dismissed EB-1C Case: Corporate Research

-identifying data deleted to 
prevent clearly unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
Ofice of Administrative Appeals, MS 2090 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
- -.- ~. 
LIN 08 129 50890 
IN RE: 
PETITION: 
 Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to 
Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 3 1 153(b)(l)(C) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. 3 103.5 for 
the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by 
filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 
days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. 3 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
1' Chief, Administrative Appeals Office 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Nebraska Service Center, denied the employment-based petition. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be 
dismissed. 
The petitioner is a United States corporation that engages in providing corporate best practices 
research. It seeks to employ the beneficiary as its senior manager, marketing, in its San Francisco 
office. Accordingly, the petitioner endeavors to classify the beneficiary as an employment-based 
immigrant pursuant to section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 
U.S.C. 8 1 153(b)(l)(C), as a multinational executive or manager. 
The director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner had not established that the 
beneficiary was employed by the foreign entity, or will be employed by the United States entity, in a 
primarily managerial or executive capacity. The director noted that the petitioner had failed to 
provide material evidence that was requested following the filing of the Form 1-140, Petition for 
Immigrant Worker. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner contends that the 
director's decision is in error. Counsel submits a brief and additional evidence on appeal. 
Section 203(b) of the Act states in pertinent part: 
(1) 
 Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified immigrants 
who are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C): 
(C) 
 Certain Multinational Executives and Managers. -- An alien is 
described in this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years 
preceding the time of the alien's application for classification 
and admission into the United States under this subparagraph, 
has been employed for at least 1 year by a firm or corporation 
or other legal entity or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof and 
who seeks to enter the United States in order to continue to 
render services to the same employer or to a subsidiary or 
affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial or executive. 
The language of the statute is specific in limiting this provision to only those executives and 
managers who have previously worked for the firm, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate 
or subsidiary of that entity, and are coming to the United States to work for the same entity, or its 
affiliate or subsidiary. 
A United States employer may file a petition on Form 1-140 for classification of an alien under 
section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. No labor certification is 
required for this classification. The prospective employer in the United States must furnish a job 
offer in the form of a statement that indicates that the alien is to be employed in the United States in 
a managerial or executive capacity. Such a statement must clearly describe the duties to be 
performed by the alien. See 8 C.F.R. 5 204.5(j)(5). 
The first issue in the present matter is whether the beneficiary would be employed in a primarily 
managerial or executive capacity in the United States. 
Section 101 (a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 10 1 (a)(44)(A), provides: 
The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily 
(i) 
 manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or 
component of the organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or 
managerial employees, or manages an essential function within the 
organization, or a department or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has 
the authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other 
personnel actions (such as promotion and leave authorization), or if no 
other employee is directly supervised, functions at a senior level 
within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function 
managed; and 
(iv) 
 exercises discretion over the day to day operations of the activity or 
function for which the employee has authority. A first line supervisor 
is not considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by 
virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees 
supervised are professional. 
Section 101 (a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101 (a)(44)(B), provides: 
The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily 
(i) 
 directs the management of the organization or a major component or 
function of the organization; 
(ii) 
 establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or 
function; 
(iii) 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision making; and 
(iv) 
 receives only general supervision or direction from higher level 
executives, the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
In a letter dated March 6,2008 submitted with the Form 1-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker, 
the petitioner stated that the beneficiary assumed the position of Senior Manager, Marketing, in its 
San Francisco office on September 1, 2007. The petitioner provided a brief list of the beneficiary's 
duties. 
On June 20,2008, the director issued a request for further evidence (RFE), in which he instructed the 
petitioner to submit the following evidence relating to the beneficiary's position with the petitioner: 
1. An expanded description of proposed permanent duties at the U.S. entity, which 
should describe the duties in greater detail and include the actual, specific day-to- 
day tasks involved in the completion of each duty and an estimate of the 
percentage of time dedicated to each duty. 
2. A detailed and dated organizational chart for the petitioner illustrating the current 
structure of the organization with the addition of the permanent proposed position 
of the beneficiary. The chart should include the names of all departments and 
teams, and the names and a detailed description of the job duties of the 
beneficiary's immediate supervisor and all subordinate employees. 
3. Copies of the college or university degrees for those named subordinate 
employees which are professional in nature. 
In a letter dated July 29, 2008 responding to the RFE, counsel for the petitioner set forth the 
following time allocation for the beneficiary's duties as described by the petitioner in its earlier 
letter: 
Manage a team of 20+ Marketing Associates, Senior Marketing Associates, and 
Associate Managers with the goal of securing meetings with senior executives 
across the entire executive suite from companies with revenues greater than $750 
million in annual revenue - % of time = ongoing. 
Support the Sales and Business Development team in generating new revenue - % 
of the time = ongoing. 
Identifies performance gaps and presents training recommendations to individuals 
on the team - ongoing but in 1:l's and formal settings roughly 50% - 25 hours 
per week 
Collaborates with Managing Directors and Directors to set goals, develop 
marketing strategies, and forecast peak performance as well as obstacles - 10% - 
approximately 5 hours per week. 
Serves as a hiring manager for Marketing Associate candidates by conducting 
interviews and assess external applicants - 15% -- approximately 7.5 hours per 
week. 
Complies and analyzes market data, as well as internal performance metrics, to 
guide team decisions and strategies -- % of the time = ongoing. 
Provides territory analysis, individual coaching, and career counseling to 
Marketing Associates -- l:lls are about 50% of time - approximately 25 hours 
per week. 
Assists in creating and teaching training modules for new Marketing Associates - 
5% - approximately 2.5 hours per week. 
Plans and executes against monthly goals, while providing strategic insights and 
territory analysis to the team - 5% - approximately 2.5 hours per week. 
Serves as an active member of the West Coast Office leadership team, 
spearheading strategic and operational office initiatives - 5% - approximately 
2.5 hours per week. 
Counsel also provided an expanded description of tasks performed in connection with each of the 
beneficiary's duties. The response to the RFE included an organizational chart for the San Francisco 
office and a description of the job duties of the beneficiary's supervisor and subordinates. Based on 
the chart and counsel's letter, the beneficiary is under the direct supervision of the 
"Head of the San Francisco Office and Franchise Lead for HR and Sales and Marketing." The job 
duties of the beneficiary's supervisor, as described by counsel, include "managing overall territory 
strategy, quota allocation and direction of Sales TeadRegion" and "directing the activities . . . of 
Sales Managers, Sales Executive, and Sales Associates within an assigned region." According to 
counsel, the staff under the beneficiary's supervision includes a sales coordinator, an associate 
manager, and eighteen sales and marketing associates, thirteen of whom report directly to the 
beneficiary and the remaining five to the associate manager. 
In his letter, counsel contended that the request from the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS) for the college or university degrees of the beneficiary's subordinates both abroad and in 
the United States is an unjustified, burdensome, and irrelevant requirement as there is no statutory 
minimum education requirement for the beneficiary or his subordinates. Nonetheless, counsel 
stated, the petitioner had attempted to procure the diplomas from its employees and only received 
three responses, as many of the beneficiary's former subordinates are no longer with the company. 
Counsel also submitted records fi-om HireRight, an employment background screening company 
used by the petitioner, confirming the educational background of certain employees. 
On June 27, 2008, the director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner had not established 
that the beneficiary was employed abroad, or would be employed by the U.S. entity, in a primarily 
managerial or executive capacity. The director found that the record does not support a conclusion 
that the beneficiary's subordinates are supervisors, managers or professionals. The director observed 
that the beneficiary performs some operational tasks as well as supervisory duties. The director 
found the petitioner has not provided evidence of an organizational structure sufficient to elevate the 
beneficiary to a position higher than a first-line supervisor of non-professional employees. The 
Page 6 
director further noted that the petitioner failed to provide certain information and documentation 
requested in the RFE regarding the beneficiary's positions in both the foreign and U.S. entities. 
Specifically, the director found the summaries of the subordinate employees' background records 
from HireRight insufficient without copies of the actual degrees of the employees. The director also 
noted that the generic organizational chart for the foreign company that was provided was not 
sufficiently responsive to the RFE and contained information that did not match the description of 
the beneficiary's position or organization abroad. 
On appeal, counsel contends that the director erred in classifying the beneficiary as a "first-line 
supervisor of non-professional employees." Counsel claims that "all of [the beneficiary's] 
subordinates have bachelor's degrees as such education is the MINIMUM requirement for the 
subordinate positions company-wide." Therefore, counsel reasons, "every single individual 
supervised by [the beneficiary] is professional." Counsel states that, previously, the petitioner was 
unable to gather all degree data from the beneficiary's subordinates both overseas and in the United 
States because of the short amount of RFE response time. Counsel explains that the petitioner has 
not been able to obtain proof of education from employees that have left its overseas office. 
However, counsel submits copies of university diplomas for the beneficiary's current reports in San 
Francisco and asserts that, as the positions of the beneficiary's subordinates abroad are the same as 
those of his current reports, the evidence submitted should be sufficient to show that those occupying 
the same positions qualify as "professional employees." Counsel claims that the director selectively 
quoted only certain elements of the beneficiary's job duties and ignored those that are truly 
demonstrative of his managerial role. Counsel restated the descriptions of the beneficiary's positions 
overseas and in the United States provided in response to the RFE and claims that "there is 
absolutely no question as to [the beneficiary's] managerial role" in the San Francisco office of the 
petitioner. 
Upon review, the AAO concurs with the director's conclusion that the petitioner has failed to 
establish that the beneficiary would be employed in a primarily executive or managerial capacity in 
the United States. 
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to 
the petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 4 204.5(j)(5). The petitioner's description 
of the job duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate 
whether such duties are either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. In addition, it should be 
noted that the definitions of executive and managerial capacity each have two parts. First, the 
petitioner must show that the beneficiary performs the high-level responsibilities that are specified in 
the definitions. Second, the petitioner must prove that the beneficiary primarily performs these 
specified responsibilities and does not spend a majority of his or her time on day-to-day functions. 
Champion World, Inc. v. INS, 940 F.2d 1533 (Table), 1991 WL 144470 (9th Cir. July 30, 1991). 
The statutory definition of "managerial capacity" allows for both "personnel managers" and 
"function managers." See section 101 (a)(44)(A)(i) and (ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 4 1 101 (a)(44)(A)(i) 
and (ii). Personnel managers are required to primarily supervise and control the work of other 
supervisory, professional, or managerial employees. Contrary to the common understanding of the 
word "manager," the statute plainly states that a "first-line supervisor is not considered to be acting 
in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees 
supervised are professional." Section 101 (a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act. 
The description of the beneficiary's job duties in the United States indicates that he is primarily 
responsible for training, coaching and supervising the performance of his team of marketing 
associates (e.g., "identifies performance gaps and presents training recommendations to individuals 
on the team, 50% - 25 hours per week;" "provides territory analysis, individual coaching, and career 
counseling to Marketing Associates, 50% of time - approximately 25 hours per week;" "assists in 
creating and teaching training modules for new Marketing Associates, 5% - approximately 2.5 hours 
per week").' Insofar as he is primarily supervising and controlling the work of other employees, the 
beneficiary would qualify as a "personnel manager" if it is established that his subordinates are 
supervisory, professional, or managerial employees. Here, the AAO acknowledges that the 
beneficiary has one managerial employee under his supervision - the associate manager. However, 
as noted, the majority of his time is occupied by the direct supervision of the entire team of 
marketing associates, who evidently have no managerial or supervisory role. Thus, in order for the 
beneficiary to be considered a "personnel manager," it must be established that the marketing 
associates under his supervision qualify as professionals. 
In evaluating whether the beneficiary manages professional employees, the AAO must evaluate 
whether the subordinate positions require a baccalaureate degree as a minimum for entry into the 
field of endeavor. Section 101(a)(32) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(32), states that "[t]he term 
profession shall include but not be limited to architects, engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, 
and teachers in elementary or secondary schools, colleges, academies, or seminaries." The term 
"profession" contemplates knowledge or learning, not merely skill, of an advanced type in a given 
field gained by a prolonged course of specialized instruction and study of at least baccalaureate 
level, which is a realistic prerequisite to entry into the particular field of endeavor. Matter of Sea, 19 
I&N Dec. 8 17 (Comm. 1988); Matter of Ling, 13 I&N Dec. 35 (R.C. 1968); Matter of Shin, 1 1 I&N 
Dec. 686 (D.D. 1966). 
Therefore, the AAO must focus on the level of education required by the position, rather than the 
degree held by subordinate employee. The possession of a bachelor's degree by a subordinate 
employee does not automatically lead to the conclusion that an employee is employed in a 
professional capacity as that term is defined above. Counsel protested in response to the RFE, and 
again on appeal, that the director's request for the college or university degrees of the beneficiary's 
subordinates is burdensome and unjustified. However, the AAO notes that the director requested 
1 
The AAO notes that the total percentage assigned to all duties, even excluding duties noted as "ongoing" without any 
time specified, is greater than 100%. Counsel does not account for this irregularity, even as he repeats the list of duties 
in full on appeal. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent 
objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits 
competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter ofHo, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). 
"copies of the college or university degrees for those named subordinate employees, abroad and in 
the U.S., which were/are professional in nature [emphasis added]," rather than degrees for all 
subordinate employees. 
Thus, the petitioner must first establish which, if any, of the subordinate positions in question are 
professional in nature -- i.e., that they require a bachelor's degree -- and the petitioner has failed to 
do so. Although counsel claims that a bachelor's degree is the "minimum requirement" company- 
wide for positions at the level of the beneficiary's subordinates, there is no indication in the 
description for "marketing associates" and "senior marketing associates" that these positions require 
at least a bachelor's degree in a specific, related field, nor has the petitioner submitted any other 
documentation evidencing such requirement. Going on record without supporting documentary 
evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter 
of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 
I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Without documentary evidence to support the claim, the 
assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. The unsupported assertions of 
counsel do not constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); 
Matter of Laureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 
(BIA 1980). Accordingly, regardless of the educational degrees that the beneficiary's subordinates 
actually hold, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the positions under the beneficiary's 
supervision are "professional" positions, such that the employees holding those positions may be 
considered professional employees. 
Accordingly, the AAO concurs with the director's assessment that the evidence indicates that the 
beneficiary is primarily a first-line supervisor of employees who have not been shown to be 
professionals. Therefore, the beneficiary cannot be deemed to be primarily acting in a managerial 
capacity as a "personnel manager." 
The petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary qualifies as a "function manager." The 
term "function manager" applies generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the work 
of a subordinate staff but instead is primarily responsible for managing an "essential function" within 
the organization. See section 101 (a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1 101 (a)(44)(A)(ii). The term 
"essential function" is not defined by statute or regulation. If a petitioner claims that the beneficiary 
is managing an essential function, the petitioner must furnish a written job offer that clearly 
describes the duties to be performed in managing the essential function, i.e., identify the function 
with specificity, articulate the essential nature of the function, and establish the proportion of the 
beneficiary's daily duties attributed to managing the essential function. See 8 C.F.R. 8 204.50)(5). 
Further, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's daily duties must demonstrate that the 
beneficiary manages the function rather than performs the duties related to the function. An 
employee who primarily performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is 
not considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 
101 (a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial 
or executive duties); see also Matter of Church Scientology Int'l., 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Cornm. 
1988). 
In this matter, the petitioner has neither claimed nor demonstrated that the beneficiary manages an 
essential function. While the beneficiary holds the title of "senior manager, marketing" in the San 
Francisco office, based on the job descriptions provided, it would appear that the beneficiary's 
supervisor, as the "Head of the San Francisco Office and Franchise Lead for HR and Sales and 
Marketing," ultimately controls and directs the sales and marketing function in that office. Thus, the 
evidence does not support the conclusion that the beneficiary manages that function, nor has the 
petitioner or counsel articulated how the beneficiary can be considered a manager of any other 
"essential function." 
Finally, the AAO notes that the petitioner has neither claimed nor provided any evidence to 
demonstrate that the beneficiary will function primarily in an executive capacity. The statutory 
definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated position within a complex 
organizational hierarchy, including major components or functions of the organization, and that 
person's authority to direct the organization. Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 
1 101(a)(44)(B). Under the statute, a beneficiary must have the ability to "direct the management" 
and "establish the goals and policies" of that organization. Inherent to the definition, the 
organization must have a subordinate level of managerial employees for the beneficiary to direct and 
the beneficiary must primarily focus on the broad goals and policies of the organization rather than 
the day-to-operations of the enterprise. An individual will not be deemed an executive under the 
statute simply because they have an executive title or because they "direct" the enterprise as the 
owner or sole managerial employee. The beneficiary must also exercise "wide latitude in 
discretionary decision making" and receive only "general supervision or direction from higher level 
executives, the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization." Id. The petitioner has 
offered no evidence that would support a conclusion that the beneficiary will function in an 
executive capacity. 
In light of the foregoing, the AAO concurs with the director's conclusion that the petitioner has 
failed to establish that the beneficiary would be employed in the United States in a primarily 
executive or managerial capacity. For that reason, the petition will be denied. 
The second issue in this matter is whether the beneficiary was employed abroad in a primarily 
executive or managerial capacity. 
In the March 6, 2008 letter, the petitioner indicated that, prior to his transfer to the United States in 
June 2007 under L-1A status, the beneficiary was employed as a marketing manager with Corporate 
Executive Board Co. (UK) Ltd., a wholly-owned subsidiary of the petitioner. The petitioner 
provided no other information relating to the beneficiary's employment abroad. 
In the RFE, the director requested the following evidence relating to the beneficiary's positions 
abroad: 
1. A list of duties that the beneficiary performed, which should include the actual, 
specific day-to-day tasks involved in the completion of each duty and an estimate 
of the percentage of time dedicated to each duty. 
Page 10 
2. A detailed and dated organizational chart for the beneficiary's foreign employer 
that should include the names of all departments and teams, and the names and a 
detailed description of the job duties of the beneficiary's immediate supervisor 
and all subordinate employees. 
3. Copies of the college or university degrees for those named subordinate 
employees which are professional in nature. 
4. Evidence to establish that the beneficiary completed the requisite period of 
employment in managerial or executive capacity abroad. 
In response, counsel stated that the beneficiary was employed by the foreign entity as a manager, 
marketing, from January 3, 2006 to June 10, 2007. Counsel listed the beneficiary's duties overseas, 
along with the time allocated to each duty, as follows: 
Delivering informal performance feedback and formal reviews for each of the 
associates - 10% -- approximately 4.5 hours per week. 
Partnering with sales management and leadership teams to discuss revenue goals 
along with the creation and execution of weekly, monthly and quarterly plans -- 
10% -- approximately 4.5 hours per week. 
Providing hands-on training for new MarketingISales Associates -- 15% -- 
approximately 6.75 hours per week. 
Serving as a resource for scripting calls as well as handling typical objections and 
coaching, mentoring and developing the internal sales team -- 50%- 
approximately 22.5 hours per week. 
Serving as a career steward regarding advancement opportunities throughout the 
organization -- 10% -- approximately 4.5 hours per week. 
Forecasting attrition and proactively taking necessary steps to remain fully staffed 
-- 10% -- approximately 2.25 hours per week. 
Counsel explained that the beneficiary worked in one of four sections within the Sales Department. 
Counsel stated that during his tenure as a "manager, marketing," the beneficiary reported to the 
"senior manager, sales and marketing." Counsel noted that the role of the beneficiary's supervisor in 
the U.K. company is identical to the role that the beneficiary now fills in the San Francisco office. 
Counsel listed 22 marketing associates or senior marketing associates who reported to the 
beneficiary during that time. The job duties of the marketing and senior marketing associates 
abroad, as described by counsel, are identical to those of the corresponding positions in the United 
States. 
Counsel submitted an organizational chart entitled "CEB UK Sales Associate Team 2006," which 
depicts a pyramid with a sales associate director supervising three sales associate managers, each of 
whom supervises six sales associates. None of the positions on the chart has any individual's name 
attached. 
On appeal, in addition to the brief and evidence described earlier, counsel also submitted two 
additional organizational charts, one entitled "2006 Organization Structure - European Franchise" 
and the other entitled "2007 Marketing Reporting Structure - CEB UK (April 2007)." On the 2006 
chart, the beneficiary is depicted as one of three marketing associate managers reporting to the senior 
marketing associate manager; the beneficiary's subordinates are not shown on the chart. The 2007 
chart also shows the beneficiary as one of four marketing associate managers reporting to the senior 
marketing associate manager. Again, the chain of command below the beneficiary is not revealed on 
that chart. 
Upon review, the AAO finds the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary was employed 
abroad in an executive or managerial capacity. 
The AAO notes that, in the U.K. company, the beneficiary reports to the senior manager of 
marketing, a role comparable to that which the beneficiary currently occupies in the San Francisco 
office. Thus, the beneficiary's position overseas would be subordinate to the beneficiary's position in 
the United States, which the AAO has not found to be primarily managerial or executive. It is also 
noted that the beneficiary's subordinates abroad are all marketing associates or senior marketing 
associates with job duties identical to the beneficiary's non-managerial subordinates in the United 
States. Thus, by the same analysis that has been applied to the beneficiary's U.S. position, the 
beneficiary appears to have been primarily a first-line manager of non-professional employees in his 
position abroad, and therefore could not be deemed to. have been functioning primarily as a 
"personnel manager." Similarly, it has not been shown that he qualified as a "function manager," 
given that there are more senior personnel overseeing the function of sales and marketing in the 
relevant chain of command, nor has the petitioner offered any evidence that would support a 
conclusion that the beneficiary functioned primarily in an executive capacity abroad. 
In light of these deficiencies in the evidence, the AAO finds that the petitioner has failed to establish 
that the beneficiary was employed abroad in an executive or managerial capacity as required by 
section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1153(b)(l)(C). For this additional reason, the petition 
will be denied. 
Finally, the AAO acknowledges that the beneficiary was previously granted an L-1A visa pursuant 
to the petitioner's approved Blanket L petition. It must be noted that many 1-140 immigrant petitions 
are denied after USCIS or a U.S. Consular officer abroad approves prior nonimmigrant 1-129 L-1 
petitions. See, e.g., Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 293 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2003); IKEA US v. 
US Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22; Fedin Brothers Co. Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1103. 
Examining the consequences of an approved petition, there is a significant difference between a 
nonimmigrant L- 1A visa classification, which allows an alien to enter the United States temporarily, 
and an immigrant E-13 visa petition, which permits an alien to apply for permanent residence in the 
United States and, if granted, ultimately apply for naturalization as a United States citizen. CJ $8 
204 and 214 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $8 1154 and 1184; see also 8 316 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1427. 
Because USCIS spends less time reviewing 1-129 nonirnmigrant petitions than 1-140 immigrant 
petitions, some nonimmigrant L-1A petitions are simply approved in error. Q Data Consulting, Inc. 
v. INS, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 29-30; see also 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(14)(i) (requiring no supporting 
documentation to file a petition to extend an L-1A petition's validity). In this case, the beneficiary 
was granted an L-1A visa at the U.S. Embassy in London pursuant to a Blanket L petition, and 
USCIS has not previously reviewed his qualifications as a manager or executive pursuant to the 
statutory definitions at Sections 101 (a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act. Despite the previously approved 
petition, USCIS does not have any authority to confer an immigration benefit when the petitioner 
fails to meet its burden of proof in a subsequent petition. See section 291 of the Act. Based on the 
lack of required evidence of eligibility in the current record, the AAO finds that the director was 
justified in departing from the previous nonimmigrant petition approval by denying the instant 
petition. 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the 
benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1361. Here, 
that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the director's decision will be affirmed and the petition 
will be denied. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.