dismissed EB-1C Case: Manufacturing/Distribution

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U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Mass Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
FILE: Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER Date: JUL 1 0 2[106 
EAC 05 131 51765 
PETITION: 
 Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to 
Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 4 1153(b)(l)(C) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS : 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
Robert P. Wiemann, Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be summarily 
dismissed. 
The petitioner claims to be a distributor, exporter, and manufacturer. Additional information, such as the 
place and date of the petitioner's establishment has not been provided. The petitioner endeavors to classify 
the beneficiary as an employment-based immigrant pursuant to section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 3 1153(b)(l)(C), as a multinational executive or manager. The director 
denied the petition based on two separate grounds of ineligibility: 1) the petitioner failed to establish that it 
has a qualifying relationship with the beneficiary's claimed foreign employer; and 2) the petitioner failed to 
establish that the beneficiary was employed abroad by a qualifying entity in a managerial or executive 
capacity. 
Counsel submits an appellate brief reiterating the director's grounds for denial and generally voicing his 
disagreement with the director's conclusion to deny approval of the petition. Counsel notes the prior 
approvals of the petitioner's Form 1-129 nonimmigrant petitions claiming that the director's latest denial of the 
Form 1-140 is inconsistent with those prior L-1A approvals. However, it should be noted that, in general, 
given the permanent nature of the benefit sought, immigrant petitions are given far greater scrutiny by 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) than nonimmigrant petitions. The AAO acknowledges that both 
the immigrant and nonimmigrant visa classifications rely on the same definitions of managerial and executive 
capacity. See $5 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1101(a)(44). Although the statutory definitions 
for managerial and executive capacity are the same, the question of overall eligibility requires a 
comprehensive review of all of the provisions, not just the definitions of managerial and executive capacity. 
There are significant differences between the nonimmigrant visa classification, which allows an alien to enter 
the United States temporarily for no more than seven years, and an immigrant visa petition, which permits an 
alien to apply for permanent residence in the United States and, if granted, ultimately apply for naturalization 
as a United States citizen. Cf: $9 204 and 214 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $9 1154 and 1184; see also 3 316 of the 
Act, 8 U.S.C. 4 1427. 
In addition, each nonimmigrant and immigrant petition is a separate record of proceeding with a separate 
burden of proof; each petition must stand on its own individual merits. The prior nonimrnigrant approvals do 
not preclude CIS from denying an extension petition. See e.g. Texas AM Univ. v. Upchurch, 99 Fed. Appx. 
556, 2004 WL 1240482 (5th Cir. 2004). The approval of a nonimmigrant petition in no way guarantees that 
CIS will approve an immigrant petition filed on behalf of the same beneficiary. CIS denies many 1-140 
immigrant petitions after approving prior nonimmigrant 1-129 L-1 petitions. See, e.g., Q Data Consulting, 
Inc. v. INS, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 25; IKEA US v. US Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 22; Fedin Brothers Co. 
Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. at 1 103. 
Furthermore, if the previous nonimrnigrant petitions were approved based on the same unsupported assertions 
that are contained in the current record, the approval would constitute material and gross error on the part of 
the director. The AAO is not required to approve applications or petitions where eligibility has not been 
demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals that may have been erroneous. See, e.g. Matter of Church 
Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Comm. 1988). It would be absurd to suggest that CIS or 
any agency must treat acknowledged errors as binding precedent. Sussex Engg. Ltd. v. Montgomery, 825 F.2d 
1084, 1090 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988). 
Finally, the AAO's authority over the service centers is comparable to the relationship between a court of 
appeals and a district court. Even if a service center director had approved the nonimmigrant petitions on 
behalf of the beneficiary, the AAO would not be bound to follow the contradictory decision of a service 
center. Louisiana Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS, 2000 WL 282785 (E.D. La.), affd, 248 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir. 
2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 5 1 (2001). 
Despite the fact that the director clearly indicated that the denial was in large part attributed to the petitioner's 
failure to provide evidence documenting its claimed qualifying relationship with the beneficiary's foreign 
employer, no additional evidence has been submitted on appeal. Counsel merely reiterated the petitioner's 
claim without acknowledging the director's objection to the lack of supporting evidence. Going on record 
without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in 
these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of 
California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). The unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute 
evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); Matter of laureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1 
(BIA 1983); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 9 103.3(a)(l)(v) states, in pertinent part: 
An officer to whom an appeal is taken shall summarily dismiss any appeal when the party 
concerned fails to identify specifically any erroneous conclusion of law or statement of fact 
for the appeal. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligbility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Inasmuch as counsel has failed to identify specifically an 
erroneous conclusion of law or a statement of fact in this proceeding, the petitioner has not sustained that 
burden. Therefore, the appeal will be summarily dismissed. 
ORDER: 
 The appeal is summarily dismissed.