dismissed EB-1C Case: Commercial Airline

PUBLIC COP1 
U.S. Department of .Homeland Security 
20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER Date: xi"\/ 3 3 
LIN 06 255 51245 
PETITION: 
 Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager bsuant to 
Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 4 1153(b)(l)(C) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
Robert P. Wiemann, Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. 
The petitioner, a Delaware corporation, is a commercial airline business which claims to have a qualifying 
relationship with Continental Airlines, Inc., the beneficiary's foreign employer. Accordingly, the petitioner 
endeavors to classify the beneficiary as an employment-based immigrant pursuant to section 203(b)(l)(C) of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 5 1153(b)(l)(C), as a multinational executive or 
manager. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary will be or 
has been employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
On appeal, counsel to the petitioner disputes the director's findings, asserts that the beneficiary will perform, 
and has performed, primarily qualifying duties, and submits a brief. 
Section 203(b) of the Act states in pertinent part: 
(1) Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified immigrants who 
are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C): 
(C) Certain Multinational Executives and Managers. -- An alien is described 
in this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years preceding the time of the 
alien's application for classification and admission into the United States 
under this subparagraph, has been employed for at least 1 year by a firm or 
corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof and who 
seeks to enter the United States in order to continue to render services to the 
same employer or to a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is 
managerial or executive. 
The language of the statute is specific in limiting this provision to only those executives and managers who 
have previously worked for a fm, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate or subsidiary of that entity, 
and who are coming to the United States to work for the same entity, or its affiliate or subsidiary. 
A "United States employer" may file a petition on Form 1-140 for classification of an alien under section 
203(b)(l)(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. No labor certification is required for this 
classification. The prospective employer in the United States must furnish a job offer in the form of a 
statement which indicates that the alien is to be employed in the United States in a managerial or executive 
capacity. Such a statement must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the alien. 
Page 3 
Title 8 C.F.R. 9 204.50)(3) explains that a petition filed for a multinational executive or manager under 
section 203(b)(l)(C) must be accompanied by a statement from an authorized official of the "petitioning 
United States employer" which demonstrates that: 
(A) 
 If the alien is outside the United States, in the three years immediately preceding the 
filing of the petition the alien has been employed outside the United States for at least 
one year in a managerial or executive capacity by a fm or corporation, or other legal 
entity, or by an affiliate or subsidiary of such a fum or corporation or other legal 
entity; or 
(B) 
 If the alien is already in the United States working for the same employer or a 
subsidiary or affiliate of the fm or corporation, or other legal entity by which the 
alien was employed overseas, in the three years preceding entry as a nonimrnigrant, 
the alien was employed by the entity abroad for at least one year in a managerial or 
executive capacity; 
(C) 
 The prospective employer in the United States is the same employer or a subsidiary 
or affiliate of the fm or corporation or other legal entity by which the alien was 
employed overseas; and 
(D) 
 The prospective United States employer has been doing business for at least one year. 
The fust issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner provided sufficient evidence to establish that it will 
employ the beneficiary in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. €j 1101(a)(44)(A), provides: 
The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily-- 
(i) manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or 
component of the organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or 
managerial employees, or manages an essential function within the 
organization, or a department or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the 
authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel 
actions (such as promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee 
is directly supervised, functions at a senior level within the organizational 
hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and 
LIN 06 255 51245 
Page 4 
(iv) 
 exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or bction 
for which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not 
considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the 
supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised are 
professional. 
Section 101 (a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1 101 (a)(44)(B), provides: 
The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily-- 
(i) 
 directs the management of the organization or a major component or function 
of the organization; 
(ii) establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or 
function; 
(iii) 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(iv) 
 receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, 
the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
The petitioner described the beneficiary's proposed job duties as "supervisor - airport services" in Louisville, 
Kentucky in a letter dated May 30, 2006 as follows: 
Supervise and coordinate activities of airport employees and agents to provide 
services for airline passengers. 
Interpret company policies and procedures for employees and ensure compliance to 
all company policies and procedures including adherence to internal control measures 
and consistent compliance to customer first initiatives. 
Observe activities of employees to evaluate work performance and maintain 
personnel records. 
Train, explain and demonstrate methods and skills required for obtaining optimum 
performance. 
Prepare daily duty assignments for airport sales agents. 
Assist general manager in the operation and administration of the station including 
direct and documentary counseling and development of agent work force. 
Ensure that all relevant and required company procedures and standards are observed 
and maintained. 
Substitute for general manager in herlhis absence. 
Page 5 
On June 15, 2007, the director requested additional evidence. The director requested, inter alia, a more 
detailed description of the beneficiary's proposed duties, a breakdown of the amount to time the beneficiary 
will devote to each of her ascribed duties, an organizational chart, and descriptions of the duties of any 
subordinate workers. 
In response, the petitioner further described the beneficiary's proposed duties as follows: 
1. 
 Substitute for general manager in herlhis absence, using managerial discretion to 
reach satisfactory resolutions to any problem at any station. 15% 
2. 
 Resolving ticketing, overselling, delayed flights and passengers['] complaints during 
irregular operations. This capacity requires managerial discretion to facilitate 
customer needs when policy does not dictate any obvious resolution. 5% 
3. Coordinate activities between: 
1) local (TSA) and federal (FAA) authorities; 
2) airport employees and; 
3) our company agents. 
Managerial discretion is used in this capacity to ensure company operation schedules 
are responsive to any changes in airport conditions or security requirements and vice 
versa. Supervisor of Auport Services must ensure the company work force is 
responsive to frequent changes in airport conditions or security threats by redirecting 
or reallocating manpower throughout the day. 40% 
4. 
 Interpret company policies and procedures for employees and ensure compliance to 
all company policies and procedures including adherence to internal control measures 
and consistent compliance to customer first initiatives. Ensure local (TSA) and 
federal (FAA) regulations are correctly enforced at all stations. This oRen requires 
managerial discretion in determining what does and does not qualify as regulatory 
enforcement. 10% 
5. 
 Observe activities of employees to evaluate work performance and maintain 
personnel records for the human resources department. At a company this size, the 
human resource department normally handles hiring and firng decisions (based upon 
supervisory recommendations noted in personnel records). 10% 
6. 
 Organize and audit station controls, expenses, sales report, oversell reports to ensure 
there are no discrepancies between actual coordinated activities and documented 
schedules. 10% 
7. 
 Prepare daily duty assignments for agents and provide any required training for 
optimum performance of those duties. 10% 
The petitioner also submitted an organizational chart showing the beneficiary reporting to the station manager 
and supervising "agents." The petitioner does not indicate how many "agents" are supervised by the 
beneficiary. The duties of the "agents" are described as follows: 
Performs a variety of duties according to the functional work area assignment, however, in 
certain stations and under certain circumstances may be required to perform all functions. 
Page 6 
Subject to rotating shifts and off days. TicketIGateslCheck-In: Handles all facts of work 
associated with ticketing and making reservations from passengers and those activities 
necessary to board and deplane passengers, including tagging and lifting passenger's baggage 
to bag belt for delivery to ramp. Baggage Service: Assists passenger in locating lost baggage 
or handling damages that may occur. Includes some clerical duties related to the reporting of 
baggage disposition and repair. Operations/Ramp: Responsible for directing[,] loading and 
unloading of aircraft, coordinating of load plans, directing ground movements, and 
communicating with aircraft, crew briefing and planning. Cargo: Responsible for the 
acceptanceldelivery and handling of cargo shipments including preparation of paperwork, 
collection of funds and receipts and lifting and transporting shipments tolfrom loading 
equipment. 
On December 13, 2007, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that the petitioner failed to 
establish that the beneficiary will be employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
On appeal, counsel to the petitioner asserts that the director erred and that the beneficiary will primarily 
perform qualifying duties. Counsel also provided a materially different job description and breakdown of the 
amount of time to be devoted to each of these duties for the proffered position. 
Upon review, counsel's assertions are not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary will be employed in a 
primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
As a threshold issue, it is noted that counsel's attempt on appeal to submit a materially different job 
description for the beneficiary was inappropriate and will not be considered by the AAO in determining 
whether the beneficiary will be employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. On appeal, a 
petitioner cannot offer a new position to the beneficiary, or materially change the position's title, its level of 
authority within the organizational hierarchy, or the associated job responsibilities. The petitioner must 
establish that the position offered to the beneficiary when the petition was filed merits classification as a 
managerial or executive position. Matter of Michelin Tire Corp., 17 I&N Dec. 248, 249 (Reg. Comm. 1978). 
A petitioner may not make material changes to a petition in an effort to make a deficient petition conform to 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) requirements. See Matter of Izummi, 22 I&N Dec. 169, 176 
(Assoc. Comm. 1998). Furthermore, counsel's job description submitted on appeal was not corroborated with 
any evidence. The unsupported statements of counsel on appeal are not evidence and thus are not entitled to 
any evidentiary weight. See INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 188-89 n.6 (1984); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 
17 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1980). Accordingly, the petition will be adjudicated based on the record before the 
director. 
In examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, CIS will look first to the petitioner's 
description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 4 204.5Cj)(5). The actual duties themselves reveal the true nature 
of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 905 F.2d 
41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
Page 7 
In this matter, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's job duties fails to establish that the beneficiary 
will act in a "managerial" or "executive" capacity. To the contrary, it appears that the beneficiary will 
primarily perform non-qualifying administrative, operational, and first-line supervisory tasks which will not 
rise to the level of being managerial or executive in nature. For example, in supervising airport services for 
the petitioner in Louisville, Kentucky, the beneficiary is described as primarily ensuring that her subordinates 
are "responsive to fi-equent changes in airport conditions or security threats by redirecting or reallocating 
manpower throughout the day," resolving customer complaints, interpreting policies and procedures for 
employees, ensuring employee compliance with policies and procedures, evaluating employees, maintaining 
personnel records, and preparing duty assignments and schedules. Accordingly, it appears that the 
beneficiary will devote virtually all of her time to supervising an undetermined number of "agents" and 
performing essential operational and administrative tasks pertaining to human resources, customer relations, 
and policy compliance. However, none of these ascribed tasks constitutes a qualifying duty. The fact that the 
petitioner has given the beneficiary a managerial or executive title does not establish that the beneficiary will 
actually perform managerial or executive duties. An employee who "primarily" perfonns the tasks necessary 
to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or 
executive capacity. See sections 101 (a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the 
enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N 
Dec. 593, 604 (Comrn. 1988). It appears that the beneficiary will be, at most, a first-line supervisor of non- 
professional workers. A managerial employee must have authority over day-to-day operations beyond the 
level normally vested in a first-line supervisor, unless the supervised employees are professionals. Section 
101(a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act; see also Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. 
Likewise, the petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary will supervise and control the work of 
other supervisory, managerial, or professional employees, or will manage an essential function of the 
organization. As noted above, the petitioner claims that the beneficiary will supervise "agents" who are 
described as performing the tasks necessary to the provision of airline services. However, as none of these 
subordinate employees have been described as having supervisory or managerial responsibilities over other 
workers, it has not been established that the beneficiary will supervise and control the work of supervisory or 
managerial employees. To the contrary, it is more likely than not that the beneficiary will be the first-line 
supervisor of the agents. Moreover, as the petitioner failed to establish the skills or educational backgrounds 
required to perform the duties of the subordinate positions, the petitioner has not established that the 
beneficiary will manage professional employees. 
In addition, counsel on appeal argues that the beneficiary will manage an essential function of the 
organization, the record does not support this position. The term "function manager" applies generally when 
a beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a subordinate staff but instead is primarily responsible 
for managing an "essential function" within the organization. See section 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. The 
term "essential function" is not defined by statute or regulation. If a petitioner claims that the beneficiary will 
manage an essential function, the petitioner must furnish a written job offer that clearly describes the duties to 
be perfonned in managing the essential function, i.e., identify the function with specificity, articulate the 
essential nature of the function, and establish the proportion of the beneficiary's daily duties attributed to 
managing the essential function. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 204.56)(2) and (5). In addition, the petitioner's description 
of the beneficiary's daily duties must demonstrate that the beneficiary will manage the hction rather than 
Page 8 
perform the tasks related to the hnction. In this matter, the petitioner has not provided evidence that the 
beneficiary will manage an essential function. As explained above, the record indicates that the beneficiary 
will more likely than not primarily perform non-qualifying tasks and serve as a first-line supervisor. Even if 
"quality control" and regulatory compliance were established to be "essential functions" of the organization, 
which they have not, the beneficiary's administration of these functions would not establish that she will be 
employed as a "function manager" for purposes of this visa classification if she will instead primarily perform 
the functions she will allegedly manage. As the beneficiary will more likely than not primarily perform non- 
qualifying, first-line supervisory tasks in her administration of these "functions," it cannot be concluded that 
she will manage an essential function. See generally IKEA US, Inc. v. US. Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 
22, 24 (D.D.C. 1999). Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will be employed 
primarily in a managerial capacity. 
Similarly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will act in an "executive" capacity. The 
statutory definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated position within a complex 
organizational hierarchy, including major components or functions of the organization, and that person's 
authority to direct the organization. Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act. Under the statute, a beneficiary must 
have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish the goals and policies" of that organization. 
Inherent to the definition, the organization must have a subordinate level of employees for the beneficiary to 
direct, and the beneficiary must primarily focus on the broad goals and policies of the organization rather than 
the day-to-day operations of the enterprise. An individual will not be deemed an executive under the statute 
simply because they have an executive title or because they "direct" the enterprise as the owner or sole 
managerial employee. The beneficiary must also exercise "wide latitude in discretionary decision making" 
and receive only "general supervision or direction 6-om higher level executives, the board of directors, or 
stockholders of the organization." Id. For the same reasons indicated above, the petitioner has failed to 
establish that the beneficiary will act primarily in an executive capacity. As explained above, it appears more 
likely than not that the beneficiary will primarily perform the tasks necessary to produce a product or to 
provide a service and will act as a first-line supervisor of non-professional workers. Therefore, the petitioner 
has not established that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in an executive capacity. 
Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will primarily perform managerial or 
executive duties, and the petition may not be approved for that reason. 
The second issue in the present matter is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary was 
employed abroad in a primarily managerial or executive position. 
The petitioner claims that the beneficiary was employed abroad as "reservation and [center ticketing office] 
supervisor" in Tel Aviv, Israel. The petitioner describes the duties of the beneficiary in a letter dated May 30, 
2006 as follows: 
Manage and oversee all activities of reservation and ticket sales. 
Supervise and train employees, and monitor and evaluate reservation agents. 
Supervise and assist [center ticketing office] agents solving pricing and ticketing 
problems. 
Page 9 
Conduct fare analysis and promote sales for special fares. 
Manage team meetings and prepare evaluation reports on the performance of 
employees. 
Making daily sales report and prepare monthly summary report. 
Ensure compliance to all company policy and procedures. 
On June 15, 2007, the director requested additional evidence. The director requested, inter alia, a more 
detailed description of the beneficiary's duties, a breakdown of the amount to time the beneficiary devoted to 
each of her ascribed duties, an organizational chart, and descriptions of the duties of any subordinate workers. 
In response, the petitioner further described the beneficiary's duties abroad as follows: 
1. 
 Managed entire reservation department [in] the absence of reservation management: 
coordinated with airport officials on daily basis, assisted all stations with all problems 
as required. 10% 
2. 
 Managed CTO (center ticketing office), managing all activities of ticketing sales, 
including quality assurance. Coordinated with Headquarters Tel Aviv and adjusted 
rules to the local market conditions. Managerial discretion utilized in this capacity to 
reach practical resolutions and to determine proper adjustments. 40% 
3. 
 Human resource management: classify potential candidates' resume for interviews, 
conduct interviews and recommend new candidates for hire. Supervised and trained 
employees, monitored and evaluated their performance. Created guidance and 
instructions for new hires to explain expectations. Manage team meetings and 
prepare evaluation reports on performance of employees for promotion or 
termination recommendations. 20% 
4. 
 Ensured compliance to all company and policy and procedure. 
 This required 
managerial discretion to determine whether certain actions were consistent with 
policies. 20% 
5. 
 Made daily sales report and prepared monthly summary report. 
 In addition, 
conducted fare analysis and promoted sales for special fares on group fares and 
corporate contracts. 10% 
The petitioner also submitted an organizational chart showing the beneficiary subordinate to a "senior 
director" and a "reservation supervisor" and directly supervising "agents." Once again, the petitioner does not 
indicate how many "agents" were supervised by the beneficiary. The duties of the "agents" are described as 
follows: 
This is a cross-utilized agent position. Responsibilities include issuing tickets, tags, luggage 
and proper fare and routing to assure passengers['] travel plans are efficient and correct. 
Maintain custody of cash and credit receipts. The operation [of] telephone system/business 
machines, computers, word processors to complete work required on a daily basis. Station 
controls and CRO training a plus. Perform routine housekeeping task to maintain work area 
and mechanical equipment. Attendance and performance must be in good standing in 
Page 10 
accordance with applicable work rules. This position may be assigned to guide arriving and 
departing aircraft, jet ways, trucks or baggage inside the aircraft body to assure loads are 
balanced and secure. Direct freight materials servicing 6 to 8 airplanes per shift. Handle 
materials that cannot be handled by material handling devices. The position works from the 
ground and aerial devices at heights up to 10 feet. Will require shift work. A high school 
diploma or equivalent as well as a valid driver's license are required. Prior airline experience 
preferred. Physical requirements include, but are not limited to, standing 100% of the time, 
using hands and fingers to perform tasks with extended reach at shoulder height and extended 
reach in fi-ont of body. Requires lifting customer baggage weighing up to 75 pounds or more 
from counter space and places on the conveyor belt. 
On December 13, 2007, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that the petitioner failed to 
establish that the beneficiary was employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
On appeal, counsel to the petitioner asserts that the director erred and that the beneficiary was primarily 
performing qualifying duties. Counsel also provided a materially different job description and breakdown of 
the amount of time devoted to each of these duties for the position abroad. 
Upon review, counsel's assertions are not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary was employed in a 
primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
As a threshold issue, it is again noted that counsel's attempt on appeal to submit a materially different job 
description for the beneficiary was inappropriate and will not be considered by the AAO in determining 
whether the beneficiary was employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. On appeal, a 
petitioner cannot materially change the position's title, its level of authority within the organizational 
hierarchy, or the associated job responsibilities. A petitioner may not make material changes to a petition in 
an effort to make a deficient petition conform to CIS requirements. See Matter of Izummi, 22 I&N Dec. at 
176. Furthermore, counsel's job description submitted on appeal was not corroborated with any evidence. 
The unsupported statements of counsel on appeal are not evidence and thus are not entitled to any evidentiary 
weight. See INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. at 188-89 n.6; Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503. 
Accordingly, the petition will be adjudicated based on the record before the director. 
As explained above, in examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, CIS will look first 
to the petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 5 204.50')(5). The actual duties themselves 
reveal the true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. At 1108, afld, 905 F.2d 
41. 
In this matter, and similar to the proffered position in the United States, the petitioner's description of the 
beneficiary's job duties abroad fails to establish that the beneficiary acted in a "managerial" or "executive" 
capacity. To the contrary, it appears that the beneficiary primarily performed non-qualifying administrative, 
operational, and first-line supervisory tasks which do not rise to the level of being managerial or executive in 
nature. For example, the beneficiary is described as primarily administering reservations and ticketing as a 
first-line supervisor of a subordinate staff of an indeterminate size. Accordingly, it appears that the 
Page 11 
beneficiary devoted virtually all of her time to supervising "agents" and performing essential operational and 
administrative tasks pertaining to ticketing and airline reservations. However, none of these ascribed tasks 
constitutes a qualifying duty. The fact that the petitioner has given the beneficiary a managerial or executive 
title does not establish that the beneficiary actually performed managerial or executive duties. Once again, an 
employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not 
considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and 
(B) of the Act; see also Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. It appears that the 
beneficiary was, at most, a first-line supervisor of non-professional workers. A managerial employee must 
have authority over day-to-day operations beyond the level normally vested in a first-line supervisor, unless 
the supervised employees are professionals. Section 101(a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act; see also Matter of Church 
Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. 
Likewise, the petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary supervised and controlled the work of 
other supervisory, managerial, or professional employees, or managed an essential function of the 
organization. As noted above, and similar to the proffered position in the United States, the petitioner claims 
that the beneficiary supervised "agents" who are described as performing the tasks necessary to the provision 
of airline services. However, as none of these subordinate employees have been described as having 
supervisory or managerial responsibilities over other workers, it has not been established that the beneficiary 
supervised and controlled the work of supervisory or managerial workers. To the contrary, it is more likely 
than not that the beneficiary was no more than the first-line supervisor of the agents. Moreover, as the 
petitioner failed to establish the skills or educational backgrounds required to perform the duties of the 
subordinate positions, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary managed professional employees. 
In addition, counsel on appeal also argues that the beneficiary managed an essential function of the 
organization, the record does not support this position. As explained above, the record indicates that the 
beneficiary was more likely than not primarily performing non-qualifying tasks and serving as a first-line 
supervisor. Even if reservations and ticketing were established to be "essential functions" of the organization, 
which they have not, the beneficiary's administration of these functions would not establish that she was 
employed as a "function manager" for purposes of this visa classification if she was primarily performing the 
hnction she is claimed to have managed. As the beneficiary more likely than not primarily performed non- 
qualifying, first-line supervisory tasks in her administration of these "functions" abroad, it cannot be 
concluded that she was managing an essential function. See generally IKEA US, Inc. v. US. Dept. of Justice, 
48 F. Supp. 2d at 24. Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary was employed 
primarily in a managerial capacity. 
Similarly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will act in an "executive" capacity. As 
explained above, it appears more likely than not that the beneficiary was primarily performing the tasks 
necessary to produce a product or to provide a service and acted as a first-line supervisor of non-professional 
workers. Therefore, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary was employed primarily in an 
executive capacity. 
Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary primarily performed managerial or 
executive duties abroad, and the petition may not be approved for that reason. 
Page 12 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 29 1 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 136 1. The petitioner has not sustained that burden. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.