dismissed EB-1C Case: Health Food Supplements

identifling data deleted to 
prevent clearly unwmted 
invasion of personal privacy 
PUBLIC COPY 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rm. A3042 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
WAC 04 21 1 51924 
PETITION: 
 Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to 
Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1153(b)(l)(C) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
/ Administrative Appeals Office 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the employment-based petition. The matter 
is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed the instant immigrant petition to classify the beneficiary as a multinational manager or 
executive pursuant to section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 
tj 1153(b)(l)(C). The petitioner is a corporation authorized to do business under the laws of the State of 
Arizona that is engaged in the manufacture, distribution, and sale of health food supplements. The petitioner 
seeks to employ the beneficiary as its United States branch manager. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner had not established that: (1) the beneficiary 
would be employed by the United States entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity; or (2) a 
qualifying relationship existed between the foreign and United States entities at the time of filing. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner contends that the beneficiary's employment meets the statutory 
requirements of a "manager," as she "is responsible for the development of the company's product line 
through sales and promotional activities, as key function that must be overseen and coordinated by a 
manager." Counsel also claims that as a branch office of the foreign Canadian company, the petitioner 
established the requisite qualifying relationship. Counsel submits a brief and additional documentary 
evidence in support of the appeal. 
Section 203(b) of the Act states, in pertinent part: 
(1) Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified immigrants who 
are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C): 
(C) Certain Multinational Executives and Managers. - An alien is 
described in this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years preceding the time 
of the alien's application for classification and admission into the United 
States under this subparagraph, has been employed for at least 1 year by a 
firm or corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof 
and who seeks to enter the United States in order to continue to render 
services to the same employer or to a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a 
capacity that is managerial or executive. 
The language of the statute is specific in limiting this provision to only those executives or managers who 
have previously worked for the firm, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate or subsidiary of that 
entity, and are coming to the United States to work for the same entity, or its affiliate or subsidiary. 
A United States employer may file a petition on Form 1-140 for classification of an alien under section 
203(b)(l)(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. No labor certification is required for this 
classification. The prospective employer in the United States must furnish a job offer in the form of a 
statement, which indicates that the alien is to be employed in the United States in a managerial or executive 
capacity. Such a statement must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the alien. 
Page 3 
The first issue in this proceeding is whether the beneficiary would be employed by the United States entity in 
a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Section 10 1 (a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1 10 1 (a)(#)(A), provides: 
The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee 
primarily- 
(i) 
 Manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
the organization; 
(ii) 
 Supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department or 
subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 Has the authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions 
(such as promotion and leave authorization) if another employee or other employees are directly 
supervised; if no other employee is directly supervised, functions at a senior level within the 
organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and 
(iv) 
 Exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function for which 
the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be acting in a managerial 
capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised 
are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1 10l(a)(44)(B), provides: 
The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee 
primarily- 
(i) 
 Directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) 
 Establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) 
 Exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-malung; and 
(iv) 
 Receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of 
directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
The petitioner filed the immigrant petition on July 22, 2004, noting on Form 1-140 the existence of a one- 
person staff. In an attached letter, dated June 16, 2004, the petitioner's president acknowledged that the 
beneficiary was the petitioner's sole employee at the time of filing, and noted that the beneficiary's 
employment would satisfy the petitioner's need "to perform critical marketing," and process its products and 
sales. The petitioner stated: 
Page 4 
As Branch Manager, the Beneficiary has been responsible for managing the sales of the 
Petitioner's products . . . [and] for managing all day-to-day operations of the company which 
includes: 
Managing sales promotions and all publicity of the company's products through 
newsletters and advertising on infomercials 
Developing bilateral agreements between other U.S. Companies and the 
Canadian Parent Company 
Developing creative packaging ideas, handling materials, order processing and 
warehousing 
Attending trade shows as a Manager of the Petitioner 
Leading the research and development of new products 
Continuing to develop and review two websites as a vehicle to sell our products 
as well as to educate our customers 
Maintaining our mail-order service which entails compiling mailing lists, 
providing service and information assistance through our toll-free numbers and 
responding to customer letters, questions or complaints 
The petitioner explained that during the next two years, the beneficiary would seek to incorporate two new 
product lines into the petitioner's business and develop new ventures for sales with outside companies. 
In a request for evidence, dated March 11, 2005, the director asked that the petitioner submit the following 
documentary evidence in support of the beneficiary's employment in a primarily managerial or executive 
capacity: (1) an organizational chart reflecting the petitioner's staffing levels, and clearly identifying the 
beneficiary and any subordinate employees; (2) a brief description of the job duties and education of the 
petitioner's employees; (3) a detailed description of the job duties performed by the beneficiary during a 
"typical day"; and (4) state quarterly wage reports filed by the petitioner for the last four quarters. 
In her June 1, 2005 response, counsel provided an outline of the same job duties as that provided in the 
petitioner's June 16, 2004 letter. Counsel also explained: 
More specifically, on a daily basis the Beneficiary communicates with health industry 
advisors, raw material suppliers, designers, lawyers, etc. scheduling meetings at trade shows, 
arranging for shipping and set-up of the [petitioner's] booths at the tradeshows, reserving 
travel and hotel accommodations, and receiving and distributing samples of our products to 
potential buyers. Due to [the] Beneficiary being in the US as the Branch Manager of 
Petitioner, the Petitioner was able to get a contract to purchase an encapsulator machine 
which is in Canada and helps makes gel capsules. The worth of this machinery is about 
$20,000. Also through Beneficiary's managerial skills, the Petitioner was able to obtain a 
contract with a US company to buy acidophalis, a raw material which the encapsultor 
machine turns into pills. The Petitioner then manages the sale of these pills throughout the 
world. The Beneficiary is also responsible for contracting with a US company to sell Argan 
Oil in the US. All of these recent business activities of the US company would not have been 
possible without the foreign entity setting up a branch office in the US. 
Counsel submitted the petitioner's requested state quarterly wage report for the quarter ending September 30, 
2004, the period during which the instant petition was filed, which reflected the employment of only the 
beneficiary. 
In a decision dated July 15, 2005, the director concluded that the petitioner had not demonstrated that the 
beneficiary would be employed by the United States entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
The director noted the beneficiary's proposed job duties, and stated that they "[are] more indicative of an 
employee who is performing the necessary tasks to provide a service or to produce a product." The director 
also noted that as the sole employee of the organization, the petitioner did not maintain "the organizational 
complexity to warrant having an executive." The director further concluded that the beneficiary would not be 
employed as a function manager, as the beneficiary would be "involved in the performance of routine 
operational activities of the entity rather than in the management of a function of that business." 
Consequently, the director denied the petition. 
In an appeal filed on August 17, 2005, counsel contends that the beneficiary satisfies the statutory 
requirements of "managerial capacity." Counsel claims that the beneficiary directs and coordinates activities 
related to the purchase and sale of the petitioner's products, and states: 
The Beneficiary manages key functions within the company, including the development of 
product lines. She supervises the work of her two professional employees with authority to 
hire and fire personnel as needed; and exercises discretion over the day to day operations of 
the activities and functions for which said employees have authority. 
[Tlhe Beneficiary is responsible for the development of the company's product line through 
sales and promotional activities, a key function that must be overseen and coordinated by a 
manager and not something left solely to an employee. To perform this task requires 
extensive knowledge of company products as well as the managerial skills to oversee the 
successful operation of the business. 
Counsel provides a list of job duties, which includes some of those already outlined above, and adds that the 
beneficiary would review the work of the petitioner's sales associate, product designer, and web site 
developer. 
Upon review, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary would be employed by the United 
States entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. tj 204.5(j)(5). The petitioner's limited description of the 
beneficiary's proposed job duties fails to clarify the managerial or executive capacity in which the beneficiary 
would be employed. The petitioner has not documented the specific managerial or executive job duties to be 
performed by the beneficiary. Rather, the petitioner and counsel submitted the same brief outline of job 
duties, which, as discussed below, are not typically deemed to be managerial or executive in nature, and fail 
to expand on the specific managerial or executive tasks to be performed by the beneficiary on a daily basis. 
Additionally, counsel's blanket claim on appeal that the beneficiary satisfies the criteria of a branch manager, 
as defined in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, is insufficient to meet the petitioner's burden provided in 
the regulation at 8 C.F.R. $ 204.5Cj)(5). Without documentary evidence to support the claim, the assertions of 
counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not 
constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); Matter of Laureano, 19 I&N 
Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). The actual duties 
themselves reveal the true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 
(E.D.N.Y. 1989), afd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). The AAO notes that the petitioner's failure to submit 
requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 
$ 103.2(b)(14). 
As noted above, it is evident that the majority of the beneficiary's time would be spent performing non- 
managerial and non-executive tasks related to the promotion and sale of the petitioner's business and its 
products. Based on the petitioner's representations, the beneficiary would be responsible for such non- 
qualifying operational tasks as developing the petitioner's packaging, "handling materials, order processing 
and warehousing," developing the company's websites, and maintaining the business' mail-order service, 
which includes compiling customer mailing lists, offering service assistance on the petitioner's toll-free line, 
and responding to customers, as well as receiving and distributing product samples and arranging for the 
shipment of products for tradeshows. Additionally, although the petitioner claims that the beneficiary would 
manage such tasks as promotions, advertising, research and development, and sales, the petitioner has not 
identified any workers employed at the time of filing who the beneficiary would manage or who would 
perform the associated non-qualifying tasks. The AAO notes that the three subordinate workers identified by 
counsel on appeal will not be considered herein. As reflected in the accompanying work contracts, none of 
the workers were employed at the time the immigrant petition was filed. A visa petition may not be approved 
based on speculation of future eligibility or after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a new 
set of facts. See Matter of Michelin Tire Corp., 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. Comm. 1978); Matter of Katigbak, 14 
I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Comm. 1971). A petitioner may not make material changes to a petition in an effort to 
make a deficient petition conform to CIS requirements. See Matter of Izummi, 22 I&N Dec. 169, 176 (Assoc. 
Comm. 1998). The beneficiary's performance of the petitioner's operational and administrative tasks is 
further supported by a June 7, 2004 letter from one of the petitioner's accounts acknowledging a presentation 
by the beneficiary of the petitioner's products and requesting product displays for its stores. An employee 
who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to 
be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the 
Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also Matter 
of Church Scientology Int 'I., 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 1988). 
The AAO notes that despite the proper finding that the beneficiary would be employed in a primarily 
qualifying capacity, the director partially based his decision on an incorrect standard. The director incorrectly 
concluded that the petitioner must possess an undefined level of "organizational complexity" in order to 
demonstrate its need for a managerial or executive employee. As required by section 101(a)(44)(C) of the 
Act, if staffing levels are used as a factor in determining whether an individual is acting in a managerial or 
executive capacity, CIS must take into account the reasonable needs of the organization, in light of the overall 
purpose and stage of development of the organization. To establish that the reasonable needs of the 
organization justify the beneficiary's job duties, the petitioner must specifically articulate why those needs are 
reasonable in light of its overall purpose and stage of development. In the present matter, the petitioner has 
not explained how the reasonable needs of the petitioning enterprise would be met through the employment of 
the beneficiary. Additionally, the petitioner has not justified the beneficiary's performance of non-managerial 
or non-executive duties with the reasonable needs of the company. Going on record without supporting 
documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. 
Matter of Sofici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craj of California, 14 
I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Furthermore, the reasonable needs of the petitioner will not supersede 
the requirement that the beneficiary be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity as 
required by the statute. See sections 101 (a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 
 1 10 l(a)(44). 
Despite counsel's claim that the beneficiary would oversee the "key function" of developing the petitioner's 
product line, the record is devoid of evidence substantiating this claim. The term "function manager" applies 
generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a subordinate staff but instead is 
primarily responsible for managing an "essential function" within the organization. See section 
101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1101(a)(44)(A)(ii). The term "essential function" is not defined by 
statute or regulation. If a petitioner claims that the beneficiary is managing an essential function, the 
petitioner must furnish a written job offer that clearly describes the duties to be performed, i.e. identify the 
function with specificity, articulate the essential nature of the function, and establish the proportion of the 
beneficiary's daily duties attributed to managing the essential function. 8 C.F.R. 3 204.50)(5). In addition, 
the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's daily duties must demonstrate that the beneficiary manages the 
function rather than performs the duties related to the function. Here, counsel's brief statement is not 
sufficient to demonstrate that the beneficiary would manage an essential function. The unsupported 
statements of counsel on appeal or in a motion are not evidence and thus are not entitled to any evidentiary 
weight. See INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 188-89 n.6 (1984); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 
503 (BIA 1980). 
As the beneficiary is primarily performing the routine day-to-day operations of the business, including tasks 
related to its marketing, advertising, and sales, which are not typically deemed to be managerial or executive 
in nature, the beneficiary cannot be considered to be employed in a primarily qualifying capacity. 
Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed. 
The AAO will next consider the issue of whether a qualifying relationship existed between the foreign and 
United States entities at the time of filing. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 204.50)(2) states in pertinent part: 
Affiliate means: 
(A) One of two subsidiaries both of which are owned and controlled by the same parent or 
individual; 
(B) One of two legal entities owned and controlled by the same group of individuals, each 
individual owning and controlling approximately the same share or proportion of each entity; 
Subsidiary means a firm, corporation, or other legal entity of which a parent owns, directly or 
indirectly, more than half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, 
half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, 50 percent of a 50-50 
Page 8 
joint venture and has equal control and veto power over the entity; or owns, directly or 
indirectly, less than half of the entity, but in fact controls the entity. 
In its June 16, 2005 letter, the petitioner represented a branch relationship with the foreign Canadian 
company, noting that each company is owned and controlled by the same three individuals. An appended 
letter from the petitioner's president indicated that the petitioning entity "is 100% owned and managerially 
controlled by [the foreign company] of Canada," and again noted the petitioner's existence in the United 
States as a branch of the foreign entity. As evidence of the petitioner's authorization to do business in the 
United States, the petitioner provided an Application for Authority to transact business in Anzona, a business 
license, certificates of trade name and free sale in the State of Arizona, and company brochures. The 
petitioner also submitted copies of the foreign entity's articles of incorporation, stock certificates and 
securities ledgers. 
In his March 11, 2005 request for evidence, the director asked that the petitioner provide: (1) the foreign 
company's annual report reflecting any related companies; (2) a copy of the minutes from the foreign 
company's stockholders' meeting addressing its stockholders and the number of shares held by each; (3) a list 
of the foreign entity's shareholders and related ownership interests; and (4) the foreign company's articles of 
incorporation. 
In response, counsel noted that as a branch of the foreign company, the petitioner was not incorporated in the 
United States, but had been authorized to do business in Anzona. Counsel stated that the petitioner is "fully 
owned and controlled by [the] foreign company," which is owned by three individuals. In addition to the 
documentary evidence previously submitted and outlined above, counsel provided the following evidence in 
support of a qualifying relationship: (1) the petitioner's Corporation Annual Report and Certificate of 
Disclosure; (2) a statement from the company's president, noting the petitioner's status as a branch office; (3) 
the foreign entity's annual report; and (4) a description of the foreign company's authorized share capital. 
In his July 15, 2005 decision, the director concluded that the petitioner had not established the existence of 
qualifying relationship between the foreign and United States entities. Referencing the petitioner's statement 
that both the foreign and United States companies are owned by three individuals, the director stated that the 
petitioner had not submitted evidence of the United States company's ownership. The director further noted 
the inability to determine "with any degree of certainty, that the foreign entity has an ownership interest in the 
petitioner." Consequently, the director denied the petition based on the petitioner's failure to establish a 
qualifying relationship. 
On appeal, counsel references the petitioner's Certificate of Good Standing issued by the Corporation 
Commission of Arizona on August 8, 2005. Counsel also notes that the petitioner's annual report confirms 
that the petitioner is domiciled in Quebec, while engaged in business in the Arizona. Counsel contends that 
"the document indicates that the US company is owned by the same three people that own the parent company 
in Canada." Counsel claims that the submitted evidence establishes the petitioner's status as a branch of the 
foreign corporation. 
Upon review, the petitioner has demonstrated the existence of a qualifying relationship between the foreign 
and United States entities. 
Page 9 
When a foreign company establishes a branch in the United States, that branch is bound to the parent 
company through common ownership and management. A branch that is authorized to do business under 
United States law becomes, in effect, part of the national industry. Matter of Schick, 13 I&N Dec. 647 at 649- 
50 (Reg. Comm. 1970). Probative evidence of a branch office would include the following: a state business 
license establishing that the foreign corporation is authorized to engage in business activities in the United 
States; copies of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 1120-F, U.S. Income Tax Return of a Foreign 
Corporation; copies IRS Form 941, Employer's Quarterly Federal Tax Return, listing the branch office as the 
employer; copies of a lease for office space in the United States; and finally, any state tax forms that 
demonstrate that the petitioner is a branch office of a foreign entity. Here, the petitioner has offered probative 
documentary evidence, including its business license, certificates to operate under a trade name and sell 
products in the State of Arizona, corporate brochures, and annual report, demonstrating its existence as a 
branch office of the foreign corporation. Accordingly, the director's decision with regard to this issue only 
will be withdrawn. 
Beyond the decision of the director, an additional issue is whether the beneficiary was employed abroad in a 
primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
 The petitioner stated in its June 16, 2004 letter that the 
beneficiary was employed as the foreign entity's treasurer, during which "she was responsible for a broad 
range of managerial duties." An attached letter from the company's president indicated that in this position, 
the beneficiary "performed key managerial functions for [the foreign entity]." The record is devoid of 
additional evidence specifically describing the managerial or executive job duties performed by the 
beneficiary as the company's treasurer. Reciting the beneficiary's vague job responsibilities or broadly-cast 
business objectives is not sufficient; the regulations require a detailed description of the beneficiary's daily job 
duties. The petitioner has failed to answer a critical question in this case: What does the beneficiary primarily 
do on a daily basis? The actual duties themselves will reveal the true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. 
Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. at 1108. Absent a comprehensive description of the beneficiary's former 
managerial or executive job duties, the AAO cannot conclude that the beneficiary satisfied the statutory 
requirement of being employed abroad in a qualifying capacity. For this additional reason, the petition will 
be denied. 
The AAO notes that at least two L-1A nonimmigrant petitions have previously been approved for the benefit 
of the beneficiary. It should be noted that, in general, given the permanent nature of the benefit sought, 
immigrant petitions are given far greater scrutiny by CIS than nonirnmigrant petitions. The AAO 
acknowledges that both the immigrant and nonimmigrant visa classifications rely on the same definitions of 
managerial and executive capacity. See $5 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1101(a)(44). 
Although the statutory definitions for managerial and executive capacity are the same, the question of overall 
eligibility requires a comprehensive review of all of the provisions, not just the definitions of managerial and 
executive capacity. There are significant differences between the nonimmigrant visa classification, which 
allows an alien to enter the United States temporarily for no more than seven years, and an immigrant visa 
petition, which permits an alien to apply for permanent residence in the United States and, if granted, 
ultimately apply for naturalization as a United States citizen. Cf: $9 204 and 214 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $5 1154 
and 1 184; see also $ 3 16 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. ij 1427. 
In addition, unless a petition seeks extension of a "new office" petition, the regulations allow for the approval 
of an L-1 extension without any supporting evidence and CIS normally accords the petitions a less substantial 
review. See 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(14)(i) (requiring no supporting documentation to file a petition to extend an 
L-1A petition's validity). Because CIS spends less time reviewing L-1 petitions than Form 1-140 immigrant 
petitions, some nonimmigrant L-1 petitions are simply approved in error. Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 293 
F. Supp. 2d at 29-30 (recognizing that CIS approves some petitions in error). 
Moreover, each nonimmigrant and immigrant petition is a separate record of proceeding with a separate 
burden of prooc each petition must stand on its own individual merits. The prior nonimmigrant approvals do 
not preclude CIS from denying an extension petition. See e.g. Texas A&M Univ. v. Upchurch, 99 Fed. Appx. 
556, 2004 WL 1240482 (5th Cir. 2004). The approval of a nonimmigrant petition in no way guarantees that 
CIS will approve an immigrant petition filed on behalf of the same beneficiary. CIS denies many 1-140 
petitions after approving prior nonimmigrant 1-129 L-1 petitions. See, e.g., Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 
293 F. Supp. 2d at 25; IKEA US v. US dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 22; Fedin Brothers Co. Ltd. v. Suva, 
724 F. Supp. at 1103. 
Furthermore, if the previous nonimmigrant petitions were approved based on the same unsupported and 
contradictory assertions that are contained in the current record, the approval would constitute material and 
gross error on the part of the director. The AAO is not required to approve applications or petitions where 
eligibility has not been demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals that may have been erroneous. See, 
e.g. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Comm. 1988). It would be absurd to 
suggest that CIS or any agency must treat acknowledged errors as binding precedent. Sussex Engg. Ltd. v. 
Montgomety, 825 F.2d 1084, 1090 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988). Due to the lack of 
required evidence in the present record, the AAO finds that the director was justified in departing from the 
previous nonimrnigrant approval by denying the present immigrant petition. 
Finally, the AAO's authority over the service centers is comparable to the relationship between a court of 
appeals and a district court. Even if a service center director had approved the nonirnrnigrant petitions on 
behalf of the beneficiary, the AAO would not be bound to follow the contradictory decision of a service 
center. Louisiana Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS, 2000 WL 282785 (E.D. La.), afyd, 248 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir. 
2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 51 (2001). 
The AAO recommends review of the prior L-1A approvals for possible revocation. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afyd. 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit 
sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 4 1361. Here, that burden has 
not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.