dismissed EB-2 NIW Case: Business Intelligence And Consulting

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
Non-Precedent Decision of the
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date: JULY 15, 2024 InRe : 31650238 
Appeal of Texas Service Center Decision 
Form 1-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Workers (National Interest Waiver) 
The Petitioner seeks employment-based second preference (EB-2) immigrant classification as a 
member of the professions holding an advanced degree, as well as a national interest waiver of the job 
offer requirement attached to this classification. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) 
section 203(b )(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1 l 53(b )(2). 
The Director of the Texas Service Center denied the petition, concluding the Petitioner qualified for 
EB-2 classification as a member of the professions holding an advanced degree, but had not established 
that a waiver of the required job offer, and thus of the labor certification, would be in the national 
interest. The matter is now before us on appeal. 8 C.F.R. § 103.3. 
The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to demonstrate eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Matter ofChawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375-76 (AAO 2010). We review the questions in this matter 
de novo. Matter of Christo 's, Inc., 26 l&N Dec. 537, 537 n.2 (AAO 2015). Upon de novo review, 
we will dismiss the appeal. 
To qualify for the underlying EB-2 visa classification, a petitioner must establish they are an advanced 
degree professional or an individual of exceptional ability in the sciences, arts, or business. Section 
203(b )(2)(A) of the Act. 
If a petitioner establishes eligibility for the underlying EB-2 classification, they must then demonstrate 
that they merit a discretionary waiver of the job offer requirement "in the national interest." 
Section 203(b )(2)(B)(i) of the Act. While neither the statute nor the pertinent regulations define the 
term "national interest," Matter of Dhanasar , 26 I&N Dec. 884, 889 (AAO 2016), provides the 
framework for adjudicating national interest waiver petitions. Dhanasar states that U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services (USCIS) may, as matter of discretion, 1 grant a national interest waiver if 
the petitioner demonstrates that: 
• The proposed endeavor has both substantial merit and national importance; 
1 See Flores v. Garland, 72 F.4th 85, 88 (5th Cir. 2023) (joining the Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuit Courts (and Third 
in an unpublish ed decision) in concluding that USCIS ' decision to grant or deny a national interest waiver is discretionary 
in nature). 
• The individual is well-positioned to advance their proposed endeavor; and 
• On balance, waiving the job offer requirement would benefit the United States. 
Id. 
The Petitioner proposed to establish a consulting business in ITexas. The Petitioner stated the 
business would specialize in "business intelligence, and the modernization of administrative, 
accounting, and controlling systems" and "will offer comprehensive services to small and medium­
sized enterprises, self-employed persons, and entrepreneurs, with a focus on providing financial 
courses to the Hispanic community and young adults." 
After reviewing the entire record, we adopt and affirm the Director's ultimate determination relating 
only to the national importance requirements under Dhanasar 's first prong with the added comments 
below. See Matter of Burbano, 20 I&N Dec. 872, 874 (BIA 1994); see also Giday v. INS, 113 F.3d 230, 
234 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting the practice of adopting and affirming the decision below has been 
"universally accepted by every other circuit that has squarely confronted the issue"); Martinez-Lopez v. 
Barr, 943 F.3d 766, 769 (5th Cir. 2019) (joining every other U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in holding 
that appellate adjudicators may adopt and affirm the decision below as long as they give "individualized 
consideration" to the case). 
On appeal, the Petitioner discusses the first prong requirements and then contends the Director's 
decision "contains instances of a misunderstanding and misapplication of law that goes beyond 
harmless error and reach the levels of abuse of discretion." The appeal brief delineates between two 
scenarios: the submission of no evidence versus the submission of insufficient evidence. Here, the 
Petitioner implies that the Director's analysis in the denial fell under the scenario in which no evidence 
was submitted to demonstrate the national importance of the proposed endeavor. 
The Petitioner asserts she was placed at a disadvantage because the Director did not provide any 
meaningful review for the evidence she submitted. The Petitioner observes in prior cases, federal 
courts have noted that decisions failing to contemplate or discuss the entirety of the evidence in a filing 
amount to critical error in the adjudicative process. In support of this concept, the Petitioner cites to 
Buletini v. INS, 860 F. Supp. 1222, 1233 (E.D. Mich. 1994). The Buletini court opinion referred to 
the Director's failure to consider all the forms of evidence that the petitioner in that case submitted 
such as the book and the medical dictionary he authored, and his study that appeared in the largest 
circulation newspaper in that petitioner's home nation. Buletini, 860 F. Supp. at 1232-33. These are 
forms of evidence the Buletini court determined that the USCIS director had failed to consider; the 
court did not indicate that the director was required to discuss each and every piece of evidence within 
the record. 
We note that in the appeal before us, the Director provided adequate analysis of the case. Although 
we agree with the Petitioner that the Director did not directly discuss every piece of evidence she 
considers salient, she has not established how those omitted documents demonstrated eligibility. In 
other words, the Petitioner did not demonstrate that the Director's failure to discuss every document 
in detail changed the outcome of the case. When USCIS provides a reasoned consideration to the 
petition, and has made adequate findings, it will not be required to specifically address each claim a 
petitioner makes, nor is it necessary for it to address every piece of evidence a petitioner presents. Amin 
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v. Mayorkas, 24 F.4th 383, 394 (5th Cir. 2022); Martinez v. INS, 970 F.2d 973, 976 (1st Cir. 1992); ajf'd 
Morales v. INS, 208 F.3d 323, 328 (1st Cir. 2000); see also Pakasi v. Holder, 577 F.3d 44, 48 (1st Cir. 
2009); Kazemzadeh v. US. Atty. Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1351 (11th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. 
Teixeira, 62 F.4th 10, 25 (1st Cir. 2023) (concluding a trier of fact "need not articulate its conclusions as 
to every jot and tittle of evidence in making a determination"). 
Further, it is not enough to demonstrate errors in an agency's decision; the Petitioner must also 
establish that they were prejudiced by the mistakes. Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009); 
Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189,203 (2016); Amin, 24 F.4th at 394. As the Petitioner 
has not demonstrated she was prejudiced by the lack of discussion of any evidence, even if we agreed 
that this was an error, such a lapse would appear to be harmless and is insufficient grounds upon which 
to base this appeal. Errors can be overlooked when they had no bearing on the substance of an agency's 
decision. Aguilar v. Garland, 60 F.4th 401,407 (8th Cir. 2023) (citing Prohibition Juice Co. v. United 
States Food & Drug Admin., 45 F.4th 8, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2022)). The party that "seeks to have a judgment 
set aside because of an erroneous ruling carries the burden of showing that prejudice resulted." 
Shinseki, 556 U.S. at 409 (quotingPalmerv. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 116 (1943)); Molina-Martinez, 578 
U.S. at 203. 
As this issue is dispositive of the Petitioner's appeal, we decline to reach and hereby reserve our 
determination of her eligibility under the second and third prongs of the Dhanasar framework. See 
INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (stating that "courts and agencies are not required to make 
findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach"); see also Matter of 
L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. 516, 526 n.7 (BIA 2015) (declining to reach alternative issues on appeal where 
an applicant is otherwise ineligible). 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
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