dismissed EB-1C Case: Finance

U.S. Department of IIomeland Security 
20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000 
Washington. DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
pu~l,lc copy 
identifying data deleted to 
prevent clearly unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy 
FILE: Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: A@ 2 8 2007 
SRC 07 015 53408 
IN RE: 
PETITION: 
 Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to 
Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 1 153(b)(l)(C) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
/ Administrative Appeals Office 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the employment-based visa petition. The matter 
is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed the immigrant visa petition to classify the beneficiary as a multinational manager or 
executive pursuant to section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 
3 1153(b)(l)(C). The petitioner is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of New Jersey that 
provides imaging products and services to photographic, graphic communications, and healthcare markets. 
The petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary as its worldwide financial analyst. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner had not established that the beneficiary would 
be employed by the United States entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner contends that Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) erred in its 
analysis of the beneficiary's employment capacity, stating that CIS incorrectly required that the beneficiary 
possess "a level of supervision of other employees." Counsel also emphasizes CIS' earlier approval of an L- 
1A nonimmigrant visa petition filed the petitioner on behalf of the beneficiary, noting that CIS previously 
deemed the beneficiary's position to be primarily managerial or executive in nature. Counsel submits a brief 
in support of the appeal. 
Section 203(b) of the Act states, in pertinent part: 
(1) Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified immigrants who 
are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C): 
(C) Certain Multinational Executives and Managers. - An alien is 
described in this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years preceding the 
time of the alien's application for classification and admission into the 
United States under this subparagraph, has been employed for at least 1 
year by a firm or corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate or 
subsidiary thereof and who seeks to enter the United States in order to 
continue to render services to the same employer or to a subsidiary or 
affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial or executive. 
The language of the statute is specific in limiting this provision to only those executives or managers who 
have previously worked for the firm, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate or subsidiary of that 
entity, and are coming to the United States to work for the same entity, or its affiliate or subsidiary. 
A United States employer may file a petition on Form 1-140 for classification of an alien under section 
203(b)(l)(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. No labor certification is required for this 
classification. The prospective employer in the United States must furnish a job offer in the form of a 
statement, which indicates that the alien is to be employed in the United States in a managerial or executive 
capacity. Such a statement must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the alien. 
The issue in this proceeding is whether the beneficiary would be employed by the United States entity in a 
primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Section 101 (a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 10 1(a)(44)(A), provides: 
The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee 
primarily- 
(i) 
 Manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
the organization; 
(ii) 
 Supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department or 
subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 Has the authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions 
(such as promotion and leave authorization) if another employee or other employees are directly 
supervised; if no other employee is directly supervised, functions at a senior level within the 
organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and 
(iv) 
 Exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function for which 
the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be acting in a managerial 
capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised 
are professional. 
Section 101 (a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1 10 1 (a)(44)(B), provides: 
The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee 
primarily- 
(i) 
 Directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) 
 Establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) 
 Exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(iv) 
 Receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of 
directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
The petitioner filed the Form 1-140 on October 23, 2006, noting that in association with her position as 
worldwide financial analyst, the beneficiary would "[plrovide financial analysis and business strategy support 
for the Worldwide Consumer and Professional Imaging Film Flow Manager." In an attached letter, dated 
October 9, 2006, the petitioner provided the following additional description of the beneficiary's employment 
in the United States entity: 
Page 4 
In her current position, [the beneficiary] is responsible for providing financial analysis and 
business strategy support for the Worldwide Consumer and Professional Imaging (C&PI) 
Film Flow Manager. Specifically, she leads and coordinates Worldwide C&PI annual 
Worldwide Operating Plan, Annual Strategic Review, monthly reporting and quarterly 
estimate processes. She also prepares explanations and consolidates monthly reports for 
Worldwide C&PI operations. In addition, [the beneficiary] performs various sourcing, new 
business and capital investment business cases. She also has responsibility for providing 
leadership for internal controls, reporting processes and general financing questions for the 
worldwide C&PI manufacturing sites. 
In the course of her duties as Worldwide Financial Analyst, [the beneficiary] makes priority 
decisions independently and exercises discretionary authority over her daily management 
activities. 
 She has supervisory authority over the functions of her position. 
 [The 
beneficiary] exercises broad discretion with regard to day-to-day decisions, as she manages 
all elements of the company's financial functions. [The beneficiary] retains broad 
discretion with regard to financial decisions and functions at a senior level within the 
company. 
On December 4, 2006, the director issued a request for evidence, noting that the present record did not 
establish the beneficiary's proposed employment as a manager or executive. The director requested that the 
petitioner submit a statement detailing the specific functions or duties to be performed by the beneficiary, 
including addressing "all goal-setting, policy-making, and discretionary decision-making duties." The 
director asked that the petitioner describe the supervision received by the beneficiary with respect to her 
position in the organizational hierarchy, and submit an organizational chart reflecting the beneficiary's 
position. The director further requested the names and job titles of the individuals supervised by the 
beneficiary, and clarification as to how the company's reasonable needs in light of its overall purpose and 
stage of development would allow the beneficiary to perform in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Counsel for the petitioner responded in a letter dated February 16, 2007. In an attached letter, dated February 
15, 2007, the petitioner stated that in her proposed position, the beneficiary would manage "the essential 
function of forecasting, analyzing and disseminating worldwide financial advice and finance distribution for 
[the petitioner's] film manufacturing operations." The petitioner explained that with respect to this function, 
the beneficiary's "develops, modifies, leads and coordinates the worldwide [C&PI] Film Manufacturing 
Annual Financial Operating Plan and in doing so, provides financial analysis, guidance, strategy and direction 
to all affected major parties, such as the Chief Executive Office (CEO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and 
Directors of [the petitioning entity], with full responsibility for a $200 million budget." The petitioner further 
provided the following outline of the beneficiary's related job responsibilities: 
Goal Setting 
[The beneficiary] sets goals for the [C&PI] such as the setting of unit manufacturing cost 
goals and their impact on [the petitioner's] annual finances, which involves communicating 
with different worldwide film manufacturing sites and processes and determining the future 
plans for the products. She also sets financial productivity goals, including production and 
sales volumes, inventory levels and future products for the [C&PI] film manufacturing and 
in so doing, exercises discretionary authority over her daily management activities. 
Page 5 
[The beneficiary] also sets Executive Compensation goals for both executives and 
employees of [the petitioning entity], such as stocks programs and wage dividends, and 
presents them to the Board of Directors Compensation Committee, which are the senior 
decision making executives as [the petitioning entity]. She executes the scoring and 
reporting of Executive Compensation with the Human Resources Compensation Executive, 
the Worldwide Control Director of Corporate Financial Planning and Analysis, and the 
CFO and CEO of [the petitioning entity], thereby functioning at a senior level within the 
organizational hierarchy and with respect to the function managed. 
Policy Making 
In policy making, [the beneficiary] leads global efforts to improve financial and operational 
processes within the [C&PI] business. She continually reviews the processes for possible 
improvement, modification or cancellation, and makes these priority decisions 
independently. 
Discretionary Decision Making 
In discretionary decision making, [the beneficiary] after receiving financial reports and 
information from [the petitioner's] various departments and groups around the world, 
performs analysis and decisions and presents them in final detail, with her suggestions, to 
the most senior level management of [the petitioning entity] for their final approval. She 
also provides leadership for internal controls by answering general financial questions for 
other departments and making decisions for the worldwide [C&PI] manufacturing sites. 
Position in Organizational Hierarchy 
[The beneficiary] 
 who is Director, Corporate Finance 
Planning and Analysis. in turn, reports directly to the 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of [the petitioning entity]. 
 Therefore, she is 
functioning at a senior level with [the petitioning entity's] organizational hierarchy. [The 
beneficiary] consolidates global monthly results and then presents them with explanations 
directly to senior operating and financial management officials in the Global Manufacturing 
and [C&PI] business units, and then offers recommendations on opportunities, risks, future 
courses of action, thereby functioning at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy. 
Although [the beneficiary] does not have any employees who directly report to her, she 
does act as the Financial Point of Contact for various Site Financial Analysts around the 
world (currently eight sites) to provide information for their required decision-making in 
the major financial corporate processes for [C&PI]. 
[The petitioner] requires [the beneficiary's] skills and experience to meet the reasonable 
needs of the company in light of its overall purpose and stage of development of the 
worldwide [C&PI] Film Manufacturing operations. This level of financial responsibility 
and functional management allows [the beneficiary] to function as a manager within the 
organization. 
Page 6 
In a decision, dated February 23, 2007, the director concluded that the petitioner had not demonstrated that 
the beneficiary would be employed by the United States entity in a primarily managerial or executive 
capacity. The director outlined the descriptions offered for the beneficiary's position, stating that the record 
does not establish that as a financial analyst, the beneficiary would be employed in a primarily managerial or 
executive capacity. The director noted that the petitioner employed other workers in the position of financial 
analyst, and stated that it is not clear whether the beneficiary's position "is more superior over the others," or 
that they would "share the duties in this company." The director stated that because the beneficiary was not 
depicted as supervising subordinate workers, "[tlhere is no evidence that [the beneficiary] has the authority to 
supervise and control the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial employees, or manages [an] 
essential function within the organization, or a department or subdivision of the organization." The director 
concluded that because the petitioner failed to establish these criteria, the beneficiary could not be considered 
a manager or executive. Consequently, the director denied the petition. 
Counsel for the petitioner filed an appeal on March 23, 2007, claiming that the director's decision contains 
errors of law and fact with respect to the requirement that the beneficiary supervise subordinate employees. 
Counsel states that the petitioner did not claim that the beneficiary would manage other individuals, but 
instead, that she would be employed as a function manager. Counsel states that the statutory definition of 
"managerial capacity" does not require the supervision or control of others in order to qualify as a manager, 
but instead allows for the management of a function. Counsel contends: "Proof was submitted that [the 
beneficiary] works at a senior level with respect to the 'functionr." 
Counsel emphasizes CIS' previously approval of an L-1A nonimmigrant petition filed by the petitioner on 
behalf of the beneficiary's employment in the position of worldwide financial analyst. Counsel states: 
[The beneficiary] was granted approval as a manager for L-IA purposes and should also be 
accorded that status for EB-1 purposes under identical regulatory language and under an 
identical fact pattern. 
Counsel references several unpublished AAO decisions, stating that in the decisions the AAO refused to 
affirm CIS' denial of an 1-140 visa petition when a prior L-1A petition had been approved for the same 
beneficiary unless the prior determination had involved gross error or the facts at issue had changed. Counsel 
claims that the AAO relied on a belief of "fairness," that "the petitioning company was entitled to rely on the 
favorable determination concerning managerial status made in the earlier L-1A adjudication." Counsel 
contends that as a matter of fairness, the "logic" of the earlier decisions should be applied to the analysis of 
the instant matter. 
Upon review, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary would be employed by the petitioning 
entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 5 204.5(i)(5). 
The job descriptions provided for the position of worldwide financial analyst do not corroborate counsel's 
claim on appeal that the immigrant visa petition was based on the beneficiary's employment as a function 
manager. The term "function manager" applies generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the 
work of a subordinate staff but instead is primarily responsible for managing an "essential functionr' within 
Page 7 
the organization. See section 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 3 1101(a)(44)(A)(ii). The term "essential 
function" is not defined by statute or regulation. If a petitioner claims that the beneficiary is managing an 
essential function, the petitioner must furnish a written job offer that clearly describes the duties to be 
performed, i.e. identifjr the function with specificity, articulate the essential nature of the function, and 
establish the proportion of the beneficiary's daily duties attributed to managing the essential function. 8 
C.F.R. 3 204.56)(5). In addition, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's daily duties must 
demonstrate that the beneficiary manages the function rather than performs the duties related to the function. 
In its initial letter, the petitioner identified the beneficiary's specific tasks as: coordinating the Worldwide 
C&PI annual worldwide operating plan, the annual strategic review, the monthly reports, and the quarterly 
estimate processes; preparing "explanations" with respect to monthly reports for worldwide C&PI operations; 
performing "sourcing," new business and capital investment cases; and providing leadership for worldwide 
C&PI manufacturing sites. These brief claims fail to identify with specificity the function to be managed by 
the beneficiary, and only reference the existence of what appears to be a "Worldwide Consumer and 
Professional Imaging" department within the petitioning entity. The petitioner did not identify the 
"Worldwide Consumer and Professional Imaging" function. Nor did the petitioner address how the 
beneficiary's coordination of the worldwide C&PI operating plan and the monthly and quarterly "processes," 
or her "explanations" of monthly reports demonstrate that she would be managing a particular financial 
function in the petitioning entity. While the record suggests that the beneficiary may be receiving financial 
documentation from other departments, or "sites," from which the beneficiary would also field general 
finance questions, there is little evidence in the record addressing how the beneficiary would be primarily 
managing the finances of the petitioning entity. Additionally, the limited record does not resolve the 
suggestion that the beneficiary may instead be performing the non-managerial and non-executive tasks related 
to the finance function, such as gathering, computing, and analyzing financial material. Going on record 
without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in 
these proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Cornm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of 
California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
As mentioned by the director, the AAO addresses the petitioner's employment of six other financial analysts. 
Although not directly associated with the analysis of whether the beneficiary performs primarily managerial 
or executive job duties, the employment of a large number of financial analysts, as well as a director and vice 
president of corporate financial planning and analysis, a finance director, and a financial specialist severely 
undermines the petitioner's initial claim that the beneficiary "manages all elements of the company's financial 
functions," "retains broad discretion with regard to financial decisions," and "functions at a senior level within 
the company." Also, the beneficiary's employment is not distinguished from that of the other six financial 
analysts, thereby raising the question of why the beneficiary would be considered the manager of the 
company's finance function. Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a 
reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. 
Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582,591 (BIA 1988). 
Moreover, the petitioner did not explain the beneficiary's additional job duties of "sourcing," "reporting 
processes," "or providing leadership for internal controls." The limited record does not explain these tasks or 
identify the specific managerial or executive job duties associated with these responsibilities. Absent 
clarification, the AAO cannot determine how these job responsibilities would warrant the beneficiary's 
eligibility as a manager ofthe company's finance function. The actual duties themselves reveal the true nature 
of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1 103, 1 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 905 F.2d 
41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
Similarly, the petitioner's response to the director's request for evidence does not demonstrate the beneficiary's 
purported role as a function manager. 
The AAO first notes a relevant and unresolved inconsistency in the subsequent job description related to the 
beneficiary's purported senior-level employment. The beneficiary was originally identified by the petitioner 
on the Form 1-140 and in its October 9, 2006 letter as reporting to the worldwide C&PI film flow manager. 
Additionally, in its February 15, 2007 response to the director's request for evidence, the beneficiary is noted 
as holding this managerial position in "the Corporate Financial Planning & Analysis group for [the 
petitioner's] Worldwide Consumer and Professional (CPI) Film ~anufacturing." However, in this same letter 
and on the company's organizational chart, the beneficiary is identified as reporting to the company's director 
of corporate finance planning and analysis, who in turn reports directly to the company's chief executive 
officer. The petitioner did not address its earlier claim of reporting to the worldwide C&PI film flow 
manager. Nor did the petitioner identify the C&PI film flow manager on its organizational chart. It is 
incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in'the record by independent objective evidence. 
Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits 
competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 
1988). This relevant and unexplained change in the beneficiary's purported managerial authority raises 
uncertainty as to the beneficiary's true position in the company's organizational hierarchy at the time of filing 
the immigrant visa petition. Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a 
reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. 
Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. at 591. 
As emphasized above, in order for the beneficiary to be deemed a function manager, the petitioner must 
describe with specificity the beneficiary's purported managerial authority over the company's financial 
function, demonstrating that the beneficiary is not personally performing tasks related to the function. While 
the petitioner provided in its response to the director's request for evidence a more lengthy description of the 
beneficiary's role as worldwide financial analyst, the record remains vague as to the specific function to be 
managed by the beneficiary, and how the beneficiary would primarily manage "all elements of the company's 
financial functions." 
The petitioner continuously references the "worldwide [C&PI] Film Manufacturing Annual Financial 
Operating Plan," which the beneficiary purportedly "develops, modifies, leads and coordinates." Yet, the 
petitioner did not submit any explanation of the "Plan," or its purported essential nature to the petitioning 
entity, or how the beneficiary's development and coordination of the Plan constitutes her role as a function 
manager. Moreover, there is only limited evidence as to how the beneficiary derives the financial information 
relied upon to develop the operating plan. In other words, the record does not clarify whether the 
beneficiary's role as a worldwide financial analyst encompasses the performance of daily routine financial 
tasks or whether the beneficiary analyzes the financial data processed by outside personnel. Other than 
mentioning the existence of film manufacturing sites and "various departments and groups around the world," 
it is unclear from where the beneficiary is receiving financial information, or which personnel and 
departments the beneficiary would interact with on a regular basis. This information is relevant to the instant 
analysis, as the beneficiary is represented as relying on reports received from separate "departments" and 
"groups" to manage the C&PI film manufacturing annual financial operating plan and the financial function 
Page 9 
as a whole. 
 If the beneficiary is in fact managing a financial function, the petitioner is obligated to 
demonstrate that she is not personally performing non-managerial and non-executive financial tasks. The 
AAO notes that an employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide 
services is not considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 
101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or 
executive duties); see also Matter of Church Scientology Int 'l., 19 I&N Dec. 593,604 (Comm. 1988). 
The AAO notes that counsel did not attempt to reconcile these deficiencies on appeal. Counsel claims only 
that "[plroof was submitted that [the beneficiary] works at a senior level with respect to the 'function'," and 
fails to even identi6 what function the beneficiary is managing. Without documentary evidence to support 
the claim, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. The unsupported 
assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); 
Matter of Laureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); Matter of Ramirez-Smchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 
1980). 
Counsel main contention on appeal is that the prior approval of an L-1A nonimmigrant petition filed on 
behalf of the beneficiary, and which comprised facts similar to the instant matter, should be sufficient to 
establish the beneficiary's eligibility for the requested immigrant visa petition. Counsel claims that as a 
matter of "fairness," the previous approval should dictate a favorable determination in the instant matter. 
Counsel cites several unpublished AAO decisions involving the approval of an L-IA nonimmigrant petition 
and subsequent denial of requests under the employment-based sixth preference, Schedule A, Group IV 
category, stating that the AAO concluded that "the petitioning company was entitled to rely on the favorable 
determination concerning managerial status made in the earlier L-1 adjudication." Counsel states: 
The underlying nonimmigrant visa status as L-1A was previously granted to [the 
beneficiary] by the USCIS. The logic of the foregoing [AAO] decisions and the policy that 
existed under Legacy [Immigration and Naturalization Services] should continue to be 
applied. To do otherwise would create a matter of significant unfairness. 
Counsel's argument that the AAO's review of the instant matter is bound by the notion of "fairness" is not 
persuasive. Contrary to counsel's claim, in the instant 1-140 proceeding, CIS is not bound by a prior approval 
of an L-IA visa petition. It should be noted that, in general, given the permanent nature of the benefit sought, 
immigrant petitions are given far greater scrutiny by CIS than nonimmigrant petitions. The AAO 
acknowledges that both the immigrant and nonimmigrant visa classifications rely on the same definitions of 
managerial and executive capacity. See $5 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1 101(a)(44). 
Although the statutory definitions for managerial and executive capacity are the same, the question of overall 
eligibility requires a comprehensive review of all of the provisions, not just the definitions of managerial and 
executive capacity. There are significant differences between the nonimmigrant visa classification, which 
allows an alien to enter the United States temporarily for no more than seven years, and an immigrant visa 
petition, which pennits an alien to apply for permanent residence in the United States and, if granted, 
ultimately apply for naturalization as a United States citizen. C$ @204 and 214 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $9 1 154 
and 1184; see also $ 316 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1427. 
Also, each nonimmigrant and immigrant petition is a separate record of proceeding with a separate burden of 
proof; each petition must stand on its own individual merits. See 8 C.F.R. $ 103.8(d). In making a 
determination of statutory eligibility, CIS is limited to the information contained in the record of proceeding. 
See 8 C.F.R. fj 103.2(b)(16)(ii). The AAO notes that the present record does not contain a copy of the prior 
approval of the nonimmigrant petition. Nonetheless, the prior nonimmigrant approvals do not preclude CIS 
from denying an extension petition. See e.g. Texm A&M Univ. v. Upchurch, 99 Fed. Appx. 556, 2004 WL 
1240482 (5th Cir. 2004). The approval of a nonimmigrant petition in no way guarantees that CIS will 
approve an immigrant petition filed on behalf of the same beneficiary. CIS denies many 1-140 petitions after 
approving prior nonimmigrant 1-129 L-1 petitions. See, e.g., Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 293 F. Supp. 2d 
at 25; IKEA US v. US Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 22; Fedin Brothers Co. Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. at 
1103. 
Moreover, if the previous nonimmigrant petition were approved based on the same unsupported and 
contradictory assertions that are contained in the current record, the approval would constitute material and 
gross error on the part of the director. The AAO is not required to approve applications or petitions where 
eligibility has not been demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals that may have been erroneous. See, 
e.g. Matter ofchurch Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Comm. 1988). It would be absurd to 
suggest that CIS or any agency must treat acknowledged errors as binding precedent. Sussex Engg. Ltd. v. 
Montgomery, 825 F.2d 1084, 1090 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988). Due to the lack of 
required evidence in the present record, the AAO finds that the director was justified in departing from the 
previous nonimmigrant approval by denying the present immigrant petition. 
Finally, the AAOts authority over the service centers is comparable to the relationship between a court of 
appeals and a district court. Even if a service center director had approved the nonimmigrant petitions on 
behalf of the beneficiary, the AAO would not be bound to follow the contradictory decision of a service 
center. Louisiana Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS, 2000 WL 282785 (E.D. La.), affd, 248 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir. 
2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 5 1 (2001). 
Counsel acknowledges on appeal the petitioner's burden of proof to establish the beneficiary's eligibility for 
the requested immigrant visa classification. The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the 
evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made 
based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. Matter of E-M-, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 
1989). In evaluating the evidence, Matter of E-M- also stated that "[tlruth is to be determined not by the 
quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." Id. Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the 
preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, 
probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to 
determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true. 
Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible 
evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not," the 
applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. See US. v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) 
(defining "more likely than not" as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the 
director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence 
or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or 
petition. 
Here, the submitted evidence is not relevant, probative, and credible. As addressed previously, deficiencies in 
the record, such as clarification of the specific function to be managed by the beneficiary, as well as 
inconsistencies undermining the petitioner's claim of employing the beneficiary in a senior-level position, 
Page I I 
raise doubt that the beneficiary would be primarily employed as a manager of the petitioner's finance 
function. These relevant inconsistencies create a "material doubt" as to the beneficiary's purported 
employment as a function manager. 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary would be 
employed by the United States entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. Accordingly, the 
appeal will be dismissed. 
Beyond the decision of the director, an additional issue is whether the petitioner demonstrated that the 
beneficiary was employed by the foreign entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
In its October 9, 2006 letter, the petitioner represented the beneficiary as having occupied the position of 
manufacturing financial analyst in the foreign entity, during which she was "in charge of Color Flow and Site 
Support Financial Operations." The petitioner provided: 
In this functional manager role, [the beneficiary] worked closely with the Finance Manager 
in providing financial and business analysis as it related to site issues and partners with 
plant operations to evaluate financial merits of Color Film Flow business case proposals. 
Specifically, she held the position of primary financial support of manufacturing operation 
for the Consumer Imaging Film Flow. As a member of this management team, she ensured 
that the flow met financial and operational objectives by providing effective financial 
reporting and budgeting processes. She also developed ad hoc financial projects and 
provided leadership and financial counseling. 
In the course of her duties as Manufacturing Financial Analyst, [the beneficiary] made 
priority decisions independently and exercised discretionary authority over her daily 
management activities. She had supervisory authority over the functions of the Financial 
Department. [The beneficiary] exercised broad discretion with regard to day-to-day 
decisions, as she managed all elements of the company's Finance functions. She retained 
broad discretion with regard to financial decisions and functioned at a senior level within 
the company. 
Based on the petitioner's representations, the beneficiary was not employed by the foreign entity in a 
primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 5 204.56)(5). 
Despite the petitioner's reference to the beneficiary's employment as a function manager, the record is devoid 
of evidence demonstrating that the beneficiary managed the foreign company's finance function. If a 
petitioner claims that the beneficiary is managing an essential function, the petitioner must furnish a written 
job offer that clearly describes the duties to be performed, i.e. identify the function with specificity, articulate 
the essential nature of the function, and establish the proportion of the beneficiary's daily duties attributed to 
managing the essential function. 
 8 C.F.R. 5 204.5(j)(5). In addition, the petitioner's description of the 
beneficiary's daily duties must demonstrate that the beneficiary manages the function rather than performs the 
duties related to the function. An employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a 
Page 12 
product or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive 
capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the 
enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also Matter of church Scientology Int'l., 19 I&N Dec. 593, 
604 (Comm. 1988). 
The offered job description indicates that as the foreign entity's manufacturing financial analyst, the 
beneficiary provided "financial and business analysis," "effective financial reporting and budgeting 
processes," and financial counseling, and "developed ad hoc financial projects." These representations 
suggest that the beneficiary performed non-managerial or non-executive tasks related to the foreign 
company's finance function, rather than managing the function as claimed by the petitioner. See 
$9 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act. Additionally, other than claiming the role of function manager, the 
petitioner failed to indicate with specificity how the beneficiary was managing the finance department. In 
light of these findings, the AAO cannot conclude that the beneficiary managed the foreign company's finance 
function. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting 
the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. 
Moreover, the fact that the beneficiary "worked closely with" and presumably reported to the manager of the 
foreign company's finance department undermines the petitioner's claims that the beneficiary possessed 
supervisory authority over the organization's finance department and "managed all elements of the company's 
Finance functions." Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation 
of the reliability and sufftciency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. Matter of 
Ho, 19 I&N Dec. at 591. 
Furthermore, a significant portion of the beneficiary's job description was based on a restatement of the 
statutory definitions of "managerial capacity" and "executive capacity." The petitioner's claims as to the 
beneficiary's "discretionary authority over [ ] daily management activities," "supervisory authority over the 
functions of the Finance department," "broad discretion with regard to day-to-day decisions," and senior-level 
position in the foreign company are not sufficient to establish the beneficiary's former overseas employment 
in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a 
beneficiary's duties are primarily executive or managerial in nature, otherwise meeting the definitions would 
simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. at 1 108. 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary was employed by 
the foreign entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. For this additional reason, the petition will 
be denied. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 200 l), aff'd. 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. Jn visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit 
sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1361. Here, that burden has 
not been met. 
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ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.