dismissed EB-2 NIW Case: Business And Corporate Law

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
Non-Precedent Decision of the
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date: JULY 8, 2024 In Re: 31281820 
Appeal of Texas Service Center Decision 
Form 1-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Workers (National Interest Waiver) 
The Petitioner proposes to be an entrepreneur in the area of business and corporate law and seeks 
employment-based second preference (EB-2) immigrant classification as a member of the professions 
holding an advanced degree, as well as a national interest waiver (NIW) of the job offer requirement 
attached to this classification. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 203(b )(2), 
8 U.S.C. § ll 53(b )(2). 
The Texas Service Center Director denied the Form 1-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Workers 
(petition), concluding that the record did not establish that the Petitioner merited a discretionary waiver 
of the job offer requirement in the national interest. The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to 
demonstrate eligibility to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) by a preponderance of 
the evidence. Section 291 of the Act; Matter ofChawathe , 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375 (AAO 2010). We 
review the questions in this matter de novo. Matter ofChristo 's Inc., 26 I&N Dec. 537, 537 n.2 (AAO 
2015). Upon de novo review, we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. SIGNATURES ON APPEAL 
Before we address the Petitioner's NIW eligibility, we observe anomalous signature issues on the 
forms the Petitioner submitted on appeal. 
A. Legal Framework 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(2) provides 
that "[u]nless otherwise specified in this chapter, an 
acceptable signature on a benefit request that is being filed with the USCIS [U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services] is one that is either handwritten or, for benefit requests filed electronically as 
permitted by the instructions to the form, in electronic format." 1 
USCIS policy explains that a valid signature is "any handwritten mark or sign made by a person" and 
such signature must be made by the person who is the affected party with standing to file an appeal or 
1 Because this Form 1-290B was not electronically filed , none of the provisions relating to electronic filings applies in this 
case. We note the Fonn 1-290B is not a form that is available for parties to file electronically online. Forms Available to 
File Online, USCIS (Mar. 21, 2024), https://www.uscis .gov/file-online/forms-available-to-file-online. 
motion to signify that "[t]he person knows of the content of the request and any supporting documents; 
[t]he person has reviewed and approves of any information contained in such request and any 
supporting documents; and [ t ]he person certifies under penalty of perjury that the request and any 
other supporting documents are true and correct." See generally 1 USCIS Policy Manual B.2(B) 
( emphasis added), https://www.uscis.gov/policymanual. A person's signature on an immigration form 
establishes a strong presumption that the signer knows its contents and has assented to them, absent 
evidence of fraud or other wrongful acts by another person. Matter of Valdez, 27 I&N Dec. 496,499 
(BIA 2018) (citing Thompson v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 638, 647 (6th Cir. 2015); Bingham v. Holder, 637 
F.3d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 2011). The probative force of a declaration subscribed 
under penalty of perjury derives from the declarant's signature. 
The USCIS Policy Manual provides that in "general, any person requesting an immigration benefit 
must sign their own immigration benefit request, and any other associated documents, before filing it 
with USCIS." See generally 1 USCIS Policy Manual, supra, at B.2(C)(l) (citing to 8 C.F.R. 
§ 103.2(a)(2)). Agency policy provides that "[a] signature is valid even if the original signature on 
the document is photocopied, scanned, faxed, or similarly reproduced. Regardless of how it is 
transmitted to USCIS, the copy must be of an original document containing an original handwritten 
signature, unless otherwise specified." See generally 1 USCIS Policy Manual, supra, at B.2(B). 
Relating to the Form I-290B, the Instructions for Notice of Appeal or Motion additionally provide: 
"Every form MUST contain the signature of the applicant or petitioner ( or parent or legal guardian, if 
applicable)." The form instructions further require: "Signature. Each form must be properly signed 
and filed. For all signatures on this form, USCIS will not accept a stamped or typewritten name in 
place of a signature." 
The instructions for the Form G-28, Notice of Entry of Appearance as Attorney or Accredited 
Representative provide: "Validity of Signatures. For Form G-28, USCIS will consider a photocopied, 
faxed, or scanned copy of the original handwritten signature valid for filing purposes. The photocopy, 
fax, or scan must be of the original document containing the handwritten, ink signature. Every form, 
benefit request, or other document must be executed in accordance with the instructions on the form, 
which are incorporated into the regulation requiring its submission. 8 C.F.R. § l 03.2(a)(l ). 
Further filing requirements for these documents are found at 8 C .F.R. § 103.2(b )( 1 ), which provides 
that "[ e Jach benefit request must be properly completed and filed with all initial evidence required by 
applicable regulations and other USCIS instructions." Therefore, the failure to follow the form 
instructions is tantamount to not complying with the regulation. 
Finally, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 292.4(a) requires that the Form G-28 "must be properly completed 
and signed by the petitioner, applicant, or respondent to authorize representation in order for the 
appearance to be recognized by DRS." 
If someone acting on behalf of a pet1t10ner-to include someone from their attorney's 
office-performs the function of electronically applying a signature to a Form I-290B, that act nullifies 
the filing because it is not a valid signature and it is not properly signed under the penalty of perjury. 
Ultimately, even if a filing party presents a photocopy of a Form I-290B to USCIS, that photocopied 
form must contain a filing party's original signature because "[a]n applicant or petitioner must sign 
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his or her benefit request." 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(2). 
Although the "regulations do not require that the person signing submit an 'original' or 'wet ink' 
signature on a petition, application, or other request to USCIS," we do "not accept signatures created 
by a typewriter, word processor, stamp, auto-pen, or similar device." See generally I USCIS Policy 
Manual, supra, at B.2(B). Also see generally I USCIS Policy Manual, supra, at B.2(A) (stating that 
"[e ]xcept as otherwise specifically authorized, a benefit requestor must personally sign his or her own 
request before filing it with USCIS"). USCIS has implemented these regulations and attendant 
policies "to maintain the integrity of the immigration benefit system and validate the identity of benefit 
requestors." See generally 1 USCIS Policy Manual, supra, at B.2(A). 
In the same way that one person signing a declaration "for" another person carries no evidentiary 
force, neither will an image of a signature duplicated in using some electronic means or method. 
Without the Petitioner's actual and personal signature as the declarant, the declaration under the 
penalty of perjury on the Form I-290B has no evidentiary force. See In re Rivera, 342 B.R. 435, 
458-59 (D. N.J. 2006); Blumberg v. Gates, No. CV 00-05607, 2003 WL 22002739 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 
19, 2003). Moreover, if we determine that a benefit request does not contain a valid or a proper 
signature, we reject, deny, or dismiss it without providing an opportunity to correct or cure a deficient 
signature. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(7)(ii)(A); See generally 1 USCIS Policy Manual, supra, at B.2(A). 
The USCIS Policy Manual further explains that the agency interprets the regulatory term "valid 
signature" to require that a signature on any form transmitted to USCIS "must be of an original 
document containing an original handwritten signature" and it may not be a digital duplicate of a 
signature that is simply transposed onto an immigration form. See generally I USCIS Policy Manual, 
supra, at B.2(B) (explaining that the signature's appearance on USCIS forms must be preponderantly 
consistent with that person's normal signature). 
B. Analysis 
On the appellate Form I-290B, the form contains an image of a signature under Part 4, 6.a in the 
Petitioner's Signature block. We conclude that this is an image of a signature and not an original 
signature due to multiple factors. First, the Petitioner's signatures on the appellate forms (Form I-290B 
and the Form G-28) are identical and indistinguishable, to include each line, loop, slant, spacing, and 
pen lift. Second, while the sole differentiating element between these two signatures is the image used 
on the Form I-290B is slightly smaller in size than the image on the Form G-28, the ratio of height to 
width is consistent throughout the signature. Moreover, the image of the signature under Part 4, 6.a is 
not similarly represented on other material in the record, meaning it is distinct in appearance from the 
Petitioner's other signatures throughout the record. 
We also observe the Petitioner's signatures he presented before the Director on the Form G-28, the 
petition, the ETA-750 Part B, Statement of Qualifications of Alien, and the Petitioner's 
autobiographical statement do not appear to be of the same image utilized on the appeal forms, but 
they do appear to be a separate transposed image as the signature image is identical on each of those 
documents. In other words, it appears the Petitioner or the person preparing his documents 
electronically transposed an image of a signature onto the documents he filed before the Director, and 
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the Petitioner or the person preparing his appeal used that same process-but with a different 
image-on his appeal forms. 
Because of the above factors, we conclude that it is more likely than not that the image of the signature 
on the Form I-290B is not a valid signature as required by the regulation. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(7)(ii)(A). 
We observe the same shortcomings on the appellate Form G-28. Therefore, the Petitioner has not 
satisfied his burden of proof, or the preponderance standard of proof, that the signature on the Form 
I-290B or the Form G-28 are valid signatures. See Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. at 375 n.7 (explaining that 
the filing party bears the burden of proof: and that the preponderance standard does not relieve them 
from satisfying regulatory requirements, such as providing a "valid signature"). 
Considering the totality of the circumstances, the record preponderantly reflects that the Petitioner's 
signatures on the Form I-290B and the Form G-28 were electronically applied to the forms and those 
are not his "original handwritten signature," as USCIS policy requires. See generally I USCIS Policy 
Manual, supra, at B.2(B). Based on that determination, we are dismissing the appeal. 
If the record does not establish that the Petitioner personally signed the Form I-290B and the Form 
G-28, we cannot recognize the appellate forms to have been properly filed by an affected party with 
legal standing in these proceedings. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(l)(iii)(B). Nor can we decide that the 
Petitioner properly filed this appeal. See generally I USCIS Policy Manual, supra, at B.2(B). As a 
result, we are dismissing the appeal in part on these factors. 
II. IMMIGRANT CLASSIFICATION 
To establish eligibility for an NIW, a petitioner must first demonstrate qualification for the underlying 
EB-2 visa classification, as either an advanced degree professional or an individual of exceptional 
ability in the sciences, arts, or business. Section 203(b)(2)(B)(i) of the Act. 
Once a petitioner demonstrates eligibility for the EB-2 classification, they must then establish that they 
merit a discretionary waiver of the job offer requirement "in the national interest." 
Section 203(b )(2)(B)(i) of the Act. While neither the statute nor the pertinent regulations define the 
term "national interest," Matter of Dhanasar, 26 I&N Dec. 884, 889 (AAO 2016), provides the 
framework for adjudicating NIW petitions. Dhanasar states that USCIS may, as matter of discretion, 
grant an NIW if the petitioner demonstrates that: 
• The proposed endeavor has both substantial merit and national importance; 
• The individual is well positioned to advance their proposed endeavor; and 
• On balance, waiving the job offer requirement would benefit the United States. 
The purely discretionary determination of whether to grant or deny an NTW rests solely with USCTS. 
See Flores v. Garland, 72 F.4th 85, 88 (5th Cir. 2023) (joining four U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals in 
concluding that USCIS' decision to grant or deny an NIW to be discretionary in nature). 
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A. Eligibility for the EB-2 Classification 
The Director determined that the Petitioner was eligible for the EB-2 classification as a member of the 
professions holding an advanced degree. 
B. Substantial Merit and National Importance (Collectively Dhanasar's First Prong) 
The first prong, substantial merit and national importance, focuses on the specific endeavor that the 
individual proposes to undertake. The endeavor's merit may be demonstrated in a range of areas such 
as business, entrepreneurialism, science, technology, culture, health, or education. In determining 
whether the proposed endeavor has national importance, we consider its potential prospective impact. 
Dhanasar, 26 I&N Dec. at 889. 
The proposed endeavor will consist of the Petitioner operating a legal consulting firm that will provide 
civil law consulting services for American investors with an interest in Kazakhstan. The Petitioner 
indicated that based on market analysis, he has identified a substantial demand for specialized services 
in cities such as ____________ But as the Director noted, the Petitioner did not 
support these claims with adequate or probative evidence. Absent, for example, is any market analysis 
referencing these three listed locations, or any basis for identifying them. 
The only other reference to the reasons for the Petitioner identifying these cities is contained within 
his business plan's executive summary. In that document, the Petitioner provided the following 
statement: 
Through rigorous market analysis, we have identified a substantial demand for these 
specialized services in key cities such as ____________ 
For instance,! Ias an international business hub, hosts a multitude of investors 
seeking to diversify their portfolios globally. I I known for its robust business 
climate, presents ample opportunities for investors exploring foreign markets. 
Similarly, I I with its strong energy sector, offers considerable potential for 
businesses looking at energy-rich countries like Kazakhstan. 
The Director's decision denying the petition noted the Petitioner's initial description and his business 
plan offered in the request for evidence response and characterized them as "general claims about what 
he intends to do," but they decided that he did not support these overly generalized claims with 
probative evidence, nor did he satisfy his burden of proof. The Director further indicated that 
(1) continuing employment in one's field or industry alone is not an endeavor sufficient to qualify for 
an NIW, (2) his membership in the American Bar Association did not act as a stand-in for a license to 
practice law, and (3) he did not show the proposed endeavor would extend beyond impacting an 
organization and its clients when Dhanasar requires an impact to the industry or field more broadly. 
Within the appeal, the Petitioner contests the Director's adverse determination under prong one with 
three points: 
l. The proposed endeavor will have national and even global implications; 
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2. The proposed endeavor is aligned with federal priorities; and 
3. The proposed endeavor will have substantial positive economic effects for the nation. 
Regarding item I, the Petitioner merely repeats the claims he presented before the Director without 
explaining what evidence the Director failed to consider properly or at all. The Petitioner's claims 
revolve around an increase in U.S. investment in Kazakhstan and the impact that could have on the 
country's foreign policy goals, national security interests, bilateral national relations, cultural 
exchanges, and diplomatic cooperation. 
When we evaluate national importance, the relevant question is not the importance of the industry or 
profession in which the foreign national will work. Rather, we focus on the "the specific endeavor 
that the foreign national proposes to undertake" and we look to evidence illustrating the "potential 
prospective impact" of his actual proposed work. See Dhanasar, 26 I&N Dec. at 889. A petitioner 
must demonstrate the proposed endeavor will "impact the field ... more broadly" (Id. at 893) and that 
it has "broader implications" (Id. at 889). Such endeavors may have "national or even global 
implications within a particular field" (Id. at 889), "significant potential to employ U.S. workers or 
[have] other substantial positive economic effects, particularly in an economically depressed area, for 
instance" (Id. at 890), or the potential to advance and affect U.S. strategic interests (Id. at 892). 
But as the Director noted, even though the proposed endeavor has sufficient merit, he did not provide 
probative evidence showing that his efforts would rise to the level of national importance. Probative 
evidence is the type that "must tend to prove or disprove an issue that is material to the determination 
of the case." Matter ofE-F-N-, 28 I&N Dec. 591, 593 (BIA 2022) (quoting Matter ofRuzku, 26 I&N 
Dec. 731, 733 (BIA 2016)); see also Evidence, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Therefore, if 
some form of the Petitioner's evidence does not adequately prove his contention, then it is not 
considered to be probative. When combined with other favorable material, evidence that is not 
probative on its own could exist on a palette in which the Petitioner "paints a mosaic" that sufficiently 
demonstrates his claims. However, the Petitioner has not crafted such a tapestry here. 
The Petitioner's burden of proof comprises both the initial burden of production, as well as the ultimate 
burden of persuasion. Matter of Y-B-, 21 I&N Dec. 1136, 1142 n.3 (BIA 1998); also see the definition 
of burden of proof from Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (reflecting the burden of proof 
includes both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion). First, the Petitioner must satisfy 
the burden of production. As the term suggests, this burden requires him to produce evidence in the 
form of documents, testimony, etc. that adheres the governing statutory, regulatory, and policy 
provisions sufficient to have the issue decided on the merits. 
Second, he must satisfy the burden of persuasion, meaning he must establish the degree to which his 
arguments and evidence should persuade or convince USCIS that the requisite eligibility parameters 
have been met (i.e., the obligation to persuade the trier of fact of the truth of a proposition). Dir., 
Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, Dep't of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 274 
(1994). The level at which the Petitioner must persuade in the present context is the preponderance of 
the evidence. Whether the Petitioner is able to show that a particular fact or event is more likely than 
not to occur is the determinant of whether he has met the preponderance of the evidence standard of 
proof. And here, the lack of specifics relating to the proposed endeavor's activities undermines the 
Petitioner's ability to satisfy his burden of proof. 
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Turning to item 2, the Petitioner claims that recent legislation in the America COMPETES Act of 
2022 refers to the strategic importance of Central Asia and competition for natural resources. But 
simple alignment or shared common aspects with recently enacted legislation are not sufficient to meet 
the first prong's national importance portion. In focusing generally on the entire foreign energy 
investment industry, the Petitioner has not established his specific endeavor will substantially benefit 
and impact the field more broadly. This misplaced focus does not address the Dhanasar 's decision 
national importance requirements. Dhanasar, 26 I&N Dec. at 893. 
And finally item 3, the appeal brief again restates the Petitioner's claims he asserted before the 
Director-mainly in his business plan-without explaining how the Director erred. He essentially 
discusses cross-border investment, leading to job creation and economic growth in the United States, 
and the ripple effects that will have on the U.S. economy. While we acknowledge the nominal benefits 
of such secondary effects, it is essential to differentiate between localized impacts and those of national 
significance. Merely demonstrating secondary effects within a narrow area does not inherently satisfy 
the stringent threshold for national importance. See Dhanasar, 26 I&N Dec. at 893. Rather, the 
Petitioner must demonstrate a capacity to substantially benefit the industry or field as a whole. Id. at 
890, 892. Therefore, it is the Petitioner's responsibility to offer sufficient arguments and evidence 
allowing us to discern the magnitude of his proposed contributions. 
Even with the second opportunity to explain why he is eligible for this classification and why the 
Director came to the wrong conclusion, the Petitioner has not adequately advanced those claims 
supported with evidence here. Because the Petitioner has not sufficiently established the national 
importance of his proposed endeavor as required by Dhanasar 's first prong, he has not demonstrated 
eligibility for a waiver of the job offer requirement. 
As we explain above, Dhanasar 's second and third prongs require the Petitioner to demonstrate he is 
eligible for an NIW meeting additional requirements. But because the Petitioner has not established 
that his proposed endeavor satisfies the Dhanasar framework's first prong, he is not eligible for an 
NIW and further discussion of the second and third prongs would serve no meaningful purpose. 
Consequently, we will not address and we reserve the Petitioner's remaining appellate arguments. 
Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328, 332 (2022) (citing INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25-26 (1976) 
(finding agencies are not required to make "purely advisory findings" on issues that are unnecessary 
to the ultimate decision)); see also Matter of Chen, 28 I&N Dec. 676, 677 n.l, 678 (BIA 2023) 
( declining to reach alternative issues on appeal where an applicant is otherwise ineligible). 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
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