dismissed EB-1C Case: Used Automobile Sales

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Mass Ave., N.W., Rrn. 3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
WBttc wpy 
idding d&a deleted to 
prevent clearly ~5ik-g wanted 
hhm dp38m1 privacy 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
TI i 
Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: MAR 0 7 2007 
SRC 06 087 52290 
PETITION: 
 Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to 
Section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1153(b)(l)(C) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: SELF-REPRESENTED 
INSTRUCTIONS : 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
2 
Robert P. Wiemann, Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Texas Service Center. The matter is 
now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be summarily dismissed. 
The petitioner was established in 1999 and is engaged in the business of selling used automobiles. It seeks to 
employ the beneficiary as its manager. Accordingly, the petitioner endeavors to classify the beneficiary as an 
employment-based immigrant pursuant to section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the 
Act), 8 U.S.C. 9 1153(b)(l)(C), as a multinational executive or manager. The director denied the petition 
based on two independent grounds of ineligibility: 1) the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary was 
employed by the foreign entity in a managerial or executive capacity; and 2) the petitioner failed to establish 
that it would employthe beneficiary in a managerial or executive capacity. 
The petitioner submitted an appeal referring to "a misrepresentation in the forms that were previously 
submitted." The petitioner describes the beneficiary's position as one involving discretion over the 
subordinate employees as well as the petitioner's daily business operations. However, the petitioner also 
concedes that the beneficiary dedicates approximately 50% of his time to purchasing the vehicles that are 
subsequently sold because purchasing is the key to the company's financial gains. Therefore, despite the 
discretionary authority and the top-most position within the petitioner's organizational hierarchy, the 
beneficiary, by the petitioner's own admission, would not be employed in the United States in a primarily 
managerial or executive capacity. See 9 9 10 1 (a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act. 
With regard to the beneficiary's foreign employment, the petitioner states that the beneficiary also attended 
auctions to purchase vehicles and supervised the business's employees. However, as with the beneficiary's 
proposed position in the United States, the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary's position abroad 
primarily involved performing qualifying managerial or executive tasks. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 9 103.3(a)(l)(v) states, in pertinent part: 
An officer to whom an appeal is taken shall summarily dismiss any appeal when the party 
concerned fails to identify specifically any erroneous conclusion of law or statement of fact 
for the appeal. 
In the instant matter, the petitioner's statements on appeal indicate that the director's analysis of the prior 
submissions was accurate. Moreover, instead of identifying an error of law or fact made by the director, it 
appears the petitioner is inappropriately seeking to correct its own errors on appeal. Regardless, the petitioner 
suggests that the AAO should overturn the director's decision despite its failure to meet the statutory 
requirements for the immigration benefit sought. The petitioner also makes a brief reference to the current 
approved L-1 employment of the beneficiary. However, the AAO is not required to approve applications or 
petitions where eligibility has not been demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals that may have been 
erroneous. See, e.g. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Comm. 1988). It 
would be absurd to suggest that CIS or any agency must treat acknowledged errors as binding precedent. 
Sussex Engg. Ltd. v. Montgomery, 825 F.2d 1084, 1090 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988). 
If the previous nonimrnigrant petitions were approved based on the same unsupported assertions that are 
contained in the current record, the approval would constitute material and gross error on the part of the 
director. Finally, the AAO's authority over the service centers is comparable to the relationship between a 
court of appeals and a district court. Even if a service center director had approved the nonimmigrant 
petitions on behalf of the beneficiary, the AAO would not be bound to follow the contradictory decision of a 
service center. Louisiana Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS, 2000 WL 282785 (E.D. La.), afyd, 248 F.3d 1139 
(5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 51 (2001). 
Furthermore, the record supports a finding of ineligibility based on at least one additional ground that was not 
previously addressed in the director's decision. More specifically, supporting evidence includes the 
beneficiary's 2002, 2003, and 2004 IRS Forms 1040 with their respective Schedule Cs, that demonstrate that 
the beneficiary is doing business as a sole proprietorship. A sole proprietorship is a business in which one 
person operates the business in his or her personal capacity. Black's Law Dictionary 1398 (7th Ed. 1999). 
Unlike a corporation, a sole proprietorship does not exist as an entity apart from the individual proprietor. See 
Matter of United Investment Group, 19 I&N Dec. 248, 250 (Comm. 1984). As in the present matter, if the 
petitioner is actually the individual beneficiary doing business as a sole proprietorship, with no authorized 
branch office of the foreign employer or separate legal entity in the United States, there is no U.S. entity to 
employ the beneficiary and therefore no qualifying organization. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), affd, 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). Therefore, based on the additional ground of ineligibility discussed above, this 
petition cannot be approved. 
When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a challenge only 
if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's enumerated grounds. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043, affd, 345 F.3d 683. 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit 
sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. fj 1361. Inasmuch as the 
petitioner has failed to identify specifically an erroneous conclusion of law or a statement of fact in this 
proceeding, the petitioner has not sustained that burden. Therefore, the appeal will be summarily dismissed. 
ORDER: 
 The appeal is summarily dismissed.