dismissed EB-1C Case: Business

identifying data deleted to 
prevent clcarty unwarranted 
invasi~il of personal privacy 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
Oflee ofAdministrative Appeals MS 2090 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
- 
Services 
LIN 06 170 52427 
PETITION: 
 Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to 
Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1153(b)(l)(C) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5 for 
the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by 
filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 
days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required by 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
uhn F. Grissom 
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was initially approved on April 5, 2007. However, 
upon further review, the director determined that numerous regulatory criteria had not been met and 
that the petitioner was not eligible for the immigration benefit sought. Accordingly, the director 
issued a notice of intent to revoke and ultimately revoked approval of the petition. The matter was 
subsequently reopened pursuant to the petitioner's motion. However, the prior decision revoking the 
approval was affirmed. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on 
appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. 
The petitioner is a Virginia corporation that seeks to employ the beneficiary as its president. 
Accordingly, the petitioner endeavors to classify the beneficiary as an employment-based immigrant 
pursuant to section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 
fj 1 153(b)(l)(C), as a multinational executive or manager. 
The initial notice of revocation, dated June 10, 2008, was based on the following five independent 
grounds of ineligibility: 1) the petitioner failed to establish that it has a qualifying relationship with 
the beneficiary's foreign employer; 2) the petitioner failed to establish that it is doing business as 
defined by regulation; 3) the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary was employed abroad 
in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity; 4) the petitioner failed to establish that it would 
employ the beneficiary in a managerial or executive capacity; and 5) the petitioner failed to establish 
that it has the ability to pay the beneficiary's proffered wage. 
In the subsequent decision, dated August 4, 2008, the director acknowledged U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services' (USCIS) receipt of the petitioner's response to the notice of intent to revoke. 
The director then found the petitioner ineligible on the following independent grounds: 1) failure to 
establish the existence of a qualifying relationship; 2) failure to establish that the beneficiary was 
employed abroad for the requisite time period; 3) failure to resolve an inconsistency regarding the 
nature of the foreign entity's business; 4) failure to establish that the petitioner was doing business 
for one year prior to filing the Form 1-140; 5) failure to establish that the beneficiary would be 
employed by the U.S. petitioner in a qualifying capacity; 6) failure to establish that the U.S. 
petitioner and the beneficiary have an employer/employee relationship; and 7) failure to establish 
that the beneficiary was employed abroad in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity. 
The AAO has reviewed the evidence submitted thus far in this proceeding and hereby finds that the 
grounds cited in Nos. 2, 3, and 4, above, have been resolved and are hereby withdrawn. 
Accordingly, the AAO will address the four remaining grounds for revocation. 
On appeal, counsel disputes the director's conclusions and submits an appellate brief attempting to 
establish that the petitioner is eligible for the immigration benefit sought. 
Section 203(b) of the Act states in pertinent part: 
(1) Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified immigrants 
who are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C): 
(C) Certain Multinational Executives and Managers. -- An alien is 
described in this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years preceding the 
time of the alien's application for classification and admission into the 
United States under this subparagraph, has been employed for at least 
1 year by a firm or corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate or 
subsidiary thereof and who seeks to enter the United States in order to 
continue to render services to the same employer or to a subsidiary or 
affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial or executive. 
The language of the statute is specific in limiting this provision to only those executives and 
managers who have previously worked for a firm, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate or 
subsidiary of that entity, and who are coming to the United States to work for the same entity, or its 
affiliate or subsidiary. 
A United States employer may file a petition on Form 1-140 for classification of an alien under 
section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. No labor certification is 
required for this classification. The prospective employer in the United States must furnish a job 
offer in the form of a statement which indicates that the alien is to be employed in the United States 
in a managerial or executive capacity. Such a statement must clearly describe the duties to be 
performed by the alien. 
The first issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has provided sufficient evidence to 
establish that it has a qualifying relationship with the beneficiary's foreign employer. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. ij 204.5Cj)(2) states in pertinent part: 
AfJiliate means: 
(A) One of two subsidiaries both of which are owned and controlled by the same 
parent or individual; 
(B) One of two legal entities owned and controlled by the same group of 
individuals, each individual owning and controlling approximately the same 
share or proportion of each entity; 
Multinational means that the qualifying entity, or its affiliate, or subsidiary, conducts 
business in two or more countries, one of which is the United States. 
Subsidiary means a firm, corporation, or other legal entity of which a parent owns, 
directly or indirectly, more than half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, 
directly or indirectly, half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, directly or 
indirectly, 50 percent of a 50-50 joint venture and has equal control and veto power 
over the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, less than half of the entity, but in fact 
controls the entity. 
. Page 4 
In the present matter, the director determined that the primary focus regarding the issue of a 
qualifying relationship rests primarily on the petitioner's dubious credibility in presenting 
inconsistent evidence regarding its ownership. The director expressly stated that, while it appears 
likely that the beneficiary owns the petitioning entity, either directly or indirectly, through his 
ownership of the foreign entity, doubt is cast on the credibility of the petitioner's claim by virtue of 
inconsistent evidence, some indicating that the beneficiary directly owns the petitioning entity and 
some indicating that the foreign entity directly owns the petitioner, making the beneficiary an 
indirect owner. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by 
independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not 
suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. 
Matter ofHo, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). 
Here, the director questioned how the petitioner's corporate secretary could have been unaware of a 
stock transfer that altered the petitioner's ownership and how that person could have issued a sworn 
statement that was purportedly contrary to the ownership scheme at the time of filing. 
On appeal, counsel asserts that confusion regarding the petitioner's ownership stemmed primarily 
from the foreign entity's attempts to ensure the most beneficial treatment under the Korean tax laws. 
With regard to the corporate secretary's lack of knowledge regarding the U.S. entity's ownership at 
the time of filing, counsel merely states that this was an unfortunate set of circumstances. However, 
going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting 
the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) 
(citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). It is noted 
that the unsupported statements of counsel on appeal or in a motion are not evidence and thus are not 
entitled to any evidentiary weight. See INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 188-89 n.6 (1984); Matter 
of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1980). As the petitioner has failed to resolve the 
inconsistencies surrounding its ownership, the credibility of the claim remains in question. In light 
of this unresolved issue, the AAO concludes that the petitioner has failed to establish that it had a 
qualifying relationship with the foreign entity. 
Next, the issue of the beneficiary's ownership interest in the U.S. entity brings to light the sixth 
ground for denial-whether the petitioner established that it has an employer/employee relationship 
with the beneficiary. The director found that, by virtue of the beneficiary's claimed ownership of the 
U.S. petitioner, it appears more likely than not that the beneficiary will not be an "employee" of the 
United States operation. As explained in 8 C.F.R. $ 204.5(')(5), the petitioner must establish that the 
beneficiary will be "employed" in an executive or managerial capacity. It is noted that "employer," 
''employee," and "employed" are not specifically defined for purposes of the Act even though these 
terms are used repeatedly in the context of addressing the multinational executive and managerial 
immigrant classification. Section 203(b)(l)(C), 8 U.S.C. $ 1153(b)(l)(C), requires beneficiaries to have 
been "employed" abroad and to render services to the same "employer" in the United States. Further, 
section 101 (a)(44), 8 U.S.C. $ 1 101 (a)(44), defines both managerial and executive capacity as an 
assignment within an organization in which an "employee" performs certain enumerated qualifying 
duties. Finally, the specific definition of "managerial capacity" in section 10 1 (a)(44)(A), 8 U.S.C. $ 
1 101(a)(44)(A), refers repeatedly to the supervision and control of other "employees." Neither the 
legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service nor U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS) has defined the terms "employee," "employer," or "employed" by regulation for purposes 
Page 5 
of the multinational executive and managerial immigration classification. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 204.5 
and 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1). Therefore, for purposes of this immigrant classification, these terms are 
undefined. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has determined that where a federal statute fails to clearly 
define the term "employee," courts should conclude "that Congress intended to describe the 
conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine." 
Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 3 18, 322-323 (1992) (hereinafter "Darden") 
(quoting Communityfor Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989)). That definition is as 
follows: 
In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law 
of agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by 
which the product is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry 
are the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the 
work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party 
has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired 
party's discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired 
party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular 
business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of 
employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party. 
Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-324; see also Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(2) (1958); Clackamas 
Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003) (hereinafter "Clackamas"). As the 
common-law test contains "no shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be applied to find the 
answer, . . . all of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one factor 
being decisive." Darden, 503 U.S. at 324 (quoting NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America, 390 U.S. 
254,258 (1968). 
Within the context of immigrant petitions seeking to classify the beneficiary as a multinational 
manager or executive, when a worker is also a partner, officer, member of a board of directors, or a 
major shareholder, the worker may only be defined as an "employee" if he or she is subject to the 
organization's "control." See Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P. C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 
449-450 (2003); see also New Compliance Manual at 
 2-III(A)(l)(d). Factors to be addressed in 
determining whether a worker, who is also an owner of the organization, is an employee include: 
Whether the organization can hire or fire the individual or set the rules and 
regulations of the individual's work. 
Whether and, if so, to what extent the organization supervises the individual's 
work. 
Whether the individual reports to someone higher in the organization. 
Whether and, if so, to what extent the individual is able to influence the 
organization. 
Page 6 
Whether the parties intended that the individual be an employee, as expressed 
in written agreements or contracts. 
Whether the individual shares in the profits, losses, and liabilities of the 
organization. 
Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 449-450 (citing New Compliance Manual). 
Applying the Darden and Clackamas tests to this matter, the petitioner has not established that the 
beneficiary will be an "employee" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. As explained 
above, the petitioner is a corporation, which the petitioner claims is ultimately owned and controlled 
by the beneficiary, who purports to assume a role as the petitioner's principal. Regardless of whether 
the beneficiary directly owns the petitioning entity or whether he derives ownership indirectly 
through his direct majority ownership of the foreign entity that may ultimately own the petitioner, 
there is no evidence that anyone other than the beneficiary himself is in a position to exercise any 
control over the work to be performed by the beneficiary. As such, it appears the beneficiary is the 
employer for all practical purposes. He will control the organization; set the rules governing his 
work; and share in all profits and losses. Given these factors, the AAO cannot conclude that the 
petitioner and the beneficiary have the requisite employer/employee relationship. 
The two remaining issues in this proceeding call for an analysis of the beneficiary's job duties. 
Specifically, the AAO will examine the record to determine whether the beneficiary was employed 
abroad and whether he would be employed in the United States in a qualifying managerial or 
executive capacity. 
Section 10 1 (a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 10 1 (a)(44)(A), provides: 
The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily-- 
(i) 
 manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or 
component of the organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or 
managerial employees, or manages an essential function within the 
organization, or a department or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has 
the authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other 
personnel actions (such as promotion and leave authorization), or if no 
other employee is directly supervised, functions at a senior level 
within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function 
managed; and 
Page 7 
(iv) 
 exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or 
function for which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor 
is not considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by 
virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees 
supervised are professional. 
Section 10 1 (a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 10 1 (a)(44)(B), provides: 
The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily-- 
(i) 
 directs the management of the organization or a major component or 
function of the organization; 
(ii) 
 establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or 
function; 
(iii) 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(iv) receives only general supervision or direction from higher level 
executives, the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
In support of the Form 1-140, the petitioner submitted a letter dated May 2, 2006, which includes the 
following description of the beneficiary's employment abroad: 
[The beneficiary] has been responsible for adopting all company financial, marketing 
and product development, and personnel policies, establishing budgets, setting up 
marketing goals, delegating product and service development and related functions to 
his subordinates and contractors and generally exercised wide latitude in operation of 
the company. He has the final say in all contract negotiations with customers and 
vendors and maintained personal contacts with the existing US customers of ICC.. .. 
He has the authority to personally hire, promote or discharge all company managers 
and many of the subordinate personnel. [The beneficiary] is only accountable to the 
Board of Directors of ICC for his operation of the company. 
The petitioner provided the following percentage breakdown allocating the beneficiary's time as 
follows: 
Adopt all company financial, marketing and product development with final 
decision-making power40% 
Supervise drafting annual budget for the [pletitioner and submit it to the Board of 
Directors of ICC (Korean Mother Company) for approval-5% 
Set up and follow-up on annual marketing goals for the [pletitioner and report its 
results to the Board of Directors of ICC-10% 
Page 8 
Sign legally binding contracts on behalf of the [pletitioner including sales 
agreement[s] with US customers-20% 
Direct and make final decision on payment methods with vendors and customers- 
10% 
Hire and terminate his subordinate managers-5% 
Answer to the Board of Directors of ICC about overall operation of the 
[pletitioner-5% 
The petitioner also provided its organizational chart showing the beneficiary at the top of the 
hierarchy with a marketing director, a legal advisor, and an accounting advisor as his immediate 
subordinates. The marketing director is shown as overseeing the work of a sales associate and an 
administrative secretary. The chart also shows a liaison team comprised of an art design manager 
and an information technology graphics associate. It is noted that there are no employees named in 
either position within the liaison team. 
In a notice of his intent to revoke (NOIR), dated April 16, 2008, the director questioned whether the 
prior approval of the petition had been warranted. Among the issues addressed in the notice were 
the beneficiary's employment capacities in his position abroad and in his proposed position within 
the U.S. entity. With regard to the latter position, the director expressly noted that the lawyer and 
accountant, both of whom were named as the beneficiary's subordinates in the petitioner's 
organizational chart, provide professional services and cannot be considered company employees. 
The director instructed the petitioner to provide a detailed description of the beneficiary's proposed 
daily tasks accompanied by the percentage of time assigned to each task. 
With regard to the beneficiary's employment abroad, the director instructed the petitioner to provide 
an organizational chart that corresponds to the time period during which the beneficiary was working 
for the foreign entity. The petitioner was also asked to provide detailed job descriptions for the 
beneficiary's immediate supervisor and his subordinate employees. Additionally, the petitioner was 
instructed to provide a detailed description of the tasks performed daily during the beneficiary's 
employment abroad accompanied by the percentage of time assigned to each task. With regard to 
both the U.S. and foreign job descriptions, the petitioner was asked not to lump tasks together, but 
rather to list tasks individually and to assign the percentage of time to each task. 
In response, the petitioner submitted a letter from counsel, dated May 15, 2008, describing the 
supporting documents that were being submitted to address the director's request. The response 
included the foreign entity's organizational chart, illustrating a multi-tiered entity, as well as the 
foreign entity's payroll documents for March 2004 and March 2008. The petitioner also provided 
additional charts, breaking down the specific positions within the foreign entity's organizational 
hierarchy, naming the employees that filled those positions, and listing the duties they performed. 
Lastly, the petitioner provided a document entitled "Duties of CEO," which included a percentage 
breakdown of the following duties and responsibilities performed during his employment abroad: 
Page 9 
Evaluate, choose and direct company goals, with assistance of staff analysis, 
regarding focusing area, amount of sales per customer segments, product mix per 
market area, and procurement of vendors by daily, monthly, quarterly and yearly 
basis in order to maximize the profit within harmony of ICC . . . policy.-1 5% 
Confer with board members and staff, daily and seasonally, to discuss financial, 
marketing and technical development upon analytic report in comparison with the 
goals initially set-up under company policy. Approve plans and daily expenditure of 
company funds with latitude of authority within the limit of operating funds.-1 5% 
Review reports submitted by staff in order to recommend approval or to suggest 
changes. Supervise and approve reports on employment of lower level workers. Hire 
and terminate subordinate managers.-1 5% 
Meet major customers to discuss and induce them to profitable contracts. 
 Sign 
legally binding contracts on behalf of the company including sales agreement with 
customers.-20% 
Set up and follow-up annual marketing goals for the company and report its results to 
the Board of Directors of ICC. Supervise drafting annual budget for the company and 
submit it to the Board of Directors of ICC for approval. Review reports to and 
answer to the Board of Directors of ICC about [the] overall operation of the 
company.-20% 
Supervise and make final decision about choice of payment methods and whether 
payments to be issued regarding to vendors and customers.-1 0% 
Set up principles of employee moral regarding treatment of customer complaint. 
Direct the company to keep a good company image to the customers of the market 
and internal employees.-5% 
With regard to the U.S. entity, the petitioner merely resubmitted the organizational chart initially 
presented in support of the petition, neglecting to acknowledge or to respond to the director's 
criticisms about having providers of professional services listed as staff members. That being said, 
aside from the professional service providers, the petitioner named a total of four employees. 
However, at Part 5, Item 2 of the Form 1-140, the petitioner stated that it had three employees at the 
time of filing. It is unclear which three employees the petitioner employed at the time of filing and 
which positions they filled. As stated above, the burden is on the petitioner to resolve any 
inconsistencies in the record by submitting independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain 
or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective 
evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. at 591-92. Lastly, the 
petitioner failed to provide the requested supplemental description of job duties as requested by the 
director in the NOIR. Failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry 
shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(14). 
In the most recent decision, dated August 4, 2008, the director determined that the petitioner failed 
to establish that the beneficiary was employed abroad or that he would be employed by the U.S. 
entity in a managerial or executive capacity. The director found that the petitioner, at the time of 
filing, lacked the organizational complexity to support a primarily managerial or executive position. 
The director discussed evidence of the petitioner's staffing, noting that there was no evidence 
establishing the existence of a liaison team, as identified in the organizational chart. The director 
also observed that the petitioner issued W-2 statements in 2006 and 2007 to an individual who had 
not been named in the organizational chart. Although the decision includes the position description 
with percentage breakdown as provided in response to the NOIR, it appears that the director 
erroneously applied this job description to the beneficiary's proposed employment rather than the 
beneficiary's employment abroad. Despite the similarities between the job description initially 
offered in support of the petition and the job description offered in response to the NOIR, the latter 
description was incorporated into a document entitled, "Duties of CEO," which was the position title 
used to describe the beneficiary's former employment with the foreign entity. While the AAO 
acknowledges this minor oversight, the director made valid findings based on the record and those 
findings were the primary basis for the director's adverse decision. As such, the director's oversight 
will have no bearing on the AAO's outcome in this matter. 
On appeal, counsel provides a brief dated September 18, 2008, claiming that one of the employees, 
who was employed abroad, was actually performing services for the U.S. petitioner from abroad 
because the petitioner was unable to transfer this individual to the United States as a result of the 
U.S. entity's slow business growth. While counsel directs the AAO's attention to the tax and 
withholding statement of the petitioner's intended employee, it is noted that this document shows the 
foreign rather than the U.S. entity as the employer. As such, the record lacks evidence to establish 
the petitioner's employment of Jang Bae Kim, who was clearly employed by the foreign entity prior, 
during, and subsequent to the time the Form 1-140 was filed. 
Next, counsel addresses the director's comment expressing doubt as to the petitioner's ability to 
employ the beneficiary in a qualifying capacity within a company of limited organizational 
complexity. Specifically, counsel argues that the petitioner's "basic structure of organization may 
yield great output," indicating that the petitioner can function despite its small size. Counsel also 
provides a real life example of a small corporation in which the CEO of a small company was able to 
bring about success for the company. However, the issue in the present matter is not whether the 
U.S. entity can function successfully, but rather whether it can function successfully while 
employing the beneficiary in a managerial or executive capacity wherein the beneficiary would be 
relieved from having to spend the primary portion of his time performing non-qualifying job duties. 
In reviewing the relevance of the number of employees a petitioner has, federal courts have 
generally agreed that 
USCIS "may properly consider an organization's small size as one factor in 
assessing whether its operations are substantial enough to support a manager." Family, Inc. v. US. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, 469 F.3d 13 13, 13 16 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing with approval 
Republic of Transkei v. INS, 923 F.2d 175, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Fedin Bros. Co. v. Sava, 905 F.2d 
41, 42 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam); Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 293 F. Supp. 2d 25, 29 (D.D.C. 
2003). Thus, in determining whether the petitioner is capable of sustaining the beneficiary in a 
qualifying managerial or executive capacity, USCIS can and should examine the petitioner's 
organizational structure, including its complexity and the beneficiary's position therein. Here, the 
director accurately determined that, in light of the deficient support staff, the petitioner would 
employ the beneficiary in whatever capacity is necessary to ensure that the company operates 
smoothly on a daily basis. 
Additionally, in examining the petitioner's description of the job duties, another key factor in 
determining the beneficiary's managerial or executive capacity, the AAO finds the description 
lacking in sufficient details regarding daily tasks. See 8 C.F.R. 5 204.50)(5). For instance, earlier in 
the proceeding, the petitioner provided a percentage breakdown indicating that 40% of the 
beneficiary's time would be spent making decisions regarding the company's finances, marketing and 
product development. However, the petitioner failed to translate this broad spectrum of decision- 
making authority into actual daily tasks. In other words, by what means did the beneficiary achieve 
these overall business objectives and how, if at all, did the staff at the time of filing assist in 
relieving the beneficiary from having to perform non-qualifying tasks in reaching these objectives? 
Similarly, the petitioner did not explain what specific tasks would be involved in directing and 
making final decisions regarding vendors' and customers' payment methods. Despite the fact that the 
director expressly instructed the petitioner to provide a list of specific daily tasks clarifying the 
general list of duties and responsibilities provided initially, the petitioner failed to comply with this 
request, thereby failing to convey a meaningful understanding of what the beneficiary did on a daily 
basis and how he operated within the organizational hierarchy that was in place at the time of filing. 
Without this highly relevant information, the AAO cannot conclude that the petitioner was able to 
employ the beneficiary in a qualifying capacity at the time the petition was filed. 
Similarly, with regard to the beneficiary's employment abroad, the petitioner has failed to provide an 
adequate job description, delineating in detail the specific tasks that consumed the beneficiary's time 
on a daily basis. In fact, despite the express request in the NOIR that the petitioner make sure to not 
"lump tasks together," but rather to list tasks separately and assign a specific percentage of time to 
each task, the petitioner did not heed the director's instruction. For instance, the petitioner indicated 
that 15% of the beneficiary's time would be consumed with conferring with the board of directors 
and approving plans and daily expenditures. The petitioner did not provide any explanation as to the 
types of plans the beneficiary was reviewing, nor is there any indication as to the amount of time 
attributed to each task. The petitioner also indicated that 20% of the beneficiary's time was spent 
meeting with customers and signing agreements. However, the petitioner did not explain how much 
time was specifically allotted to each task. Similarly, the petitioner combined the reviewing of 
reports, approval of reports, and the hiring and firing of employees, indicating that, together, these 
tasks consumed 15% of the beneficiary's time. Again, the petitioner failed to assign time constraints 
to individual tasks. Lastly, the petitioner failed to explain what tasks were involved in supervising 
the final decision-making regarding payment methods. In other words, what type of supervision was 
involved and what was the beneficiary's specific role in making contact with the companies andlor 
individuals who were making the payments? As the petitioner has failed to provide an adequate 
description of the job duties performed by the beneficiary during his employment abroad, the AAO 
cannot conclude that the primary portion of the beneficiary's time abroad was spent performing 
qualifying tasks within a managerial or executive capacity, despite the beneficiary's job title and 
position within the foreign entity's organizational hierarchy. 
In summary, the petitioner was not eligible for the immigration benefit at the time of filing based on 
four independent grounds: 1) the petitioner failed to resolve inconsistencies regarding its ownership, 
thereby casting doubt on the credibility of its claim regarding its qualifying relationship with the 
Page 12 
beneficiary's foreign employer; 2) the petitioner failed to establish that it has an employer/employee 
relationship with the beneficiary; 3) the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary was 
employed abroad in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity; and 4) the petitioner failed to 
establish that it would employ the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity. 
Accordingly, the revocation of the approval will be affirmed for the above stated reasons, with each 
considered as an independent and alternative basis for the adverse decision. In visa petition 
proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. The petitioner has not sustained that burden. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.