dismissed EB-2 NIW Case: Architecture

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
Non-Precedent Decision of the
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date: APR. 5, 2024 In Re: 30361521 
Appeal of Texas Service Center Decision 
Form 1-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Workers (National Interest Waiver) 
The Petitioner is an architect who seeks employment-based second preference (EB-2) immigrant 
classification as a member of the professions holding an advanced degree, as well as a national interest 
waiver of the job offer requirement attached to this classification. See Immigration and Nationality 
Act (the Act) section 203(b )(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b )(2). 
The Texas Service Center Director denied the Form 1-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Workers 
(petition), concluding that the record did not establish that she qualifies for the underlying visa 
classification or merits a discretionary waiver of the job offer requirement in the national interest. The 
Petitioner bears the burden of proof to demonstrate eligibility to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS) by a preponderance of the evidence. Section 291 of the Act; Matter of Chawathe, 
25 I&N Dec. 369, 375 (AAO 2010). We review the questions in this matter de novo. Matter of 
Christo 's Inc., 26 I&N Dec. 537, 537 n.2 (AAO 2015). Upon de novo review, we will dismiss the 
appeal. 
I. LAW 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(2) provides that "[u]nless otherwise specified in this chapter, an 
acceptable signature on a benefit request that is being filed with the USCIS [U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services] is one that is either handwritten or, for benefit requests filed electronically as 
permitted by the instructions to the form, in electronic format." 1 
USCIS policy explains that a valid signature is "any handwritten mark or sign made by a person" and 
such signature must be made by the person who is the affected party with standing to file an appeal or 
motion to signify that "[t]he person knows of the content of the request and any supporting documents; 
[t]he person has reviewed and approves of any information contained in such request and any 
supporting documents; and [t]he person certifies under penalty of perjury that the request and any 
other supporting documents are true and correct." See generally l USCIS Policy Manual B.2(B) 
(emphasis added), https://www.uscis.gov/policymanual. A person's signature on an immigration form 
1 Because this Form 1-290B was not electronically filed , none of the provisions relating to electronic filings applies in this 
case. We note the Form 1-290B is not a form that is available for parties to file electronically online. Forms Available to 
File Online, USCIS (Mar. 21, 2024), https://www.uscis .gov/file-online/forms-available-to-file-online. 
establishes a strong presumption that the signer knows its contents and has assented to them, absent 
evidence of fraud or other wrongful acts by another person. Matter of Valdez, 27 I&N Dec. 496,499 
(BIA 2018) (citing Thompson v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 638, 647 (6th Cir. 2015); Bingham v. Holder, 637 
F.3d I 040, l 045 (9th Cir. 2011 ). The probative force of a declaration subscribed 
under penalty of perjury derives from the signature of the declarant. 
The USCIS Policy Manual provides that in "general, any person requesting an immigration benefit 
must sign their own immigration benefit request, and any other associated documents, before filing it 
with USCIS." See generally 1 USCIS Policy Manual, supra, at C.l (citing to 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(2)). 
Agency policy provides that "[a] signature is valid even if the original signature on the document is 
photocopied, scanned, faxed, or similarly reproduced. Regardless of how it is transmitted to USCIS, 
the copy must be of an original document containing an original handwritten signature, unless 
otherwise specified." See generally I USCIS Policy Manual, supra, at B. 
Finally, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 292.4(a) requires that the Form G-28, Notice of Entry of Appearance 
as Attorney or Accredited Representative "must be properly completed and signed by the petitioner, 
applicant, or respondent to authorize representation in order for the appearance to be recognized by DHS." 
If someone acting on behalf of a petitioner-to include someone from their attorney's office­
performs the function of electronically applying a signature to a Form I-290B, that act nullifies the 
filing because it is not a valid signature and it is not properly signed under the penalty of perjury. 
Ultimately, even if a filing party presents a photocopy of a Form I-290B to USCIS, that photocopied 
form must contain a filing party's original signature that is consistent with how the person signing 
normally signs his or her name because "[a]n applicant or petitioner must sign his or her benefit 
request." 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(2). 
Although the "regulations do not require that the person signing submit an 'original' or 'wet ink' 
signature on a petition, application, or other request to USCIS," we do "not accept signatures created 
by a typewriter, word processor, stamp, auto-pen, or similar device." See generally I USCIS Policy 
Manual, supra, at B. Also see generally I USCIS Policy Manual, supra, at A (stating that "[e]xcept 
as otherwise specifically authorized, a benefit requestor must personally sign his or her own request 
before filing it with USCIS"). USCIS has implemented these regulations and attendant policies "to 
maintain the integrity of the immigration benefit system and validate the identity of benefit 
requestors." See generally I USCIS Policy Manual, supra, at A. 
In the same way that one person signing a declaration "for" another person carries no evidentiary 
force, neither will an image of a signature duplicated in using some electronic means or method. 
Without the Petitioner's actual and personal signature as the declarant, the declaration under the 
penalty of perjury on the Form I-290B has no evidentiary force. See In re Rivera, 342 B.R. 435, 458-
59 (D. N.J. 2006); Blumberg v. Gates, No. CV 00-05607, 2003 WL 22002739 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 
2003). Moreover, ifwe determine that a benefit request does not contain a valid or a proper signature, 
we reject, deny, or dismiss it without providing an opportunity to correct or cure a deficient signature. 
8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(7)(ii)(A); see generally I USCIS Policy Manual, supra, at A. 
The USCIS Policy Manual further explains that the agency interprets the regulatory term "valid 
signature" to mean a signature that "is consistent with how the person signing normally signs his or 
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her name." See generally 1 USCJS Policy Manual, supra, at B (explaining that the appearance of the 
signature on USCIS forms must be preponderantly consistent with that person's normal signature). 
TI. ANALYSIS 
On the appellate Form I-290B, the form contains an image of a signature under Part 6.a in the 
Petitioner's Signature block. We conclude that this is an image of a signature and not an original 
signature due to multiple factors. First, the Petitioner's signatures on the appellate forms (Form I-290B 
and the Form G-28) are identical and indistinguishable, to include each line, loop, slant, spacing, and 
pen lift. Second, while the sole differentiating element between these two signatures is the image used 
on the Form I-290B is slightly smaller in size than the image on the Form G-28, the ratio of height to 
width is consistent throughout the signature. 
Third, the images of the Petitioner's signature on both appellate forms contain an "imperfection" or 
an unusual mark in the form of a small line below the signature image. On the Form I-290B, this 
merely appears to be a small line made by a pen, but on the Form G-28 it seemingly creates a tilde 
symbol above the letter "e" in the word "Signature." It appears that the person who extracted the 
image from another document, brought with it additional content. This is an indication that this may 
have been copied from another source and electronically transferred onto the submitted appellate 
forms. And we note the Form G-28 dated June 16, 2023, that appears the Petitioner provided when 
responding to the Director's request for evidence is also identical in every measure to the images on 
the appellate forms. 
Because of the above factors, we conclude that it is more likely than not that the image of the signature 
on the Form I-290B is not a valid signature as required by the regulation. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(7)(ii)(A). 
To be valid here, regardless of how the filing party transmits the immigration form to USCIS, any 
signature must be on an original immigration form "containing an original handwritten signature, 
unless otherwise specified." See generally 1 USCJS Policy Manual, supra, at B. 
We observe the same shortcomings on the appellate Form G-28, meaning that form does not comply 
with the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 292.4(a) requiring that the Form G-28 "must be properly completed 
and signed by the petitioner, applicant, or respondent to authorize representation in order for the 
appearance to be recognized by DHS." Therefore, the Petitioner has not satisfied their burden, or the 
preponderance standard of proof, that the signature on the Form I-290B or the Form G-28 are valid 
signatures. Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. at 3 7 5 n.7 ( explaining that the filing party bears the burden of 
proof, and that the preponderance standard does not relieve them from satisfying regulatory 
requirements, such as providing a "valid signature"). 
Considering the totality of the circumstances, the record preponderantly reflects that the signatures of 
the Petitioner on the Form I-290B and the Form G-28 were electronically applied to the forms and 
those are not their "original handwritten signature," as required by the USCIS Policy Manual. See 
generally I USCIS Policy Manual, supra, at B. Based on that determination, we are dismissing the 
appeal. Additionally, because we conclude the signatures in question are not "any handwritten mark 
or sign made by a person," we are not basing this decision on a signature that appears inconsistent 
with other signatures in the record, and we will not issue a notice seeking additional information 
relating to the appearance of the signature. 
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If the record does not establish that the Form I-290B and the Form G-28 were personally signed by 
the Petitioner, we cannot recognize the appellate forms to have been properly filed by an affected party 
with legal standing in these proceedings. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(l)(iii)(B). Nor can we decide that 
the Petitioner properly filed this appeal, and we will dismiss this filing. See generally l USCIS Policy 
Manual, supra, at B. 
Even if the appellate filing did not contain these signature issues, we would still dismiss the appeal. 
Regarding the second prong requirements from Matter of Dhanasar, 26 I&N Dec. 884, 889 (AAO 
2016), the Director denied the petition in part on this dispositive requirement; dispositive meaning the 
Petitioner cannot qualify for a national interest waiver without satisfying this freestanding necessity. 
In the appeal, the Petitioner must first identify an error in fact or in applying the law that the Director 
made in their denial decision. However, pertaining to Dhanasar 's second prong, the Petitioner 
presents the same arguments and evidence she offered before the Director without alleging any 
erroneous conclusion of law or fact. 
The reason for filing an appeal is to provide an affected party with the means to remedy what they 
perceive as an erroneous conclusion of law or statement of fact within a previous proceeding. See 
8 C.F.R. § I 03.3(a)(l )(v). By presenting only a generalized statement of disagreement with the 
Director's conclusion without explaining the specific aspects they consider to be incorrect, the affected 
party has failed to identify the basis for contesting this requirement on appeal, and effectively abandons 
or waives that claim on appeal. There is agreement among several circuit courts of appeals on this 
issue. Minghai Tian v. Holder, 745 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014); Zivojinovich v. Barner, 525 F.3d 
1059, 1062 (11th Cir. 2008); Sepulveda v. US. Att'y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1228 n.2 (11th Cir. 
2005); Irwin v. Hawk, 40 F.3d 347, 347 n. l (I Ith Cir. 1994); Rivera-Gomez v. de Castro, 843 F.2d 
631,635 (1st Cir. 1988); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628,634 (9th Cir. 1988); Tedder v. FMC. 
Co,p., 590 F.2d 115, 117 (5th Cir. 1979). See also Matter of Valencia, 19 I&N Dec. 354, 354-55 
(BIA 1986). 
Whether an appellant has sufficiently addressed a claim relies on at least two aspects. First, they must 
raise the "core issue" before us within the appeal. Montano Cisneros v. US. Att'y Gen., 514 F.3d 
1224, 1228 n.3 (11th Cir. 2008). Second, the appellant must also set out any discrete arguments it 
relies on in support of that core issue claim. Shkambi v. US. Att'y Gen., 584 F.3d 1041, 1048 n.4 
(11th Cir. 2009). While there is no requirement for a petitioner to "use precise legal terminology" or 
provide abundantly developed arguments to support their claim, an appellant is required to "provide 
information sufficient to enable [ the appellate body] to review and correct any errors 
below." Indrawati v. US. Att'y Gen., 779 F.3d 1284, 1297 (I Ith Cir. 2015) (quotingArsdi v. 
Holder, 659 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2011)). 
Similarly, the Supreme Court has recognized the common-law application of issue preclusion as 
appropriate within administrative proceedings. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 
104, 107 (1991). When a decision has been decided within administrative proceedings, no relitigation 
on an issue identical in substance and by the same party is warranted, as it would be an unjustifiable 
burden and would drain the resources of the agency's adjudicatory system. Id. at 107-08. See also 
Bravo-Fernandez v. United States, 580 U.S. 5, 9 (2016) (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 
742, 748 (200 I) (finding it is appropriate to foreclose a rehashing of the very same claim)). 
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As a result, the Petitioner would not prevail on appeal within a merits analysis because they have 
waived a dispositive issue; the second prong of the Dhanasar analysis. Because the Petitioner has 
abandoned or waived a dispositive requirement in the appeal, even ifwe were to decide on the merits, 
we would not address and we would reserve their remaining appellate arguments. Patel v. Garland, 
596 U.S. 328, 332 (2022) (citing INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25-26 (1976) (finding agencies 
are not required to make "purely advisory findings" on issues that are unnecessary to the ultimate 
decision)); see also Matter of Chen, 28 I&N Dec. 676, 677 n.1, 678 (BIA 2023) ( declining to reach 
alternative issues on appeal where an applicant is otherwise ineligible). 
III. CONCLUSION 
The appeal will be dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each considered an independent and 
alternative basis for the decision. In visa petition proceedings, it is a petitioner's burden to establish 
eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. The Petitioner has not met that burden. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
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