dismissed EB-1C Case: Garments And Textiles

,' idsqtifying &a dcleted to 
prevent chky unwarranted 
- invasion of p&onal privacy 
c) BLLC COPY 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rrn. 3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
(7 
Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: AU6 0 1 
SRC 06 183 53150 
PETITION: 
 Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to 
Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1153(b)(l)(C) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any mher inquiry must be made to that office. 
Robert P. Wiemann, Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Texas Service Center. The matter is 
now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. 
The petitioner is a New York corporation which claims to be a subsidiary of City Glory Holdings, Ltd., 
located in China. Accordingly, the petitioner endeavors to classify the beneficiary as an employment-based 
immigrant pursuant to section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 
5 1 153(b)(l)(C), as a multinational executive or manager. 
The director denied the petition based on the following independent grounds of ineligibility: 1) the petitioner 
failed to establish that it would employ the beneficiary in a managerial or executive capacity; and 2) the 
petitioner failed to establish that it has been doing business for at least one year. 
On appeal, counsel disputes the director's findings, asserts that the beneficiary will be employed in either a 
managerial or executive capacity, and submits a brief and additional evidence in support of her arguments. 
Section 203(b) of the Act states in pertinent part: 
(1) Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified immigrants who 
are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C): 
(C) Certain Multinational Executives and Managers. -- An alien is described 
in this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years preceding the time of the 
alien's application for classification and admission into the United States 
under this subparagraph, has been employed for at least 1 year by a firm or 
corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof and who 
seeks to enter the United States in order to continue to render services to the 
same employer or to a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is 
managerial or executive. 
The language of the statute is specific in limiting this provision to only those executives and managers who 
have previously worked for a firm, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate or subsidiary of that entity, 
and who are coming to the United States to work for the same entity, or its affiliate or subsidiary. 
A "United States employer" may file a petition on Form 1-140 for classification of an alien under section 
203(b)(l)(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. No labor certification is required for this 
classification. The prospective employer in the United States must furnish a job offer in the form of a 
statement which indicates that the alien is to be employed in the United States in a managerial or executive 
capacity. Such a statement must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the alien. 
Page 3 
Title 8 C.F.R. 4 204.5(j)(3) explains that petition filed for a multinational executive or manager under section 
203(b)(l)(C) must be accompanied by a statement from an authorized official of the "petitioning United 
States employer" which demonstrates that: 
(A) 
 If the alien is outside the United States, in the three years immediately preceding the 
filing of the petition the alien has been employed outside the United States for at least 
one year in a managerial or executive capacity by a firm or corporation, or other legal 
entity, or by an affiliate or subsidiary of such a firm or corporation or other legal 
entity; or 
(B) 
 If the alien is already in the United States working for the same employer or a 
subsidiary or affiliate of the fm or corporation, or other legal entity by which the 
alien was employed overseas, in the three years preceding entry as a nonimrnigrant, 
the alien was employed by the entity abroad for at least one year in a managerial or 
executive capacity; 
(C) 
 The prospective employer in the United States is the same employer or a subsidiary 
or affiliate of the firm or corporation or other legal entity by which the alien was 
employed overseas; and 
(D) 
 The prospective United States employer has been doing business for at least one year. 
The first issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner provided sufficient evidence to establish that it will 
employ the beneficiary in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Section 101 (a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. # 1 101(a)(44)(A), provides: 
The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily-- 
(i) manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, hction, or 
component of the organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or 
managerial employees, or manages an essential function within the 
organization, or a department or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the 
authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel 
actions (such as promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee 
is directly supervised, functions at a senior level within the organizational 
hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and 
SRC 06 183 53150 
Page 4 
(iv) 
 exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function 
for which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not 
considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the 
supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supe~ised are 
professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101(a)(44)(B), provides: 
The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily-- 
(i) 
 directs the management of the organization or a major component or function 
of the organization; 
(ii) 
 establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or 
function; 
(iii) 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(iv) 
 receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, 
the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
The petitioner described the beneficiary's proposed job duties in the United States in the Form 1-140 as 
"[dlirect corporate development, investment strategies, develop business contacts and business, liaison to 
Parent; hire and fire employees." 
The petitioner also claims to employ five workers. In the letter dated April 25, 2006, the petitioner further 
describes the petitioning organization's business activities and the beneficiary's past duties. The petitioner 
describes the foreign employer as "selling, manufacturing and marketing high quality garments and fabrics." 
The petitioner's purpose is described as "explor[ing] and acquir[ing] relevant U.S. markets and introduce[ing] 
our fabrics, garments and quality manufacturing to U.S. businesses." In serving the United States operation, 
the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary traveled extensively in 2005 and, beginning in mid-2005, focused on 
the petitioner's marketing and sales activities in the United States. The petitioner further describes the 
beneficiary's activities as follows: 
Beneficiary established contacts with key personnel in the company which took a lot of time 
and effort by using all resources and available contacts. Beneficiary had to use persistence to 
convince and convey the financial potential in utilizing our company to produce their 
products. 
The petitioner indicates that the beneficiary attended numerous "affairs and fashion shows to explore more 
possible business for our company." 
SKC Ub 183 5313U 
Page 5 
Finally, the petitioner listed the beneficiary's proposed duties in the United States as follows: 
develop continuing strategic investment goals and policies in accordance with the 
Petitioner's overall goals and business plans and instructions; including planning, 
formulating and pursuing investments and venture capital; 
direct and coordinate investment activities in accordance with policies and short-term 
and long-term goals of the company; includes setting investment quotas and 
expenses; 
develop investment opportunities, which includes meeting and maintaining relations 
with companies and executives of relevant U.S. companies and markets; 
act as liaison and representative for the Parent Company in the U.S.; report to the 
Parent Company regarding progress, development, and large investments requiring 
approval; 
supervise, review and analyze reports fiom managers and accountants in the sales and 
office administration departments; includes reviewing financial statements, sales, 
costs and performance and suggest changes if necessary to meet company objectives; 
identify business opportunities in the U.S. and international markets, which includes 
reviewing U.S. market research analysislreports of managers andlor research 
companies (such as Dunn and Bradstreet)[;] 
review financials and establish visibility, which includes determining the financial 
strengths and weaknesses of certain sales and corporate directions; direct and allocate 
financial resources for the promotion of company services and products in the U.S.; 
hire, fire, supervise and provide direction to key personnel and oversee the 
establishment and launching of the local office and showroom; includes coordinating 
with managers to devise improvement of company growth and expansion. 
The petitioner also alleges that the beneficiary "will not be required to provide the services of the company, 
since the various managers, agents and their respective employees and contractors will perform those duties. 
They will solicit local businesses, contact customers, fill out the necessary customs/purchase/order forms, 
invoices, arrange for shipping, etc." 
The director requested additional evidence. The director requested, inter alia, an organizational chart for the 
United States operation; job descriptions for all subordinate employees, including breakdowns of the amount 
of time devoted to each duty; and Forms W-2 or quarterly tax returns. 
In response, the petitioner submitted an organizational chart for the United States operation. The chart shows 
the beneficiary reporting to the president/CEO in China and directly supervising an office 
administratorlmanager and a vice president of sales. The office administratorlmanager is, in turn, portrayed 
as supervising a coordinatorltechnician and the vice president of sales is, in turn, portrayed as supervising a 
sales agent. 
The petitioner also described the job duties of the four subordinate workers, including the two claimed 
subordinate supervisory employees. As these job descriptions are in the record, they will not be repeated here 
Page 6 
verbatim. Generally, the office administrator/manager is described as administering the office, performing 
shipping tasks, processing accounts payable and receivable, and "overseeing" certain clerical functions. The 
office administrator/manager's direct subordinate, the coordinator/technician, is described as primarily 
processing orders for customers and coordinating the importation of ordered goods. The vice president of 
sales is described as primarily involved "in sales development for [the petitioning organization] and giving 
guidance to [the] sales agent(s)." The petitioner also indicates that the vice president of sales "serves as [vice 
president] in more than one company" and that "he does not regularly appear as a salaried employee as his 
compensation is in commissions, profits, and percentages in future partnershiplventures." Finally, the sales 
agent, purportedly a direct subordinate of the vice president of sales, is described as performing sales related 
tasks. 
The petitioner further describes the beneficiary's proposed duties as follows: 
20% of Time: develop continuing strategic investment goals and policies in accordance with 
the Petitioner's overall goals and business plans and instructions; including planning, 
formulating and pursuing investments and venture capital; direct and coordinate investment 
activities in accordance with policies and short-term and long-term goals of the company; 
includes setting investment quotas and expenses; 
40% of Time: develop investment opportunities, which includes meeting and maintaining 
relations with companies and executives of relevant U.S. companies and markets; and also 
includes identifying business opportunities in the U.S. and international markets; Act as 
liaison and representative for the Parent Company in the U.S.; report to the Parent Company 
regarding progress, development, and large investments requiring approval; 
20% of Time: review financials and establish visibility, which includes determining the 
financial strengths and weaknesses of certain sales and corporate directions; direct and 
allocate financial resources for the promotion of company services and products in the U.S.; 
20% of Time: hire, fire, supervise and provide direction to key personnel and oversee the 
establishment and launching of the local office and showroom; includes coordinating with 
managers to devise improvement of company growth and expansion. 
On October 30, 2006, the director denied the petition. The director concluded, inter alia, that the petitioner 
failed to establish that the beneficiary will be employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the director erred and that the beneficiary will perform qualifying duties. 
Counsel argues that the beneficiary's work in "generating interest in the business by developing relationships 
with top-level executives of potential customers" constitutes a qualifying duty. 
Upon review, counsel's assertions are not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary will be employed in a 
primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Page 7 
In examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(CIS) will look first to the petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 8 204.5(j)(5). The actual 
duties themselves reveal the true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 
1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), afd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
In this matter, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's job duties fails to establish that the beneficiary 
will act in a "managerial" or "executive" capacity. In support of the petition, the petitioner has submitted a 
vague and non-specific job description which fails to sufficiently describe what "managerial" or "executive" 
duties the beneficiary will perform. For example, the petitioner states that the beneficiary will devote 60% of 
his time to meeting and maintaining relations with "companies and executives of relevant U.S. companies and 
markets;" identifying business opportunities; acting as a "liaison" with, and reporting to, the foreign 
employer; reviewing financials; determining financial strengths and weaknesses; and directing and allocating 
financial resources for the promotion of company services and products in the United States. However, the 
petitioner has failed to establish that these vague duties are truly managerial or executive in nature. Specifics 
are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties are primarily executive or managerial in 
nature; otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Id. 
Furthermore, as the record fails to establish that any of the subordinate workers is a supervisory, managerial, 
or professional employee (see infra), the 20% of his time devoted to supervisory duties would be non- 
qualifling, first-line supervisory tasks. Finally, while the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary will devote 
20% of his time to developing goals and policies, the petitioner does not specifically explain what, exactly, 
the beneficiary will do in performing this task other than to target additional United States customers. The 
fact that the petitioner has given the beneficiary a managerial or executive title and has prepared a vague job 
description which includes inflated job duties does not establish that the beneficiary will actually perform 
managerial or executive duties. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient 
for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 
I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972). 
Accordingly, most of the duties ascribed to the beneficiary appear to be non-qualifying administrative or 
operational tasks which will not rise to the level of being managerial or executive in nature. As noted above, 
it appears that the beneficiary will devote most of his time to marketing and sales related tasks such as 
attending trade shows, meeting with existing and potential customers, identifying and acting on business 
opportunities, and reporting to his superiors in China on his sales. It also appears that the beneficiary will 
devote much of his remaining time to supervising his three to four-person staff who appear to perform 
clerical, ordering, shipping, and sales tasks. As the petitioner has indicated that the beneficiary will devote 
most of his time to these non-qualifying tasks, it has not been established that he will be "primarily" employed 
as a manager or an executive. An employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a 
product or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive 
capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the 
enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N 
Dec. 593,604 (Comm. 1988). 
The petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary will supervise and control the work of other 
supervisory, managerial, or professional employees or will manage an essential function of the organization. 
Page 8 
The petitioner asserts that the beneficiary will directly supervise an office administrator/manager and a vice 
president of sales who will each supervise a subordinate employee. However, the petitioner has failed to 
establish that either the office administratorlmanager or the vice president of sales will truly be a supervisory 
or managerial worker. While the petitioner's organizational chart indicates that these workers will each 
supervise a subordinate employee, their corresponding job descriptions do not support this assertion. The 
office adrninistrator/manager is described as primarily performing clerical and office administration tasks. 
Likewise, the vice president of sales, an intermittent worker whose compensation is based on commissions, 
will primarily perform sales related tasks, and it does not appear that either worker will truly supervise or 
manage another worker. An employee will not be considered to be a supervisor simply because of a job title, 
because he or she is arbitrarily placed above other employees on an organizational chart, or even because he 
or she supervises some daily work activities and assignments. Rather, the employee must be shown to 
possess some significant degree of control or authority over the employment of subordinates. See generally 
Browne v. Signal Mountain Nurseiy, L.P., 286 F.Supp.2d 904, 907 (E.D. Tenn. 2003) (cited in Hayes v. 
Laroy Thomas, Inc., 2007 WL 128287 at *16 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 11,2007)). Overall, the record is not persuasive 
is establishing that the United States operation has acquired an organizational complexity which requires the 
employment of a subordinate tier of supervisors or managers who are ultimately supervised and controlled by 
an employee who primarily performs managerial or executive duties. To the contrary, it is more likely than 
not that both the beneficiary, as a first-line supervisory worker, and his subordinate staff will primarily 
perform the nonqualifying sales, marketing, shipping, and clerical tasks necessary to the enterprise. See 
Family, Inc. v. U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 469 F.3d 13 13, 1 3 16 (9' Cir. 2006). 
Therefore, it appears that the beneficiary will primarily be a first-line supervisor of non-professional workers, 
the provider of actual services, or a combination of both. A managerial employee must have authority over 
day-to-day operations beyond the level normally vested in a first-line supervisor, unless the supervised 
employees are professionals. 101(a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act; see also Matter of Church Scientology 
International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. As the petitioner failed to establish the skills required to perform the 
duties of the subordinate positions, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will manage 
professional employees.' 
1 
In evaluating whether the beneficiary managed or will manage professional employees, the AAO must 
evaluate whether the subordinate positions require a baccalaureate degree as a minimum for entry into the 
field of endeavor. Section 101(a)(32) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(32), states that "[tlhe term profession 
shall include but not be limited to architects, engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and teachers in 
elementary or secondary schools, colleges, academies, or seminaries." The term "profession" contemplates 
knowledge or learning, not merely slull, of an advanced type in a given field gained by a prolonged course of 
specialized instruction and study of at least baccalaureate level, which is a realistic prerequisite to entry into 
the particular field of endeavor. Matter of Sea, 19 I&N Dec. 81 7 (Comm. 1988); Matter of Ling, 13 I&N 
Dec. 35 (R.C. 1968); Matter of Shin, 11 I&N Dec. 686 (D.D. 1966). Therefore, the AAO must focus on the 
level of education required by the position, rather than the degree held by subordinate employee. The 
possession of a bachelor's, or even a master's, degree by a subordinate employee does not automatically lead 
to the conclusion that an employee is employed in a professional capacity as that term is defined above. In 
the instant case, the petitioner has not, in fact, established that a degree is actually necessary to perform the 
duties of any of the subordinate positions. 
SRC 06 183 53150 
Page 9 
Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in a managerial 
capacity.2 
Similarly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will act in an "executive" capacity. The 
statutory definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated position within a complex 
organizational hierarchy, including major components or functions of the organization, and that person's 
authority to direct the organization. Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act. Under the statute, a beneficiary must 
have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish the goals and policies" of that organization. 
Inherent to the definition, the organization must have a subordinate level of employees for the beneficiary to 
direct, and the beneficiary must primarily focus on the broad goals and policies of the organization rather than 
the day-to-day operations of the enterprise. An individual will not be deemed an executive under the statute 
simply because they have an executive title or because they "direct" the enterprise as the owner or sole 
managerial employee. The beneficiary must also exercise "wide latitude in discretionary decision making" 
and receive only "general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of directors, or 
stockholders of the organization." Id. For the same reasons indicated above, the petitioner has failed to 
establish that the beneficiary will act primarily in an executive capacity. The job description provided for the 
beneficiary is so vague that the AAO cannot deduce whether the beneficiary will primarily perform executive 
duties in the United States. Moreover, as explained above, it appears that the beneficiary will be primarily 
employed as a first-line supervisor and will perform nonqualifying sales, marketing, and first-line 
supervisory tasks. Therefore, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will be employed 
primarily in an executive capacity. 
2 
While the petitioner has not argued that the beneficiary will manage an essential function of the organization, 
the record nevertheless would not support this position even if taken. The term "hction manager" applies 
generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a subordinate staff but instead is 
primarily responsible for managing an "essential function" within the organization. See section 
101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. The term "essential function" is not defined by statute or regulation. If a 
petitioner claims that the beneficiary is managing an essential function, the petitioner must hish a written 
job offer that clearly describes the duties to be performed in managing the essential function, i.e., identify the 
function with specificity, articulate the essential nature of the function, and establish the proportion of the 
beneficiary's daily duties attributed to managing the essential hction. See 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(3)(ii). In 
addition, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's daily duties must demonstrate that the beneficiary 
manages the function rather than performs the duties related to the hction. In this matter, the petitioner has 
not provided evidence that the beneficiary will manage an essential function. The petitioner's vague job 
description fails to document that the beneficiary's duties will be primarily managerial. Also, as explained 
above, the record establishes that the beneficiary will primarily be a first-line supervisor of non-professional 
employees and perform non-qualifying operational or administrative tasks. Absent a clear and credible 
breakdown of the time spent by the beneficiary performing his duties, the AAO cannot determine what 
proportion of his duties will be managerial, nor can it deduce whether the beneficiary will be primarily 
performing the duties of a function manager. See lKEA US, Inc. v. US. Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22, 
24 (D.D.C. 1999). 
SRC 06 183 53150 
Page 10 
In reviewing the relevance of the number of employees a petitioner has, federal courts have generally agreed 
that CIS "may properly consider an organization's small size as one factor in assessing whether its operations 
are substantial enough to support a manager." Family, Inc. v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 469 
F.3d at 1316 (citing with approval Republic of Transkei v. INS, 923 F.2d 175, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Fedin 
Bros. Co. v. Suva, 905 F.2d 41, 42 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam); Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 293 F. Supp. 
2d 25, 29 (D.D.C. 2003). Furthermore, it is appropriate for CIS to consider the size of the petitioning 
company in conjunction with other relevant factors, such as a company's small personnel size, the absence of 
employees who would perform the non-managerial or non-executive operations of the company, or a "shell 
company" that does not conduct business in a regular and continuous manner. See, e.g. Systronics Corp. v. 
INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2001). 
Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will primarily perform managerial or 
executive duties in the United States, and the petition may not be approved for that reason. 
The second issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has established that it has been "doing business" 
for at least one year. 8 C.F.R. 4 204.5Cj)(3)(D). "Doing business" is defined as "the regular, systematic, and 
continuous provision of goods andlor services by a firm, corporation, or other entity and does not include the 
mere presence of an agent or office." 8 C.F.R. fj 204.50')(2). 
In this matter, the petitioner describes the petitioning organization's foreign and United States business 
activities in the letter dated April 25, 2006. The petitioner describes the foreign employer as "selling, 
manufacturing and marketing high quality garments and fabrics." The petitioner, a New York corporation, 
describes its business as "explor[ing] and acquir[ing] relevant U.S. markets and introduce[ing] our fabrics, 
garments and quality manufacturing to U.S. businesses." The beneficiary and two other United States-based 
employees market the foreign employer's garment services to United States customers. The orders are 
processed by the petitioner and ultimately fulfilled in China by the foreign employer. The foreign employer 
then ships the products to the customers in the United States and generates invoices for its services. 
Accordingly, the petitioner's primary purpose is to acquire business for the foreign employer's manufacturing 
enterprise. 
The petitioner also submits documentation related to its United States operation. The petitioner submitted 
wage reports indicating that it employs approximately five workers and tax retunrs indicating that the 
petitioner had gross receipts of over $100,000.00 in both 2004 and 2005. However, the record does not 
explain the source of this revenue. 
The director requested additional evidence. The director requested, inter alia, evidence establishing the scope 
and volume of business conducted in the United States during the one year immediately prior to the filing of 
the petition including payroll records, invoices, bank records, and other documents demonstrating that the 
petitioner is "doing business" as defined in the regulations. 
In response to the director's Request for Evidence, the petitioner submitted a detailed description of the 
beneficiary's activities during the prior year. The beneficiary is generally described as performing sales and 
marketing tasks related to selling the foreign employer's garment services. The beneficiary met with 
SRC 06 183 53150 
Page 11 
customers and attended various trade shows. However, the record is devoid of evidence of any sales by the 
petitioner or its receipt of any revenue. 
On October 30, 2006, the director denied the petition. The director determined that the petitioner failed to 
establish that it has been engaged in the regular, systematic, and continuous provision of goods and/or 
services during the prior year. 
On appeal, counsel argues that the petitioner has been doing business during the prior year. Counsel asserts 
that the revenue reported on its 2005 tax return was the result of clothing orders "attributed to the Petitioning 
U.S. branch." Counsel, however, did not support this claim with any evidence. Counsel also asserts that the 
petitioner's payment of overhead, employment taxes, rent, and insurance as well as its maintenance of a 
"showroom" establish that it was doing business. 
Upon review, counsel's assertions are not persuasive. 
In this matter, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the petitioner has been "doing business" for one 
year prior to the filing of the instant petition. More specifically, the petitioner has failed to submit any 
evidence of it regularly, systematically, and continuously providing a good or service even though this 
evidence was specifically requested by the director. The petitioner did not submit any invoices from the 
United States petitioner or its bank records. Failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material 
line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(14). While counsel asserts on 
appeal that the petitioner's revenue was the result of clothing orders, she failed to corroborate this assertion 
with any evidence. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes 
of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Sofici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comrn. 1998) 
(citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190). Without documentary evidence to support 
the claim, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. The unsupported 
assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); 
Matter of Laureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 
1980). 
Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the United States employer has been "doing business," 
and the petition may not be approved for this additional reason. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has also failed to establish that it is an "affiliate or 
subsidiary" of the foreign employer, City Glory Holdings, Ltd., located in China. 
A "subsidiary" is defined at 8 C.F.R. 5 204.50)(2) as: 
[A] firm, corporation, or other legal entity of which a parent owns, directly or indirectly, 
more than half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, half of the 
entity and controls the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, 50 percent of a 50-50 joint 
venture and has equal control and veto power over the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, 
less than half of the entity, but in fact controls the entity. 
Page 12 
Likewise, an "affiliate" is defined in pertinent part at 8 C.F.R. 3 204.56)(2) as: 
(A) 
 One of two subsidiaries both of which are owned and controlled by the same parent 
or individual; 
(B) 
 One of two legal entities owned and controlled by the same group of individuals, 
each individual owning and controlling approximately the same share or proportion 
of each entity[.] 
In this matter, the petitioner asserts that it is 100% owned by City Glory Holdings, Ltd., a company located in 
China. In support of this assertion, the petitioner submits organizational documents, a stock certificate, and a 
stock ledger. However, the record contains evidence which is inconsistent with this assertion and undermines 
the petitioner's claim to be owned and controlled by the foreign employer. For example, the petitioner 
submits copies of its 2004 and 2005 Forms 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return. In Schedule K of 
each of these returns, the petitioner indicates that it does not have any foreign stockholders owning 25% or 
more of it stock. This averment directly contradicts the petitioner's claim to be owned and controlled by a 
Chinese company. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by 
independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice 
unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 
I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to 
a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa 
petition. Id. at 591. 
In view of this unresolved inconsistency, it is impossible for CIS to conclude that the petitioner is an affiliate 
or subsidiary of the foreign employer, and the petition shall be denied for this additional reason. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afd, 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). Therefore, based on the additional ground of ineligibility as discussed above, 
this petition cannot be approved. 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can 
succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's 
enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043, afd, 345 F.3d 
683. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. The petitioner has not sustained that burden. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.