dismissed EB-2 NIW Case: Human Development

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
Non-Precedent Decision of the
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date: NOV. 01, 2023 In Re: 28820290 
Appeal of Nebraska Service Center Decision 
Form 1-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Workers (National Interest Waiver) 
The Petitioner, a human development specialist, seeks employment-based second preference (EB-2) 
immigrant classification as an advanced degree professional or an individual of exceptional ability, as 
well as a national interest waiver of the job offer requirement attached to this classification . See 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 203(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2) . 
The Director of the Nebraska Service Center denied the petition, concluding that although the 
Petitioner established eligibility for the underlying second preference classification, she did not 
establish eligibility for a national interest waiver under the framework outlined in Matter of Dhanasar, 
26 l&N Dec. 884 (AAO 2016). The matter is now before us on appeal. 8 C.F.R. § 103.3. 
The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to demonstrate eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Matter of Chawathe, 25 l&N Dec. 369, 375-76 (AAO 2010). We review the questions in this matter 
de nova. Matter of Christa's, Inc., 26 l&N Dec. 537, 537 n.2 (AAO 2015). Upon de nova review, 
we will dismiss the appeal. 
On appeal, the Petitioner states verbatim that the Director's decision "was extremely generic, vague, 
which avoid the right of contest, as well as the decision did not cite lack of evidence or even the real 
reason why the application was denied." While we acknowledge this contention, the Petitioner did 
not provide any specific examples of where or how this occurred in the Director's decision. We 
reviewed the decision and do not find support for the Petitioner's assertion. The Director discussed 
multiple pieces of evidence individually and quoted material in the record in several instances. 
Additionally, the Director identified multiple deficiencies in the evidence and explained specifically 
why the evidence did not establish the Petitioner' s eligibility under the Dhanasar framework. 
In fact, we adopt and affirm the Director 's decision as it relates to the Petitioner's eligibility under the 
Dhanasar framework. See Matter of Burbano, 20 l&N Dec. 872, 874 (BIA 1994); see also Giday v. 
INS, 113 F.3d 230,234 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting that the practice of adopting and affirming the decision 
below has been "universally accepted by every other circuit that has squarely confronted the issue"); 
Chen v. INS, 87 F.3d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1996) Uoining eight circuit courts in holding that appellate 
adjudicators may adopt and affirm the decision below as long as they give "individ uali zed 
consideration" to the case). The Director acknowledged the Petitioner's assertion that her specific 
services "deeply differ from the ones generally provided by ordinary [h]uman [d]evelopment 
[s]pecialists" and "have been the key to several companies' triumph .... " The Director explained 
why the evidence did not substantiate such an assertion. Nevertheless, the Petitioner restates this claim 
on appeal without addressing the identified deficiencies. Like the Director, we conclude the record 
does not explain: (1) how her services differ deeply from the standard human development services; 
(2) how her deeply different services operated within the context of the businesses she worked for in 
the past or how they will operate in her proposed endeavor; or (3) how the results obtained for 
individual businesses and clients are indicative of broader implications in the field. As the Petitioner 
has not presented any new evidence or arguments on appeal to address these and numerous other 
identified deficiencies, she has not overcome them. 
While we adopt and affirm the decision regarding the Director's analysis under Dhanasar, we 
withdraw the Director's finding regarding the Petitioner's eligibility for the underlying classification. 
The Director determined the Petitioner qualifies for the requested EB-2 classification but did not 
specify whether the Petitioner qualified as either an advanced degree professional or an individual of 
exceptional ability. In either instance, and for the reasons below, we withdraw that finding. 
Regarding the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(A)-(F), the Petitioner acknowledged that she does 
not need, nor does she have, a license to practice her profession; therefore, we conclude she has not 
established eligibility under 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(C). She did not assert her eligibility under 8 
C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(E) relating to membership in professional associations. Although she provided 
invoices of payments for work performed, such payments do not establish what her salary or remuneration 
is or how it demonstrates exceptional ability in accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(D). 
Additionally, the invoices postdate the petition filing and therefore do not establish eligibility at the time 
of filing. The evidence does not demonstrate the Petitioner has received recognition for achievements 
and significant contributions to the industry or field under 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(F). Her 
professional accomplishments and successes, as identified in her statement and reference letters, 
appear to have affected her clients or employers but do not substantiate a finding that she impacted 
the field or industry, which the Director's decision fully explained. 
Regarding her eligibility under 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(A), the Petitioner provided evidence that she 
earned a "titulac;ao de bacharelado" in administration in 2013 from I I
I l(PUC). The Director specifically requested evidence to establish whether PUC is an 
accredited college, university, school, or other institution of higher learning. In response, the 
Petitioner provided a letter from PUC's general secretary, which states that PUC is accredited with the 
federal government of Brazil under various decrees and ordinances. However, the general secretary's 
letter is unsigned and therefore it carries little probative weight. Moreover, without the text of the 
ordinances and decrees before us, we cannot determine whether the referenced documents accredit the 
university. This is important because the Petitioner's education evaluation from Geo Credential 
Services states that the Ministry of Education and Culture accredited PUC but contains no reference 
1to the ordinances and decrees that the general secretary Iisted. 
1 While mentioning the accreditation in the heading of the evaluation, the GEO Credential Services evaluator does not 
analyze PUC' s accreditation or state which documents the evaluator relied upon in determining PUC' s accreditation status. 
2 
The Petitioner also provided evidence that in 2015, she completed a post-graduate specialization 
course "lato sensu" entitled "MBA in Strategic People Management." We reviewed the AACRAO 
EDGE database, which is a reliable resource concerning the U.S. equivalencies of foreign education. 
See generally American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers, Electronic 
Database for Global Education, https://www.aacrao.org/edge. Although the database reflects that a 
"titulo de bacharel" may be a foreign equivalent of a U.S. bachelor's degree, it does not indicate that 
the post-graduate "lato sensu," is the foreign equivalent of a U.S. master's degree. Rather, information 
in the database suggests the Petitioner may have completed a graduate program in which she received 
graduate credits leading to a professional certificate, but not necessarily leading to a graduate degree. 
Id. In addition, the database suggests that the "curso de especializa9ao" is a program in a particular 
area of study in which a student may select to specialize. Id. Therefore, we conclude the Petitioner's 
completion of the "MBA in Strategic People Management" course is not the equivalent of earning a 
master's U.S. degree. As such, the record supports a finding that the Petitioner earned, at most, the 
foreign equivalent of a U.S. bachelor's degree. 
The employment letters documenting the Petitioner's experience in the field of endeavor do not 
provide sufficient information to establish eligibility under criterion 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(B), 
related to 10 years of full-time experience in the profession. Specifically, the letter from[ II !evidences employment that appears to have begun after the petition's filing date and therefore 
does not establish eligibility for the EB-2 classification at the time of filing; the I ILJ letter is undated, appears to have no original signature, does not state whether the Petitioner's 
work was full-time, and refers to the Petitioner using a different gender pronoun; and thel I 
I I letter provides exact dates for five years of employment with CPFL but does not 
contain any indication of the Petitioner's duties or whether her work was full-time. Two letters, one 
from,__ ______ ___, and the other from ,__________ ___. contain the required 
elements to serve as an employer letter but demonstrate the Petitioner's work experience as an 
administrative assistant and logistics intern, respectively, rather than as a human development 
specialist. Therefore, these two letters do not demonstrate the Petitioner's experience in the area of 
claimed exceptional ability. 2 
The Petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence to establish that she qualifies for the underlying 
EB-2 classification, nor has she addressed the deficiencies the Director identified regarding eligibility 
under the Dhanasar framework. The appeal will be dismissed for the above stated reasons. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
2 These letters do not establish at least five years of progressive post-baccalaureate experience in the occupation for the 
same reasons as they do not evidence 10 years of experience under criterion 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(B). Additionally, 
the letters from I Irefer to work experience gained before the Petitioner earned her 
"titula9iio de bacharelado" in administration. As such, the Petitioner has not established that she has an advanced degree 
by earning the foreign equivalent of a U.S. bachelor's degree in combination with five years of progressive post­
baccalaureate experience as delineated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(i)(B). 
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