dismissed EB-1C Case: Nutrition Supplies

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prevent dearly unwarrantmd 
3 of oersonal Drj- 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
SRC 05 800 10406 
 3~r u u LJUM 
IN RE: 
PETITION: 
 Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to 
Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 1153(b)(l)(C) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
A*=------- - 
~bbert P. &ann, Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Texas Service Center. The matter is 
now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be summarily dismissed. 
The petitioner is a Florida corporation, which was incorporated on December 4, 1995. The Form 1-140 
indicates that the petitioner is engaged in the business of nutrition supplies. The petitioner indicates its intent 
to employ the beneficiary as its sales manager. Accordingly, the petitioner endeavors to classify the 
beneficiary as an employment-based immigrant pursuant to section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. $ 11 53(b)(l)(C), as a multinational executive or manager. It is noted that, 
aside from an official offer of employment, the petitioner failed to provide any documentation in support of 
its Form 1-140. 
Accordingly, on January 31, 2005, the director issued an extensive request for additional evidence (RFE) 
discussing the missing initial evidence as well as other crucial evidence that the director deemed necessary in 
determining the petitioner's eligibility to classify the beneficiary as a multinational manager or executive. 
After reviewing the petitioner's deficient response, which failed to fully address the issues discussed in the 
RFE, the director issued a decision dated July 22, 2005 denying the petitioner. The director determined that 
the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary would be employed in the United States in a managerial 
or executive capacity. More specifically, the director noted that the petitioner failed to provide the requested 
list of the beneficiary's specific daily activities with a breakdown of time that would be spent performing each 
duty. The director also discussed the petitioner's failure to provide any information about the beneficiary's 
proposed subordinates. 
Although counsel has submitted an appeal, his entire argument consists of paraphrasing the statutory 
definition of executive capacity and adding brief comments next to each of the four prongs of the definition. 
None of counsel's comments, however, address the director's specific findings or suggest how such findings 
were erroneous either factually or legally. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 9 103.3(a)(l)(v) states, in pertinent part: 
An officer to whom an appeal is taken shall summarily dismiss any appeal when the party 
concerned fails to identify specifically any erroneous conclusion of law or statement of fact 
for the appeal. 
Merely disagreeing with the director's conclusion, as counsel has done in the instant matter, is not 
synonymous with pointing to specific factual or legal errors. Therefore, a summary dismissal is warranted. 
Furthermore, the record supports a finding of ineligbility based on additional grounds that were not 
previously addressed in the director's decision. 
First, 8 C.F.R. $ 204.56)(3)(i)(A) states that the petitioner must establish that the beneficiary was employed 
abroad in a qualifying managerial or executive position for at least one out of the three years prior to filing the 
Form 1-140. In the instant matter, the director specifically addressed this issue in the RFE by instructing the 
petitioner to provide a detailed analysis of the beneficiary's daily activities during his employment abroad. 
However, the petitioner failed to provide the requested information; nor did the petitioner provide any 
information regarding this issue when the Form 1-140 was initially submitted. Failure to submit requested 
Page 3 
evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 
9 103.2@)(14). 
Second, 8 C.F.R. 9 204.50)(3)(i)(C) states that the petitioner must establish that it has a qualifying 
relationship with the beneficiary's foreign employer. Again, the RFE instructed the petitioner to provide 
evidence showing common ownership and control for the U.S. petitioner and the beneficiary's foreign 
employer. See Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593 (BIA 1988); see also Matter of 
Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986); Matter of Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 (Comm. 
1982). 
 In response, the petitioner provided a translation of the foreign entity's amended articles of 
incorporation showing that 
 owns 70% of the foreign entity. Although the 
petitioner provided its own articles of incorporation, which generally discusses the petitioner's stock and its 
board of directors, there is no specific information discussing the petitioner's ownership; nor did the petitioner 
provide other evidence indicating who owns a majority of its stock. Going on record without supporting 
documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. 
Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 
I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
Third, 8 C.F.R. 9 204.56)(3)(i)(D) states that the petitioner must establish that it has been doing business for 
at least one year prior to filing the Form 1-140. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 9 204.56)(2) states that doing 
business means "the regular, systematic, and continuous provision of goods andlor services by a firm, 
corporation, or other entity and does not include the mere presence of an agent or office." Although the director 
instructed the petitioner to provide this vital information when issuing the RFE, the only documentation 
provided was the petitioner's 2003 tax return. However, a tax return does not show the frequency of the 
petitioner's sales transactions. As such, it cannot be relied upon to determine whether an entity is conducting 
business on a "regular, systematic, and continuous" basis. See id. As previously stated, failure to submit 
requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 
9 103.2(b)(14). 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), affd, 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). Therefore, based on the three additional grounds of ineligibility discussed above, 
this petition cannot be approved. 
When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a challenge only 
if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's enumerated grounds. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043, affd, 345 F.3d 683. 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit 
sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1361. The petitioner has not 
sustained that burden. Therefore, the appeal will be summarily dismissed. 
ORDER: 
 The appeal is summarily dismissed.