dismissed EB-2 NIW Case: Fitness

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
Non-Precedent Decision of the
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date: MAR. 11, 2025 In Re: 36403709 
Motion on Administrative Appeals Office Decision 
Form 1-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Workers (National Interest Waiver) 
The Petitioner, a fitness director, seeks employment-based second preference (EB-2) classification as 
a member of the professions holding an advanced degree, as well as a national interest waiver of the 
job offer requirement attached to this EB-2 classification. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the 
Act) section 203(b )(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1 l 53(b )(2). 
The Director of the Texas Service Center denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioner qualified 
for the classification as a member of the professions holding an advanced degree, but that she had not 
established that a waiver of the required job offer, and thus of the labor certification, would be in the 
national interest. We dismissed the Petitioner's subsequent appeal and motion to reconsider. The 
matter is now before us on a second motion to reconsider. 
The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to demonstrate eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Matter of Chawathe, 25 l&N Dec. 369, 375-76 (AAO 2010). Upon review, we will dismiss the 
motion. 
A motion to reconsider must establish that our prior decision was based on an incorrect application of 
law or policy and that the decision was incorrect based on the evidence in the record of proceedings 
at the time of the decision. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(3). Our review on motion is limited to reviewing our 
latest decision. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(l)(ii). We may grant motions that satisfy these requirements and 
demonstrate eligibility for the requested benefit. 
On motion, the Petitioner contests the correctness of our prior decision and claims that we used "an 
incorrect and stricter than required standard when evaluating the evidence." In support of the motion, 
the Petitioner submits a brief and argues that our "analysis of the evidence was arbitrary and 
inconsistent with applicable regulations and precedent decisions." The Petitioner highlights the 
evidence submitted in support of the petition and in response to the Director's request for evidence, 
including the training plan, expert opinion letter, and probative research to demonstrate her proposed 
endeavor's national importance. The Petitioner further asserts that if we had evaluated the evidence 
in its entirety, the national significance of her proposed endeavor would have been recognized. 
Instead, she contends that our decision appears arbitrary, as it failed to consider the collective weight 
of her statement, expert opinion letter, and supporting research, all of which demonstrate the "broad 
and impactful reach of her work on a national scale." 
In dismissing the prior motion to reconsider, we concluded that the Petitioner failed to sufficiently 
explain how our decision overlooked the totality of the evidence and did not clarify how an alternative 
analysis of the record would have established her eligibility. Moreover, in our appellate decision, we 
explained why the Petitioner has not met the requisite first prong of the Dhanasar framework. For 
example, unlike the scientific researcher in Dhanasar, the Petitioner did not demonstrate that her 
proposed endeavor of working as a fitness director at offers broader 
implications in her field or that her services or business would largely influence the field and rise to 
the level of national importance. Here, simply disagreeing with our conclusions, without showing 
how we misapplied law or pointing to policy that contradicts our analysis of the evidence, is not 
sufficient to reconsider our decision. See Matter of O-S-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 56, 58 (BIA 2006) (finding 
that a motion to reconsider is not a process by which the party may submit in essence, the same brief 
and seek reconsideration by generally alleging error in the prior decision). 
In addition, the Petitioner expresses disagreement with our analysis of the expert opinion letter, but 
she does not explain how our specific conclusions applied a stricter standard of proof The Petitioner 
does not also point to specific instances where we required a "stricter standard" or explain how we 
applied a different standard of proof other than by the preponderance of the evidence. The 
preponderance of the evidence is the standard of proof governing immigration benefit requests. 
Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. at 375; see also Mater of Martinez, 21 I&N Dec. 1035, 1036 (BIA 1997); 
Matter ofSao Hoo, 11 I&N Dec. 151, 152 (BIA 1965). Here, the Petitioner has not demonstrated that 
our appellate decision was based on an incorrect application of law or USCIS policy and that our 
decision was incorrect based on the evidence in the record at the time of the decision. 
The Petitioner also has not identified our immediate prior decision was based on an incorrect 
application of law or policy. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(3). We have already considered and analyzed 
the Petitioner's evidence under the preponderance of the evidence standard and found it insufficient 
to demonstrate eligibility for the requested benefit. Our prior motion decision also appropriately 
pointed out that the Petitioner's arguments did not specify the reasons why the preceding decision was 
based on incorrect application oflaw or policy. See Matter of Coelho, 20 I&N Dec. at 473. 
Because the Petitioner has not established that our previous decision was based on an incorrect 
application oflaw or policy at the time we issued our decision, the motion will be dismissed. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 103.5(a)(4). The Petitioner's appeal therefore remains dismissed, and her underlying petition 
remains denied. 
ORDER: The motion to reconsider is dismissed 
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