dismissed EB-1C Case: Natural Supplement Sales

(b)(6)
DATE: NOV 1 2 2013 OFFICE: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER 
INRE: Petitioner : 
Beneficiary : 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
U.S . Citizen ship and Immigration Services 
Office of Administrative Appeals 
20 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., MS 2090 
Washington , DC 20529-2090 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
FILE: 
PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to 
Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(l)(C) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) in your case. 
This is a non-precedent decision. The AAO does not announce new constructions of law nor establish agency 
policy through non-precedent decisions. If you believe the AAO incorrectly applied current law or policy to 
your case or if you seek to present new facts for consideration, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion 
to reopen, respectively. Any motion must be filed on a Notice of Appeal or Motion (Form I-290B) within 33 
days of the date of this decision. Please review the Form I-290B instructions at 
http://www.uscis.gov/forms for the latest information on fee, filing location, and other requirements. See 
also 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. Do not file a motion directly with the AAO. 
Thank you, 
+t.lif-
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office 
www.uscis.gov 
(b)(6)
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the employment-ba sed immigrant visa 
petition. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal 
will be dismissed. 
The petitioner is a Texas limited liability company that is engaged in natural SU£plement sales. The 
petitioner, which claims to be an affiliate of located in 
Mexico, seeks to employ the beneficiary as its chief executive officer. Accordingly, the petitioner 
endeavors to classify the beneficiary as an employment-based immigrant pursuant to section 
203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(l)(C), as a 
multinational executive or manager. 
On June 19, 2013, the director denied the petition based on the following grounds of ineligibility: (1) 
the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary was employed in a qualifying managerial or 
executive capacity in Mexico; (2) the petitioner failed to establish that it will employ the beneficiary 
in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity; (3) the petitioner failed to establish that it has a 
qualifying relationship with the foreign entity; and, ( 4) the petitioner failed to establish the ability to 
pay the beneficiary's proffered wage. 
On appeal, counsel disputes the director's findings and provides an appellate brief laying out the 
grounds for challenging the denial. 
I. The Law 
Section 203(b) of the Act states in pertinent part: 
(1) Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available ... to qualified immigrants 
who are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C): 
* * * 
(C) Certain Multinational Executives and Managers. -- An alien is 
described in this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years preceding the 
time of the alien's application for classification and admission into the 
United States under this subparagraph, has been employed for at least 1 
year by a firm or corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate or 
subsidiary thereof and who seeks to enter the United States in order to 
continue to render services to the same employer or to a subsidiary or 
affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial or executive. 
The language of the statute is specific in limiting this provision to only those executives and 
managers who have previously worked for a firm, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate or 
subsidiary of that entity, and who are coming to the United States to work for the same entity, or its 
affiliate or subsidiary. 
(b)(6)
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A United States employer may file a petition on Form I-140 for classification of an alien under 
section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. No labor certification is 
required for this classification. The prospective employer in the United States must furnish a job 
offer in the form of a statement which indicates that the alien is to be employed in the United States 
in a managerial or executive capacity. Such a statement must clearly describe the duties to be 
performed by the alien. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(A), provides: 
The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily--
(i) manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or 
component of the organization; 
(ii) supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or 
managerial employees, or manages an essential function within the 
organization, or a department or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the 
authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel 
actions (such as promotion and leave authorization), or if no other 
employee is directly supervised, functions at a senior level within the 
organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and 
(iv) exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or 
function for which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor 
is not considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue 
of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised 
are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(B), provides: 
The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily--
(i) directs the management of the organization or a major component or 
function of the organization; 
(ii) establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or 
function; 
(iii) exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(b)(6)
Page4 
(iv) receives only general superv1s10n or direction from higher level 
executives, the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
II. The Issues on Appeal 
A. Employment Abroad in a Managerial or Executive Capacity 
The first issue to be addressed is whether the petitioner provided sufficient evidence to establish that 
the beneficiary had been employed by the foreign entity in a managerial or executive capacity. 
In the decision dated June 19, 2013, the director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner 
failed to establish that the beneficiary had been employed by the foreign entity in a managerial or 
executive capacity because it had provided an overly broad position description that failed to specify 
the nature of the beneficiary's day-to-day duties. Specifics are clearly an important indication of 
whether a beneficiary's duties are primarily executive or managerial in nature, otherwise meeting the 
definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 
F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), ajfd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
Upon review of the beneficiary's duties for the foreign entity, the petitioner provided a very brief job 
description with overly general duties. Reciting the beneficiary's vague job responsibilities or 
broadly-cast business objectives is not sufficient; the regulations require a detailed description of the 
beneficiary's daily job duties. For example, the beneficiary's job duties with the foreign company 
included: "overseeing design, marketing, promotion, delivery and quality of services"; "managing 
resources within budget guidelines"; and, "focusing ,on setting the strategy and vision for the 
company." The petitioner has failed to provide any detail or explanation of the beneficiary's activities 
in the course of his daily routine. The actual duties themselves will reveal the true nature of the 
employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), ajfd, 905 F.2d 
41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
On January 31, 2013, the director requested additional information of the beneficiary's job duties but 
the petitioner failed to submit a more detailed statement of the duties, including the percentage of 
time spent on each duty. The petitioner's failure to submit this information cannot be excused. The 
failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for 
denying the petition. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(14). 
Beyond the required description of the job duties, USCIS reviews the totality of the record when 
examining the claimed managerial or executive capacity of a beneficiary, including the petitioner's 
organizational structure, the duties of the beneficiary's subordinate employees, the presence of other 
employees to relieve the beneficiary from performing operational duties, the nature of the petitioner's 
business, and any other factors that will contribute to a complete understanding of a beneficiary's 
actual duties and role in a business. 
Here, the director observed discrepancies between the information provided in the foreign company's 
organizational chart and statements made in a letter submitted by the foreign company's director of 
(b)(6)
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finance. The director noted that the letter stated that the beneficiary had six subordinate employees 
but the organizational chart showed 18 subordinate employees. In addition, out of the six subordinate 
employees identified in the letter, five of them were not listed on the organizational chart. It is 
incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective 
evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the 
petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 
I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). Based on these unresolved discrepancies, the petitioner has not 
provided reliable evidence of the number and type of employees the beneficiary supervised during his 
employment with the foreign entity. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner contends that the beneficiary worked for the requisite one year 
abroad with the foreign company as Chief Executive Officer from November 2009 to December 
2010. On appeal, counsel did not provide any additional information or evidence to overcome the 
director's concerns regarding the brief and vague job description for the beneficiary's duties while 
working abroad, or provide information to overcome the discrepancies in the information regarding 
the organizational structure of the foreign entity during the beneficiary's relevant period of 
employment in Mexico. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient 
for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. 
158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. 
Comm. 1972)). 
Accordingly, based on the deficiencies and unresolved inconsistencies discussed, the petitioner has 
not established that the foreign entity employed the beneficiary in a primarily managerial or executive 
capacity. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed. 
B. U.S. Employment in a Managerial or Executive Capacity 
The second issue to be addressed is whether the petitioner established that it will employ the 
beneficiary in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
In examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, USCIS will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.50)(5). Published case law clearly 
supports the pivotal role of a clearly defined job description, as the actual duties themselves reveal the 
true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 
1989), affd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990); see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(5). However, as observed 
above, US CIS reviews the totality of the record, which includes not only the beneficiary's job 
description, but also takes into account the nature of the petitioner's business, the employment and 
remuneration of employees, as well as the job descriptions of the beneficiary's subordinates, if any, 
and any other facts contributing to a complete understanding of a beneficiary's actual role within a 
given entity. 
The definitions of executive and managerial capacity have two parts. First, the petitioner must show 
that the beneficiary performs the high-level responsibilities that are specified in the definitions. 
Second, the petitioner must prove that the beneficiary primarily pelforms these specified 
(b)(6)
Page 6 
responsibilities and does not spend a majority of his or her time on day-to-day functions. Champion 
World, Inc. v. INS, 940 F.2d 1533 (Table), 1991 WL 144470 (9th Cir. July 30, 1991). 
Upon review of the petition and evidence, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary 
would be employed in a managerial or executive capacity. 
With regard to the U.S. position, the petitioner provided a vague and general job description that 
failed to provide insight into the nature of the beneficiary's day-to-day tasks. For example , the 
petitioner stated that the beneficiary would be responsible for the "important function of planning and 
strategizing the growth of the company" and "generating new business and forming new strategies for 
the company." The beneficiary would also be responsible for the "coordination of the goals and 
activities of the different departments"; "ensuring the supply chain between the factory in Mexico and 
the distribution centers is running according to plan"; "reviewing reports of export and import and 
other related functions": and, "reviewing the finances of the company." It is unclear which specific 
tasks actually fall within these broad areas of responsibility and whether any supervisory tasks the 
beneficiary will perform are of a qualifying nature. Again, reciting the beneficiary's vague job 
responsibilities or broadly-cast business objectives is not sufficient; the regulations require a detailed 
description of the beneficiary's daily job duties. The petitioner has failed to provide any detail or 
explanation of the beneficiary's activities in the course of her daily routine. The actual duties 
themselves will reveal the true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 
at 1108, affd , 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). The petitioner's vague and general description of the 
beneficiary's position does not identify the actual duties to be performed, such that they could be 
classified as managerial or executive in nature. 
The job description, when viewed in light of the totality of the evidence submitted, also includes 
several potentially non-qualifying duties such as generating new business, coordinating the activities 
of departments, reviewing export and import reports, and reviewing company finances. These duties 
generally suggest the beneficiary's supervision of subordinate staff organized among different 
departments. However, the petitioner's quarterly federal tax returns show, and the petitioner 
confirms, that it has only one employee other than the beneficiary . The petitioner does not provide 
sufficient evidence it has employees to assist with the budgeting , bookkeeping, sales, marketing, 
business development and importing and exporting operations and, thus, it appears that the 
beneficiary would need to be actively involved in the day-to-day operations of the business. An 
employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or provide a service is 
not considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 
101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial 
or executive duties); see also Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I & N Dec. 593, 604 
(Comrn. 1988). 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner states that "many of the responsibilities detailed in the job 
description are broad job responsibilities," and, "if the Service considers the nature of the business it 
should be clear that the duties listed by [the petitioner] are appropriate for a Chief Executive Officer." 
However, as discussed herein, USCIS looks beyond the petitioner' s description of the beneficiary's 
job duties and reviews the totality of the record when examining the claimed managerial or executive 
(b)(6)
Page 7 
capacity of a beneficiary. This review takes into account the petitioner's organizational structure, the 
duties of the beneficiary's subordinate employees, the presence of other employees to relieve the 
beneficiary from performing operational duties, the nature of the petitioner's business, and any other 
factors that will contribute to a complete understanding of a beneficiary's actual duties and role in a 
business. 
Counsel correctly observes that a company's size alone, without taking into account the reasonable 
needs of the organization, may not be the determining factor in denying a visa to a multinational 
manager or executive. See § 101(a)(44)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(C). However , it is 
appropriate for USCIS to consider the size of the petitioning company in conjunction with other 
relevant factors, such as a company's small personnel size, the absence of employees who would 
perform the non-managerial or non-executive operations of the company, or a "shell company" that 
does not conduct 
business in a regular and continuous manner. See, e.g. Family Inc. v. USCIS, 469 
F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 2006); Systronics Corp. v. INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2001). The size of 
a company may be especially relevant when USCIS notes discrepancies in the record and fails to 
believe that the facts asserted are true. See Systronics, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 15. 
As discussed above, the petitioner has not identified employees within the petitioner's organization, 
subordinate to the beneficiary, who would relieve the beneficiary from performing routine duties 
inherent to operating the business. Throughout 2011 and 2012, the petitioner operated with the 
beneficiary and one other employee. Reading section 101(a)(44) of the Act in its entirety, the 
"reasonable needs" of the petitioner may justify a beneficiary who allocates 51 percent of his duties to 
managerial or executive tasks as opposed to 90 percent, but -those needs will not excuse a beneficiary 
who spends the majority of his or her time on non-qualifying duties. The reasonable needs of the 
petitioner will not supersede the requirement that the beneficiary be "primarily" employed in a 
managerial or executive capacity as required by the statute. See Brazil Quality Stones v. Chertoff, 531 
F.3d 1063, 1070 n.lO (9th Cir., 2008). The petitioner has not established that one employee is able to 
relieve the beneficiary from having to perform primarily non-qualifying duties associated with the 
daily functions of the business. 
Based on the foregoing, the petitioner has failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that the 
beneficiary would be employed in the United States in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity. 
For this additional reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
C. Qualifying Relationship 
The third issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner submitted sufficient evidence to establish 
that it has a qualifying relationship with the beneficiary's foreign employer. To establish a 
"qualifying relationship" under the Act and the regulations, the petitioner must show that the 
beneficiary's foreign employer and the proposed U.S. employer are the same employer (i.e. a U.S. 
entity with a foreign office) or related as a "parent and subsidiary" or as "affiliates." See generall y 
§ 203(b)(l)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(l)(C); see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(2) (providing 
definitions of the terms "affiliate" and "subsidiary"). 
(b)(6)
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The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.50)(2) states in pertinent part: 
Affiliate means: 
(A) One of two subsidiaries both of which are owned and controlled by the same 
parent or individual; 
(B) One of two legal entities owned and controlled by the same group of individuals, 
each individual owning and controlling approximately the same share or 
proportion of each entity; 
* * * 
Multinational means that the qualifying entity, or its affiliate, or subsidiary, conducts 
business in two or more countries, one of which is the United States. 
Subsidiary means a firm, corporation, or other legal entity of which a parent owns, 
directly or indirectly, more than half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, 
directly or indirectly, half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, directly or 
indirectly, 50 percent of a 50-50 joint venture and has equal control and veto power 
over the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, less than half of the entity, but in fact 
controls the entity. 
The petitioner claims to be an affiliate of the foreign entity based on common ownership by the same 
group of individuals. 
The petitioner provided a copy of its Articles of Organization filed with the Texas Secretary of State 
in April 2005, which identifies the following individuals as the com any's members: 
The petitioner has not provided membership certificates or a copy of its limited 
liability company operating agreement reflecting the proportion of membership interest held by the 
individual members. 
The petitioner also submitted a corporation formation document for the foreign entity which identifies 
its ownership as follows: 
5,024,700 shares 
3,722,000 shares 
93,050 shares 
93,050 shares 
93,050 shares 
93,050 shares 
93,050 shares 
93,050 shares 
(b)(6)
Page 9 
The director requested additional evidence to establish that the two companies have a qualifying 
relationship. In response, the petitioner submitted a letter from its accountant, who stated that "the 
members of the LLC ... are the same people who own the Mexican company." She identified the 
petitioner's members as the beneficiary, 
In the director's decision dated June 19, 2013, the director noted that the documentation and evidence 
submitted by the petitioner regarding its qualifying relationship with the beneficiary's foreign 
employer was not consistent. Specifically, the director observed that the information in the foreign 
entity's corporate 
documents was not the same information as provided in the petitioner's statements, 
and did not corroborate the claim that the two companies are owned by the same group of individuals. 
In addition, the director denied the petition, in part, based on the petitioner's failure to provide full 
English translations of the foreign entity's documents. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner contends that "the Service overlooks the fact that the U.S. and 
foreign companies are two legal entities owned and controlled by the same group of individuals." 
Counsel asserts that the director "makes an erroneous conclusion of law when it denies there is a 
qualifying organization" based on the fact that the foreign entity has eight owners while the U.S. 
company has only five owners. In addition, on appeal, counsel cites Sun Moon Star Advanced 
Power, Inc. v. Chappel, 773 F. Supp. 1373 (N.D. Cal 1990) and Matter of Tessel, Inc., 17 I&N Dec. 
631 (Acting Assoc. Comm. 1981) in support of her assertion that two companies may qualify as 
affiliates even though they are not owned by the exact same individuals. 
The Sun Moon Star Advanced Power decision is distinguishable from the facts of the present matter. 
First, the court relied heavily on Matter of Tessel, Inc. to conclude that the two entities were affiliates 
through indirect ownership. 17 I&N Dec. at 633. Although Matter of Tessel determined that a 
majority stock ownership in both companies is sufficient for the purposes of establishing a qualifying 
relationship, counsel has misconstrued the decision. In the Tessel decision, the beneficiary solely 
owned 93% of the foreign corporation and 60% of the petitioning organization, thereby establishing a 
"high percentage of common ownership and common management . . . . " /d. It was further 
determined that "[ w ]here there is a high percentage of ownership and common management between 
two companies, either directly or indirectly or through a third entity, those companies are 'affiliated' 
within the meaning of that term as used in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act." /d. 
The facts in the present matter can be distinguished from Matter of Tessel, however, because it has 
not been established that one shareholder holds a majority interest in both companies. As later 
codified in part A of the definition of affiliate at 8 C.F.R. § 204.50)(2), the petitioner in the Tessel 
case would have qualified as an affiliate given that the beneficiary owned and controlled a majority of 
both entities. The record in the present matter, however, fails to demonstrate that there is majority 
ownership and control, directly or indirect! , of both companies by any one person. The foreign 
entity's documents reflect that holds a majority of the company's shares; 
however, the petitioner has not provided evidence that the same individual also owns a majority 
membership interest in the U.S. company. The petitioner has not provided copies of its membership 
certificates or operating agreement identifying the proportion of membership interest owned by each 
(b)(6)
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member. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of 
meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165 (citing 
Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm'r 1972)). 
In the Sun Moon Star decision, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (now USCIS) refused to 
recognize the indirect ownership of the petitioner by three brothers, who held shares of the company 
as individuals through a holding company. The decision further noted that the two claimed affiliates 
were not owned by the same group of individuals. The court found that the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service decision was inconsistent with previous interpretations of the term "affiliate" 
and contrary to congressional intent because the decision did not recognize the indirect ownership. 
Prior to the adjudication of the Sun Moon Star petition, the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
amended the regulations so that the definition of "subsidiary" recognized indirect ownership. See 52 
Fed. Reg. 5738, 5741-2 (February 26, 1987). Accordingly, the basis for the court's decision has been 
incorporated into the regulations. However, despite the amended regulation and the decision in Sun 
Moon Star, neither legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service nor USCIS has ever accepted a 
random combination of individual shareholders as a single entity, so that the group may claim 
majority ownership, unless the group members have been shown to be legally bound together as a 
unit within the company by voting agreements or proxies. 
To establish eligibility in this case, it must be shown that the foreign employer and the petitioning 
entity share common ownership and control. Control may be "de jure" by reason of ownership of 51 
percent of outstanding stocks of the other entity or it may be "de facto" by reason of control of voting 
shares through partial ownership and possession of proxy votes. Matter of Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 
(Comm'r 1982). 
In this case the U.S. entity is owned by five individuals with no documented majority shareholder, 
and the foreign entity is majority owned by with seven minority 
shareholders. While the companies do have five owners in common, the companies are not affiliates 
as both companies are not owned and controlled by the same entity, individual or group of 
individuals. Based on the evidence submitted, the petitioner has not established that it has a 
qualifying relationship with the beneficiary's foreign employer. For this additional reason, the 
petition cannot be approved. 
D. Ability to Pay 
The final issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner established that it has the ability to pay the 
beneficiary's proffered wage. 
The regulation at 8 C.P.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states, in pertinent part: 
Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer 
of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States 
employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate 
this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the 
(b)(6)
Page 11 
beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be in the 
form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The petitioner indicates on the Form I-140, at Part 6, that it will pay the beneficiary a salary of 
$60.000.00 per year. 
In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS will first examine whether 
the petitioner employed the beneficiary at the time the priority date was established. If the petitioner 
establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater 
than the proffered wage, this evidence will be considered prima facie proof of the petitioner's ability 
to pay the beneficiary's salary. 
In the present case, the petitioner did not submit any documentation evidencing that it paid the 
beneficiary's proffered salary of $60,000 per year. Rather, the petitioner stated that the foreign entity 
has been paying his salary during his period of stay in the United States as a nonimmigrant. 
As an alternate means of determining the petitioner's ability to pay, the AAO will next examine the 
petitioner's net income figure as reflected on the federal income tax return, without consideration of 
depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a 
petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. Elatos 
Restaurant Corp. v. Sava, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing Tongatapu Woodcraft 
Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh, 
719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985); Ubeda v. Palmer, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), affd, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). 
In K. C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava, the court held the Immigration and Naturalization Service (now 
USCIS) had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's 
corporate income tax returns, rather than on the petitioner's gross income. 623 F. Supp. at 1084. The 
court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before 
expenses were paid rather than net income. Finally, there is no precedent that would allow the 
petitioner to "add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year." Chi-F eng Chang v. 
Thornburgh, 719 F. Supp. at 537; see also Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava, 632 F. Supp. at 1054. 
Finally, if the petitioner does not have sufficient net income to pay the proffered salary, the AAO will 
review the petitioner's net current assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's 
current assets and current liabilities. Net current assets identify the amount of "liquidity" that the 
petitioner has as of the date of filing and is the amount of cash or cash equivalents that would be 
available to pay the proffered wage during the year covered by the tax return. As long as the AAO is 
satisfied that the petitioner's current assets are sufficiently "liquid" or convertible to cash or cash 
equivalents, then the petitioner's net current assets may be considered in assessing the prospective 
employer's ability to pay the proffered wage. 
(b)(6)
Page 12 
As the petition's priority date falls on October 17, 2012, the AAO must examine the petitioner's tax 
return for 2012; however, it was unavailable at the time of filing and has not been provided on appeal. 
The director determined that the petitioner's IRS Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return, 
did not reflect sufficient net income or net assets to pay the proffered salary of $60,000, and the 
petitioner has not contested these findings. 
The petitioner provided an unaudited profit and loss statement 
covering the time period from January 
2012 through June 2012 to indicate that it can pay the beneficiary's proffered wage. However, as 
noted by the director, the profit and loss statement precedes the priority date and thus, does not 
indicate that the petitioner can pay the proffered wage as of October 2012. In addition, on appeal, 
counsel for the petitioner states that "based on their past gross receipts and continues influx or new 
contracts and product orders, [the petitioner] reasonable believes they can pay the proffered wage to 
the beneficiary." The unsupported statements of counsel on appeal or in a motion are not evidence 
and thus are not entitled to any evidentiary weight. See INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 188-89 n.6 
(1984); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1980). 
Accordingly, in light of the lack of sufficient corroborating evidence submitted to establish that the 
petitioner meets the provisions of 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), the petition cannot be approved. 
III. Conclusion 
The appeal will be dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent 
and alternate basis for the decision. In visa petition proceedings, it is the petitioner's burden to 
establish eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361; 
Matter of Otiende, 26 I&N Dec. 127, 128 (BIA 2013). Here, that burden has not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.