dismissed EB-1C Case: Property Management

IdentlQtng data deleted to 
prevent clearly unwarranted 
invasion of pemnal privacy 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Mass. Ave. N.W., Rm. 3000 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
PETITION: 
 Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to 
Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 
 1 153(b)(l)(C) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5 for 
the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by 
filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 
days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. 
 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
John F. Grissom, Acting chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The director, Texas Service Center, initially approved the employment-based visa petition 
on December 8, 2006. Upon later review of the record, however, the director determined that the petitioner 
was not eligible for the benefit sought and therefore issued a Notice of Intent to Revoke (NOIR). The director 
ultimately revoked approval of the petition on April 15, 2008. The matter is now before the Administrative 
Appeals Office (AAO). The appeal will be dismissed. 
The petitioner is a limited liability company formed under the laws of the State of Florida and claims to be in the 
business of property management. It seeks to employ the beneficiary as its general manager. Accordingly, it 
endeavors to classify the beneficiary as an employment-based immigrant pursuant to section 203(b)(l)(C) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. $ 1153(b)(l)(C), as a multinational executive or manager. 
Upon review and after providing proper notice, the director ultimately revoked the approval pursuant to section 
205 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1155. The director determined (1) that the petitioner failed to establish that the 
beneficiary will be employed in a primarily managerial or executive position in the United States; and (2) that the 
petitioner failed to establish that it had been doing business for at least one year prior to the filing of the petition 
on November 14,2005. 
On appeal, counsel claims that the record establishes that the beneficiary will primarily perform qualifyrng duties 
in the United States and that the petitioner engaged in the regular, systematic, and continuous provision of 
services for one year prior to the filing of the petition. 
Section 203(b) of the Act states in pertinent part: 
(1) Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified immigrants who 
are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C): 
(C) Certain Multinational Executives and Managers. -- An alien is described 
in this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years preceding the time of the 
alien's application for classification and admission into the United States 
under this subparagraph, has been employed for at least 1 year by a firm or 
corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof and who 
seeks to enter the United States in order to continue to render services to the 
same employer or to a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is 
managerial or executive. 
The language of the statute is specific in limiting this provision to only those executives and managers who 
have previously worked for a fm, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate or subsidiary of that entity, 
and who are coming to the United States to work for the same entity, or its affiliate or subsidiary. 
A "United States employer" may file a petition on Form 1-140 for classification of an alien under section 
203(b)(l)(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. No labor certification is required for this 
Page 3 
classification. The prospective employer in the United States must furnish a job offer in the form of a 
statement which indicates that the alien is to be employed in the United States in a managerial or executive 
capacity. Such a statement must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the alien. 
Title 8 C.F.R. ij 204.5Cj)(3) explains that a petition filed for a multinational executive or manager under section 
203(b)(l)(C) must be accompanied by a statement fkom an authorized official of the "petitioning United States 
employer" which demonstrates that: 
(A) 
 If the alien is outside the United States, in the three years immediately preceding the 
filing of the petition the alien has been employed outside the United States for at least 
one year in a managerial or executive capacity by a firm or corporation, or other legal 
entity, or by an affiliate or subsidiary of such a firm or corporation or other legal 
entity; or 
(B) 
 If the alien is already in the United States working for the same employer or a 
subsidiary or affiliate of the firm or corporation, or other legal entity by which the 
alien was employed overseas, in the three years preceding entry as a nonimmigrant, 
the alien was employed by the entity abroad for at least one year in a managerial or 
executive capacity; 
(C) 
 The prospective employer in the United States is the same employer or a subsidiary 
or afiliate of the fum or corporation or other legal entity by which the alien was 
employed overseas; and 
(D) 
 The prospective United States employer has been doing business for at least one year. 
Regarding the revocation on notice of an immigrant petition under section 205 of the Act, the Board of 
Immigration Appeals has stated: 
In Matter of Estime, . . . this Board stated that a notice of intention to revoke a visa petition is 
properly issued for "good and sufficient cause" where the evidence of record at the time the 
notice is issued, if unexplained and unrebutted, would warrant a denial of the visa petition 
based upon the petitioner's failure to meet his burden of proof. The decision to revoke will 
be sustained where the evidence of record at the time the decision is rendered, including any 
evidence or explanation submitted by the petitioner in rebuttal to the notice of intention to 
revoke, would warrant such denial. 
Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 590 (BIA 1988) (citing Matter of Estime, 19 I&N 450 (BIA 1987)). 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) regulations affumatively require an alien to establish 
eligibility for an immigrant visa at the time an application for adjustment of status is filed. See 8 C.F.R. ij 
245.1(a). If the beneficiary of an approved visa petition was ineligible or is no longer eligible for the 
classification sought, the director may seek to revoke his approval of the petition pursuant to section 205 of 
Page 4 
the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1155, for "good and sufficient cause." By itself, a director's realization that a petition was 
incorrectly approved is good and sufficient cause for the issuance of a notice of intent to revoke an immigrant 
petition. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. at 590. Notwithstanding the USCIS burden to show "good and 
sufficient cause" in proceedings to revoke the approval of a visa petition, the petitioner bears the ultimate 
burden of establishing eligibility for the benefit sought. The petitioner's burden is not discharged until the 
immigrant visa is issued. Tongatapu Woodcraft of Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1 984). 
The first issue in the present matter is whether the petition in this matter was properly revoked because the 
petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary will be employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Section lOl(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 3 1101(a)(44)(A), provides: 
The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee 
primarily-- 
(i) manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or 
component of the organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or 
managerial employees, or manages an essential hction within the 
organization, or a department or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the 
authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel 
actions (such as promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee 
is directly supervised, functions at a senior level within the organizational 
hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and 
(iv) 
 exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or fhnction 
for which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not 
considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the 
supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised are 
professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 3 1101(a)(44)(B), provides: 
The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee 
primarily- 
(i) 
 directs the management of the organization or a major component or finction 
of the organization; 
Page 5 
(ii) 
 establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or 
function; 
(iii) 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(iv) 
 receives only general supervision or direction fiom higher level executives, 
the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
In this matter, the petitioner does not clearly state in the underlying petition whether the beneficiary will be 
employed in a managerial or an executive capacity. Due to the lack of clarity, the AAO will assume that the 
petitioner is claiming that the beneficiary will be employed in either a managerial or executive capacity and will 
consider both classifications on appeal. The AAO reviews appeals on a de novo basis. See Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 
997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989). 
In the Form 1-129, the petitioner claims to be a property management business and to employ four workers. The 
petitioner describes the beneficiary's proposed duties as "general manager" of this enterprise, and the staffing of 
the business, in a letter dated November 1,2005 as follows: 
As General Manager of [the petitioner], [the beneficiary] will continue to be responsible for the 
overall operation of the company (1 5%) in addition to: 
Defining and implementing company's goals and policies (1 5%) 
Supervising the administration and marketing managers (10%) 
Organizing weekly meetings with managerial employees to set up goals and review 
company's progress (5%) 
Meeting with accounting and legal representatives (5%) 
Negotiate with independent contractors for maintenance services (5%) 
Meet and negotiate contract services for main clients (20%) 
Establish financial goals and set up expenditures projections (10%) 
Attend Chamber of Commerce's meetings and luncheons along with other network 
organizations (5%) 
Report to member's [sic] abroad (5%) 
Visit properties and client's premises to assure quality of services (5%) 
[The petitioner] currently has 3 direct employees in addition to [the beneficiary] consisting of an 
Administrative Manager, Marketing Manager and a Customer Service Representative. In 
addition, we also hire independent contractors for the lawn care, swimming pool maintenance 
and cleaning service. 
The petitioner also submitted an organizational chart for the United States operation. The chart shows the 
beneficiary at the top of the organization directly supervising the administrative manager and the marketing 
manager. The administrative manager is shown, in tm, as supervising the customer service representative. 
Page 6 
Finally, the petitioner described the duties of the administrative manager as follows: 
Provide general administrative support such as typing, answering phones, filing paperwork, 
receiving and reconciling invoices, processing expense reports, receiving and distributing 
department mail, shipping training materials, maintaining supplies, and coordinating 
meetings 
Maintain current knowledge of each assigned property 
Prepare service contracts and follow-up with clients 
Prepare and distribute memos, notices and other correspondence to clients 
Review application packages for sales and rentals 
Coordinate all property inspections 
Assist with contractor selection process 
Communicate with clients as needed 
Maintain database of clientele and properties being serviced 
Report to General Manager. 
On December 8,2006, the director approved the petition. 
On September 19, 2007, the director issued an NOIR. In the NOIR, the director indicated, inter alia, that the 
record does not establish that the beneficiary will be primarily employed in a managerial or executive capacity. 
Instead, the director noted that it appears the beneficiary will be, at most, a first-line supervisor of non- 
professional employees. The director also indicated that the record does not establish that the petitioner was 
"doing business" for one year prior to the filing of the petition. 
In response, counsel claims in a letter dated October 15, 2007, that the beneficiary is a "function manager" and 
that the subordinate employees and intermittently engaged independent service providers, e.g., a handyman, a 
lawn service, an accountant, and a carpet cleaner, relieve the beneficiary of the need to primarily perform non- 
qualifying duties. 
Counsel also submits a list of the petitioner's employees and their ascribed duties, which is largely identical to the 
evidence submitted with the initial petition. However, the new list omits the customer service representative and 
indicates that the administrative manager performs the duties previously ascribed to this worker. Accordingly, it 
appears that the beneficiary is now directly supervising two workers who perform the tasks necessary to provide a 
service. 
On April 15,2008, the director revoked the petition. The director concluded that the petitioner failed to establish 
in part that the benefieiary will be employed in a primarily managerial or executive position in the United States. 
On appeal, counsel argues that the record establishes that the beneficiary will primarily perform qualifying duties 
in the United States. 
Upon review, counsel's assertions are not persuasive and the appeal will be dismissed. 
Page 7 
In examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, USCIS will look first to the petitioner's 
description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 4 204.5Cj)(5). The actual duties themselves reveal the true nature 
of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1 103, 1 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), afd, 905 F.2d 
41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
In this matter, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's job duties fails to establish that the beneficiary 
will act in a "managerial" or "executive" capacity. In support of the petition, the petitioner has submitted a 
vague and non-specific job description which fails to sufficiently describe what the beneficiary will do on a 
day-to-day basis. For example, the petitioner states that the beneficiary will be "responsible for the overall 
operation of the company" and will define and implement goals and policies. However, the petitioner fails to 
specifically describe these goals and policies or explain what, exactly, the beneficiary will do to be 
"responsible for the overall operation of the company" other than act as a first-line supervisor of three claimed 
property management employees. The fact that the petitioner has given the beneficiary a managerial or 
executive title and has prepared a vague job description which includes inflated job duties does not establish 
that the beneficiary will actually perform managerial or executive duties. Specifics are clearly an important 
indication of whether a beneficiary's duties are primarily executive or managerial in nature; otherwise meeting 
the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Id. 
 Going on record without 
supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these 
proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of 
California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
Consequently, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary will primarily perform 
qualifying duties in his operation of the enterprise. To the contrary, it appears more likely than not that the 
beneficiary will primarily perform first-line supervisory, administrative, and operational tasks. As the 
beneficiary's subordinate workers have not been established to be managerial, supervisory, or professional 
(see infra), it has not been established that the first-line supervisory tasks associated with the beneficiary's 
supervision of these workers will be qualifying duties. Furthermore, absent evidence to the contrary, the 
record is not persuasive in establishing that the other duties ascribed to the beneficiary will be truly 
managerial or executive in nature. For example, the petitioner claims that the beneficiary will devote 
substantial periods of time to meet with accountants and lawyers, negotiate with service providers, attend 
meetings, and visit managed properties. However, these duties do not appear to be managerial or executive in 
nature. Accordingly, it appears that the beneficiary will more likely than not "primarily" perform non- 
qualifying administrative, operational, or first-line supervisory tasks. An employee who "primarily" performs 
the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily" employed 
in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one 
"primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also Matter of Church Scientology 
International, 19 I&N Dec. 593,604 (Comm. 1988). 
The petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary will supervise and control the work of other 
supervisory, managerial, or professional employees, or will manage an essential fbnction of the organization. 
As asserted in the record, the beneficiary will directly or indirectly supervise approximately three subordinate 
workers. Although the petitioner claims that one of these employees is a supervisory or managerial 
employee, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the "administrative manager" is a bona fide 
Page 8 
supervisor or manager. The petitioner does not describe this worker as having supervisory responsibilities or 
duties. To the contrary, it appears that this worker primarily performs clerical tasks necessary to the business 
and is not truly supervising the customer service representative. An employee will not be considered to be a 
supervisor simply because of a job title or because he or she supervises daily work activities and assignments. 
Rather, the employee must be shown to possess some significant degree of control or authority over the 
employment of subordinates. Artificial tiers of subordinate employees and inflated job titles are not probative 
and will not establish that an organization is sufficiently complex to support an executive or managerial 
position. In this matter, the petitioner has not established that the reasonable needs of the United States 
operation compel the employment of a managerial or executive employee to oversee one or more subordinate 
supervisors. To the contrary, it is more likely than not that the workers are all primarily performing non- 
quaIi@ing tasks. See generally Family, Inc. v. US. Citizenship and hmigration Services, 469 F.3d 13 13 (9" 
Cir. 2006). Accordingly, it appears that the beneficiary will be, at most, the first-line supervisor of the non- 
professional subordinate employees. A managerial employee must have authority over day-to-day operations 
beyond the level normally vested in a first-line supervisor, unless the supervised employees are professionals. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act; see also Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 
604. Finally, as the petitioner failed to establish the skills necessary to perform the duties of the subordinate 
positions, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will supervise professional employees.' 
Furthermore, the record does not establish that the beneficiary will primarily manage an essential function of 
the organization. The term "function manager" applies generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or 
control the work of a subordinate staff but instead is primarily responsible for managing an "essential 
function" within the organization. See section 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. The term "essential function" is 
not defined by statute or regulation. If a petitioner claims that the beneficiary will manage an essential 
function, the petitioner must furnish a written job offer that clearly describes the duties to be performed in 
managing the essential function, i.e., identify the function with specificity, articulate the essential nature of 
the function, and establish the proportion of the beneficiary's daily duties attributed to managing the essential 
function. See 8 C.F.R. $5 204.5(j)(2) and (5). In addition, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's 
daily duties must demonstrate that the beneficiary will manage the function rather than perform the tasks 
1 
In evaluating whether the beneficiary will manage professional employees, the AAO must evaIuate whether 
the subordinate positions require a baccalaureate degree as a minimum for entry into the field of endeavor. 
Section 101(a)(32) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101(a)(32), states that "[tlhe term profession shall include but not 
be limited to architects, engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and teachers in elementary or secondary 
schools, colleges, academies, or seminaries." The term "profession" contemplates knowledge or learning, not 
merely skill, of an advanced type in a given field gained by a prolonged course of specialized instruction and 
study of at least baccalaureate level, which is a realistic prerequisite to entry into the particular field of 
endeavor. Matter of Sea, 19 I&N Dec. 8 17 (Cornm. 1988); Matter of Ling, 13 I&N Dec. 35 (R.C. 1968); 
Matter of Shin, 11 I&N Dec. 686 (D.D. 1966). Therefore, the AAO must focus on the level of education 
required by the position, rather than the degree held by the subordinate employee. The possession of a 
bachelor's degree by a subordinate employee does not automatically lead to the conclusion that an employee 
is employed in a professional capacity as that term is defined above. In the instant case, the petitioner has not, 
in fact, established that a bachelor's degree is actually necessary to perform the duties of any of the 
subordinate positions. 
Page 9 
related to the function. 
In this matter, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will manage an essential function. The 
petitioner's vague job description fails to document that the beneficiary's duties will be primarily managerial. 
Also, as explained above, the record indicates that the beneficiary will more likely than not primarily perform 
non-qualifying tasks and be a first-line supervisor of non-professional workers. Absent a clear and credible 
breakdown of the time spent by the beneficiary performing his duties, the AAO cannot determine what 
proportion of his duties will be managerial, nor can it deduce whether the beneficiary will primarily perform 
the duties of a function manager. See IKEA US, Inc. v. US. Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22, 24 (D.D.C. 
1999). Therefore, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in a 
managerial capacity. 
Similarly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will act in an "executive" capacity. The 
statutory definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated position within a complex 
organizational hierarchy, including major components or functions of the organization, and that person's 
authority to direct the organization. Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act. Under the statute, a beneficiary must 
have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish the goals and policies" of that organization. 
Inherent to the definition, the organization must have a subordinate level of employees for the beneficiary to 
direct, and the beneficiary must primarily focus on the broad goals and policies of the organization rather than 
the day-to-day operations of the enterprise. An individual will not be deemed an executive under the statute 
simply because they have an executive title or because they "direct" the enterprise as the owner or sole 
managerial employee. The beneficiary must also exercise "wide latitude in discretionary decision making" 
and receive only "general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of directors, or 
stockholders of the organization." Id. For the same reasons indicated above, the petitioner has failed to 
establish that the beneficiary will act primarily in an executive capacity. The beneficiary's job description is 
so vague that it cannot be discerned what, exactly, the beneficiary will do on a day-to-day basis. Also, as 
explained above, it appears more likely than not that the beneficiary will primarily perform administrative or 
operational tasks and work as a first-line supervisor of non-professional workers. Therefore, the petitioner 
has not established that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in an executive capacity. 
In reviewing the relevance of the number of employees a petitioner has, federal courts have generally agreed that 
USCIS "may properly consider an organization's small size as one factor in assessing whether its operations are 
substantial enough to support a manager." Family, Inc. v. US. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 469 F.3d at 
13 16 (citing with approval Republic of Transkei v. INS, 923 F.2d 175, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1991)); Fedin Bros. Co. v. 
Suva, 905 F.2d 41, 42 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam); Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 293 F. Supp. 2d 25, 29 
(D.D.C. 2003)). Furthermore, it is appropriate for USCIS to consider the size of the petitioning company in 
conjunction with other relevant factors, such as a company's small personnel size, the absence of employees who 
would perform the non-managerial or non-executive operations of the company, or a "shell company" that does 
not conduct business in a regular and continuous manner. See, e.g. Systronics COT. v. INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 
(D.D.C. 2001). 
Accordingly, as the record does not establish that the beneficiary will primarily perform managerial or 
executive duties, the petition was properly revoked, and the petition may not be approved for that reason. 
Page 10 
The second issue in the present matter is whether the petition was properly revoked because the record does 
not establish that the prospective United States employer has been "doing business" for at least one year. 8 
C.F.R. 9 204.5(j)(3)(D). "Doing business" is defined in pertinent part as "the regular, systematic, and 
continuous provision of goods and/or services." 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(2). 
The instant petition was filed on November 14, 2005. In support of its claim to have been "doing business" 
for at least one year, the petitioner submitted, inter alia, bank account statements, tax returns, wage reports, 
licenses, financial statements, and copies of eight "Property Management Agreements" pertaining to the 
various properties the petitioner purportedly manages. The Agreements obligate the petitioner to secure 
tenants, collect rents, and generally care for the properties in exchange for $100.00 monthly payments plus 
the first months' rents. However, the petitioner did not submit evidence that it has received any of these 
payments or that it has in fact found tenants for any of these properties. 
On September 19, 2007, the director issued an NOR. In the NOIR, the director indicated, inter alia, that the 
record does not establish that the petitioner was "doing business" for at least one year prior to the filing of the 
petition. 
In response, counsel submits evidence indicating that the petitioner had intermittently compensated third party 
service providers during the one-year period prior to the filing of the petition. The petitioner also submits an 
unsigned copy of its 2005 tax return. However, the petitioner did not submit any evidence that it received any 
compensation from its "property management" customers prior to the filing of the instant petition. The petitioner 
also submitted business records dated after the filing of the instant petition. 
On April 15,2008, the director revoked the petition. The director concluded that the petitioner failed to establish 
that the prospective United States employer has been "doing business" for at least one year. 
 8 C.F.R. 
204.50)(3)@). 
On appeal, counsel argues that the record establishes that the petitioner was doing business for at least one year 
prior to the filing of the petition. 
Upon review, counsel's assertions are not persuasive and the appeal will be dismissed. 
As correctly noted by the director, the record is devoid of evidence that the petitioner was engaged in the "the 
regular, systematic, and continuous provision of goods and/or services" for at least one year prior to the filing 
of the petition on November 14, 2005. 8 C.F.R. § 204.50)(2). Although the record contains copies of 
"Property Management Agreements," the petitioner did not submit evidence that it was ever compensated by 
customers pursuant to the Agreements. Merely signing agreements to manage properties, or paying wages to 
contractors and employees, does not establish that the petitioner was actually engaged in the regular, 
systematic, and continuous provision of a service. Once again, going on record without supporting 
documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. 
Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190. Furthermore, it is noted that the submitted business 
records pertaining to business activity occurring after the filing of the instant petition are not relevant to 
determining whether the petitioner was engaged in business for at least one year prior to the filing of the 
SRC 06 035 51277 
Page 11 
petition on November 14, 2005. A petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing; a petition cannot 
be approved at a future date aRer the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of facts. 
Matter of Katigbak, 14 I&N Dec. 45,49 (Comm. 1971). 
Accordingly, the petition was properly revoked, because the record does not establish that the prospective 
United States employer has been "doing business" for at least one year. 8 C.F.R. 8 204.50')(3)(D). 
As a final note, USCIS records indicate that the beneficiary has previously been approved for L-1 
employment with the instant petitioner. However, with regard to the beneficiary's L-1 nonimmigrant 
classification, it should be noted that, in general, given the permanent nature of the benefit sought, immigrant 
petitions are given far greater scrutiny by USCIS than nonimmigrant petitions. The AAO acknowledges that 
both the immigrant and nonimmigrant visa classifications rely on the same definitions of managerial and 
executive capacity. See $8 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(44). Although the statutory 
definitions for managerial and executive capacity are the same, the question of overall eligibility requires a 
comprehensive review of all of the provisions, not just the definitions of managerial and executive capacity. 
There are significant differences between the nonirnrnigrant visa classification, which allows an alien to enter 
the United States temporarily for no more than seven years, and an immigrant visa petition, which permits an 
alien to apply for permanent residence in the United States and, if granted, ultimately apply for naturalization 
as a United States citizen. CJ: $8 204 and 214 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $8 1154 and 1184; see also $ 316 of the 
Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1427. 
In addition, unless a petition seeks extension of a "new office" petition, the regulations allow for the approval 
of an L-1 extension without any supporting evidence and USClS normally accords the petitions a less 
substantial review. See 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(14)(i) (requiring no supporting documentation to file a petition to 
extend an L-1A petition's validity). Because USCIS spends less time reviewing Form 1-129 nonimmigrant 
petitions than Form 1-140 immigrant petitions, some nonimmigrant L-1 petitions are simply approved in error. 
Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 29-30 (recognizing that USCIS approves some petitions in 
error). 
Moreover, each nonimmigrant and immigrant petition is a separate record of proceeding with a separate 
burden of proof; each petition must stand on its own individual merits. The prior nonimmigrant approvals do 
not preclude USCIS from denying an extension petition. See e.g. Texas A&. Univ. v. Upchurch, 99 Fed. 
Appx. 556, 2004 WL 1240482 (5th Cir. 2004). The approval of a nonimmigrant petition in no way 
guarantees that USCIS will approve an immigrant petition filed on behalf of the same beneficiary. USCIS 
denies many 1-140 immigrant petitions after approving prior nonimmigrant 1-129 L-1 petitions. See, e.g., Q 
Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 25; IKEA US v. US Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 22; 
Fedin Brothers Co. Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. at 1103. 
Furthermore, if the previous nonimmigrant petitions were approved based on the same unsupported and 
contradictory assertions that are contained in the current record, the approvals would constitute material and 
gross error on the part of the director. The AAO is not required to approve applications or petitions where 
eligibility has not been demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals that may have been erroneous. See, 
e.g. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Comm. 1988). It would be absurd to 
Page 12 
suggest that USCIS or any agency must treat acknowledged errors as binding precedent. Sussex Engg. Ltd. v. 
Montgomery, 825 F.2d 1084, 1090 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988). 
In addition, the AAO's authority over the service centers is comparable to the relationship between a court of 
appeals and a district court. Even if a service center director had approved the nonirnmigrant petitions on 
behalf of the beneficiary, the AAO would not be bound to follow the contradictory decision of a service 
center. Louisiana Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS, 2000 WL 282785 (E.D. La.), afd, 248 F.3d 11 39 (5th Cir. 
2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 51 (2001). 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 1361. The petitioner has not sustained that burden. 
ORDER. The decision of the director is affirmed and the petition is revoked.