dismissed EB-1C Case: Electronics And Telecommunications

identifying data deleted to 
prevent clear 1 y unwmted 
invasion of ped privacy 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rm. A3042 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Petition: 
 Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to 
Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1153(b)(l)(C) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
Robert P. Wiemann, Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the employment-based visa petition. The matter 
is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. 
The petitioner is a limited liability company organized in the State of Florida in November 2000. It imports 
and exports electronic and telecommunication equipment and products and distributes floor mats and printer 
cartridges. 
 It seeks to employ the beneficiary as its president and general manager. 
 Accordingly, the 
petitioner endeavors to classify the beneficiary as an employment-based immigrant pursuant to section 
203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. tj 11530>)(1)(C), as a multinational 
executive or manager. 
The director denied the petition on March 2, 2005 and subsequently denied motions to reopen and reconsider 
on April 15, 2005 and June 14, 2005. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that the 
beneficiary would be employed in a managerial or executive capacity for the U.S. petitioner. 
On appeal, counsel submits a brief and re-submits documents already in the file. 
Section 203(b) of the Act states in pertinent part: 
(1) 
 Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified immigrants who 
are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C): 
(C) 
 Certain Multinational Executives and Managers. -- An alien is described in 
this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years preceding the time of the alien's 
application for classification and admission into the United States under this 
subparagraph, has been employed for at least 1 year by a firm or corporation 
or other legal entity or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof and who seeks to 
enter the United States in order to continue to render services to the same 
employer or to a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is 
managerial or executive. 
The language of the statute is specific in limiting this provision to only those executives and managers who 
have previously worked for the firm, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate or subsidiary of that 
entity, and are coming to the United States to work for the same entity, or its affiliate or subsidiary. 
A United States employer may file a petition on Form 1-140 for classification of an alien under section 
203(b)(l)(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. No labor certification is required for this 
classification. The prospective employer in the United States must furnish a job offer in the form of a 
statement that indicates that the alien is to be employed in the United States in a managerial or executive 
capacity. Such a statement must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the alien. See 8 C.F.R. 
tj 204.56)(5). 
The issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary will be employed in 
a primarily managerial or executive capacity for the U.S. entity. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(44)(A), provides: 
The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily 
1. manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or 
component of the organization; 
ii. 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or 
managerial employees, or manages an essential function within the 
organization, or a department or subdivision of the organization; 
. . . 
111. 
 if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the 
authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel 
actions (such as promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee 
is directly supervised, functions at a senior level within the organizational 
hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and 
iv. 
 exercises discretion over the day to day operations of the activity or function 
for which the employee has authority. A first line supervisor is not 
considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the 
supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised are 
professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(44)(B), provides: 
The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily 
1. 
 directs the management of the organization or a major component or function 
of the organization; 
ii. establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or 
function; 
iii. 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision making; and 
iv. 
 receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, 
the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
In a July 14, 2004 letter appended to the petition, the beneficiary on behalf of the petitioner stated: 
Since the approval of my L-1 visa, I have been responsible for managing the entire US 
organization, including the administrative and financial [sic] of the U.S. entity and have had 
the discretion over all operating decisions for the company. I manage the organization['s] 
goals and performance objectives, and other essential functions of the business. Parts [sic] of 
my functions include negotiating contracts on behalf of the company, and dealing with the 
U.S. Company's suppliers and vendors. 
As President/General Manager, I am also responsible to evaluate and review the services 
provided by the company, to ensure it meets proper specifications as per customer and the 
products. Further, I am responsible to ensure conformity with company standards. I am also 
responsible for selecting, hiring and training the personnel. I am responsible for maintaining 
regular communication with the foreign parent company. Additionally, I handle all personnel 
decisions for the US entity. I have the responsibility for orienting and do the jobs 
descriptions of the personnel, training, retaining, [sic] dismissing and placing all of [the 
petitioner's] employees within the United States as necessary, as well as overseeing lower 
level management. 
Counsel for the petitioner in a separate letter also dated July 14, 2005 indicated that the beneficiary was 
responsible for all of the administrative decisions of the company, for all marketing and sales activities of the 
U.S. entity, and for the overall performance of the company. Counsel noted that the beneficiary had 
discretion over all full-time, long-term personnel decisions, negotiated contracts on behalf of the company, 
and dealt with distributors, suppliers, and shippers. Counsel further indicated that the beneficiary oversaw an 
assistant, three sales representatives, and an individual doing business as a freight forwarding company. 
Counsel allocated the percentage of time the beneficiary spent on his duties as: 
(5%) Networking with business industries in community to identify and cultivate new 
information sources. 
(10%) Communicate with various suppliers, distributors, clients, and potential clients, related 
to electronic and telecommunications equipment and products. 
(10%) Preparation of budget for the US entity. 
(10%) Plot strategies for the expansion of business, contracts and negotiations, and develop 
financial objectives 
(10%) Maintain regular communication wit the foreign parent company. 
(55%) Monitor the activities of all employees, including the Assistant, Three Sales 
Representatives, M., d/b/a/ CARIMAR, the freight 
forwarding iring of new employees. Manage the 
overall activities of the company; handle andlor supervise the administration and 
finances of the company. Evaluate and review the services ultimately provided by 
the company to ensure it meets proper specifications as per customer, and the 
products to ensure conformity with standards. 
On January 26, 2005, the director issued a notice of intent to deny the petition. The director requested the 
number of the petitioner's employees when the petition was filed, Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Forms W-2, 
Wage and Tax Statements for 2004, IRS Forms 1099, Miscellaneous Income for 2004, and IRS Forms 941, 
Quarterly Tax Report, for 2004, and a copy of the petitioner's corporate tax return for 2003. 
In a February 10, 2005 response, counsel for the petitioner provided among other things: (1) copies of sales 
agreements the petitioner had entered into with three individuals to sell the petitioner's products; (2) IRS 
Forms 1099 issued to the three sales representatives in the amounts of $9,645.65, $5,938.31, and $7,809.10; 
the petitioner's Florida Form UCT-6, Employer's Quarterly Report, for the third quarter of 2004, the quarter in 
which the petition was filed, showing that the petitioner had paid the individual in the position of "assistant" 
$1,440; a letter from a licensed freight forwarder that indicated the freight forwarding company took 
instructions from the beneficiary concerning the services provided; and copies of solicitation letters sent by 
the beneficiary to other companies expressing a desire to represent or sell their products. 
The record also contains the petitioner's organizational chart showing the beneficiary as the direct report for 
the assistant, the three sales representatives identified as sales managers, and an accountant, a freight 
forwarder, and law offices. The record also contains the petitioner's payroll chart showing the monies paid to 
the beneficiary, the assistant, and the three sales representatives for each month in 2004. The payroll chart 
showed that the assistant was paid $720 each month for her part-time employment, the export sales 
representative was paid a total of $5,938.31 for six out of twelve months of work, the Dade County sales 
representative was paid a total of $9,645.65 for ten out of twelve months of work, and the Broward County 
sales representative was paid a total of $7,809.10 for ten out of twelve months of work. 
The director denied the petition on March 2, 2005, determining that the beneficiary was the only full-time 
employee; the salaries of the other employees indicated that they were employed part-time; and that the 
record did not demonstrate that there were a sufficient number of employees who would relieve the 
beneficiary from performing non-qualifying duties. The director concluded that the beneficiary would 
perform a wide range of daily functions associated with running a business and that these duties are unrelated 
to the definitions of manager or executive. 
In an April 1, 2005 motion to reopen counsel referenced the documentation previously submitted, cited an 
unpublished decision and a district court decision to stand for the proposition that the size of a petitioner and 
the number of employees supervised does not justify a denial when the beneficiary has been employed as the 
organization's top manager, and provided job summaries for each of the petitioner's employees. Counsel also 
alluded to the beneficiary's position as a position managing functions. Counsel restated portions of the 
beneficiary's position description and added that the beneficiary: supervises personnel, supervises collecting 
and paying accounts, analyzes the management of inventories, establishes corporate policy and negotiates 
purchase/sales prices on behalf of the company. Counsel listed the duties of the beneficiary's subordinates as: 
the part-time assistant handles mail, monitors purchases and the work agenda, and gives support to the sales 
team; the sales representatives focus on sales and introducing products; and the export sales representative 
manages the export market. 
Page 6 
On April 15, 2005, the director acknowledged counsel's arguments but determined that the petitioner had not 
provided sufficient evidence to establish that the beneficiary would be relieved from performing the 
non-qualifying day-to-day duties of the business. 
Counsel submitted a second motion to reopen approximately May 13, 2005. Counsel proffered the same 
arguments adding only an explanation that the reason the petitioner's 2004 IRS Form shows that the petitioner 
sold $152,390 and paid only $23,393.06 in commissions is that the petitioner at times did not receive a full 
price on good sold but received only a commission. 
On June 14,2005 the director again acknowledged counsel's arguments but determined that the petitioner had 
not established that the independent contractors were full-time employees. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner again cites an unpublished decision and a district court decision to stand 
for the proposition that the size of a petitioner and the number of employees supervised does not justify a 
denial when the beneficiary has been employed as the organization's top manager. Counsel cites the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service's (now Citizenship and Immigration Services) operations instructions 
214.2(1)(5) as guidance for applying the definitions of managerial and executive capacity. Counsel asserts 
that the petitioner employed four full-time employees and one part-time employee, including the beneficiary, 
when the petition was filed. Counsel asserts that operating a small business with a small staff are not factors 
precluding consideration of the beneficiary's managerial or executive status. Counsel contends that if the 
beneficiary cannot be considered a manager or an executive then the beneficiary is a functional manager. 
Counsel's assertions are not persuasive. When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the 
beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 
fj 204.56)(5). First, the petitioner does not clarify whether the beneficiary is claiming to be primarily engaged 
in managerial duties under section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, or primarily executive duties under section 
101(a)(44)(B) of the Act. A petitioner may not claim that a beneficiary will be employed as a hybrid 
"executive/manager" and rely on partial sections of the two statutory definitions. If the petitioner chooses to 
represent the beneficiary as both an executive and a manager, it must establish that the duties of the 
beneficiary's position satisfies each of the four criteria set forth in the statutory definition for executive and 
the statutory definition for manager. 
The petitioner's first iteration of the beneficiary's duties borrows liberally from portions of the statutory 
definition of managerial capacity and does little to establish what the beneficiary will be doing on a daily 
basis. Merely repeating the language of the statute or regulations does not satisfy the petitioner's burden of 
proof. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1 103, 1 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), afd, 905 F. 2d 41 (2d. Cir. 
1990); Avyr Associates, Inc. v. Meissner, 1997 WL 188942 at *5 (S.D.N.Y.). In addition, portions of counsel 
and the petitioner's initial descriptions include duties that traditionally are not considered managerial or 
executive duties. Duties such as negotiating contracts, dealing with suppliers, vendors, distributors, or 
shippers, and responsibility for all marketing and sales activities are not duties that necessarily comprise 
managerial or executive tasks. The beneficiary also alludes to performing some quality assurance tasks to 
ensure the petitioner's services meet customers' specifications. However, an employee who "primarily" 
performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily" 
Page 7 
employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that 
one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also Matter of Church 
Scientology Int 'l., 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comrn. 1988). 
Further, counsel's allocation of the beneficiary's duties does not succeed in showing that the beneficiary's 
primary tasks are managerial or executive. Counsel allocates 55 percent of the beneficiary's time to 
monitoring the activities of the employees, managing the overall activities, handling and supervising the 
administration and finances of the company, and providing quality assurance. Neither counsel nor the 
petitioner has explained how the performance of these broadly-stated daily administrative and supervisory 
tasks elevates the beneficiary's position to a managerial or executive position. Specifics are clearly an 
important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties are primarily executive or managerial in nature, 
otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., 
Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). Moreover, counsel 
allocates an additional 25 percent of the beneficiary's time to networking, communicating with suppliers, 
distributors, clients and potential clients, and preparing the petitioner's budget. Again, these duties do not 
comprise managerial or executive tasks. 
At most, the description of the beneficiary's duties, the organizational chart, and the beneficiary's subordinates 
duties portray the beneficiary's position as primarily a supervisory position over sales representatives and an 
office clerk, along with responsibility for the routine administrative and operational tasks involved in 
coordinating the import, export, and sale of various products. Although the beneficiary is not required to 
supervise personnel, if it is claimed that his duties involve supervising employees, the petitioner must 
establish that the subordinate employees are supervisory, professional, or managerial. See 9 lOl(a)(44)(A)(ii) 
of the Act. The record does not provide evidence that the positions of the beneficiary's subordinate sale 
representatives, office clerk, or freight forwarder required individuals with professional credentials, rather 
than individuals who could perform the sales, administrative, and clerical tasks of an import, export, and 
distribution company. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for 
purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 
(Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
Counsel's contention that the description of the beneficiary's duties established the beneficiary's position as a 
functional manager is also not persuasive. The term "function manager" applies generally when a beneficiary 
does not supervise or control the work of a subordinate staff but instead is primarily responsible for managing 
an "essential function" within the organization. 
 See section 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 
$ 1 101(a)(44)(A)(ii). The term "essential function" is not defined by statute or regulation. If a petitioner 
claims that the beneficiary is managing an essential function, the petitioner must furnish a written job offer 
that clearly describes the duties to be performed, i.e. identify the function with specificity, articulate the 
essential nature of the function, and establish the proportion of the beneficiary's daily duties attributed to 
managing the essential function. 8 C.F.R. 9 204.56)(5). In addition, the petitioner's description of the 
beneficiary's daily duties must demonstrate that the beneficiary manages the function rather than pe$orms the 
duties related to the function. Again, an employee who primarily performs the tasks necessary to produce a 
product or to provide services is not considered to be employed in a managerial or executive capacity. 
Boyang, Ltd. v. INS., 67 F.3d 305 (Table), 1995 WL 576839 (9th Cir, 1995)(citing Matter of Church 
Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. In this matter the majority of the beneficiary's duties relate to 
supervising non-professional, non-managerial, and non-supervisory subordinates as well as performing 
administrative and operational functions related to the sale, import, export, and distribution of products. The 
description of the beneficiary's duties does not establish that the beneficiary is primarily managing or 
directing a function. 
Counsel's assertions and references to other decisions are not persuasive. Counsel's citation to unpublished 
matters carries little probative value. When examining the managerial or executive capacity of a beneficiary, 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) reviews the totality of the record, including descriptions of a 
beneficiary's duties and his or her subordinate employees, the nature of the petitioner's business, the 
employment and remuneration of employees, and any other facts contributing to a complete understanding of 
a beneficiary's actual role in a business. The evidence must substantiate that the duties of the beneficiary and 
his or her subordinates correspond to their placement in an organization's structural hierarchy. Upon review 
of the record in this matter the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary's duties and those of his 
claimed subordinates elevate the beneficiary's position to a primarily managerial or executive position. 
Further, counsel should take note that unpublished decisions are not binding on CIS in its administration of 
the Act. See 8 C.F.R. § 103,3(c). 
Counsel's citation to a district court decision is noted. However, counsel alludes to but does not fully discuss 
the district court's decision that refers to the requirement that a company's size alone, without talung into 
account the reasonable needs of the organization, may not be the determining factor in denying a visa to a 
multinational manager or executive. See 9 101(a)(44)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1 101(a)(44)(C). Moreover, it 
is appropriate for CIS to consider the size of the petitioning company in conjunction with other relevant 
factors, such as a company's small personnel size, the absence of employees who would perform the 
non-managerial or non-executive operations of the company, or a "shell company" that does not conduct 
business in a regular and continuous manner. See, e.g. Systronics Corp. v. INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 
2001). In addition, the petitioner is required to specifically articulate why its needs are reasonable in light of 
its overall purpose and stage of development to establish that the reasonable needs of the organization justify 
the beneficiary's performance of non-managerial or non-executive duties. Even then the reasonable needs of 
the petitioner will not supersede the requirement that the beneficiary be "primarily" employed in a managerial 
or executive capacity as required by the statute. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 
1101(a)(44). 
In this matter, the petitioner has not provided evidence that it has attained the organizational complexity 
wherein hiringlfiring personnel, discretionary decision-making, and setting company goals and policies would 
constitute significant components of the beneficiary's duties performed on a day-to-day basis. Although the 
beneficiary's position is the highest in this organization, the AAO declines to extend the definition of 
"managerial capacity" to include a beneficiary whose duties comprise primarily the duties of: (1) a first-line 
supervisor of non-professional employees; and (2) the routine non-qualifying duties of an individual 
performing operational and administrative tasks coordinating the petitioner's import, export, and distribution 
business. The petitioner has not established that the beneficiary's duties elevate the beneficiary's position to a 
primarily managerial position. The actual duties themselves reveal the true nature of the employment. Fedin 
Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. at 1108. 
Page 9 
Although neither counsel nor the petitioner specifically claim that the beneficiary's position is an executive 
position, the AAO observes that the beneficiary's position cannot be considered primarily executive. The 
statutory definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated position within a complex 
organizational hierarchy, including major components or functions of the organization, and that person's 
authority to direct the organization. Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1101(a)(44)(B). Under the 
statute, a beneficiary must have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish the goals and policies" 
of that organization. Inherent to the definition, the organization must have a subordinate level of managerial 
employees for the beneficiary to direct and the beneficiary must primarily focus on the broad goals and 
policies of the organization rather than the day-to-operations of the enterprise. An individual will not be 
deemed an executive under the statute simply because they have an executive title or because they "direct" the 
enterprise as the owner or sole managerial employee. As observed above, the beneficiary's subordinates are 
not managerial employees. Counsel for the petitioner indicates that the beneficiary's subordinates sell the 
petitioner's products and provide the office's clerical services. These duties are not managerial. Again, the 
petitioner does not employ a sufficient number of individuals to relieve the beneficiary from performing 
first-line supervisory duties of non-professional employees and the daily administrative and operational tasks 
associated with running an import, export, and distribution enterprise. 
The petitioner has not established that the beneficiary's position with the United States entity will be primarily 
managerial or executive. For this reason, the petition will not be approved. 
Counsel also references the previous approvals of L-1A intracompany transferee petitions filed by the 
petitioner on behalf of this beneficiary. The AAO acknowledges that CIS approved other petitions that had 
been previously filed on behalf of the beneficiary. With regard to the similarity of the eligibility criteria, the 
AAO acknowledges that both the immigrant and nonimmigrant visa classifications rely on the same 
definitions of managerial and executive capacity. See $5 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 
$ 1101(a)(44). Although the statutory definitions for managerial and executive capacity are the same, the 
question of overall eligibility requires a comprehensive review of all of the provisions, not just the definitions 
of managerial and executive capacity. There are significant differences between the nonimmigrant visa 
classification, which allows an alien to enter the United States temporarily for no more than seven years, and 
an immigrant visa petition, which permits an alien to apply for permanent residence in the United States and, 
if granted, ultimately apply for naturalization as a United States citizen. CJ: $$ 204 and 214 of the Act, 
8 U.S.C. $$ 1154 and 1184; see also fj 316 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1427. 
In general, given the permanent nature of the benefit sought, immigrant petitions are given far greater scrutiny 
by CIS than nonimrnigrant petitions. Accordingly, many Form 1-140 immigrant petitions are denied after CIS 
approves prior nonimmigrant Form 1-129 L-1 petitions. See, e.g., Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 293 F. 
Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2003); IKEA US v. US Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22 (D.D.C. 1999); Fedin 
Brothers Co. Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). Because CIS spends less time reviewing 
Form 1-129 nonimmigrant petitions than Form 1-140 immigrant petitions, some nonimmigrant L-1A petitions 
are simply approved in error. Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 29-30; see also 8 C.F.R. 
$ 214.2(1)(14)(i)(requiring no supporting documentation to file a petition to extend an L-1A petition's 
validity). 
Page 10 
Moreover each nonimmigrant and immigrant petition is a separate record of proceeding with a separate burden of 
proof; each petition must stand on its own individual merits. See 8 C.F.R. 103.8(d); 8 C.F.R. 9 103.2@)(16)(ii). 
The approval of a nonimmigrant petition does not guarantee that CIS will approve an immigrant petition filed on 
behalf of the same beneficiary. As the evidence submitted with this petition does not establish eligbility for the 
benefit sought, the director was justified in departing from previous nonimmigrant approvals by denying the 
immigrant petition. 
In addition, if the previous nonimmigrant petitions were approved based on the same information contained in 
the current record, the approval would constitute material and gross error on the part of the director. The 
AAO is not required to approve applications or petitions where eligibility has not been demonstrated, merely 
because of prior approvals that may have been erroneous. 
 See, e.g. Matter of Church Scientology 
International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Comm. 1988). It would be absurd to suggest that CIS or any agency 
must treat acknowledged errors as binding precedent. Sussex Engg. Ltd. v, Montgomery, 825 F.2d 1084, 1090 
(6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988). 
Further, the AAO's authority over the service centers is comparable to the relationship between a court of 
appeals and a district court. Even if a service center director had approved the nonimmigrant petitions on 
behalf of the beneficiary, the AAO would not be bound to follow the contradictory decision of a service 
center. Louisiana Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS, 2000 WL 282785 (E.D. La.), afyd, 248 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir. 
2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 51 (2001). The petitioner has not provided evidence or argument on appeal 
sufficient to overcome the director's decision. 
Finally, the AAO observes that as the director was justified in departing from the previous nonimmigrant 
approvals in this matter; the director should review the previous nonimmigrant approvals for revocation 
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. tj 214.2(1)(9)(iii). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reason. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving 
eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1361. 
Here, that burden has not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.