dismissed EB-1C Case: Clothing/Apparel

identifying data deleted to 
prevent clearly unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy 
PUsLIC COPY 
U.S. Department of IIomeland Security 
U.S. Citizenship and Imm~gration Services 
Office of Administrative Appeals, MS 2090 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
FILE: - Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER Date: j UL 2 8 2W19 
LIN 07 022 53738 
IN RE: 
PETITION: 
 Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to 
Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1153(b)(l)(C) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. 8 103.5 for 
the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by 
filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 
days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
JL-pZL 
sohn F. Gr ssom 
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Nebraska Service Center, denied the employrnent-based visa petition. 
The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will 
dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed the immigrant visa petition to classify the beneficiary as a multinational manager 
or executive pursuant to section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), 8 U.S.C. 
1153(b)(l)(C). The petitioner is a limited liability company organized under the laws of the State 
of Texas that claims to be engaged in the import and retail sale of corporate clothing and apparel. 
The petitioner represents itself as an affiliate of the beneficiary's foreign employer, Mustafa & Co., 
located in Pakistan, and seeks to employ the beneficiary as its general manager. 
The director denied the petition on January 9, 2008, concluding that the petitioner had not 
established that the beneficiary will be employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or 
executive capacity, or that there exists a qualifying relationship between the petitioner and the 
beneficiary's foreign employer. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner contends that the evidence demonstrates that the beneficiary's 
position in the United States meets the regulatory requirements for "managerial capacity," and that 
the record reflects that the U.S. company is a subsidiary of the foreign entity. Counsel submits a 
brief, but no additional evidence, in support of the appeal. 
Section 203(b) of the Act states, in pertinent part: 
(1) Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified immigrants 
who are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C): 
(C) Certain Multinational Executives and Managers. - An alien is 
described in this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years preceding 
the time of the alien's application for classification and admission 
into the United States under this subparagraph, has been employed 
for at least 1 year by a firm or corporation or other legal entity or an 
affiliate or subsidiary thereof and who seeks to enter the United 
States in order to continue to render services to the same employer or 
to a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial or 
executive. 
The language of the statute is specific in limiting this provision to only those executives or managers 
who have previously worked for the firm, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate or 
subsidiary of that entity, and are coming to the United States to work for the same entity, or its 
affiliate or subsidiary. 
Page 3 
A United States employer may file a petition on Form 1-140 for classification of an alien under 
section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. No labor certification is 
required for this classification. If the alien is already in the United States working for the petitioning 
United States employer or its affiliate or subsidiary, the petitioner must demonstrate that, in the three 
years preceding entry into the United States as a nonimmigrant, the alien was employed by the entity 
abroad for at least one year in a managerial or executive capacity. 8 C.F.R. 5 204.50)(3)(1)(B). The 
prospective employer in the United States must furnish a job offer in the form of a statement, which 
indicates that the alien is to be employed in the United States in a managerial or executive capacity. 
Such a statement must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the alien. 8 C.F.R. 5 
204.50)(5). 
The first issue in this proceeding is whether the beneficiary will be employed by the U.S. company 
in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Section 101 (a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101(a)(44)(A), provides: 
The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily- 
(i) Manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or 
component of the organization; 
(ii) 
 Supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or 
managerial employees, or manages an essential hnction within the organization, or a 
department or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 Has the authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel 
actions (such as promotion and leave authorization) if another employee or other 
employees are directly supervised; if no other employee is directly supervised, functions 
at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function 
managed; and 
(iv) 
 Exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or hnction for 
which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be acting 
in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless 
the employees supervised are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(44)(B), provides: 
The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily- 
(i) 
 Directs the management of the organization or a major component or hnction of 
the organization; 
(ii) 
 Establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) 
 Exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(iv) 
 Receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the 
board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
The petitioner filed the immigrant visa petition on October 26, 2006, stating that the beneficiary 
would occupy the position of vice president - strategy management for the U.S. company. Along 
with the Form 1-140, the petitioner submitted a support letter dated October 12, 2006 in which it 
stated that it wishes to employ the beneficiary "as an Executive Director in a permanent managerial 
position." While it is unclear based on the petition and supporting documentation what the 
beneficiary's official positions and titles in the U.S. and foreign companies have been, the petitioner 
claimed that the beneficiary has been involved in the U.S. company since its inception in 1999 and 
described her responsibilities in the company as follows: 
Manages the marketing, factory line, and future clothing projects, which are major 
components of the companies; 
Maintains communication and direction of the Pakistani factory; 
Helps negotiate international contracts, particularly with French and other western 
European clients; 
Has the authority to establish the policies in these areas, and frequently initiates 
changes in policies regarding the type of clothing to manufacture and sell; 
Has complete latitude in discretionary decision-making (i.e. she can reject or approve 
projects, as well as hire fire, or promote workers in her departments); 
Has no supervision from higher executives, as she occupies alongside her husband 
one of the two highest positions in the corporation. 
The petitioner submitted an organizational chart for the U.S. company, which depicts the 
beneficiary, as vice president, second in command below the president. The chart indicates that the 
beneficiary's direct subordinate is the general manager, who in turn supervises the production 
department with two digitizers and six production assistants, and the administration department with 
two account assistants. 
On August 3, 2007, the director issued a request for further evidence (RFE). With respect to the 
beneficiary's position in the U.S. company, the director requested that the petitioner describe in 
greater detail the specific day-to-day duties of the beneficiary, including the number of hours spent 
on the job each week, an estimate of the percentage of time spent on each individual task, and what 
activities the beneficiary would need to do to perform each task. 
The director also requested an explanation of the job duties, Ievel of authority, and responsibilities of 
the employees under the beneficiary's supervision; the work schedule for the company's employees 
in the preceding two weeks; copies of the 2006 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Forms W-2 for all 
employees; and a copy of the company's IRS Form 941, Employer's Quarterly Federal Tax Return, 
for the first quarter of 2007. 
In a letter responding to the RFE dated October 23, 2007, counsel stated that the beneficiary has 
worked as a vice president in the U.S. company, performing duties which counsel claimed "qualify 
both under the executive definition and the managerial definition." Counsel described the 
beneficiary's duties in the U.S., with a breakdown in terms of percentage of time spent per week, as 
follows: 
Heads up the purchasing of raw materials, selection of colors, designs, fabrics, etc. to 
ensure that the product itself is easy to sell. As such, her negotiation, purchasing, and 
final approval of each raw material and distributor is a large part of her work week. 
[30%] 
Coordinates with the Pakistani entity, ensuring that the correct orders have been 
placed and that the deadlines will be met. Furthermore, if there are problems in the 
Pakistani factory line, she will often be the one to address them. [20%] 
Arranges to have trainers, business people, and other saleslfactory representatives to 
come to the office and present training and business presentations. [5%] 
Oversees the work of the administrative department, which handles the bills and 
paychecks to employees. She also addresses problems and concerns with employees 
and business partners when they arise. These could include salary disputes, hiring, 
firing of employees, price disputes, quality concern with a provider, etc. [15%, 
although varies depending on time of year] 
Helps negotiate international contracts, particularly with French and other Western 
European clients, and makes sure that [the U.S. company] secure the lowest possible 
prices with the highest possible quality. [20%] 
Holds final authority to approve the Rock Point brochures, pamphlets, and other 
marketing materials. She oversees the digitizers in the completion of these materials. 
[I O%] 
The petitioner did not submit an explanation of the job duties, level of authority, and responsibilities 
of the employees under the beneficiary's supervision as requested. The petitioner submitted Forms 
W-2 for the year 2006 for 18 employees; it is noted that there was none submitted for the 
beneficiary. The petitioner did not submit IRS Form 941 for the first quarter of 2007 as requested, 
but submitted instead its Texas State Workforce Commission Forms C-4, Employer's Quarterly 
Report Continuation Sheets, for the first, second, and third quarter of 2007, which show that the 
petitioner had thirteen to sixteen employees during that time. The petitioner also submitted its 
payroll register for the weeks ending August 8 and 15, 2007. Again, it is noted that the beneficiary's 
name did not appear in any of the Texas Forms C-4 or the company's payroll registers that were 
submitted. 
In his decision denying the petition, the director concluded that the petitioner had not demonstrated 
that the beneficiary would be employed by the U.S. company in a primarily managerial or executive 
capacity. Refening to the descriptions of the beneficiary's job duties, the director noted that some of 
the duties were vague, and others appear to be operational tasks that are typically performed by 
subordinates rather than a multinational executive or manager. The director further noted that 
although the petitioner claims that the beneficiary has been working with the U.S. company since its 
inception, there is no evidence submitted showing that the beneficiary has received any wages. The 
director concluded that the evidence of record shows that the beneficiary functions not at a senior 
level within the organizational hierarchy, but rather as a first-line supervisor. 
On appeal, counsel contends that the beneficiary acts as both a manager and an executive in the U.S. 
company. Counsel resubmits the organizational chart of the company and claims that the 
beneficiary supervises the general manager, who supervises two departmental managers, who in turn 
supervise eight other employees.' Counsel further claims that the beneficiary is a function manager 
in that she manages the purchasing function, and alternatively, that she spends the rest of her time 
outside of the purchasing function managing the employees of the U.S. company and "keeping tabs 
on the workings of the Pakistani business." With respect to the lack of evidence of wages paid to the 
beneficiary, counsel claims that the beneficiary "has been receiving remuneration for her services 
jointly with her husband," who is the president of the U.S. company. 
Upon review, the AAO concurs with the director's determination that the petitioner has not 
established that the beneficiary would be employed by the U.S. company in a primarily managerial 
or executive capacity. 
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to 
the petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 5 204.5(j)(5). The petitioner's description 
of the job duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate 
whether such duties are either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. 
On review, the AAO agrees with the director's observation that the petitioner has provided a vague 
and nonspecific description of the beneficiary's duties that fails to demonstrate what the beneficiary 
will do on a day-to-day basis. For example, the petitioner states that the beneficiary "heads up the 
purchasing of raw materials," "coordinates with the Pakistani entity," "oversees the work of the 
administrative department, which handles the bills and paychecks to employees," "addresses 
problems and concerns with employees and business partners when they arise," and "helps negotiate 
international contracts." The job description failed to provide details as to what is involved in the 
process of purchasing raw materials, what the beneficiary actually will do to coordinate with the 
- -- 
1 
 It is noted that counsel's claim that there are two levels of management between the beneficiary and the eight digitizers 
and production and account assistants is not supported by the record. 
 All organizational charts submitted by the 
petitioner show that there is only one general manager between the beneficiary and the lowest level of employees in the 
company. 
foreign entity, what problems and concerns the beneficiary might be required to address, or what her 
specific role is in the negotiation of contracts. Going on record without supporting documentary 
evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter 
of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 
I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a 
beneficiary's duties are primarily executive or managerial in nature, otherwise meeting the 
definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 
724 F. Supp. 1 103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), afd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
Further, it is noted that although the petitioner claims that the beneficiary will supervise a staff of at 
least nine employees, the evidence of record does not reveal what it is that the beneficiary's 
subordinate employees actually do. The petitioner failed to provide any information in response to 
the director's request for an explanation of the job duties, level of authority, and responsibilities of 
the employees under the beneficiary's supervision. The regulation states that the petitioner shall 
submit additional evidence as the director, in his or her discretion, may deem necessary. The 
purpose of the request for evidence is to elicit further information that clarifies whether eligibility for 
the benefit sought has been established, as of the time the petition is filed. See 8 C.F.R. $5 
103.2(b)(8) and (12). The failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of 
inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. fj 103.2(b)(14). 
In this instance, the job descriptions of the beneficiary's subordinates are crucial to the determination 
of whether the beneficiary will function in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. Without 
any information regarding the job responsibilities of the staff, the petitioner's claims regarding the 
beneficiary's managerial responsibilities cannot be ascertained, especially as the beneficiary's job 
description itself lacks specific details. 
For example, counsel claims on appeal that the beneficiary's management of the purchasing of raw 
materials constitutes a "functional managerial duty." The term "function manager" applies generally 
when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a subordinate staff but instead is 
primarily responsible for managing an "essential function" within the organization. See section 
101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(44)(A)(ii). If a petitioner claims that the beneficiary 
is managing an essential function, the petitioner must identify the function with specificity, articulate 
the essential nature of the function, and establish the proportion of the beneficiary's daily duties 
attributed to managing the essential hnction. In addition, the petitioner must provide a 
comprehensive and detailed description of the beneficiary's daily duties demonstrating that the 
beneficiary manages the function rather than performs the duties relating to the function. 
In this instance, with respect to the purchasing function, counsel claims that the beneficiary "does 
not go around and find the raw material, nor does she actually physically deal with them in any 
way." However, as the petitioner has not identified any other employee who "actually physically 
deals" with purchasing the materials instead of the beneficiary, the evidence doesn't support the 
conclusion that the beneficiary will manage the function rather than perform the duties relating to the 
function. An employee who primarily performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to 
provide services is not considered to be employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See 
Page 8 
sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" performs the enumerated 
managerial or executive duties); see also Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 
593,604 (Comm. 1988). 
Counsel also claims on appeal that aside from the purchasing function, the rest of the beneficiary's 
weekly schedule is spent managing the employees of the U.S. business. Although the beneficiary is 
not required to supervise personnel, if it is claimed that her managerial duties involve supervising 
employees, the petitioner must establish that the subordinate employees are supervisory, 
professional, or managerial. See tj 101 (a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. 
As previously noted, the petitioner has provided no information regarding the beneficiary's 
subordinates. Thus, the AAO cannot find that the petitioner has established that these employees 
possess or require a bachelor's degree, such that they could be classified as professionals. Nor has 
the petitioner shown that any of the employees supervise subordinate staff members or manage a 
clearly defined department or function of the petitioner, such that they could be classified as 
managers or supervisors. While the organizational chart places the beneficiary above a general 
manager, nothing has been revealed about the general manager's responsibilities or level of authority 
to demonstrate that she actually performs a managerial function, and is not a manager in name only. 
In fact, it is noted that the beneficiary's job description states that the beneficiary herself oversees the 
work of the administrative department in handling the company's bills and paychecks as well as the 
work of the digitizers in the completion of marketing materials. Thus, as the director concluded, the 
beneficiary appears to function as a first line supervisor. A first-line supervisor will not be 
considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of her supervisory duties unless the 
employees supervised are professional. Section 101(a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act. Here, the petitioner 
has not shown that the beneficiary manages supervisory, professional, or managerial subordinate 
employees as required by section 10 1 (a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. 
In addition, the evidence does not support the petitioner's claim that the beneficiary has been 
employed by the U.S. company since its inception, or even at the time the petition was filed. As the 
director noted, the beneficiary's name does not appear on any of the company's payroll register or 
IRS Forms 941 submitted into evidence, nor did the petitioner provide any Form W-2 for the 
beneficiary as requested. Counsel claims on appeal that the beneficiary "has been receiving 
remuneration jointly with her husband." However, counsel has provided no evidence in support of 
this claim. Without documentary evidence to support the claim, the assertions of counsel will not 
satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute 
evidence. ~atter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); Matter of Laureano, 19 I&N 
Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). 
Further, it is noted that the record contains the beneficiary's Forms G-325A, Biographic Information, 
filed with two previous Forms 1-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status, 
in 2002 and 2005. In November 2002, where asked to list her employment for the past five years, 
the beneficiary stated that she has been unemployed and specified her occupation as "Homemaker." 
In July 2005, in response to the same question, the beneficiary stated that she had been employed as 
a teacher by Campbell Middle School in Houston, Texas since August 2003, and as a homemaker 
prior to that date. The Forms G-325A also requests information regarding the alien's last employer 
and occupation abroad, regardless of dates of employment. The beneficiary did not provide any 
information in response to this question on the Forms G-325A in 2002 or 2005. 
It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent 
objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless 
the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 
19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). The petitioner has provided no satisfactory explanation for 
why it has not been able to provide evidence that the beneficiary is in the U.S. company's employ as 
claimed, or why the beneficiary previously indicated that she was unemployed until 2003, and 
subsequently employed as a middle school teacher. Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's 
proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining 
evidence offered in support of the visa petition. Id. 
In light of these deficiencies in the record, the AAO finds that the petitioner has failed to establish 
that the beneficiary would be employed in the United States in a primarily executive or managerial 
capacity. For that reason, the petition will be denied. 
The second issue in this matter is whether the petitioner has established that a qualifying relationship 
exists between the U.S. company and the beneficiary's foreign employer. In order to qualify for this 
visa classification, the petitioner must establish that a qualifgng relationship exists between the United 
States and foreign entities in that the petitioning company is the same employer or an affiliate or 
subsidiary of the foreign entity. See section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Act. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 204.56)(2) states in pertinent part: 
AfJiliate means: 
(A) 
 One of two subsidiaries both of which are owned and controlled by the same 
parent or individual; 
(B) 
 One of two legal entities owned and controlled by the same group of 
individuals, each individual owning and controlling approximately the same 
share or proportion of each entity. 
Multinational means that the qualifying entity, or its affiliate, or subsidiary, conducts 
business in two or more countries, one of which is the United States. 
Subsidiary means a firm, corporation, or other legal entity of which a parent owns, 
directly or indirectly, more than half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, 
directly or indirectly, half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, directly or 
indirectly, 50 percent of a 50-50 joint venture and has equal control and veto power 
over the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, less than half of the entity, but in fact 
controls the entity. 
In its October 12, 2006 letter in support of the petition, the petitioner claimed that it is an affiliate of 
the foreign entity. Counsel for the petitioner submitted a memorandum of law with the initial 
petition, in which counsel claimed that the foreign entity is owned in three equal shares by (1) the 
beneficiary and her husband, (2) the beneficiary's brother-in-law, and (3) an uncle 
of the beneficiary's husband. According to counsel, the U.S. company is 5 1% owned by the foreign 
entity, and 49% owned by other investors. Therefore, counsel asserted, the two entities are affiliates 
because the three Pakistani owners each own 33% of the controlling interest of each company. 
With respect to the ownership of the U.S. company, the petitioner submitted the company's 
Certificates of members hi^ Interests number 2 through 6 dated Februarv 16, 2000. Certificates 
v 
number 2 through 5 re resent the ownershi of 12.25 shares each by - 
, an-the fi brothers), and certificate number 6 represents the 
ownership of 51 shares by Mustafa & Company Ltd. In its October 12, 2006 letter, the petitioner 
explained that certificate number 1 was voided because it was erroneously issued to- 
instead of the foreign entity. The petitioner also submitted two of the company's formation 
documents, dated February 16, 2000 - the Certificate of Organization, signed by the four Olivo 
brothers and as members, and the Resolutions from the Initial Meeting of the 
Members resolving, among other things, that membership interest certificates be issued to the 
members, who are identified as 
 and the four brothers. 
 There is no 
indication on these documents that was acting on behalf of the foreign entity 
rather than in his individual capacity. The foreign entity is not mentioned in the U.S. company's 
formation documents. 
The petitioner also provided its IRS Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return, for the year 
2005, and its IRS Form 1120X, Amended U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return, for the years 2003 
and 2004. On each tax return, the petitioner indicated on Schedule E, Compensation of Officer, that 
With respect to the foreign entity, the petitioner submitted the company's Memorandum and Articles 
A - 
of ~ssociation, both undated, khich'indicated that 
, and each subscribed to one share of the company. No other documentation' 
of ownership in the foreign entity was submitted. 
In the WE, the director requested evidence of the correction of the clerical error that the petitioner 
claimed occurred when the U.S. company's ownership interests were issued, and proof of 
amendment of the previous years' tax returns as the petitioner claimed. The director also requested a 
copy of the company's 2006 federal income tax return. 
In response, the petitioner submitted copies of its certificates of membership interests number 1 
through 20, with certificate number 1, statingas owner of 51 shares, voided; 
certificates number 2 through 6 as previously described; and certificates 7 through 20 left blank. 
Petitioner also submitted a copy of its stock transfer ledger, which lists the ownership of certificates 
number 2 through 6 as previously described. The petitioner resubmitted its amended tax returns for 
Page 11 
the years 2003 and 2004, and provided a copy of its 2006 IRS Form 1120, Schedule E, which again 
indicated that "" owns 5 1.0% of the company. The 2004 Form 1 120, 
at Schedule K, identifies the beneficiary alone as the owner of 5 1 % of the company. 
In denying the petition, the director found that the ownership of the U.S. company has not been 
satisfactorily established. The director noted that the foreign entity's claimed ownership of 51% of 
the U.S. company is not reflected in the U.S. company's corporate documents, which show only 
or the company's tax filings, which reported 
" and not the foreign entity alone owning 5 1% of 
the U.S. company. Therefore, the director found, the petitioner has failed to show that a qualifying 
relationship exists between the U.S. and foreign entities. 
On appeal, counsel claims that there "has been a parent-subsidiary relationship from the start, with 
Mustafa & Co. owning 5 1% of the U.S. business." Counsel simply asserts that the stock certificates 
and tax returns demonstrate that the foreign entity owns the petitioner, and that past accounting 
mistakes have been rectified and properly amended. Counsel submits no further evidence in support 
of these assertions. 
The AAO finds counsel's assertions regarding the existence of a qualifying relationship between the 
two entities to be unpersuasive. As stated previously, the assertions of counsel do not constitute 
evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. at 534; Matter Of Laureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1; Matter 
of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. at 506. The regulation and case law confirm'that ownership and 
control are the factors that must be examined in determining whether a qualifying relationship exists 
between United States and foreign entities for purposes of this visa classification. Matter of Church 
Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593 (BIA 1988); see also Matter of Siemens Medical 
Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986); Matter of Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 (Comm. 1982). In 
context of this visa petition, ownership refers to the direct or indirect legal right of possession of the 
assets of an entity with full power and authority to control; control means the direct or indirect legal 
right and authority to direct the establishment, management, and operations of an entity. Matter of 
Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 595. 
As the director observed, there are material inconsistencies in the record regarding the ownership of 
the U.S. entity, which the petitioner failed to address. Although the petitioner maintained that the 
foreign entity owns 5 1% of the U.S. company, and has submitted copies of its stock ledger and stock 
certificates demonstrating that ownership interest, the petitioner has not explained wh the U.S. 
company's Articles of Organization and initial Members' Resolutions still list only the brothers 
and as members with ownership interest in the U.S. company and make no mention 
of the foreign entitv as the maioritv member. Nor has the ~etitioner satisfactorilv ex~lained whv its 
Ld 2 d 
tax returns for the years 2003 though 2006 all list 
 or I- 
" rather than the foreign entity alone as the owner of 51 % of the U.S. company. As previously 
noted, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent 
objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless 
the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 
19 I&N Dec. at 591-92. Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a 
Page 12 
reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the 
visa petition. Id. 
Further, it is noted that the ownership of the foreign entity also has not been clearly established. The 
only documentation that has been offered as evidence of the foreign entity's ownership are the 
undated Memorandum and Articles of Association of the company listing the initial subscribers in 
the company, as described above. Without further, more current documentation, these documents 
alone are insufficient to establish that the initial ownership interest in the foreign company described 
therein continued to exist at the time the petition was filed. 
Because the ownership interest in both the U.S. and foreign entities has not been satisfactorily 
established, the AAO can not determine whether the two entities are affiliates, or parent and 
subsidiary, as the petitioner claimed. As such, the record is insufficient to establish that there exists 
a qualifying relationship between the U.S. and foreign entities. For this additional reason, the 
petition will be denied. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the AAO finds that the petitioner has failed to establish that she 
was employed by the foreign entity for at least one year prior to the filing of the petition, or to her 
entry into the United States, as required under section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Act. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 
 204.5('j)(3)(1) requires the petitioner to demonstrate that: 
(A) If the alien is outside the Untied States, in the three years immediately 
preceding the filing of the petition the alien has been employed outside the 
United States for at least one year in a managerial or executive capacity by a 
firm or corporation, or other legal entity, or by an affiliate or subsidiary of such 
a firm or corporation or other legal entity; or 
(B) If the alien is already in the United States working for the same employer or a 
subsidiary or affiliate of the firm or corporation, or other legal entity by which 
the alien was employed overseas, in the three years preceding entry as a 
nonimmigrant, the alien was employed by the entity abroad for at least one year 
in a managerial or executive capacity. 
The petitioner claimed in its letter in support of the Form 1-140 that the beneficiary joined the 
foreign entity as an executive sometime in the 1980s, after her marriage. The petitioner provided 
organizational charts for the foreign entity, which assigned the beneficiary the role of assistant 
director of the foreign entity. In response to the RFE, the petitioner supplied further information 
regarding the beneficiary's alleged role in the foreign entity, although no specific dates as to her 
employment with the foreign entity were provided. 
However, as previously noted, the record contains Forms G-325A filed by the beneficiary in 2002 
and 2005 which provide information that is not consistent with the petitioner's claim regarding her 
employment overseas. Again, the beneficiary indicated on those Forms G-325A that she was 
employed as a teacher in Texas from August 2003 through the filing of the Form G-325A in July 
2005, and prior to that, was unemployed as far back as November 1997, five years before the filing 
of the 2002 Form G-325A. In addition, according to the disclosures on the Forms G-235A, the 
beneficiary did not claim to ever have been employed abroad. 
The petitioner has not provided any explanation or information that would account for this material 
inconsistency in the record regarding the beneficiary's employment abroad. It is incumbent upon the 
petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any 
attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits 
competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. at 591-92. 
Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the 
reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. Id. 
In light of the above, the AAO finds that the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary has 
the requisite employment abroad for purposes of this petition. For this additional reason, the petition 
will be denied. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be 
denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the 
initial decision. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. 
Cal. 2001), affd. 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 
1989) (noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a de novo basis). When the AAO denies a petition 
on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the 
AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's enumerated grounds. See Spencer 
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043. 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the 
benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Here, 
that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the director's decision will be affirmed and the petition 
will be denied. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.