dismissed EB-1C Case: Garment And Textile

, 
identifying data Meted to 
prevent clearly unwatranted 
invasion of persona\ p~ivac~ 
U.S. Department of IIomeland Security 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
Office of Administrative Appeals, MS 2090 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
FILE: 
 LIN 07 120 54619 
 Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER 
 Date: JU L 2 8 2009 
IN RE: 
PETITION: 
 Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to 
Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1153(b)(l)(C) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. 9 103.5 for 
the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by 
filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 
days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
&&L 
hohn F. Gnssom 
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office 
LIN07 12054619 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Nebraska Service Center, denied the employment-based petition. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be 
dismissed. 
The petitioner is a corporation organized in the State of California that claims to be in the business of 
garment and textile import and export. The petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary as its chief 
executive officer. Accordingly, the petitioner endeavors to classify the beneficiary as an 
employment-based immigrant pursuant to section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 5 1153(b)(l)(C), as a multinational executive or manager. 
The director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner had not established that the 
beneficiary will be employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner contends that the 
beneficiary's position in the United States meets the statutory requirements for classification as a 
multinational executive or manager. The petitioner submitted further evidence in support of its 
claims on appeal. 
Section 203(b) of the Act states in pertinent part: 
(1) 
 Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified immigrants 
who are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C): 
(C) 
 Certain Multinational Executives and Managers. -- An alien is 
described in this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years 
preceding the time of the alien's application for classification 
and admission into the United States under this subparagraph, 
has been employed for at least 1 year by a firm or corporation 
or other legal entity or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof and 
who seeks to enter the United States in order to continue to 
render services to the same employer or to a subsidiary or 
affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial or executive. 
The language of the statute is specific in limiting this provision to only those executives and 
managers who have previously worked for the firm, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate 
or subsidiary of that entity, and are coming to the United States to work for the same entity, or its 
affiliate or subsidiary. 
A United States employer may file a petition on Form 1-140 for classification of an alien under 
section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. No labor certification is 
required for this classification. The prospective employer in the United States must furnish a job 
LIN07 12054619 
Page 3 
offer in the form of a statement that indicates that the alien is to be employed in the United States in 
a managerial or executive capacity. Such a statement must clearly describe the duties to be 
performed by the alien. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(5). 
At issue in the present matter is whether the beneficiary will be employed in a primarily managerial 
or executive capacity by the United States entity. 
Section 101 (a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101 (a)(44)(A), provides: 
The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily 
(i) 
 manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or 
component of the organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or 
managerial employees, or manages an essential function within the 
organization, or a department or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has 
the authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other 
personnel actions (such as promotion and leave authorization), or if no 
other employee is directly supervised, functions at a senior level 
within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function 
managed; and 
(iv) 
 exercises discretion over the day to day operations of the activity or 
function for which the employee has authority. A first line supervisor 
is not considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by 
virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees 
supervised are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 1101(a)(44)(B), provides: 
The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily 
(i) 
 directs the management of the organization or a major component or 
function of the organization; 
(ii) 
 establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or 
function; 
(iii) 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision making; and 
LIN 07 120 54619 
Page 4 
(iv) 
 receives only general supervision or direction from higher level 
executives, the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
In a letter dated March 14, 2007 submitted with the Form 1-140, Immigration Petition for Alien 
Worker, the petitioner described the beneficiary's duties in the United States as follow: 
[The beneficiary] has been on the position of CEO in [the petitioning company] since 
his entry of the U.S. [sic]. This position requires the candidate Plan, develop and 
establish policies and objectives of our U.S. subsidiary in accordance with board 
directives and corporation charter of our parent company:[sic] Confer with company 
officials to plan business objectives, to develop organizational policies to coordinate 
functions and operations between divisions and departments, and to establish 
responsibilities and procedures for attaining objectives. Review activity reports and 
financial statements to determine progress and status in attaining objectives and 
revise objectives and plans in accordance with current conditions. Direct and 
coordinate formulation of financial programs to provide funding for new or 
continuing operations to maximize returns on investments, and to increase 
productivity. Reviews financial statements and sales and activity reports to ensure 
that organization's objectives are achieved. Plan and develop industrial, labor, and 
public relation policies designed to improve company's image and relations with 
customers. Evaluate performance of executives for compliance with established 
policies and objectives of the company. Person in this position has authority to hire 
and fire executive and managerial personnel. 
The petitioner stated on the Form 1-140 that it has 6 employees. However, the petitioner also 
submitted its California State Forms DE6, Quarterly Wage and Withholding Reports, for all four 
quarters of 2006, which indicated that the petitioner only had five employees on its payroll during 
each quarter. The petitioner did not submit any description of its employees other than the 
beneficiary. 
On May 22, 2008, the director issued a request for further evidence (RFE). 
 In connection with the 
beneficiary's position in the United States, the. director requested a more detailed description of the 
beneficiary's duties, including the specific day-to-day tasks associated with each duty and an 
estimate of the percentage of time the beneficiary would spend on each specific duty. The director 
also requested a detailed organization chart for the U.S. company that should illustrate the current 
structure of the company with the proposed position for the beneficiary, list the names of all 
departments and teams, and include the names and detailed descriptions of the job duties for the 
beneficiary's subordinate employees. 
The petitioner responded to the WE in a letter dated June 23, 2008, accompanied by additional 
evidence. In the letter, the petitioner restated the description of the beneficiary's U.S. job duties 
provided in the March 2007 letter and added the following: 
LIN07 12054619 
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Due to his dual functions in both the U.S. entity and the Chinese parent group 
company i.e. CEO of the U.S. company and a member of the Board of Directors of 
SHANDON D&Y TEXTILE & GARMENT GROUP (D&Y GROUP), he has been 
playing a critical role in planning, developing, and establishing policies and 
objectives of both the foreign parent company and the U.S. subsidiary. In order to 
fulfill his task, he has to spend about 95% of his total working hours in planning, 
developing, and establishing policies for both the group company and the U.S. 
subsidiary and about 10% working hours in administrative activities, e.g. training, 
hiring and firing employees of the U.S. company. 
The petitioner indicated in the same letter that the beneficiary has four immediate subordinates, 
whose names, titles and job descriptions are as follow: 
importing garment products from China; [mlanage company staff, preparing work 
schedules and assigning specific duties; [rleview financial statements, sales and 
activity reports, and other performance data of the company in order to measure 
productivity to determine areas needing cost reduction and program improvement; 
[dletermining staffing requirements, and interview, hire and train new employees; 
[mlonitor purchasing agencies to ensure that they efficiently and effectively provide 
needed services while staying within budgetary limits; [dlirect and coordinate 
organization's financial and budget activities to fund operations; [mlanage the 
movement of goods and product into and out of production facilities. 
information in response to inquiries about products and services and to handle and 
resolve complaints. 
accounting, investing, banking, insurance, securities, and other financial activities of 
a branch, office, or department of an establishment. 
goals and establish training programs for sales representatives. 
 Analyze sales 
statistics gathered by staff to determine sales potential and inventory requirements 
and monitor the preferences of customers. 
1 
 The AAO notes that the nam- does not appear on any of the California State Forms DE6 or Internal 
Revenue Service Forms W-2 for the year 2006 that are in the record. Although the name does appear on 
some of those forms, there is no evidence that and are the same person. Thus, it is not clear 
based on the record that was employed by the petitioner, or that the position of General Operation 
Manager was actually filled, at the time the petition was filed. 
' LIN07 12054619 
Page 6 
On the organizational chart the petitioner submitted, the beneficiary is listed as "President" at the top 
of the chart. The positions immediately below him are "Sales Dept." and "General Operation 
Manager." Listed under the General Operation Manager are the "Financial and Accounting Dept." 
and the "Customer Service Dept." Under "Sales Dept." are the names of three companies who are 
listed as distributors. 
On January 28, 2008, the director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner had not 
established that the beneficiary will be employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Specifically, the director noted that the petitioner has used either vague statements or paraphrased 
statutory language to describe the beneficiary's activities. The director also noted that, based on the 
organizational chart of the U.S. company, the beneficiary has two direct subordinates who are not 
performing in a managerial capacity, despite their managerial titles. The director further found that 
the evidence does not show that there is a sufficiently complex or sophisticated US organization that 
requires the services of an executive; rather, the U.S. entity is primarily a small sales office with 
three support staff operating as an agent for the foreign parent. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner contends that the beneficiary's position in the United States 
meets the statutory requirements for classification as a multinational executive or manager under 
section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Act. Counsel restates the beneficiary's job description that was provided 
in response to the RFE and asserts that it clearly indicates what functions the beneficiary has in the 
U.S. company and the percentage of time dedicated to each function. Counsel further asserts that the 
fact that the description uses statutory language should not be a ground for denial if the language in 
question clearly explains the beneficiary's responsibilities. Counsel notes the director's finding that 
the beneficiary's direct subordinates are not managers, but argues that the key issue is whether the 
beneficiary functions in an executive capacity. Counsel claims that the beneficiary's position in the 
U.S. company meets the requirements for "executive capacity" in that he "is to direct both the 
management of the U.S. subsidiaries [sic] and the function of the U.S. entity; he establishes the goals 
and policies of the U.S. entity; he has the wide latitude in discretionary decision-making and is only 
follow [sic] the direction of the Board of Directors of the parent [company]." 
Upon review, the AAO concurs with the director's conclusion that the petitioner has failed to 
establish that the beneficiary would be employed in the United States in a primarily executive or 
managerial capacity. 
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to 
the petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(5). The petitioner's description 
of the job duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate 
whether such duties are either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. 
As the director noted in the RFE, the petitioner's initial description of the beneficiary's job duties 
lacked specificity and failed to demonstrate what the beneficiary does on a day-to-day basis. The list 
contains vague and general phrases such as "confer with company officials to plan business 
objectives, to develop organizational policies to coordinate functions and operations between 
LIN07 12054619 
Page 7 
divisions and departments, and to establish responsibilities and procedures for attaining objectives," 
"review activity reports and financial statements to determine progress and status in attaining 
objectives and revise objectives and plans in accordance with current conditions," and "direct and 
coordinate formulation of financial programs to provide funding for new or continuing operations to 
maximize returns on investments, and to increase productivity." It is not clear without further 
explanation what the company's "objectives" or "plans" are, or what the beneficiary actually does 
towards "attaining [such] objectives," or what is involved when the beneficiary is said to "direct and 
coordinate formulation of financial programs." The general phrases used by the petitioner do not 
shed light on what the beneficiary actually does on a day-to-day basis within the company. Going 
on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the 
burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing 
Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Specifics are clearly 
an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties are primarily executive or managerial in 
nature, otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. 
Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 
1990). 
To address the deficiency in the initial petition, the petitioner was asked to provide a more detailed 
list of the specific day-to-day duties of the beneficiary, including an estimate of the percentage of 
time spent on each individual task at the beneficiary's job in the U.S. company. However, the 
petitioner failed to provide any further detail or explanation regarding the beneficiary's stated job 
duties, and instead repeated the job description previously given. The petitioner's additional 
disclosure that the beneficiary spends "95% of his total working hours in planning, developing, and 
establishing policies" and "about 10% working hours in administrative activities, e.g. training, hiring 
and firing employees of the U.S. company" is too vague and fails to show what the beneficiary 
actually does on a day-to-day basis. The evidence requested in the RFE is critical as it would have 
established what the beneficiary actually does within the company, and thus would enable U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to determine whether he indeed functions in a 
primarily executive capacity as claimed. The regulation states that the petitioner shall submit 
additional evidence as the director, in his or her discretion, may deem necessary. The purpose of the 
request for evidence is to elicit further information that clarifies whether eligibility for the benefit 
sought has been established. See 8 C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(8). The failure to submit requested evidence 
that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 5 
103.2(b)(14). 
Counsel's claim on appeal that the beneficiary's job duties meet the requirement for "executive 
capacity" is not persuasive. The AAO notes counsel's assertion that the petitioner's use of "statutory 
language [in the job description] should not be a ground for denial if the language in question clearly 
explains the beneficiary's responsibilities." However, as noted above, the petitioner failed to 
supplement the statutory language in the beneficiary's job description with details that clearly 
explain the beneficiary's day-to-day job responsibilities. In claiming that the beneficiary functions in 
an executive capacity, counsel also did no more than stating the statutory definition of the term 
"executive capacity" and asserting that it represents the beneficiary's job duties. Merely repeating 
the language of the statute or regulations does not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. Fedin 
LIN 07 120 54619 
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Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1108; Avyr Associates Inc. v. Meissner, 1997 WL 188942 at "5 
(S.D.N.Y.). Without documentary evidence to support the claim, the assertions of counsel will not 
satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute 
evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); Matter of Laureano, 19 I&N 
Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503,506 (BIA 1980). 
Beyond the required description of the job duties, USCIS reviews the totality of the record when 
examining the claimed managerial or executive capacity of a beneficiary, including the petitioner's 
organizational structure, the duties of the beneficiary's subordinate employees, the presence of other 
employees to relieve the beneficiary from performing operational duties, the nature of the 
petitioner's business, and any other factors that will contribute to a complete understanding of a 
beneficiary's actual duties and role in a business. 
Further, the statutory definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated 
position within a complex organizational hierarchy, including major components or functions of the 
organization, and that person's authority to direct the organization. Section 10 1 (a)(44)(B) of the 
Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1101(a)(44)(B). Under the statute, a beneficiary must have the ability to "direct the 
management" and "establish the goals and policies" of that organization. Inherent to the definition, 
the organization must have a subordinate level of managerial employees for the beneficiary to direct 
and the beneficiary must primarily focus on the broad goals and policies of the organization rather 
than the day-to-operations of the enterprise. 
Here, the record does not demonstrate that there is a subordinate level of managerial employees 
under the beneficiary's direction. Although the beneficiary's four subordinate employees all have 
managerial titles, the record does not show that they actually function in a managerial or supervisory 
capacity. For example, although the job description for the Sales Dept. Manager, a direct 
subordinate of the beneficiary, states that he "establish[es] training programs for sales 
representatives" and "analyze[s] sales statistics gathered by staff," there is no evidence in the record 
that the company has sales representatives or any sales staff other than this employee. The duties of 
the General Operations Manager, the other direct subordinate of the beneficiary, include "direct[ing] 
and coordinate[ing] activities of businesses concerning purchasing textile raw material from the U.S. 
cotton seller and importing garment products" and "managling] the movement of goods and product 
into and out of production facilities. Again, the record lacks any evidence that there is additional 
staff to assist this employee with these purchasing and distribution functions. The record does not 
indicate how much of the General Operations Manager's time is occupied with these purchasing and 
distribution functions, but if he is primarily performing these tasks that are necessary to produce or 
provide the company's products or services, he is not considered to be primarily functioning in a 
managerial capacity. See Matter of Church Scientology Int 'l., 19 I&N Dec. 593,604 (Comm. 1988). 
Similarly, there is no evidence that the Customer Service Dept. Manager and the Financial and 
Accounting Dept. Manager supervise or manage any other employees, or otherwise function in a 
managerial capacity. The job description for the Customer Service Dept. Manager indicates that this 
employee acts primarily as a customer service representative. The description of the duties of the 
Financial and Accounting Dept. Manager as "plan[ing], direct[ing], and coordinate[ing] accounting, 
* LIN07 12054619 
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investing, banking, insurance, securities, and other financial activities of a branch, ofice, or 
department of an establishment" [emphasis added] appears to be a generic job description for that 
job title rather than a description of the duties of this particular employee in this particular company. 
An employee will not be considered to be a supervisor simply because of a job title, because he or 
she is arbitrarily placed on an organizational chart in a position superior to another employee, or 
even because he or she supervises daily work activities and assignments. Rather, the employee must 
be shown to possess some significant degree of control or authority over the employment of 
subordinates. Given the size and nature of the vaguely described garment business, it is more likely 
than not that the beneficiary and his proposed subordinate employees will all primarily perform the 
tasks necessary to the operation of the business. See generally Family, Inc. v. US. Citizenship and 
Iminigration Services, 469 F.3d 13 13 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, it appears that the beneficiary will 
be, at most, a first-line supervisor of non-professional employees. A managerial or executive 
employee must have authority over day-to-day operations beyond the level normally vested in a 
first-line supervisor. See 101(a)(44) of the Act; see also Matter of Church Scientology International, 
19 I&N Dec. at 604. 
In light of the foregoing, the AAO finds the record is insufficient to establish that the beneficiary 
would be employed in a primarily executive or managerial capacity in the United States. For that 
reason, the petition will be denied. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the AAO finds the evidence is insufficient to establish that the 
petitioner has a qualifying relationship with the beneficiary's foreign employer. To establish a 
"qualifying relationship" under the Act and the regulations, the petitioner must show that the 
beneficiary's foreign employer and the proposed U.S. employer are the same employer (i.e., a U.S. 
entity with a foreign office) or related as a "parent and subsidiary" or as "affiliates." See generally 
5 203(b)(l)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1153(b)(l)(C); see also 8 C.F.R. 5 204.50)(2) (providing 
definitions of the terms "affiliate" and "subsidiary"). 
The regulation and case law confirm that ownership and control are the factors that must be 
examined in determining whether a qualifying relationship exists between the U.S. and foreign 
entities for purposes of this visa classification. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N 
Dec. 593; see also Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986); Matter of 
Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 (Comm. 1982). In the context of this visa petition, ownership refers to 
the direct or indirect legal right of possession of the assets of an entity with full power and authority 
to control; control means the direct or indirect legal right and authority to direct the establishment, 
management, and operations of an entity. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 
at 595. 
In its March 14, 2007 letter, the petitioner claimed that it is a subsidiary of Shandong D&Y Textile 
& Garment Group (SDYTG Group), a company located in Shandong, China. The petitioner 
submitted a copy of a stock certificate number 1, dated February 18,2005, certifying that "Shandong 
Daiyin Textile Group Share Co. Ltd." (SDYTG Share), which the petitioner claims to be the same 
entity as SDYTG Group, owns 1,000,000 of the U.S. company's shares, representing all of the 
* LIN 07 120 54619 
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company's authorized shares, according to the stock certificate. The petitioner also submitted a copy 
of its stock transfer ledger showing that certificate number 1 is the only issuance of the company's 
shares. In addition, the petitioner submitted a copy of a "Unanimous Written Consent of Board of 
Director to Corporate Action," dated January 28, 2005, confirming the issuance of 1,000,000 of the 
company's shares to SDYTG Share for the consideration of $1 50,000. 
With respect to the beneficiary's foreign employer, the petitioner claimed in its March 2007 letter 
that the beneficiary's most recent position outside the United States was as the general manager of 
two of SDYTG Group's subsidiaries, D & Y Imports and Exports Co. Ltd. (D&YIE) and Leinuo 
Apparel Co. Ltd. (Leinuo). However, the record lacks sufficient evidence demonstrating that these 
two companies are subsidiaries of the petitioner's parent company, and therefore affiliates of the 
petitioner, as claimed. The petitioner submitted an organizational chart for SDYTG Share listing the 
beneficiary as general manager for D&YIE and Leinuo. In addition, the record contains a brochure 
for SDYTG Group with photographs and names of the companies that are purportedly part of the 
Group, including the U.S. company, D&YIE and Leinuo. However, there is no documentation in the 
record that actually confirms or sets forth the details of the ownership and control of the 
beneficiary's foreign employers. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not 
sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 22 
I&N Dec. at 165 (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190). 
In light of the lack of evidence relating to the ownership and control of the beneficiary's foreign 
employers, the AAO finds the petitioner has failed to establish that there exists a qualifying 
relationship between the U.S. company and the beneficiary's claimed foreign employers. For this 
additional reason, the petition will be denied. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be 
denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the 
initial decision. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. 
Cal. 2001), afd. 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 
1989) (noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a de novo basis). When the AAO denies a petition 
on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the 
AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's enumerated grounds. See Spencer 
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043. 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the 
benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Here, 
that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the director's decision will be affirmed and the petition 
will be denied. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.