dismissed EB-2 NIW Case: Aviation Maintenance

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
Non-Precedent Decision of the
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date: AUG. 21, 2024 In Re: 32676137 
Motion on Administrative Appeals Office Decision 
Form 1-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Workers (National Interest Waiver) 
The Petitioner, an aviation maintenance technician, seeks employment-based second preference (EB-
2) immigrant classification as an individual of exceptional ability, as well as a national interest waiver 
of the job offer requirement attached to this classification. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the 
Act) section 203(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2). 
The Director of the Nebraska Service Center denied the petition, concluding that the record did not 
establish that the Petitioner qualifies for the EB-2 classification or for a national interest waiver as a 
matter of discretion. We dismissed a subsequent appeal. The matter is now before us on combined 
motions to reopen and reconsider. 
The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to demonstrate eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375-76 (AAO 2010). Upon review, we will dismiss the 
motions. 
A motion to reopen must state new facts and be supported by documentary evidence. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 103.5(a)(2). A motion to reconsider must establish that our prior decision was based on an incorrect 
application of law or policy and that the decision was incorrect based on the evidence in the record of 
proceedings at the time of the decision. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(3). Our review on motion is limited to 
reviewing our latest decision. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(l)(ii). We may grant motions that satisfy these 
requirements and demonstrate eligibility for the requested benefit. See Matter ofCoelho, 20 I&N Dec. 
464,473 (BIA 1992) (requiring that new evidence have the potential to change the outcome). 
The Petitioner indicates on the Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, that his submission is both 
a motion to reopen and a motion to reconsider. The Petitioner also submits a brief that refers to the 
submission as "the Motion to Reopen and Reconsider." However, the Petitioner does not identify a 
new fact, nor does he submit documentary evidence of such a fact in support of the motion to reopen. 
Because the submission does not identify a new fact, and it is not supported by documentary evidence 
of such a fact, it does not satisfy the requirements of a motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(2). 
Therefore, the motion to reopen will be dismissed. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(4). 
On motion, the Petitioner contests the correctness of our prior decision. In support of the motion to 
reconsider, the Petitioner contends that we did not apply the proper standard of proof in our appellate 
decision, instead imposing a stricter standard. Upon review, we conclude that the evidence was 
properly analyzed to evaluate the Petitioner's eligibility by a preponderance of evidence and the 
Petitioner did not meet three of the six required criteria for a determination of exceptional ability, as 
discussed below. Matter ofChawathe, 25 I&N Dec. at 375-76. 
In analyzing the Petitioner's eligibility as an individual of exceptional ability, the Director determined 
that the Petitioner only met two of the required criteria and on appeal; 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(A) 
and (B). On appeal we agreed, concluding that the Petitioner was not eligible for EB-2 classification 
as he did not meet the remaining criteria. On motion, the Petitioner again claims that he meets the 
following three criteria; ten years of full-time experience in the occupation, membership in a 
professional association, and recognition for achievements and significant contributions. Although he 
mentions that he believes he possesses ten years of full-time experience in his occupation, he does not 
discuss his eligibility for this criterion in any detail or discuss how our appellate decision was based 
on the application of incorrect law or policy. Therefore, we will consider this issue waived and limit 
our analysis to the final two criteria that are addressed on motion. 1 
The Petitioner does not specifically state how we imposed a stricter standard than required but 
reiterates that he meets 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(E) based on his membership with the Professional 
Aviation Maintenance Association (PAMA). The Petitioner's membership in this organization was 
previously evaluated and addressed in the appellate decision. The record contains evidence of his 
membership in the organization, the bylaws of the organization, and pages from the PAMA website. 
The Petitioner asserts that PAMA is a professional organization in the field of aviation maintenance. 
We note that the term "profession" is defined at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2) as "any occupation for which 
a United States baccalaureate degree or its foreign equivalent is the minimum requirement for entry 
into the occupation." The bylaws state that to be a "regular member" of the organization, "[a]n 
applicant must be certificated under Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Title 14 Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR) part 65, subpart D-Mechanics or subpart E-Repairman, or foreign national 
aviation authority equivalent, or hold a Federal Communications Commission General Radio and 
Telephone certificate." The evidence in the record does not establish the occupation, or the 
membership in an association for that occupation, requires a U.S. bachelor's degree or foreign 
equivalent. Therefore, we conclude that he has not established that PAMA qualifies as a professional 
association under the regulatory definition, and he has not established that he meets 8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(E). 
The Petitioner states that he disagrees with the analysis in the appellate decision regarding 8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(F) and that the recommendation letters in the record validate the significance of his 
achievements. In addition, the Petitioner states the expert opinion letters also speak to his abilities and 
contributions. On motion, the Petitioner submits a new letter from the employer. However, a motion 
to reconsider is limited to an incorrect application of law or policy based on the evidence in the record 
of proceedings at the time of the decision. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(3). Therefore, this letter was not part 
of the record when the appellate decision was issued, and we need not consider this letter on motion 
1 An issue not raised on appeal is waived. See, e.g., Matter of O-R-E-, 28 I&N Dec. 330, 336 n.5 (BIA 2021) (citing 
Matter ofR-A-M-, 25 l&N Dec. 657, 658 n.2 (BIA 2012)). 
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to reconsider. However, even if we were to consider this letter, we note that while this letter praises 
the Petitioner's work that impacted their organization's operations and safe standards, it does not 
establish he made "significant contributions to the industry." Similarly, the appellate decision 
analyzed other recommendation letters in the record in detail, quoting and citing them and their 
compliments of the Petitioner's work. While we acknowledge that the letters attest to the experience 
and expertise of the Petitioner, they do not attest to, "significant contributions to the field." Although 
his work may have benefitted his employers, the record does not establish that his work has contributed 
to the field of aviation mechanics as a whole. 
The record also contains various certifications that the Petitioner asserts, "serve as external validation 
and recognition of his contributions." The certifications in the record demonstrate the Petitioner's 
continued growth in the knowledge of his field and his personal achievements, however they do not 
establish significant contributions to the field as is required by this criterion. The Petitioner also 
highlights the expert opinion letters in the record as further proof of recognition, stating that they were 
previously overlooked. While they do speak to the Petitioner's experience in his field, the letters 
reiterate what can be found in the Petitioner's resume and the recommendation letters we previously 
reviewed. Neither discuss significant contributions the Petitioner may have made to the industry of 
aviation mechanics. Therefore, we conclude that the Petitioner has not met this criterion. 
Lastly, the Petitioner claims that we omitted analyzing the evidence in the record that pertains to the 
first prong of the Dhanasar framework; namely the national importance of the Petitioner's proposed 
endeavor. Matter ofDhanasar, 26 I&N Dec. 884, 889 (AAO 2016). In our prior decision, we declined 
to discuss the remaining arguments regarding the Dhanasar framework because the Petitioner did not 
establish he was eligible for the underlying EB-2 classification. Because the Petitioner did not qualify 
for the underlying EB-2 classification, further analysis of his eligibility under the Dhanasar 
framework would serve no meaningful purpose. As noted in our prior decision, we are not required 
to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results we reach. See INS v. 
Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976); see also Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. 516, 526 n. 7 (BIA 
2015) (declining to reach alternate issues on appeal where an applicant is otherwise ineligible). 
The Petitioner did not identify any new facts, or submit any additional documentary evidence of such 
facts, and therefore, the Petitioner has not established eligibility for a motion to reopen. On motion to 
reconsider, the Petitioner has not established that our previous decision was based on an incorrect 
application of law or policy at the time we issued our decision. Therefore, the motions will be 
dismissed. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(4). 
ORDER: The motion to reopen is dismissed. 
FURTHER ORDER: The motion to reconsider is dismissed. 
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