dismissed EB-1C Case: International Trade

PUBLIC COPY 
SERVICE CENTER Date: 
WAC 96 018 52653 
U.S. Department of IIomeland Security 
20 Mass. Ave.. N.W.. Rm. 3000 
Wash~ngton. DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
PETITION: 
 Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to 
Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1153(b)(l)(C) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS : 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
Administrative Appeals Office 
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, initially approved the petition for an immigrant 
visa. Following an overseas investigation performed in connection with the beneficiary's 1-485 Application to 
Adjust Status, the director revoked approval of the petition. The matter is now before the Administrative 
Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed the instant visa petition to classify the beneficiary as a multinational manager or executive 
pursuant to section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 9 1153(b)(l)(C). 
The petitioner is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of California that is engaged in providing 
international trading services. The petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary as its president. 
The director revoked approval of the immigrant visa petition concluding that the petitioner had not 
demonstrated that: (1) at the time of filing, a qualifying relationship existed between the foreign and United 
States entities; or (2) the beneficiary would be employed by the United States entity in a primarily managerial 
or executive capacity. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner claims that CIS failed to consider "the complete evidence" submitted by 
the petitioner. Counsel challenges the director's findings, and submits a brief and additional documentary 
evidence in support of the appeal. 
Section 203(b) of the Act states, in pertinent part: 
(1) Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified immigrants who 
are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C): 
(C) Certain Multinational Executives and Managers. - An alien is 
described in this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years preceding the time 
of the alien's application for classification and admission into the United 
States under this subparagraph, has been employed for at least 1 year by a 
firm or corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof 
and who seeks to enter the United States in order to continue to render 
services to the same employer or to a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a 
capacity that is managerial or executive. 
The language of the statute is specific in limiting this provision to only those executives or managers who 
have previously worked for the firm, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate or subsidiary of that 
entity, and are coming to the United States to work for the same entity, or its affiliate or subsidiary. 
A United States employer may file a petition on Form 1-140 for classification of an alien under section 
203(b)(l)(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. No labor certification is required for this 
classification. The prospective employer in the United States must furnish a job offer in the form of a 
statement, which indicates that the alien is to be employed in the United States in a managerial or executive 
capacity. Such a statement must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the alien. 
Following approval of an immigrant or nonimmigrant petition, the director may revoke approval of the 
petition in accordance with the statute and regulations. Section 205 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 4 1155 (2005), 
states: "The Secretary of Homeland Security may, at any time, for what he deems to be good and sufficient 
cause, revoke the approval of any petition approved by him under section 1154 of this title. Such revocation 
shall be effective as of the date of approval of any such petition." 
Regarding "good and sufficient cause" and the revocation of an immigrant petition under section 205 of the 
Act, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has stated: 
In Matter of Estime, . . . this Board stated that a notice of intention to revoke a visa petition is 
properly issued for "good and sufficient cause" where the evidence of record at the time the 
notice is issued, if unexplained and unrebutted, would warrant a denial of the visa petition 
based upon the petitioner's failure to meet his burden of proof. The decision to revoke will be 
sustained where the evidence of record at the time the decision is rendered, including any 
evidence or explanation submitted by the petitioner in rebuttal to the notice of intention to 
revoke. would warrant such denial. 
Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 590 (BIA 1988)(citing Matter of Estime, 19 I&N Dec. 450 (BIA 1987)). 
By itself, the director's realization that a petition was incorrectly approved is good and sufficient cause for the 
issuance of a notice of intent to revoke an immigrant petition. 
 Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. at 590. 
Notwithstanding the CIS burden to show "good and sufficient cause" in proceedings to revoke approval of a 
visa petition, the petitioner bears the ultimate burden of establishing eligibility for the benefit sought. The 
petitioner's burden is not discharged until the immigrant visa is issued. Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. 
Feldman, 736 F.2d 1305 (9' Cir. 1984). 
The MO will first address the issue of whether the petitioner established a qualifying relationship between 
the foreign and United States entities. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 9 204.56)(2) states in pertinent part: 
AfJiliate means: 
(A) One of two subsidiaries both of which are owned and controlled by the same parent or 
individual; 
(B) One of two legal entities owned and controlled by the same group of individuals, each 
individual owning and controlling approximately the same share or proportion of each entity; 
Subsidiary means a finn, corporation, or other legal entity of which a parent owns, directly or 
indirectly, more than half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, 
half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, 50 percent of a 50-50 
joint venture and has equal control and veto power over the entity; or owns, directly or 
indirectly, less than half of the entity, but in fact controls the entity. 
Page 4 
The petitioner filed the instant petition on October 25, 1995. In an appended letter, dated October 5, 1995, the 
petitioner's former counsel claimed the existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship between the foreign and 
United States entities, stating that the petitioner is wholly owned by the beneficiary's foreign employer. In the 
accompanying documentation, counsel provided: (1) a July 28, 1999 resolution adopted by the petitioner's 
directors acknowledninn a transfer of stock in the amount of 5 10 shares to the foreim entitv and 490 shares to 
- - - 
'2) stock certificate numbers two and three identifying the foreign entity and I 
as the owners of 510 and 490 shares of the petitioner's stock, respectively; and (3) a stock transfer ledger 
reflecting the above-noted transfers, as well as an initial issuance of 1,000 shares of stock ta 
The director issued a Notice of Intent to Revoke on July 9, 2005, noting that an interview and overseas 
investigation performed by the United States Embassy in Monrovia, Liberia in connection with the 
beneficiary's 1-485 application revealed evidence that the beneficiary did not qualify for the requested 
classification. The director stated that despite providing stock certificates identifying the foreign entity and 
as shareholders, the record failed to demonstrate that the foreign entity owned the United 
States company. The director stated that the petitioner had not presented evidence that the foreign entity had 
furnished money in exchange for its purported stock ownership. The director further referenced an overseas 
INS investigation which revealed that the foreign company had ceased operating in 1990, the year during 
which the beneficiary arrived in the United States as a nonimmigrant and five years prior to filing the instant 
immigrant visa petition. The director asked that the petitioner submit documentary evidence, such as original 
wire transfer receipts and bank statements reflecting monies transferred by the foreign entity to the United 
States company and a copy of its Notice of Transaction Pursuant to Corporations Code Section 25102(f) 
identifying the petitioner's total offering amounts. 
The petitioner's present counsel responded in a letter dated August 4, 2005 claiming that the foreign entity has 
continued operating in Liberia since the initial filing, and referencing copies of certificates of registration for 
the years 1999 through 2002. As addressed by the director in his decision, the AAO notes that the certificates 
of registration for the years 1999 and 2000 identify the foreign business' name as "State Trading 
Import/Export Company," while the subsequent certificates identify the foreign business as "State Trading 
Corporation," which is the name reflected on the company's articles of incorporation.' Counsel also provided 
the petitioner's corporate tax returns for the years 1995 through 2004, which identify the foreign entity as the 
owner of 5 1 percent of the petitioner's stock. Counsel explained that due to a civil war in Liberia from 1989 
through 1996, which resulted in looting, many of the documents pertaining to the Liberian business were lost. 
In a decision dated February 14, 2006, the director revoked approval of the petition concluding that the 
petitioner had not demonstrated that a qualifying relationship existed between the foreign and United States 
entities at the time of filing. The director acknowledged that the petitioner had submitted a stock certificate 
and stock transfer ledger identifying the foreign entity as a majority owner of the United States company, but 
stated that these two documents, without additional evidence, are not sufficient to establish the purported 
parent-subsidiary relationship. The director stated that the petitioner had failed to establish that "the foreign 
entity actually contributed the cash funds to purchase common stock as prescribed in the articles of 
1 
 The minutes from a November 12, 1997 meeting held by the foreign corporation indicate an intent to re- 
register the company's name as "States Trading Import and Export Company," yet the record does not contain 
documentation confirming the name change with the appropriate Liberian authorities. Nor does the petitioner 
explain why subsequent certificates of registration contain "States Trading Corporation," the foreign entity's 
former name. 
incorporation." The director also noted the inconsistencies previously addressed with respect to the name 
depicted on the foreign certificates of registration, and stated that the evidence did not "substantiate that the 
foreign entity is still a qualifying foreign entity." The director also addressed counsel's claim that the foreign 
entity was originally established as a sole proprietorship, owned by the beneficiary. The director stated that if 
the beneficiary owned the foreign entity, he would no longer possess control over the organization as he is in 
the United States and not in Liberia. Consequently, the director revoked approval of the petition. 
Counsel for the petitioner filed an appeal on March 6, 2006. In an appended appellate brief, counsel states 
that the foreign entity's initial purchase of the petitioner's stock occurred in May 1990, fours months prior to 
the beneficiary's entrance into the United States. Counsel explains that because the transactions were 
originated with the Liberian company, the documentation related to the transfer of monies was destroyed 
during the country's civil war. Counsel references the petitioner's 1991 and 1992 income tax returns as 
evidence that "clearly proves that [the foreign entity] through [the beneficiary] continued to finance the 
operation in the United States." 
Counsel challenges the director's findings that the foreign entity is a sole proprietorship, and that the 
beneficiary relinquished control of the organization when he departed from Liberia to the United States. 
Counsel states that the beneficiary's foreign employer was formed as a corporation and is presently registered 
in the name of its resident manager, who is a Liberian national. Counsel explains that the foreign 
organization needed to create "a Liberian front," holding itself out as a Liberian company in order to avoid the 
harassment typically incurred by foreign-owned companies. Counsel states that despite being registered in 
the name of its resident manager, the foreign entity is majority owned by the beneficiary, who "holds control 
over all final decisions" and "still communicates with the Board of Directors regularly." 
Counsel submits on appeal: (1) the foreign organization's articles of incorporation; (2) the minutes from a 
November 12, 1997 meeting held by the foreign organization noting the company's intent to create a ''home 
front" by re-registering the company's name as "States Trading Import and Export Company" with "Elizabeth 
Tamba" as its managin director, and transferring 210 shares of the beneficiary's stock in the corporation to 
in the amounts of 90 shares and 120 shares, respectively; (3) three of 
issued stock certificates; and (4) four wire transfer receipts reflecting the beneficiary's 
receipt of monies in May 2003, April, October and December 2004, and May 2005 from banks in Liberia and 
London. 
Upon review, the petitioner has not demonstrated that a qualifying relationship existed between the foreign 
and United States entities at the time of filing. 
The regulation and case law confirm that ownership and control are the factors that must be examined in 
determining whether a qualifying relationship exists between United States and foreign entities for purposes 
of this visa classification. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593 (BIA 1988); see also 
Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986); Matter of Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 
(Comm. 1982). In the context of this visa petition, ownership refers to the direct or indirect legal right of 
possession of the assets of an entity with full power and authority to control; control means the direct or 
indirect legal right and authority to direct the establishment, management, and operations of an entity. Matter 
of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 595. 
Page 6 
As general evidence of a petitioner's claimed qualifying relationship, stock certificates alone are not sufficient 
evidence to determine whether a stockholder maintains ownership and control of a corporate entity. The 
corporate stock certificate ledger, stock certificate registry, corporate bylaws, and the minutes of relevant 
annual shareholder meetings must also be examined to determine the total number of shares issued, the exact 
number issued to the shareholder, and the subsequent percentage ownership and its effect on corporate 
control. Additionally, a petitioning company must disclose all agreements relating to the voting of shares, the 
distribution of profit, the management and direction of the subsidiary, and any other factor affecting actual 
control of the entity. See Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. at 364-365. Without full 
disclosure of all relevant documents, CIS is unable to determine the elements of ownership and control. 
The regulations specifically allow the director to request additional evidence in appropriate cases. 8 C.F.R. 
fj 204.5(j)(3)(ii). As ownership is a critical element of this visa classification, the director may reasonably 
inquire beyond the issuance of paper stock certificates into the means by which stock ownership was 
acquired. As requested by the director, evidence of this nature should include documentation of monies, 
property, or other consideration furnished to the entity in exchange for stock ownership. Additional 
supporting evidence would include stock purchase agreements, subscription agreements, corporate by-laws, 
minutes of relevant shareholder meetings, or other legal documents governing the acquisition of the 
ownership interest. 
The petitioner did not clarify the claimed ownership of the United States entity. The petitioner's former 
counsel claimed that the petitioner is wholly owned by the foreign entity. Stock certificates and the 
petitioner's stock transfer ledger, however, represent the foreign entity as one of two shareholders in the 
United States corporation. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by 
independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice 
unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 
I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). 
Regardless of the inconsistency, the record does not demonstrate that the foreign entity furnished 
consideration in exchange for its purported majority ownership interest in the petitioning entity. The 
petitioner's stock transfer ledger reflects the foreign entity's purported purchase of 510 shares of stock for 
$1,020 on July 28, 1990. Although specifically requested by the director, the record is devoid of 
documentary evidence, such as bank statements, wire transfer receipts, cancelled checks, or bank deposit 
receipts, that the foreign entity paid $1,020 to the petitioning entity. The petitioner's failure to submit 
requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 
8 C.F.R. 9 103.2(b)(14). 
The AAO recognizes that as a result of the civil war in Liberia, documentation related to the foreign entity 
may have been destroyed. However, it is reasonable to expect that the petitioner would have bank statements 
and financial records available to corroborate the claim that the petitioning entity received monies from the 
foreign entity in exchange for the issued stock. The non-existence or other unavailability of required 
evidence creates a presumption of ineligibility. 8 C.F.R. fj 103.2(b)(2)(i). As noted above, evidence of the 
means by which the foreign entity acquired its purported stock ownership is relevant to determining whether 
the critical element of ownership has been established for a qualifying relationship. Going on record without 
supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these 
proceedings. Matter of Soflci, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of 
California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
Page 7 
Additionally, it is questionable whether the foreign entity was operating in Liberia in 1995, the period during 
which the instant immigrant visa petition was filed. While the petitioner presented a July 1995 certificate of 
registration for the foreign entity, the remaining certificates reflect its registration in 1999 through 2002. 
Letters in the record from the beneficiary's brother in Monrovia, Liberia, the location of the foreign business, 
suggest that during 1991 through 1997 the foreign entity ceased operations due to the loss of utilities and 
damage caused by the country's civil war. Also, counsel acknowledges on appeal that vandalism throughout 
Monrovia caused the foreign entity to close in 1990 and again in 1996. Other than the 1995 certificate of 
registration, which reveals only that the foreign entity existed on paper, there is no documentary evidence that 
the foreign corporation resumed its business operations during 1991 through 1996. If, in fact, the foreign 
entity was inactive at the time the visa petition was filed, this would preclude a finding that the two 
companies had a qualifying relationship as of the date of filing. 
In order to establish eligibility for classification as a multinational manager or executive for immigrant visa 
purposes, the petitioner must establish that it maintains a qualifying relationship with the beneficiary's foreign 
employer; the foreign corporation or other legal entity that employed the beneficiary must continue to exist 
and have a qualifying relationship with the petitioner at the time the immigrant petition is filed. 8 C.F.R. 
4 204.56)(3)(i)(C). A multinational manager or executive is one who "seeks to enter the United States in 
order to continue to render services to the same employer or to a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity 
that is managerial or executive." Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 
 1153(b)(l)(C). 
Although the regulations at 8 C.F.R. $ 204.56)(3)(i)(B) reference beneficiaries who are already employed by 
the petitioner as nonimmigrants, the fact that the beneficiary is currently in the United States as an 
employment-based nonimmigrant does not exempt the petitioner from its burden to establish the existence of 
an ongoing qualifying relationship with the beneficiary's previous foreign employer as of the date the petition 
is filed. Rather, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 4 204.56)(3)(i)(B) simply allows CIS to look beyond the three-year 
period immediately preceding the filing of the 1-140 petition in order to determine whether the beneficiary has 
the requisite one year of qualifying employment abroad. To construe the regulation as creating an exception 
that allows L-1A beneficiaries to qualify as multinational managers without a qualifying relationship between 
the United States and foreign entities would contravene the plain language of the statute. The petitioner must 
establish eligibility at the time of filing the immigrant visa petition. Matter of Katigbak, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 
(Comm. 1971). 
In this case, any qualifying relationship that may have existed between the petitioner and the beneficiary's 
foreign employer would have been severed when the foreign company ceased its operations in 1991. Again, 
there is no evidence in the record demonstrating that in fact the foreign entity was operating at the time the 
petition was filed. The beneficiary's employment in the foreign entity is not considered employment with a 
qualifying entity for the purposes of this immigrant visa classification, and it cannot be found that the 
beneficiary is seeking "to continue to render services to the same employer or to a subsidiary or affiliate 
thereof." The petitioner's burden of establishing compliance with the criteria outlined in section 203(b)(l)(C) 
of the Act is not discharged until the immigrant visa is issued. See Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. 
Feldman, 736 F.2d 1305 (9~ Cir. 1984). 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the director's revocation of approval of the immigrant visa petition was 
properly based on "good and sufficient cause. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed. 
Page 8 
The AAO will next consider the issue of whether the petitioner established that the beneficiary would be 
employed by the United States entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1101(a)(44)(A), provides: 
The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee 
primarily- 
(i) 
 Manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
the organization; 
(ii) 
 Supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department or 
subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 Has the authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions 
(such as promotion and leave authorization) if another employee or other employees are directly 
supervised; if no other employee is directly supervised, functions at a senior level withn the 
organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and 
(iv) 
 Exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function for which 
the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be acting in a managerial 
capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised 
are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(44)(B), provides: 
The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee 
primarily- 
(i) 
 Directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) 
 Establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) 
 Exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-malung; and 
(iv) 
 Receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of 
directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
The petitioner noted on the Form 1-140 that the beneficiary would be employed as the president of the four- 
person United States company. In an attached letter, dated October 5, 1995, the petitioner's former counsel 
provided the following description for the beneficiary's proposed position: 
[The beneficiary] has full authority to handle the local operations, hirelfire staff and establish 
local policies and procedures as he sees fit. 
[The beneficiary] develops, directs and manages the operations of the U.S. business entity. 
He selects, hires, trains, and supervises staff. He assigns specific job duties, establishes work 
schedules, and maintains priorities of work to be performed. He establishes and implements 
corporate goals and policies and prepares short and long term company goals and 
management policies. 
Counsel explained that the petitioner employed three workers "to engage in business management, market 
survey, product procurement, price negotiation and to make shipping arrangements," and noted that it had 
secured premises for office space, as well as a showroom. 
Counsel submitted an employee list, dated June 30, 1995, which reflected the employment of the beneficiary 
in the position of president, and two additional employees in the positions of manager and delivery person. 
An attached state quarterly wage report for the period ending June 30, 1995, which the AAO notes is 
unsigned, identified the same three employees purportedly employed at this time. 
In his July 9, 2005 notice of intent to revoke, the director stated that the job description previously offered by 
the petitioner was inadequate to determine whether the beneficiary would be employed in a primarily 
managerial or executive capacity. The director noted that the record did not contain an organizational chart of 
the staffing levels maintained by the petitioner on the filing date or a description of the positions held by the 
beneficiary's subordinate employees. The director asked that the petitioner submit: (1) an organizational chart 
identifying the beneficiary's position, as well as its managerial hierarchy and staffing levels at the time of 
filing; (2) a detailed description of the job duties performed by the beneficiary during a "typical day"; (3) a 
brief description of the job duties and educational levels of the employees supervised by the beneficiary; and 
(4) certified copies of the petitioner's state quarterly wage reports for the fourth quarter in 1995 and the first 
quarter in 1996. The director noted that the quarterly wage reports should be submitted in a sealed envelope 
from the California Employment Development Department with a stamp certifying that the documents are 
true and original. 
The petitioner's current counsel responded in a letter dated August 4, 2005, and submitted the following 
description of the beneficiary's "daily duties": 
[The beneficiary] oversees and manages the day[-]to[-]day activities of the corporation. He 
hires and fires all employees. He negotiates and signs all contracts with clients and 
customers on behalf of the corporation. He meets with corporate clients to negotiate 
contracts and to take orders. [The beneficiary] negotiates loans, letters of credit, and lines of 
credit with financial institutions on behalf of the corporation. He handles the payroll, 
accounts receivable, and accounts payable. He negotiates all imports on behalf of the 
corporation, conducts negotiations in order to get better prices and to ensure prompt 
shipments. He represents the corporation with charitable organizations. 
As additional documentation of the petitioner's staffing levels, counsel submitted copies of the quarterly wage 
reports filed by the petitioner for the last quarter of 1995 and the first quarter of 1996. The AAO notes that 
the reports were not certified by the California Employment Development Department or submitted in a 
sealed envelope as requested by the director. The petitioner's Employer's Quarterly Federal Tax Return 
ending on December 31, 1995, the period during which the instant petition was filed, indicates that one 
worker was employed during this quarter. A corresponding state quarterly wage report identified the 
beneficiary as the sole worker employed by the petitioner during this time. The petitioner's 1995 federal and 
state income tax returns, both of which reflect a cumulative payment of $36,000 in salaries and compensation 
to officers, as well as the beneficiary's 1995 personal income tax return, confirm that the beneficiary was the 
company's sole employee at the time of filing.' 
In his February 14, 2006 decision, the director revoked approval of the petition concluding that the petitioner 
had not demonstrated that the beneficiary would be employed by the United States entity in a primarily 
managerial or executive capacity. The director noted that the petitioner had failed to submit such requested 
documentation as an organizational chart identifying the beneficiary's position within the corporation, and job 
descriptions for each of the employees supervised by the beneficiary. The director also noted an 
inconsistency in the information contained on the petitioner's quarterly wage reports. The director noted the 
relevancy of the omitted organizational chart and job descriptions in determining the beneficiary's proposed 
employment capacity. The director stated that "[tlhe evidence is insufficient to support the claim of [the 
beneficiary's employment in a] managerial or executive position." Consequently, the director revoked 
approval of the immigrant visa petition. 
In his March 3, 2006 appellate brief, counsel claims that the job description offered by the petitioner is 
sufficient to establish the beneficiary's role as a manager or executive. Counsel emphasizes the beneficiary's 
role in maintaining the petitioner's business operations in the United States since 1991, and states that "under 
the primary management of [the beneficiary,] [the petitioner] achieved sales of nearly one million dollars." 
Counsel addresses the petitioner's failure to submit an organizational chart, stating that the petitioner's 
previous attorney neglected to properly respond to the director's request.3 Counsel submits on appeal a 
current list of the petitioner's employees. As the chart reflects the petitioner's staffing levels at the time of the 
appeal and not those workers employed at the time of filing, it will not be considered herein. See Matter of 
Katigbak, 14 I&N Dec. at 49 (finding that a petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing; a petition 
cannot be approved at a future date after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of 
facts). 
Upon review, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary would be employed by the United 
States entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
2 
 The AAO notes that the record contains two state quarterly wage reports for the period ending June 30, 
1995. The form initially submitted with the Form 1-140 identifies three employees, including the beneficiary, 
who the petitioner represented as occupying the positions of president, manager and delivery person. As 
noted previously, the Form DE-6 was not signed or dated by the petitioner. A second signed and dated 
quarterly wage report for the period ending June 30, 1995, which counsel submitted in response to the 
director's notice of intent to revoke, identified the beneficiary as the sole employee. The petitioner has not 
explained the existence of two conflicting quarterly wage reports. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to 
resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Doubt cast on any aspect of the 
petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining 
evidence offered in support of the visa petition. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. at 591. 
The AAO notes that the petitioner's current counsel was counsel of record at the time of the petitioner's 
response to the director's notice of intent to revoke. 
Page 1 I 
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the MO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 9 204.56)(5). 
The overly broad and vague descriptions offered for the beneficiary's position as president fail to demonstrate 
his proposed employment in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. The regulations require that the 
petitioner provide more detailed job duties than such statements as: "selects, hires, trains, and supervises 
staff," "assigns specific job duties," "establishes work schedules," "handles the local operations," "implements 
corporate goals and policies," and "prepares short and long term company goals and management policies." 
See 8 C.F.R. 5 204.56)(5) (stating that the petitioner "must clearly describe" the managerial or executive job 
duties to be performed by the beneficiary.) A more detailed job description is especially relevant in this 
particular case as many of the beneficiary's job duties pertain to his purported supervision of a subordinate 
staff, which, as discussed above, the petitioner has not proven to employ. Reciting the beneficiary's vague job 
responsibilities or broadly-cast business objectives is not sufficient; the regulations require a detailed 
description of the beneficiary's daily job duties. The petitioner has failed to answer a critical question in this 
case: What does the beneficiary primarily do on a daily basis? The actual duties themselves will reveal the 
true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), 
afyd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
The additional job description offered by counsel in response to the director's notice of intent to revoke is 
equally vague and demonstrates that the beneficiary would primarily perform non-qualifying tasks of the 
organization. Based on the subsequent job description, the beneficiary would perform the following non- 
managerial and non-executive tasks: negotiate contract prices, loans, and lines of credit, take orders, track 
shipments, and handle the company's payroll, and accounts receivable and payable. See $9 101(a)(44)(A) and 
(B) of the Act. The MO notes that an employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a 
product or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive 
capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the 
enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also Matter of Church Scientology Int 'l., 19 I&N Dec. 593, 
604 (Comm. 1988). 
Moreover, an analysis of the reasonable needs of the corporation in conjunction with its overall purpose and 
stage of development undermines the petitioner's claim that the beneficiary would be employed in a primarily 
managerial or executive capacity. As required by section 101(a)(44)(C) of the Act, if staffing levels are used 
as a factor in determining whether an individual is acting in a managerial or executive capacity, CIS must take 
into account the reasonable needs of the organization, in light of the overall purpose and stage of development 
of the organization. 
Here, the record demonstrates that the beneficiary was the sole employee of the petitioning entity at the time 
of filing.4 The AAO recognizes that the beneficiary does not have to supervise subordinate personnel in order 
to be considered a manager or executive. See 5 101(a)(44)(A)(iii) of the Act. However, the petitioner must 
The MO recognizes that the petitioner identified a lower-level staff consisting of a manager and delivery 
person. Additionally, some of the petitioner's April though July 1995 invoices identify an individual other 
than the beneficiary as the company's sales representative. However, the petitioner's quarterly wage report, as 
well as its 1995 federal income tax return, which represents that the petitioner did not pay compensation for 
cost of labor or outside services, demonstrate that the beneficiary was the sole employee of the petitioning 
entity at the time of filing. 
prove that the beneficiary primarily performs the high-level responsibilities specified in the statutory 
definitions of "managerial capacity" and "executive capacity" and does not spend a majority of his or her time 
on day-to-day functions. Champion World, Inc. v. INS, 940 F.2d 1533 (Table), 1991 WL 144470 (9th Cir. 
July 30, 1991). The petitioner has failed to meet this essential requirement. 
In addition to performing the above-named non-qualifying tasks, the record suggests that the beneficiary 
would also be responsible for personally performing the petitioner's sales, inventory, marketing, and customer 
service functions. The AAO notes, in particular, the office and showroom premises secured by the petitioner, 
and the lack of lower-level personnel employed by the petitioner to sell its products. Additionally, invoices 
dated April through July 1995 identify the beneficiary as the company's sales representative. Clearly, the 
reasonable needs of the petitioning company would not plausibly be met by the services of the beneficiary 
only. Regardless, the reasonable needs of the petitioner serve only as a factor in evaluating the lack of staff in 
the context of reviewing the claimed managerial or executive duties. The petitioner must still establish that 
the beneficiary is to be employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity, 
pursuant to sections 101 (a)(44)(A) and (B) or the Act. As discussed above, the petitioner has not established 
this essential element of eligbility. 
Based on the above discussion, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary would be employed by 
the United States entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. As a result, the director properly 
revoked approval of the immigrant visa petition. 
Beyond the decision of the director, an additional issue is whether the beneficiary was employed by the 
foreign entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity for at least one year during the three years prior 
to his entrance into the United States an a nonimmigrant. In his October 5, 1995 letter, counsel identified the 
beneficiary as occupying the position of president in the foreign entity. Counsel did not submit a description 
of the beneficiary's employment as president. Nor did the director request additional evidence of the 
beneficiary's foreign employment in his notice of intent to revoke. The record, however, contains an August 
29, 2000 letter submitted by the foreign entity in connection with the beneficiary's 1-485 Application to 
Adjust Status, in which the managing director outlined the following "major responsibilities" of the 
beneficiary as president: 
(a) Oversee & manage day to day activities of the corporation 
(b) Negotiate & sign all contracts with government agencies and local businesses for the 
supply of stationary on behalf of the corporation 
(c) Negotiate [lloans, [l]etter[s] of credit, [olverdraft line[s] of credit with financial 
institutions 
(d) Supervisor of all imports on behalf of the corporation, and conduct travel overseas in 
order to negotiate better priced and ensure prompt shipments. 
(e) Corporation [rlepresentative for [clharitable [olrganizations such as Indian Association 
Liberia, Rotary club of Monrovia, Chamber of Commerce, Masonic Lodge, etc. 
The AAO notes that the job duties associated with the beneficiary's employment overseas are essentially the 
same as those provided for the beneficiary's position in the United States company. As discussed above, the 
overly broad and vague statements used to describe the beneficiary's employment as president are not 
sufficient to establish that he performed primarily managerial or executive job duties. Again, reciting the 
beneficiary's vague job responsibilities or broadly-cast business objectives is not sufficient; the regulations 
require a detailed description of the beneficiary's daily job duties. The petitioner has failed to answer a 
critical question in this case: What does the beneficiary primarily do on a daily basis? The actual duties 
themselves will reveal the true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. at 
1108. Absent additional evidence describing the managerial or executive job duties performed by the 
beneficiary while employed as the foreign entity's president, the MO cannot conclude that the beneficiary 
occupied a position that was primarily managerial or executive in nature. Going on record without supporting 
documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. 
Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 
I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). For this additional reason, the petition will be denied. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afyd. 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
The petition approval will be revoked for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent 
and alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit 
sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 1361. Here, that burden has 
not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.