dismissed EB-1C Case: Business

identifyingdatadeletedto
preventclearlyunwarranted
invasionof personalprivacy
PUBLICCOPY
U.S.Departmentof HomelandSecurity
U. S.CitizenshipandImmigrationServices
AdministrativeAppealsOffice (AAO)
20 MassachusettsAve.N.W., MS2090
Washington,DC 20529-2090
U.S.Citizenship
and Immigration
Services
DATE: SEP 0 4 2012 OFFICE:TEXASSERVICECENTER FILE:
IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:
PETITION: ImmigrantPetitionfor AlienWorkerasaMultinationalExecutiveorManagerPursuantto
Section203(b)(1)(C)of theImmigrationandNationalityAct, 8 U.S.C.§ 1153(b)(1)(C)
ONBEHALFOFPETITIONER:
INSTRUCTIONS:
Enclosedpleasefind thedecisionof theAdministrativeAppealsOffice in yourcase.All of thedocuments
relatedto thismatterhavebeenreturnedto theofficethatoriginallydecidedyourcase.Pleasebeadvisedthat
anyfurtherinquirythatyoumighthaveconcerningyourcasemustbemadetothatoffice.
If you believethe law was inappropriatelyappliedby us in reachingour decision,or you haveadditional
informationthatyouwishto haveconsidered,youmayfile a motionto reconsideror a motionto reopenin
accordancewith the instructionson FormI-290B,1Noticeof Appealor Motion,with a fee of $630. The
specificrequirementsfor filing sucha requestcanbe foundat 8 C.F.R.§ 103.5.Do not file any motion
directly with theAAO. Pleasebeawarethat8C.F.R.§ 103.5(a)(1)(i)requiresthatanymotionmustbefiled
within30daysof thedecisionthatthemotionseekstoreconsiderorreopen.
Thankyou,
PerryRhew
Chief,AdministrativeAppealsOffice
www.uscis.gov
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DISCUSSION:Thepreferencevisapetitionwasdeniedby theDirector,TexasServiceCenter.Thematteris
nowbeforetheAdministrativeAppealsOffice(AAO)onappeal.Theappealwill bedismissed.
The petitioner is a Pennsylvaniacorporationthat seeksto employ the beneficiaryas its manager.
Accordingly,thepetitionerendeavorsto classifythebeneficiaryasanemployment-basedimmigrantpursuant
to section203(b)(1)(C)of the ImmigrationandNationalityAct (theAct), 8U.S.C.§ ll53(b)(1)(C), as a
multinationalexecutiveormanager.
In supportof theFormI-140thepetitionersubmitteda statementdatedDecember10,2008,whichcontained
informationpertainingto thepetitioner'seligibility,includinggeneraloverviewsof thebeneficiary'sforeign
andproposedemployment.Thepetitioneralsoprovidedsupportingevidencein theformof bank,tax, and
businessdocumentspertainingtothepetitionerandthebeneficiary'sforeignemployer.
Thedirectorreviewedthepetitioner'ssubmissionsanddeterminedthatthepetitiondid notwarrantapproval.
Thedirectorthereforeissueda noticeof intentto deny(NOID)datedMay 12,2009informingthepetitioner
of variousevidentiarydeficiencies.Thedirectordeterminedthattherecordlackedevidenceshowingthat
(1)thepetitionerhasa qualifyingrelationshipwith thebeneficiary'sforeignemployer;(2) thebeneficiary
wouldbeemployedin theUnitedStatesin a qualifyingcapacity;(3)thebeneficiarywasemployedabroadin
aqualifyingcapacity;and(4)thepetitionerhastheabilityto paythebeneficiary'sprofferedwage.
The petitionerprovideda brief statementdatedJune8, 2009itemizingthe documentsthat werebeing
submittedin responseto theconcernslistedin theNOID. Thepetitioner'ssubmissionsincludedanaffidavit
addressingownershipof theforeignentity,job descriptionspertainingto thebeneficiary'sforeignandU.S.
employment,andvariouswageandtaxdocumentsaddressingthepetitioner'sabilitytopay.
After reviewingtherecord,thedirectorconcludedthatthepetitionerfailedto overcometheadversefindings
listed in Nos. 2-4 above. Additionally,the directorrelied on the commonlaw definitionof the term
"employee"in concludingthat the petitionerand the beneficiarydo not have an employer-employee
relationship.Thedirectorcontinued,questioningthepetitioner'scredibilityin light of thepetitioner'sfailure
to explain or provide evidence clarifying why the petitioner, which was incorporated in the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, listed a State of Maryland residential addressat Part I of the Form I-140 to representthe
locationwhereits businessis conducted.The directorthereforeissueda decisiondatedFebruary17, 2011
denyingthepetition.
On appeal,counselsubmitsa brief disputingthe denialand contendingthat the beneficiary'sproposed
positionwith the U.S. entity falls underthe statutorydefinitionof managerialcapacity. The petitioner
providesseparatestatementsdiscussingthebeneficiary'semploymentwith theforeignandU.S.entities.The
petitioneralsosubmitswageandtaxdocumentsaddressingitsabilitytopaythebeneficiary'sprofferedwage.
TheAAO hasreviewedtherecordin itsentiretyandfindsthattheadversefindingsregardingthepetitioner's
abilityto payanditsemployer-employeerelationshipwiththebeneficiarywerenotwarranted.TheAAO will
thereforewithdrawthesefindings.
Notwithstandingthewithdrawalof two of thedirector'sgroundsfor denial,theAAO neverthelessfindsthat
the evidencesubmittedon appealis not persuasivein overcomingtheremainderof thedirector'sadverse
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findings. Thediscussionbelowwill provideananalysisof therelevantdocumentationandwill explainthe
underlyingreasoningfor theAAO's decision.
Section203(b)of theAct statesin pertinentpart:
(1) PriorityWorkers.-- Visasshallfirst bemadeavailable. . . to qualifiedimmigrantswho
arealiensdescribedin anyof thefollowingsubparagraphs(A) through(C):
* * *
(C)CertainMultinationalExecutivesandManagers.-- An alienis described
in this subparagraphif the alien,in the 3 yearsprecedingthe time of the
alien'sapplicationfor classificationandadmissioninto the United States
underthissubparagraph,hasbeenemployedfor at least1yearby a firm or
corporationor otherlegalentityor anaffiliateor subsidiarythereofandwho
seeksto entertheUnitedStatesin orderto continueto renderservicesto the
sameemployeror to a subsidiaryor affiliate thereofin a capacitythat is
managerialorexecutive.
Thelanguageof thestatuteis specificin limiting this provisionto only thoseexecutivesandmanagerswho
havepreviouslyworkedfora firm,corporationorotherlegalentity,or anaffiliateor subsidiaryof thatentity,
andwhoarecomingtotheUnitedStatestoworkfor thesameentity,oritsaffiliateor subsidiary.
A United Statesemployermay file a petitionon Form I-140 for classificationof an alien undersection
203(b)(1)(C)of theAct asa multinationalexecutiveor manager.No laborcertificationis requiredfor this
classification.Theprospectiveemployerin the UnitedStatesmustfurnisha job offer in the form of a
statementwhichindicatesthatthealienis to beemployedin theUnitedStatesin a managerialor executive
capacity.Sucha statementmustclearlydescribethedutiestobeperformedbythealien.
The first two issues to be addressed in this proceeding call for an analysis of the beneficiary's employment
capacityin her former position with the foreign entity and her proposedposition with the U.S. petitioner.
Specifically,the AAO will examinethe recordto determinewhetherthe petitionersubmittedsufficient
evidenceto establishthatthebeneficiarywasemployedabroadandwouldbeemployedin theUnitedStates
in aqualifyingmanagerialorexecutivecapacity.
Section101(a)(44)(A)of theAct, 8U.S.C.§ 1101(a)(44)(A),provides:
The term "managerialcapacity"meansan assignmentwithin an organizationin which the
employeeprimarily--
(i) managesthe organization,or a department,subdivision,function, or
componentof theorganization;
(ii) supervisesand controlsthe work of other supervisory,professional,or
managerialemployees,or managesan essentialfunction within the
organization,oradepartmentor subdivisionof theorganization;
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(iii) if anotheremployeeor otheremployeesare directly supervised,hasthe
authorityto hire and fire or recommendthoseas well as otherpersonnel
actions(suchaspromotionandleaveauthorization),or if nootheremployee
is directlysupervised,functionsat a seniorlevelwithin the organizational
hierarchyor with respectto thefunctionmanaged;and
(iv) exercisesdiscretionovertheday-to-dayoperationsof theactivityor function
for which the employeehas authority. A first-line supervisoris not
consideredto be actingin a managerialcapacitymerelyby virtue of the
supervisor'ssupervisoryduties unless the employeessupervisedare
professional.
Section101(a)(44)(B)of theAct, 8U.S.C.§ 1101(a)(44)(B),provides:
The term "executivecapacity"meansan assignmentwithin an organizationin which the
employeeprimarily-
(i) directsthemanagementof theorganizationor amajorcomponentor function
of theorganization;
(ii) establishesthe goals and policies of the organization,component,or
function;
(iii) exerciseswidelatitudein discretionarydecision-making;and
(iv) receivesonly generalsupervisionor directionfromhigherlevelexecutives,
theboardof directors,orstockholdersof theorganization.
In examiningthe executiveor managerialcapacityof the beneficiary,the AAO will look first to the
petitioner'sdescriptionof thejob duties.See8C.F.R.§ 204.5(j)(5).Publishedcaselawsupportsthepivotal
role of a clearly definedjob description,as the actualdutiesthemselvesrevealthe true natureof the
employment.FedinBros. Co.,Ltd. v.Sava,724F. Supp.1103,1108(E.D.N.Y. 1989),affd, 905F.2d41 (2d.
Cir. 1990);seealso8 C.F.R.§ 204.5(j)(5).
TheAAO alsofindsthatit is appropriatetoconsiderotherfactors,includingtheorganizationalhierarchyand
overallstaffingof the entity(s)in question. Thesefactorsarehighly relevantastheyallow the AAO to
understandwhoperformedor wouldperformthedaily operationaltaskssuchthatthebeneficiarywasand
would be relievedfrom havingto makethosetasksthe primary portion of the former and proposed
employment.WhiletheAAO acknowledgesthatno beneficiaryis requiredto allocate100%of his or her
timeto managerial-or executive-leveltasks,thepetitionermustestablishthatthenon-qualifyingtasksthe
beneficiaryperformedandwouldperformwereandwouldbeonly incidentalto theposition(s)in question.
An employeewho"primarily"performsthetasksnecessaryto produceaproductor toprovideservicesis not
consideredto be"primarily"employedin amanagerialor executivecapacity.Seesections101(a)(44)(A)and
(B) of theAct (requiringthatone"primarily"performtheenumeratedmanagerialor executiveduties);see
alsoMatterof ChurchScientologyInternational,19I&N Dec.593,604(Comm.1988).
In applyingtheaboveanalysisto thebeneficiary'spositionwith theforeignentity,theAAO findsthatthejob
descriptionprovidedon appealindicatesthat the beneficiaryperformeda significantnumberof non-
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qualifyingjob duties. Specifically,in its April 6, 2011statement,whichlistedthebeneficiary'sjob duties
with theforeignentity,thepetitionerstatedthatthebeneficiaryperformedthefollowingnon-qualifyingtasks:
evaluatingclients' technicalneeds,preparingreportsand studiesto addressthoseneeds,developingthe
foreignentity'sbusiness,conductingresearchanddevelopmentof newproductsto suit customers'needs,
designinganddevelopingcustomizedsoftware,preparingbidsandproposalsfor softwareprojects,providing
trainingto variouspersonnel,andmaintainingknowledgeof industrytrendsanddevelopments.Whilethe
petitionerpointedoutthatthebeneficiaryexerciseddiscretionaryauthoritywith regardto personnelissues,
developedorganizationalpoliciesandstrategicplans,anddirectedoperationsconcerningsoftwareproducts,
theAAO cannotoverlookthesignificantquantityof non-qualifyingtasksthebeneficiaryperformedaspartof
herpositionwith theforeignentity.
In the beneficiary'sproposedpositionwith the U.S. entity,the AAO similarly finds that a considerable
portionof thejob dutiesassignedto thebeneficiary'sproposedpositiondo not fall within thecriteriafor
managerialor executivecapacity. Specifically,counsel'ssupportingstatementon appealcontainsthe
followinglist of non-qualifyingjob dutiesthatwouldbepartof thebeneficiary'sproposedemploymentwith
theU.S.entity: creatingbudgets,evaluatingandidentifyingcustomers'IT needs,preparingrecommendation
reportsandstudies,and conductingresearchto developcost effectivemethodsto meetcompanygoals.
Althoughthejob descriptionalsoindicatesthatthebeneficiarywould coordinatepricing,promotion,and
marketingof thecompany'sservices,it is unclearwho,if notthebeneficiary,wouldactuallycarryoutthe
marketingandsales-relatedfunctions.
Further,despitecounsel'sparaphrasingof thestatutorycriteriafor managerialandexecutivecapacity,thereis
no way of knowing what actualtaskswould be involved in developingand overseeingstrategiesfor
identifyingsuitabletechnology,developingorganizationalpolicies,overseeinganddirectingoperations,and
developingandimplementingstrategicplansforoverseeingcompanyoperations.Thesestatementsareoverly
vagueand fail to adequatelyconveywhatunderlyingtaskswouldbe involved. Specificsareclearlyan
importantindicationof whethera beneficiary'sdutiesare primarily executiveor managerialin nature:
otherwisemeetingthedefinitionswouldsimplybea matterof reiteratingtheregulations.FedinBros.Co.,
Ltd. v.Sava,724F.Supp.1103.
Additionally, while the petitioner maintains the claim that the beneficiary would oversee professional
employeeswho would actually carry out the consultingand IT servicesto meetclient needs,the record lacks
supportingevidenceto establishpreciselywhom the petitioner employedat the time theForm I-140 was filed,
asall of thetax returnsthepetitionerhasprovidedthusfar reflectpaymentof only thebeneficiary'ssalary,
not the salariesand wagesof consultantsand otherIT workers. Going on recordwithout supporting
documentaryevidenceis not sufficientfor purposesof meetingthe burdenof proof in theseproceedings.
Matter of Soffici,22l&N Dec. 158,165(Comm.1998)(citingMatterof TreasureCraftof California,14
I&N Dec.190(Reg.Comm.1972)).
In summary,the AAO finds that the petitionerfailedto providesufficientevidenceto establishthat the
beneficiarywas employedabroador that shewould be employedin the United Statesin a qualifying
managerialor executivecapacity. Basedonthesetwo groundsof ineligibility,theinstantpetitioncannotbe
approved.
Additionally,therecordshowsthatthepetitionerfailedto addresstheissuesof credibilitythatstemmedfrom
thepetitioner'suseof a residentialaddressat Part1 of thepetition,wherethepetitionerwassupposedto
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providean addressrepresentingits placeof business.In light of the fact that thepetitioneris an entity
incorporatedin theCommonwealthof Pennsylvaniaandhasprovidedno documentationto establishthatit
hastheauthoritytocarryonbusinessactivityin theStateof Maryland,theAAO findsthepetitioner'suseof a
residentialaddressin Marylandasits businessaddressto bequestionableandrequiringfurtherinformation.
As previously statedin the director's decision,it is incumbentupon the petitionerto resolveany
inconsistenciesin therecordby independentobjectiveevidence.Any attemptto explainor reconcilesuch
inconsistencieswill notsufficeunlessthepetitionersubmitscompetentobjectiveevidencepointingto where
thetruthlies. Matterof Ho, 19I&N Dec.582,591-92(BIA 1988).Asthepetitionerhasfailedto resolveor
evento acknowledgetheanomalydescribedherein,theAAO findsthatthepetitioner'sdiminishedcredibility
castsdoubt on other aspectsof the petitioner's proof and further causesthe AAO to questionthe validity of
thepetitioner'sclaims.Seeid. at591.
Lastly,theAAO findsthatthepetitionerhasfailedto submitsufficientevidenceto establishthat it hasa
qualifyingrelationshipwith thebeneficiary'sforeignemployerasrequiredby 8 C.F.R.§ 204.5(j)(3)(i)(C).
Theregulationandcaselaw confirmthatownershipandcontrolarethe factorsthatmustbe examinedin
determiningwhethera qualifyingrelationshipexistsbetweenUnitedStatesandforeignentitiesfor purposes
of thisvisaclassification.Matterof ChurchScientologyInternational,19I&N Dec.593;seealsoMatterof
SiemensMedicalSystems,Inc., 19I&N Dec.362(BIA 1986);MatterofHughes,18I&N Dec.289(Comm.
1982).In thecontextof thisvisapetition,ownershipreferstothedirector indirectlegalrightof possessionof
theassetsof anentitywith full powerandauthorityto control;controlmeansthedirector indirectlegalright
andauthorityto directthe establishment,management,and operationsof an entity. Matter of Church
ScientologyInternational,19I&N Dec.at595.
While thepetitionerprovideda stockcertificateto establishits ownershipandcontrol,the only evidence
providedto establishownershipof theforeignentitywasa swornaffidavitauthoredby the foreignentity's
claimedmajorityowner. Thepetitionersubmittednocorroboratingevidenceof ownershipto supporta self-
servingstatementmadeby theentity's allegedowner.
In visapetitionproceedings,theburdenof provingeligibility for thebenefitsoughtremainsentirelywith the
petitioner. Section291of theAct, 8 U.S.C.§ 1361.Thepetitionerhasnotsustainedthatburden.
ORDER: Theappealis dismissed.