and alternative basis for the decision. When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative 
grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a challenge only if he or she shows that the AAO abused its discretion 
with respect to all of the AAO's enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. 
Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afd. 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003). 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.