dismissed EB-1C Case: Automotive

identifying data deleted to 
Prevent c/early un warran led 
invasion of personal pri vacj 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
__ _- .,- 20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
PUBLIC COPY . n~~:&wwh& 
(G In, &? 
- 
MAR 1 3 2007 
FILE: Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER Date: 
LIN 06 003 5 1627 
PETITION: 
 Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to 
Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. fj 1153(b)(l)(C) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
Administrative Appeals Office 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Nebraska Service Center, denied the employment-based visa petition. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed the instant petition to classify the beneficiary as a multinational manager or executive 
pursuant to section 203(b)(l )(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 5 1 153(b)(l)(C). 
The petitioner is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Delaware that is operating as a 
supplier of interior automotive lighting products. The petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary as its 
automotive globalization project manager. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner had not established that the beneficiary had 
been employed by the foreign entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity or that the beneficiary 
would occupy a position primarily managerial or executive in nature in the United States organization. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner has demonstrated the beneficiary's eligibility 
for the requested immigrant visa classification. In support of the appeal, counsel submits an appellate brief 
and a letter from the petitioning entity addressing the beneficiary's employment in the United States 
organization. 
Section 203(b) of the Act states, in pertinent part: 
(1) Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified immigrants who 
are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C): 
(C) Certain Multinational Executives and Managers. - An alien is 
described in this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years preceding the time 
of the alien's application for classification and admission into the United 
States under this subparagraph, has been employed for at least 1 year by a 
firm or corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof 
and who seeks to enter the United States in order to continue to render 
services to the same employer or to a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a 
capacity that is managerial or executive. 
The language of the statute is specific in limiting this provision to only those executives or managers who 
have previously worked for the firm, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate or subsidiary of that 
entity, and are coming to the United States to work for the same entity, or its affiliate or subsidiary. 
A United States employer may file a petition on Form 1-140 for classification of an alien under section 
203(b)(l)(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. No labor certification is required for this 
classification. The prospective employer in the United States must furnish a job offer in the form of a 
statement, which indicates that the alien is to be employed in the United States in a managerial or executive 
capacity. Such a statement must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the alien. 
The first issue in this proceeding is whether the beneficiary was employed by the foreign entity in a primarily 
managerial or executive capacity. 
Page 3 
Section 10 l(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 10 1 (a)(44)(A), provides: 
The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee 
primarily- 
(i) 
 Manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
the organization; 
(ii) 
 Supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department or 
subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 Has the authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions 
(such as promotion and leave authorization) if another employee or other employees are directly 
supervised; if no other employee is directly supervised, functions at a senior level within the 
organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and 
(iv) 
 Exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function for which 
the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be acting in a managerial 
capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised 
are professional. 
Section 10 1 (a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. fj 1 1 0 1 (a)(44)(B), provides: 
The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee 
primarily- 
(i) 
 Directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) 
 Establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) 
 Exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(iv) 
 Receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of 
directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
In a March 23, 2006 decision, the director concluded that the petitioner had not demonstrated that the 
beneficiary had been employed by the foreign organization in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
The director outlined the three job responsibilities attributed to the beneficiary's former position as manager 
of the foreign entity's knowledge transfer team, but concluded that the provided description "does not 
adequately define the beneficiary's actual duties, such as what was involved in program management or his 
specific duties regarding product demonstration." The director further noted uncertainty as to why the 
beneficiary's responsibilities of "demonstrating products" or "preparing an engineering plan" would be 
considered primarily managerial or executive in nature. Consequently, the director denied the petition. 
Page 4 
In his appellate brief, counsel contends only that the beneficiary's employment as a manager of the foreign 
entity is "in compliance with the [statutory] requirements to make him eligible to be a candidate for an 1-140 
petition." In an attached May 26, 2006 letter, counsel references a letter from the foreign entity to supplement 
the job description originally offered for the beneficiary's foreign employment, but notes that it "is not yet 
available and will be sent under separate letterhead." As of this date, counsel has not submitted any additional 
documentary evidence in support of the instant appeal. As a result, the record will be considered complete. 
The petitioner has not demonstrated on appeal that the beneficiary had been employed by the foreign 
organization in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. Counsel's blanket claim on appeal of the 
beneficiary's eligibility for classification as a multinational manager or executive, without specifically 
identifying the managerial or executive job duties performed by the beneficiary as manager of the foreign 
entity's knowledge transfer team, does not overcome the well-founded and logical conclusions the director 
reached based on a review of the record. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. 
Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); Matter of Laureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); 
Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 1 7 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). 
The AAO concurs with the director's denial of the petition based on the petitioner's failure to specifically 
document the managerial or executive job duties primarily performed by the beneficiary in the foreign entity, 
particularly in light of the director's request for "a detailed, comprehensive Ijob] description'' and the specific 
amount of time the beneficiary would spend performing each task. The petitioner's limited statements that the 
beneficiary "prepared [a] plan to share advanced engineering technology between Europe and North 
America," presented products to North American marketing, sales and engineering groups, and managed the 
transfer of design, validation and tooling programs from a French manufacturing facility to the new facility in 
Mexico are simply insufficient to establish that the beneficiary occupied a primarily managerial or executive 
position in the overseas company. Reciting the beneficiary's vague job responsibilities or broadly-cast 
business objectives is not sufficient; the regulations require a detailed description of the beneficiary's daily job 
duties. The petitioner has failed to answer a critical question in this case: What did the beneficiary primarily 
do on a daily basis? The actual duties themselves will reveal the true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. 
Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1 103, 1 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), afd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). The AAO 
notes that a petitioner's failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be 
grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(14). Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed. 
The AAO will next consider the issue of whether the beneficiary would be employed by the United States 
entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
The petitioner filed the Form 1-140 on September 28, 2005, noting that the beneficiary would occupy the 
position of automotive globalization project manager in the United States company. In an accompanying 
letter, dated July 29, 2005, the petitioner explained that the beneficiary oversees a "group" in the United 
States that is responsible for identifying products and technologies in the United States organization, as well 
as those in the United Kingdom, "that can be brought to the market place for a profit." The petitioner 
explained that "[tlhe activities of this group will help eliminate waste and redundancies of efforts, unify and 
streamline communications between all global groups and our customers, and provide a common path to 
market profitable products now and in the future." The petitioner outlined the following job duties as being 
related to the beneficiary's employment in the United States: 
Page 5 
Managing the transfer of engineering and manufacturing expertise from Europe to 
North America. 
Meet with, on a regular basis, the New Jersey engineering group to share European 
products and technology. 
Revisit Europe on a biannual basis to reverse information flow and keep-up with new 
advances in Europe. 
Managed direct contact with European based companies starting manufacturing 
operations in North America for potential opportunities. These include Grupo and 
Faurecia. 
Provide direct management for a major target account - Johnson Controls International 
[(JCI)]. ($15 million annual sales, growing at 12% per year) 
Establish a pricing and quotation formula for all products at JCI 
Manage all engineering activities related to Johnson Controls 
Visit customer in Holland, MI on a biweekly basis 
Manage all commercial activities including quotations, pricing, contracts, 
and communications between company and customer. 
Manage company resident engineer stationed at JCI in Holland. 
Manage meetings with JCI advanced engineering groups to develop future 
products. 
Manage and control all launch activities for new products at JCI[.] 
The petitioner submitted documentary evidence that the beneficiary had completed the requirements to earn a 
degree in engineering. 
On December 6, 2005, the director issued a request for evidence noting that the job description initially 
offered for the beneficiary's position in the United States company "relied on generalized language," and did 
not define his specific job duties. The director requested that the petitioner submit "a detailed, comprehensive 
description" clearly defining the job duties to be performed by the beneficiary and the amount of time the 
beneficiary would devote to each task. The director instructed the petitioner to describe and illustrate the 
positions occupied by the beneficiary and any subordinate employees in the petitioner's organizational 
hierarchy, and clearly identify the subordinates' job titles and job duties. 
Counsel for the petitioner responded in a February 23, 2006 letter. In an appended February 23, 2006 letter, 
the petitioner noted its need to have the beneficiary continue as its program manager in order to "spearhead" 
and manage the process "of transferring knowledge, design ability and advanced engineering from our sister 
companies in Europe to our companies in the United States." The petitioner explained: 
[The beneficiary's] group provides the inter-link between the [United States and United 
Kingdom] companies as a whole. He is responsible for ensuring the successful 
globalization of the automotive business through the integration of worldwide activities. 
The emphasis of this group is centered on the identification and sharing of products, 
technologies, and advanced engineering techniques throughout the organization worldwide. 
The petitioner divided the beneficiary's responsibilities in the United States entity between two positions: 
manager of the knowledge transfer team and manager for program management in North America. The 
Page 6 
responsibilities identified for each position are essentially the same as those previously listed in the 
petitioner's July 29, 2005 letter. With respect to the beneficiary's role in program management, the petitioner 
noted that the beneficiary would oversee two program managers, one of whom was stationed at Johnson 
Controls International. 
In an attached organizational chart, the beneficiary was identified as the technology sharing/program manager 
overseeing a senior program manager and a program manager-quality engineer, both located in the United 
States. 
In a decision dated March 23,2006, the director concluded that the beneficiary would not be employed by the 
United States entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. The director outlined the job duties 
associated with the beneficiary's proposed position and stated that the "description relies heavily on broad, 
general terminology that does not adequately illustrate the beneficiary's actual duties." The director noted that 
the job description offered by the petitioner in response to his request for evidence restated the same job 
duties and "did not provide additional detail regarding either position or further define the claimed 
management duties." The director also noted that the petitioner had provided only minimal evidence of its 
organizational hierarchy, and failed to provide the job duties related to the positions held by the beneficiary's 
two subordinates. The director noted that without this evidence, the beneficiary could not be deemed to be 
managing professional, managerial or supervisory employees. Accordingly, the director denied the petition. 
Counsel for the petitioner filed the instant appeal on April 21, 2006. In an appellate brief, counsel contends 
that the beneficiary would be employed in a primarily managerial capacity as he is "directly involved in the 
supervision of employees," and "has the authority to hire and fire those under his immediate control." 
In an attached letter, dated May 25, 2006, the petitioner identified the beneficiary's employment as the 
company's manager of program development, during which he would manage "the launch of new programs'' 
and the transfer of engineering knowledge. With respect to the beneficiary's management over the launch of 
new programs, the petitioner explains that the beneficiary "establishes objectives and targets both with 
customers and internally with subordinate [mlanagers," who the petitioner identified as including the 
previously identified senior program manager and program manager-quality engineer, as well as two 
managers who had purportedly been assigned to the beneficiary from the company's sales department. An 
attached organizational chart, which differs from the one previously submitted in response to the director's 
request for evidence, reflects the beneficiary's purported authority over these four individuals. The petitioner 
further explains that the beneficiary establishes the "internal time line" for the launching of new programs, 
"schedules, directs and attends all [plrogram [rleview [mleetings and creates agendas on a per meeting basis," 
assigns tasks to his subordinate managers, approves design changes, and assigns tasks to managers in the 
following departments in order to ensure compliance "with the company agenda": tolling engineering, 
manufacturing engineering, design engineering, quality control, production control, finance, quality 
development, and manufacturing. The petitioner also explains: 
If [the beneficiary] feels the project is critically off of the target for cost, timing, and 
product performance without immediate remediation he takes it to upper management for 
review . . . . [The beneficiary's] role in this regard is to prepare a business case that 
explains why his suggestion is made and to justify it with supporting documentation like 
quotes, returns on investment value analysis, etc. which he orders the managers of our 
departments to have prepared for him. 
Page 7 
The petitioner notes that the beneficiary possesses authority for hiring, firing, promoting and delegating 
assignments to his subordinate managers, and works directly with the human resources department to recruit 
employees. 
With respect to the beneficiary's assignment as manager of engineering knowledge transfer, the petitioner 
states: 
Functioning autonomously[,] [the beneficiary] is responsible for managing activities 
directing the flow of engineering data through the associate engineering managers and 
routinely meeting with technical specialists to insure the corporate philosophy that 
'knowledge and[e]ngineering transfer is understood, delivered and implemented accurately.' 
Also[,] he establishes and promotes the standardization of technical support and service 
base upon the corporate knowledge and engineering transfer model. 
To this end[,] [the beneficiary] [works] regularly with our various [klknowledge and 
[elngineering [mlanagers in the United States and Europe and their units to review their 
current policies and procedures in using the transferred data to ensure compulsory 
development practice in accordance with corporate policy. He deals with our foreign based 
facilities and companies on a continual and ongoing basis. In [slummary, [the beneficiary] 
has autonomous control over and exercises wide latitude and discretionary decision making 
in establishing the most advantageous courses of action for the successful management and 
direction of our [elngineering [klnowledge [tlransfer. [The beneficiary's] time is allocated 
about 60% to [mlanaging [the] [nlew [Ilaunch program and 40% to [mlanaging 
[elngineering [klnowledge [tlransfer. 
Upon review, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary would be employed by the United 
States entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
The petitioner has not clarified the position in which the beneficiary would be employed by the United States 
entity. On the Form 1-140, the petitioner identified the beneficiary as occupying the position of automotive 
globalization project manager, yet the petitioner subsequently addressed the beneficiary's proposed 
employment in the positions of program manager and manager of program development. While it is possible 
that the job duties are the same for each position, the petitioner's repeated inconsistent references to the 
position offered to the beneficiary complicate the analysis of determining the true capacity in which the 
petitioner would employ the beneficiary. The petitioner is obligated to clari@ the inconsistent and conflicting 
testimony by independent and objective evidence. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). 
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 5 204.5(j)(5). 
The job descriptions offered by the petitioner fail to clearly explain the beneficiary's employment in the 
United States entity and his related managerial or executive job duties. The petitioner represented that one of 
the beneficiary's primary responsibilities would be to "manage" the transfer of engineering and manufacturing 
knowledge from the organization in Europe to the United States. But, as noted by the director, the petitioner 
never explained the process in which the knowledge would be transferred, or, in other words, what tasks or 
functions the beneficiary would manage. The  petitioner.'^ general statements that the beneficiary would meet 
Page 8 
with the petitioner's engineering groups and travel to Europe biannually "to reverse information flow and 
keep-up with new advances" fail to offer any clarification of the beneficiary's purported managerial or 
executive role over the "knowledge transfer team." The petitioner's additional explanation on appeal that the 
beneficiary would function autonomously in "managing activities directing the flow of engineering data" and 
reviewing the current policies and procedures of transferring data is not sufficient to explain how the 
beneficiary is acting in a managerial or executive position with respect to the transfer of engineering 
knowledge. The actual duties themselves reveal the true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. 
Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1 103, 1 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 905 F.2d 4 1 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
The beneficiary's role in the company's program management, or the "launch of new programs" is equally 
unclear. In response to the director's request for evidence, the petitioner explains only that the responsibilities 
related to this area would be to "[mlanage (launch) programs" for such customers as Mercedes Benz and 
BMW, and oversee the "[plrogram [mlanagement activities" of two program managers. The petitioner's 
extremely broad and nonspecific representations in no way explain what the beneficiary would do as the 
manager of program management. Reciting the beneficiary's vague job responsibilities or broadly-cast 
business objectives is not sufficient; the regulations require a detailed description of the beneficiary's daily job 
duties. The petitioner has failed to answer a critical question in this case: What does the beneficiary primarily 
do on a daily basis? The actual duties themselves will reveal the true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. 
Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
The AAO also notes that while the beneficiary is first identified as maintaining a role in the management of "a 
major target account" of the petitioner, specifically Johnson Controls International, the petitioner fails to 
expound on this responsibility in subsequent job descriptions. In its February 23, 2006 letter, the petitioner 
stated only that the beneficiary would manage a program manager based at JCI and "all new program 
launches there." On appeal, the petitioner neglects to even address the beneficiary's purported managerial 
authority over programs at JCI. Case law dictates that a petitioner's blanket claim of employing the 
beneficiary as a manager or executive without a description of how, when, where and with whom the 
beneficiary's job duties occurred is insufficient for establishing employment in a primarily managerial or 
executive capacity. Id. at 1108. Based on the limited evidence provided by the petitioner, the beneficiary's 
purported managerial or executive responsibilities with respect to this function are not clear. 
Furthermore, the job description offered for the beneficiary on appeal appears to have been broadened from 
his initial job description. In the original organizational chart, the beneficiary is identified as managing a 
senior program manager and a program managerlquality engineer. However, in its appellate brief and revised 
organizational chart, the petitioner identifies the beneficiary as overseeing four managers, which are 
represented on the organizational chart as the only four subordinate managers in the United States company. 
On appeal, a petitioner cannot offer a new position to the beneficiary, or materially change a position's title, 
its level of authority within the organizational hierarchy, or the associated job responsibilities. The petitioner 
must establish that the position offered to the beneficiary when the petition was filed merits classification as a 
managerial or executive position. Matter of Michelin Tire Corp., 17 I&N Dec. 248, 249 (Reg. Comm. 1978). 
A petitioner may not make material changes to a petition in an effort to make a deficient petition conform to 
CIS requirements. See Matter of Zzummi, 22 I&N Dec. 169, 176 (Assoc. Comm. 1998). 
These inconsistencies cast doubt on the petitioner's claim that the beneficiary would devote sixty percent of 
his time to managing its four managerial employees in the launch of new programs. Doubt cast on any aspect 
Page 9 
of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the 
remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591 (BIA 1988). 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary would be 
employed by the United States entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. Accordingly, the 
appeal will be dismissed. 
Beyond the decision of the director, an additional issue is whether the petitioner established the existence of a 
qualifying relationship between the foreign and United States entities on the date of filing. 
To establish a qualifying relationship under the Act and the regulations, the petitioner must show that the 
beneficiary's foreign employer and the proposed United States employer are the same employer (i.e. a United 
States entity with a foreign office) or related as a "parent and subsidiary" or as "affiliates." See generally 5 
203(b)(l)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 153(b)(l)(C); see also 8 C.F.R. 5 204.5(j)(2) (providing definitions of 
the terms "affiliate" and "subsidiary"). 
The record indicates that prior to his transfer in January 1999 to the United States entity, which the 
petitioner's president identified in a February 22, 2006 certification as doing business under the name of CML 
Innovative Technologies, Inc., the beneficiary was employed in France by the company SLI Miniature 
Lighting SA. The petitioner represents the beneficiary's foreign employer as being part of the "CML 
Innovative Technologies European group," which is "under the control of the president of CML Innovative 
Technologies." In a second February 22, 2006 certification, the company's president outlines the ownership 
of the petitioning entity and attaches an organizational chart of the petitioning entity and its purportedly 
related organizations. The petitioner did not submit additional documentary evidence of the claimed 
qualifying relationship between the United States entity and the beneficiary's foreign employer. 
The record does not substantiate the petitioner's claim of a qualifying relationship between the foreign and 
United States entities. The petitioner did not clearly identify the existence of a relationship between the 
beneficiary's foreign employer and the United States company, other than to note their association as part of a 
"group." Also, the beneficiary's purported employer in France is not identified on the organizational chart of 
related companies. The AAO further notes ambiguity in whether the beneficiary's foreign employer is doing 
business as CML Innovative Technologies, SAS, the company referenced by the petitioner's president in his 
February 22, 2006 certification. Absent an additional explanation of the purported relationship between the 
foreign and United States entities, as well as evidence documenting the claimed relationship, the AAO cannot 
determine the existence of the required qualifying relationship. Going on record without supporting 
documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. 
Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 
I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). For this additional reason, the petition will be denied. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Znc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afyd. 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
Page 10 
The AAO recognizes the beneficiary's previously approved L-IA nonimmigrant petition. It must be noted 
that many 1-140 immigrant petitions are denied after CIS approves prior nonimmigrant 1-129 L-1 petitions. 
See, e.g., Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 293 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2003); IKEA US v. US Dept. of Justice, 
48 F. Supp. 2d 22 (D.D.C. 1999); Fedin Brothers Co. Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1 103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). 
Examining the consequences of an approved petition, there is a significant difference between a 
nonimmigrant L-1A visa classification, which allows an alien to enter the United States temporarily, and an 
immigrant E-13 visa petition, which permits an alien to apply for permanent residence in the United States 
and, if granted, ultimately apply for naturalization as a United States citizen. C.' $5 204 and 214 of the Act, 8 
U.S.C. $5 1 154 and 1 184; see also 5 3 16 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1427. Because CIS spends less time 
reviewing I- 129 nonimmigrant petitions than 1-1 40 immigrant petitions, some nonimmigrant L-1 A petitions 
are simply approved in error. Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 29-30; see also 8 C.F.R. 5 
214.2(1)(14)(i)(requiring no supporting documentation to file a petition to extend an L-1A petition's validity). 
Furthermore, each nonimmigrant and immigrant petition is a separate record of proceeding with a separate 
burden of proof; each petition must stand on its own individual merits. The approval of a nonimmigrant 
petition in no way guarantees that CIS will approve an immigrant petition filed on behalf of the same 
beneficiary. Based on the lack of evidence of eligibility in the current record, the director was justified in 
departing from the prior nonimmigrant petition approval and denying the immigrant petition. 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit 
sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Here, that burden has 
not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.